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    Warfare and violence in the post-Roman West have attracted much interest,
and historians have used the insights of social anthropology and literary theory to
interpret the evidence. To date, however, psychological and behavioural aspects
of  violence  in  late  antiquity  have  been  relatively  neglected.  As  a  result,  the
question of how ‘warrior cultures’ consistently produced individuals who were
enthusiastic participants in ancient warfare, has not been properly explored.
    This thesis explores the warrior culture of the post-Roman Frankish kingdoms,
through three sequential phases. First, by reviewing a range of modern literature
on  the  causes  and  consequences  of  violence,  the  shortcomings  of  present
assumptions about violence in this period – which tend to interpret it in strategic
terms – are brought into relief. Violence is re-conceived as a uniquely powerful
experience  with  lasting  psychological  effects  on  participants,  victims  and
witnesses. And violent behaviour, including participation in warfare, is shown to
be  an  outcome not  just  of  culturally-bounded  strategic  thinking,  but  also  of
psychological and behavioural adaptation that comes about through experience.
    Second, the thesis puts the warrior culture of the Frankish kingdoms into
historical perspective by looking at the the emergence of the Franks and other
military groups of the late-Roman West. This section engages with the debates
about  the collapse of  the  Western  Empire  and the  formation of  the  Frankish
kingdoms, focusing on the evidence for violence and warrior subcultures in the
fourth and fifth centuries. It is argued that the northern frontier was a hotbed of
violent  experiences  and  behavioural  profiles,  where  militant  subcultures,
stimulated  by  Roman  military  activity  and  demands  for  manpower,  were
producing a surfeit of willing fighters prior to the Frankish takeover.
    Finally, the largest section of the thesis examines the evidence for the culture
of violence in the post-Roman Frankish kingdoms through a detailed analysis of
Lex Salica  and the  Histories of  Gregory of Tours.  It  is  argued that  these are
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valuable sources of information for understanding the warrior classes and their
violence. Through close attention to the language and evaluations of violence in
these  sources,  some  aspects  of  contemporary  attitudes  and  experiences  of
violence  are  reconstructed.  And  the  mechanisms  by  which  warriors  were
psychologically and behaviourally conditioned to embrace the horrors of battle
are brought into relief.
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General Introduction
   “All  arts  and all  works progress  through daily  practice and
continual exercise... Even to this day the barbarians think this art
alone deserves their attention... For those who have not for a long
time, or never at all, seen men being wounded or killed are greatly
shocked when they first catch sight of it, and confused by panic
start thinking of flight instead of fighting.”1
 -    Vegetius, De Re Militari, c. 400 A.D.
    War – the ‘art’ of killing and forcibly subduing humans  en masse – is  a
difficult  business,  and even more  than  in  the  modern  world,  ancient  warfare
could  be  an  intimately  and  horrifically  visceral  experience.2 As  Vegetius  so
lucidly  explained,  the  difficulties  entailed  are  not  merely  practical  but
psychological in nature, and the kind of ‘practice’ required to overcome such
psychological difficulties cannot be reduced to dry, repetitive, technical exercise.
In his opinion, competent warriors were also the outcome of a process of what
modern psychologists might refer to as ‘conditioning’.
    While many of Vegetius’s claims are questionable, this one has proven to be
well-founded,  being  confirmed  and  elaborated  in  recent  generations  by  field
research into violence in all kinds of contexts. And it calls our attention to two
axioms which will underpin the present thesis: First, in any period, the treatment
of soldiers as mere automatons at the disposal of their commanders, or of an
army as a ‘military machine’3 which seems to act merely as an extension of the
personal ambitions and proclivities of its leader, is inadvisably reductive.4 And
second, psychological preparation for the battlefield comes about  as much or
more through prior experiences of violence as it does through regular training or
discipline.
1 Milner, N. P. (trans.), Vegetius: Epitome of Military Science, (Liverpool 1993), III.10 [p. 86-
8]
2 Grossman, D. On killing: the psychological cost of learning to kill in war and society, 
(Boston 1996); Van Wees, H. Greek Warfare: myths and realities, (London 2004)
3 Contamine, P. (trans. M. Jones), War in the Middle Ages, (Oxford 1984), p. 23
4 Keegan, The face of battle (1976), p. 35-50. See Chapter 1, p. 29-30
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    Thus even the Roman empire, with its elaborate system of supply, reward and
punishment,  could  not  guarantee the  efficacy of  its  soldiers  in  the field,  and
sought to compensate by recruiting bolder and more aggressive recruits from its
frontier provinces and beyond the empire, who participated in what historians
have  sometimes  referred  to  as  ‘warrior  cultures’.5 It  was  widely  accepted,
without question, that these wild people were ‘fecund’ sources of a product that
the  empire  always  needed,  but  struggled  to  manufacture,  even  with  all  the
powers at its disposal: men who were eager for war.6 And as the Western empire
waned, it was replaced by less sophisticated kingdoms which were, if anything,
even more militarily reliant on the ‘natural’ aggression of their gentes. 
    But the mechanisms by which this ‘fecundity’ was achieved have remained
obscure. Would not the barbarians, who lacked regular centralized systems of
pay, supply and discipline, have been much less able to produce the qualities
necessary to withstand the psychological pressures of the battlefield? This is the
central  question  which  this  thesis  will  investigate:  how  and  why  did  those
peoples relied upon by the Western empire, and whose warrior-elites eventually
took over its territories,  undertake the ‘practice’ entailed in the production of
such a plentiful supply of eager fighters? Or, to put it another way, how did the
social aspect of the late- and post-Roman ‘war system’ actually work? To answer
that question, we will open up the concept of military preparation to include not
just official training, but also less formal experiences of violence, including those
that take place in the course of social and political life.
    Many historians have been content to take for granted the capacity of the
barbarian  tribes,  and  the  kingdoms  that  they  established,  to  produce  a  ready
supply of willing warriors, or otherwise explain it in somewhat reductive terms.
5 This term has been used in several senses but remains somewhat vaguely defined in many 
instances – see for instance, Geary, P. “Barbarians and Ethnicity”, in G. W. Bowersock, P. 
Brown & O. Grabar (eds.), Late Antiquity: A Guide to the Postclassical World, (London 
1999), p. 122; Anderson Jr, T. “Roman military colonies in Gaul, Salian Ethnogenesis and 
the forgotten meaning of Pactus Legis Salicae”, in J. France & K. Devries, (eds.) Warfare in 
the Dark Ages (2017). In this thesis the term is not supposed to connote heroic literature, as 
some historians have done in the past, but merely denotes a sub-culture that produces an 
inordinate proportion of individuals who are psychologically willing and able to participate 
in collective violence, or the practices by which this production is achieved.
6 Nazarius, Panegyric of Constantine (c. 321), 17, in Nixon, C. E. V. and Rodgers, B. S. In 
Praise of Later Roman Emperors: The Panegyrici Latini (Berkeley 1994)
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But a growing body of research into modern industrial and pre-industrial violent
subcultures has not found the question so simple.7 This modern research adopts a
variety of  theoretical  approaches,  and owes much to detailed observations  of
violent behaviour in practice. Studies into military and criminal violence have
revealed  a  multi-faceted  phenomenon  which  regularly  fails  to  conform  to
monolithic explanations. And psychological research into aggression, focusing
on underlying neural processes, has suggested a combination of biological and
social bases for violent behaviour. The present thesis will seek to explore the
social production of violent behaviour and ‘warlikeness’ among the elites of the
early Frankish kingdoms, by bringing a range of such hitherto neglected modern
research  into  the  social  generation  of  violence  to  bear  upon  contemporary
evidence.
    Employing heuristic tools from modern research better to understand historical
violence is not entirely without precedent in historical work on the early middle
ages. John Michael Wallace-Hadrill, considering the social conflicts of the early
Franks, made use of anthropological models derived from analyses of ‘feuding’
societies  of  the  present  day.8 However,  his  work,  like  that  of  many  other
historians,  remained  deeply  informed  by  popular  conceptions  of  violence  as
essentially innate, primal,  and ‘pneumatic’9 -  an assumption which seemed to
challenge the historian not to explain why violence happened, but rather why it
did  not  happen.  Thus  Wallace-Hadrill’s  influential  analyses  of  the  Frankish
feuding culture concluded that “Such evidence as we have of these [feuds] by no
means suggests that the Germans took to fighting between families as a desirable
occupation and a proper outlet for bellicose instincts. Rather the opposite.”10 In
short, he remained more interested in the social limitation of violence than the
social construction of ‘bellicose instincts’, and did not explore the relationship
7 See below, and Chapter 1.
8 “The Bloodfeud of the Franks”, in Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, 41:2 (1959), p. 459-
487. His main source of inspiration was Max Gluckman’s Custom and Conflict in Africa 
(Oxford 1963 [1955]). See also, Wood, I. “‘The Bloodfeud of the Franks’: a historiographical
legend”, in Early medieval Europe vol. 14 iss.4 (2006), pp. 489-504; White, S. D. “Peace in 
the feud revisited: feuds in the peace in medieval European feuds”, in K. Cooper & C. Leyser
(eds.), Making early medieval societies: Conflict and belonging in the Latin West, 300-1200 
(Cambridge 2016).
9 Cf. Rosenwein 1998, p. 234-5
10 Wallace-Hadrill, J. M. “War and peace in the middle ages”, in J. M. Wallace-Hadrill, Early 
Medieval History, (Oxford 1975), p. 22 [my emphasis]
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between the ‘feuding’ culture and the militarization of elite  society.  Wallace-
Hadrill’s astute observation – that Gallo-Romans were also apparently involved
in bitter and violent ‘feuds’ – did not lead to a corresponding interest in how such
a scenario came about, and despite a passing acknowledgement that the post-
Roman warrior classes must have been “trained for the mysteries of battle”,11 no
thought  was  given  to  the  question  of  how  social  experiences  might  have
contributed to these processes.
    Some influential military considerations of Roman and post-Roman warfare,
despite also being influenced by ideas of innate violence, and without seeking to
explore the question in much detail, nonetheless showed greater awareness of the
psychological rigours of battle and the sociological aspects of preparation for
war. Ardant du Picq asserted that “Absolute bravery, which does not refuse battle
even on unequal terms...is not natural in man; it is the result of moral culture.”12
J. F. Verbruggen referred to the “private warfare” of the early middle ages as a
form of “collective training” for larger-scale conflicts, adding that “Besides, if a
people  is  warlike  by  nature,  characteristics  of  daily  life  [i.e.  mundane  non-
military violence] may compensate for many other qualities which in an army of
more civilized folk would have to be artificially fostered by long drilling under
strict discipline, as in the case of the Romans.”13 This quote is illustrative of one
line  of  reasoning  about  barbarian  warriors  in  particular,  which  Verbruggen
inherited  in  part  from  Roman  authors,  according  to  which  the  violence  of
relatively ordinary social life contributes to military inclination and competence,
and vice-versa. To use the language of Pierre Bourdieu, violence is understood as
a kind of habitus made socially normal by a conditioning process embedded both
in warfare, and in relatively ordinary social discourse.14 
11  Ibid, p. 24
12  Du Picq, A. Battle Studies (1921), ch. 6
13 Verbruggen, The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the middle ages: from the eighth 
century to 1340, (1997 [1954]), p. 63
14 Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (1990), p. 52-5. Such an interpretation is also adduced by 
Keegan (1976, p. 96), in considering the motivation of soldiers at the battle of Agincourt in 
light of the violent tenor of later medieval social life - “...the commonplace character of 
violence [meant that] the victim of assault...was likely to have been a good deal less 
surprised by it when it occurred… Thus battle, though on the extreme spectrum of 
experience, was not something unimaginable, something wholly beyond the peace-loving 
individual’s ken.”
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    To date, however, in seeking to account for Frankish military inclination and
competence,  and for post Roman violence in general,  historians have usually
approached  the  problem  from  other  directions.  Some  treatments  have  fairly
emphasised  the  difficulty  of  imagining very large  armies,  given the practical
problems of supply and organization,15 and the epistemological basis of seeing
post-Roman societies as unusually violent has been fairly called into question.16
Other studies have postulated a continuity of sophisticated Roman methods of
military organization into the post-Roman period,  which only ended with the
dissolution  of  the  Carolingian  empire.17 But  this  notion  of  bureaucratic  and
disciplinary continuity lacks support in contemporary evidence, suffering from a
tendency  to  rely  on  inference  from  earlier  and  later  sources.18 The  social
production of violence, and its psychological aspects, have remained peripheral
to historical investigations touching upon the subject. 
    General studies taking on the theme of violence tend to focus on institutional
and military  dimensions  of  the  issue,  although recent  work has  placed more
emphasis on the social implications of war and militarization.19 The theme of
violence  also  appears  in  a  number  of  treatments  of  the  early  middle  ages
focusing on other  aspects  of  the period,  such as  anger  and other  emotions,20
revenge,21 and  religion22.  Violence  is  particularly  prominent  in  discussions
15 Reuter, “Carolingian and Ottonian Warfare”, in M. Keen (ed.), Medieval Warfare: A History 
(Oxford 1999), p. 13-35
16 For instance in Delbruck, H. Numbers in History (1913); Goffart, W. “Rome, Constantinople 
and the barbarians”, in AHR 86 (1981); Zimmerman, M. “Violence in Late Antiquity 
Reconsidered”, in H. A. Drake (ed.), Violence in Late Antiquity: Perceptions and Practices 
(2006), p. 343-358
17 Bachrach, B. S. Merovingian Military Organization (Miinesota 1972); Durliat, J. Les 
rentiers de l'impôt: recherches sur les finances municipales dans la Pars Orientis au IVe 
siècle (Vienna 1993); Goffart, W. “Frankish military duty and the fate of Roman taxation”, in
EME 16:2 (May 2008)
18 Bachrach 1972. For a brief but trenchant criticism of his conclusions on Roman continuity, 
see Gaier, C. Review of Merovongian military organisation, 481-751, in Speculum 49:3 
(1974), p. 549-551. See Chapters 2-3.
19 Shaw, B. D. “War and Violence”, in Bowersock, G. W., Brown, P. & Grabar, O. Late 
Antiquity: A guide to the postclassical world (1999); Whitby, “Armies and society”, in 
Cameron, A., Ward-Perkins, B. & Whitby, M. (eds.) The Cambridge ancient history volume 
14: Late Antiquity: Empire and successors, AD 425-600 (Cambridge 2001); Halsall, G. 
Warfare and Society in the barbarian West, 450-900, (London 2003); Bispham, E. “Warfare 
and the army” in Bispham, E. (ed.) Roman Europe (Oxford 2008)
20 Rosenwein (ed.), Anger’s Past: The social uses of emotion in the middle ages (Ithaca 1998)
21 Throop, A. & Hyams, P. R. (eds.), Vengeance in the middle ages: emotion, religion and feud, 
(Farnham 2010)
22 Rosenwein, B. H. & Little, L. K. “Social meaning in the monastic and mendicant 
spiritualities”, in Past and Present 64 (1974); Smith, K. A. War and the making of medieval 
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focusing on the question of barbarian ‘ethnogenesis’, in which the nature of the
military  origins  and  identities  of  the  gentes has  often  been  a  central  to  the
debate.23 The  relationship  between violence  and ethnic  identity  is  universally
agreed to be one of profound importance, but its extent and implications remain
controversial. These are associated with vigorous debates around the degree of
militarization, the seriousness of warfare, and the seriousness of destruction in
the  fourth-  and  fifth-century  empire.24 The  previously  popular  impression  of
catastrophic collapse, and in particular the narrative accounts from which it is
partially  derived,  have  been  challenged  in  the  last  generation  as  a  potential
exaggeration or distortion of a process that may have been characterized by a
much greater degree of relatively peaceful accommodation than was previously
assumed.25 The most balanced conclusions have acknowledged the wide range of
possible  positions  on  the  extent  of  violence  permitted  by  the  sources.26
Christianization has often been thought of as broadly antithetical to violence and
militarization.27 But  more  recent  work  has  tended  to  reject  the  most  irenic
interpretations of Christianity in relation to violence, emphasising the cultural
influence  of  warfare,  and  adaptation  of  Christian  culture  to  accommodate
warriors, as well as their values and practices.28
monastic culture (Woodbridge 2011)
23 For instance in Halsall, “Social identities...” 1998; Geary 1999; Heather, P. J. “Ethnicity, 
group identity, and social status in the migration period”, in Garipzanof, I. H., Geary, P. & 
Urbanczyk, P. (eds.), Franks, Northmen, and Slavs: identities and state formation in early 
medieval Europe (Turnhout 2008)
24 For instance in Wightman, E. M. Gallia Belgica, (Manchester 1985); See the bibliography 
provided by Sarti, L. Perceiving war and the military in early Christian Gaul (ca. 400-700 
A.D.) (Leiden 2013), p. 208. For an eastern Roman comparison, see Whately, C. 
“Militarization, or the rise of a distinct military culture? The east Roman ruling elite in the 6th
century AD” (2013)
25 Kulikowski, M. “Nation versus army: a necessary contrast?”, in Gillett, A. (ed.) On 
Barbarian identity, (Turnhout, 2002); Goffart, W. Barbarian Tides, (Philadelphia 2006); 
Lewit, T. “Vanishing Villas: What happened to elite rural habitation in the 5th-6th century?”, in
Journal of Roman Archaeology 16 (2003)
26 For instance, Pohl, W. “Perceptions of Barbarian Violence”, in H. A. Drake (ed.), Violence in
Late Antiquity: Perceptions and Practices (Hampshire 2006), p. 24-26
27 Gibbon, The history of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, (1776-8), ch. 38; Erdmann, 
C. The origin of the idea of Crusade (Princeton 1977) [1935]
28 France, J. “Holy war and holy men: Erdmann and the lives of saints”, in M. Bull & N. 
Housley (ed.), The experience of Crusading: Western approaches (Cambridge 2003); Smith 
2011; Sarti 2013
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    Extensive considerations of military motivation among the warriors of the
Frankish kingdoms at the level of the individual are few,29 and Timothy Reuter’s
reflections  on  the  economic  motives  behind  Carolingian  warfare  remain  a
relatively  isolated  effort.30 As  Lauri  Sarti  states  in  a  recent  and  welcome
extensive treatment of post-Roman warrior culture, “The question that has only
been marginally touched upon until now and that needs further investigation is
what motivated men to initiate or actively participate in an armed undertaking.”
Sarti’s monograph on the warrior classes of Gaul shows an unprecedented degree
of  concern  for  “the  intensity  of  the  contemporary  experience  of  violence”31,
which is perhaps indicative of a growing public awareness of the psychological
repercussions  of  experiences  of  violence.  But  her  evident  interest  in
physiological and psychological aspects of experiences of violence – which finds
parallels in other recent work on the subject32 – is not matched by a concomitant
effort  to  establish  a  theoretical  position  on  these  aspects.  As  a  result  her
conclusions on motivation retain the conventional over-emphasis on the image of
violence as a means to various ends – usually material gain and social prestige –
rather than a complex phenomenon with diverse and intricate causes. Influential
approaches to post-Roman warfare and social conflict by Guy Halsall, Timothy
Reuter,  Walter  Pohl  and Paul Fouracre have similarly been united in  making
assumptions about the causes of violence which tend to reduce the issue to the
pursuit of wealth and reputation.33 
    But a considerable body of modern evidence suggests that such assumptions –
which  have  been broadly  labelled  ‘strategic’ –  are  inadequate  for  explaining
many aspects of violence in both social and military settings. A primary aim of
this  thesis  is  to  clearly identify and critique the  reductive assumptions  about
violence  that  have  hitherto  underpinned  so  much  of  the  research  into  Late
29 Sarti (2013), p. 192-3
30 “Plunder and tribute in the Carolingian empire” [1985]; “The end of Carolingian military 
expansion” [1990] both in Rueter, T. Medieval polities and modern mentalities, (Cambridge 
2006)
31 Sarti 2013, p. xiii, 4, 9-10, etc
32 For instance Hyams, P. R. “Neither unnatural nor wholly negative: The future of medieval 
vengeance”, in Throop, A. & Hyams, P. R. (eds.) (2010)
33 Halsall (1998); Reuter (1988), (1990); Fouracre (1998); Pohl (2006). See Chapter 1.
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Antique and Early Medieval warfare and society, in order to establish a revised
field of assumptions about the causes and implications of violence at a personal
as well as a political level – in particular their under-appreciated psychological
and physiological aspects. This psychologically informed conception of violence
will bring into relief the importance of the experience of violence in conditioning
human psychology and behaviour, and raise the related question of the role of
violence  in  the  development  of  societies.  It  will  then  be  suggested  that  the
societies of the late- and post-Roman West are particularly strong candidates for
a case study of the role of violence in social and political development.
    Having established a firmer theoretical basis through this consideration of the
literature on the causes and consequences of violence, the thesis will investigate
the relationship of social life to military enthusiasm among the inhabitants of
Northern Gaul and Germany – the territory that became the Frankish kingdoms –
in the period c. 350-600. In doing so it will also seek to contribute to the debates
surrounding militarization and social identity within the late empire and the early
barbarian kingdoms.  The reason for the selection of this  region is  the strong
combination of late- and post-Roman legal and narrative material it  offers, in
particular the  Histories of Gregory of Tours, for which nothing comparable is
available regarding the other barbarian groups that took over the former empire.
    Thus, the historical sources considered in the greatest detail will be those that
seem to bring us closest to the subculture and experience of warriors in the post-
Roman Frankish kingdoms: the provisions of the earliest Frankish law-code, the
Pactus Legis Salicae; and the narrative accounts of Gregory of Tours’ Histories.34
The  utility  of  these  two  sources  for  the  study  of  Frankish  society  has  been
criticised,  and will  be considered in  detail  in  due course,  but  the most  basic
justification for their use is that they are among the few texts which present the
post-Roman  military  elites  as  individuals  and  small  groups  rather  than  an
34 Ekhardt, K. A. (ed.), Pactus Legis Salicae. Monumenta Germania Historica, Legum Sectio I,
Leges Nationum Germanicarum, Vol. IV, Part 1 (Hanover 1962); Hessels, J. H. (ed.), Lex 
Salica: The ten Texts with the Glosses, and the Lex Emendata, (London 1880); translations 
adapted from Drew, K. F. The Laws of the Salian Franks (1991). Krusch, B & Levison, W. 
(eds.), Gregorii episcopi Turonensis. Libri Historiarum X, in MGH SRM I.1 (Hannover 1951)
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undifferentiated mass, and this important perspective remains drastically under-
represented both in ancient and modern historiography.35 
    It is important to state at the outset that the present thesis will treat violence
not  merely  as  something  which  is  described,  constructed,  contested  and
evaluated in (particularly literary) culture, but as a real and immediate physical
phenomenon with an  objective  existence  outside  the  texts  through which  we
learn about it.36 This is not at all to deny that violence is a historical product,
which  takes  on  different  forms  in  different  times  and  places,  or  that  the
valuations and meanings attached to it do not differ significantly between one
culture and another.37 But a central argument here will be that there are certain
tendencies in terms of the causes and outcomes of physical attacks which retain a
degree  of  consistency  across  cultures  and  historical  epochs;  that  the  human
experience of physical violence, while clearly different in different cultures, is
limited in its plasticity.38 And that we therefore can and should seek to establish
its  more  generic  aspects  for  the  purposes  of  historical  investigation,  and
cautiously employ the insights of modern research – not just anthropology but
also neuroscience,39 psychology and criminology – in considering post-Roman
violence. 
    Thus we will seek not only to get more out of the historical sources, but also to
interpret  them  in  light  of  relevant  modern  information  on  the  causes  and
implications of violence. As will become clear, this will not be an attempt to
reassert a conception of violence as innate, or of a ‘civilizing process’ understood
as  a  progressive  movement  toward  social  control  over  naturally  violent
tendencies,  but  rather  the  opposite.  Violence  will  be  conceived  as  a  social
product, which the late- and post-Roman context produced in unique ways. What
we  will seek to  do to,  however,  is  to recapture something of the capacity of
35 For instance in Shaw, “War and violence” (1999); Halsall, G. Warfare and Society in the 
barbarian West, 450-900, (London 2003)
36 Cf. Hyams 2010, p. 211-212
37 Zimmerman 2006, p. 343-4
38 Cf. Reddy, W. M. “Against Constructionism: the historical ethnography of emotions”, in 
Current Anthropology 38:3 (1997); Pampler, J. “The history of emotions: an interview with 
Willaim Reddy, Barbara Rosenwein, and Peter Stearns”, in History and Theory 49 (May 
2010)
39 As suggested in Hyams 2010, p. 219
14
violence for apparent irrationality and arbitrariness, by including the mechanics
of involuntary physiological response and adaptation in seeking to account for it.
This will challenge the presently popular picture of violence in the late and post-
Roman West as emerging principally from strategic thinking and cultural norms.
It will also bring into relief the full extent and implications of the relationship
between military participation and relatively ordinary social violence. 
    The thesis will thus elaborate a conception of sixth-century Frankish society in
which  violent  behaviour  was  produced  through  culturally  conditioned
psychological developments in response to prior experiences of violence. It will
sketch the social system by which violence might have been systematically –
though not necessarily deliberately or ‘rationally’ – reproduced and perpetuated
by physiological  and  psychological  means,  resulting  in  a  ‘cycle  of  violence’
whereby warfare fuelled social violence and vice-versa.
    Chapter  1  comprises  a  wide-ranging  discussion  of  the  relationship  of
biological  and  psychological  response  and  development,  at  the  level  of
individuals and small groups, to violence, reviewing work done in a range of
modern  academic  disciplines.  A preliminary  historiographical  discussion  will
consider  the  currently  popular,  though little  debated,  assumptions  about  how
violence comes about, and question how successful they are in accounting for the
phenomenon. The relevance of modern research on violence to the post-Roman
warrior  culture  will  be  discussed,  resulting  in  a  new  set  of  paradigmatic
perspectives which complement and modify the existing canon of explanatory
factors  normally  available  to  historians  –  innate  inclinations,  cultural
imperatives,  and  strategic  decisions  –  by  adding  several  new aspects  to  our
understanding of why violence happens, in particular (mal)adaptive behavioural
change derived from experience. 
    This discussion will seek to go beyond the crude binary opposition between
competing images of violence as an inevitable outcome of innate ‘pneumatic’
drives  and  emotions,  and  violence  as  purely  strategically  and  culturally
constructed,  developing a  more  complicated  and  dialectical conception  of  its
historical causes and implications. A number of innovative perspectives on the
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source material will be developed, the most fundamental of which will be the
interconnectedness  of  violence  in  different  social  contexts,  particularly  in
bureaucratically unsophisticated societies. This revised set of assumptions about
the causes and implications of violence, in general and specifically in the post-
Roman context,  will  tend to  emphasise  its  capacity  for  self-reproduction and
self-propagation by physiological and psychological means, and the necessity of
viewing warfare as both a contributory cause and a partial product of local social
violence. 
    Having considered the evidence for the causes and implications of violence
emerging from modern research on humans in a  range of industrial  and pre-
industrial  contexts,  the thesis  will  turn to the much-discussed question of the
violence associated with the end of Roman power in the West. The second and
third  chapters  will  consider  the  military  experiences  and  development  of
northern  Gaul  and  the  frontier  in  the  fourth  and  fifth  centuries,  and  the
dissolution of Roman rule, in order to contextualise the warrior culture of the
post-Roman Frankish kingdoms. Although most historians agree that the end of
the western Roman empire was characterised by serious and frequent warfare,
some are not convinced by the dire  picture painted by the Roman and post-
Roman narrators of the period.40 This section will focus on the historiographical
debate about the seriousness of warfare and the extent of militarization on both
sides of the frontier, referring to archaeological as well as literary evidence. It
will also focus on the question of ‘barbarization’ of Roman military and political
culture,  considering  the  debates  about  the  extent  of  barbarian  migration,  the
possible  adoption of non-Roman or not-entirely-Roman identities west  of the
Rhine, and the extent and nature of integration between incoming and existing
groups. 
    Chapter 2 considers a range of evidence – narrative, archaeological and legal –
for the late-third and fourth century development of the Franks and the regions
that they would eventually occupy, with special attention to the detailed accounts
of Roman military activity provided by Ammianus Marcelinus. It will be argued
40 Goffart, W. “Rome, Constantinople, and the Barbarians”, in AHR 1981; cf. Gillett (2002), p. 
13-15 
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that there is strong archaeological as well as written evidence that the period was
marked  by  physical  insecurity  and cultural  change,  especially  in  the  regions
between the Rhine and the Garonne. And evidence will be presented that implies
that  the regions in  question were culturally  disposed to produce an abundant
supply of willing military recruits. The picture of a relationship between military
violence and social development, reflected upon generally in the first chapter,
will be considered in greater detail through the late-Roman evidence.
    Chapter 3 evaluates the Frankish takeover of Gaul in the fifth and early sixth
centuries in a similar vein, using a range of evidence to consider the nature and
extent of the violence and social change entailed in the process. It will be argued
that the collapse of the Western empire and the Frankish takeover of Gaul were
attended by considerable physical and social upheavals, and that the rulers of the
Frankish kingdoms inherited only the vestiges of the Roman governmental and
military infrastructure. But it will also be argued that the cultural interaction and
convergence of the societies either side of the Rhine facilitated an exceptionally
effective  synthesis  between  the  incoming  warrior  elites  and  the  military
subcultures  of  Gaul,  which  contributed  both  to  the  expansion  and  relative
stability of the new political and social order.
    The final section turns to the central investigation into the ‘warrior culture’ –
or, more accurately, the violent subculture – which the elites of the post-Roman
Frankish kingdoms and their followers participated in during the sixth century.
This is based on a detailed analysis of the references to violence in  Lex Salica
and  Gregory  of  Tours’  Histories,  through  the  prism of  the  understanding  of
violent subcultures deduced in Chapter 1. This psychological perspective will
bring the utility of these sources for the understanding of contemporary violence
– which has been the subject of considerable debate – into relief. These Chapters,
drawing on the conclusions of Chapter 1, will set out to show that the Laws and
Histories hint at a sub-culture in which enthusiasm and readiness for war were
associated  with  the  relative  normality  and  frequency  of  (mostly  non-lethal)
violence in times of ‘peace’.
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    Chapter 4 argues, as some other historians have done recently, that the laws
are  a  more  valuable  source  for  contemporary  violence  than  has  often  been
averred,  offering  a  unique  perspective on the  social  habits  and values  of  the
communities who the laws were supposed to serve.41 The configuration of values
placed on various violent acts, and their relationship to those placed on other
offences, will be examined in detail. And by comparing the Pactus Legis Salicae
with other near-contemporary laws on violence, in particular the Burgundian and
Visigothic codes, this section evaluates the specific place of violence in Frankish
culture  relative  to  competing  kingdoms  and  identities,  and  the  particular
incentives  offered by the laws to  the elite  warriors  who upheld the Frankish
kingdoms.  It  will  be  argued  that  the  Frankish  laws  on  violence  should  be
regarded  not  merely  as  a  crude  propaganda  effort  loosely  based  on  Roman
models,  but  as  a  sophisticated  (re-)construction  of  conditions  of  relative
justification  and  legitimacy  which  may  provide  important  clues  as  to  the
character of elite society in post-Roman Gaul. It will further be suggested that
the  laws  of  the  Franks,  and  the  habitus which  they  implied,  systematically
encouraged violent ‘self-help’ in a range of scenarios, particularly in hierarchical
contexts.
   Chapter 5 looks again at the evidence for social violence provided by Gregory
of  Tours,  arguing  against  the  influential  contention  that  the  caricatured  and
partial picture of elite social life provided by Gregory should be dismissed as a
literary  fiction  aimed  at  the  moral  edification  of  a  primarily  Gallo-Roman
audience.42 The  biases  and  ambiguities  of  Gregory’s  moral  positioning  are
considered  in  light  of  his  political  and  social  situation,  highlighting  the
ambivalence of his attitude to violence and his frequent reticence on the subject.
It will be argued that while the evidence of the  Histories must be treated with
caution and attention to their author’s frequently intimate relationships to their
protagonists,  they  comprise  a  uniquely  valuable  source  for  the  study  of  the
contemporary warrior elite and their followers.
41 For instance, Lambert, T. “Theft, homicide and crime in late Anglo-Saxon law”, in Past & 
Present 214 (2012), p. 3-43; Brown, W. C. Violence in Medieval Europe (New York 2011), p.
47-60. See Chapter 4.
42 Goffart, W. The narrators of barbarian history (Princeton 1988). See Chapter 5.
18
    Chapter  6  explores  the  language  of  the  Histories,  and  the  incidents  and
individuals to whom it refers, in greater detail. A preliminary discussion, looking
at  the  level  of  political  violence  and  disorder  implied  by  the  Histories,  is
followed by an extensive review of the nomenclature of violence and violent
individuals  –  interficere,  caedere,  viri,  pueri,  etc  –  which  will  consider  the
significance of these terms in relation to the contexts in which they occur. It is
argued  that  Gregory’s  use  of  language  implies  that  non-lethal  violence  was
relatively ordinary, and that violence was tacitly expected and even mandated in
a wide range of scenarios. A final, supplementary section will reconsider some of
the biographies provided by Gregory through the lens of violent socialization and
its psychological consequences. This discussion will open up the possibility that
the sometimes irrational and self-destructive acts of violence related by Gregory
can be interpreted as outcomes of violent socialization, which may be instructive
in understanding the nature of the  Histories’ audience and Gregory’s didactic
intentions. And it will be suggested that the individuals excoriated by Gregory
were  not  cartoon  characters,  whose  deeds  are  calculated  to  evoke  automatic
outrage,  but  all-too-realistic  stereotypes  exaggerated  and  condemned  as  a
warning to Gregory’s patrons and contemporaries.
    The overall aim of the thesis is twofold: First, to add to the understanding of
post-Roman Gaul,  by effectively using modern knowledge to  think about the
cross-cultural causes and implications of violence, and how they functioned in
this  context.  Second,  to  contribute  to  the  body  of  modern  knowledge  about
violence,  by  teasing  out  the  implications  of  the  specific  factors  of  violent
socialization in late- and post-Roman Gaul, which have much to tell us both as a
comparative  case  study and as  an  important  cultural  ancestor  of  the  modern
world.
19
Chapter 1: Violence, Medieval and Modern
 “...the village priest sent one of his boys [pueri] to invite some of
the men to come and have a drink in his house. When the boy
arrived, one of those who were invited drew his sword and did not
fear to hit him. He fell down dead.”43
  -    Gregory of Tours
     This scene, the opening episode of a much-discussed Tours ‘feud’ which
eventually claimed the lives of three freemen, as well as an unknown quantity of
slaves and pueri, provides a good platform for thinking about several aspects of
elite violence in post-Roman Francia. The most immediately striking aspect of
the  scene  is  its  apparent  senselessness  –  whereas  the  other  episodes  in  the
conflict are contextualized by prior offences, this  incident, from which all the
others in the famous sequence descend, seems to be an attack out of the blue.
Gregory  himself,  inevitably  more  concerned  with  the  high-status  individuals
drawn into conflict by the incident, provides only the most cursory and cryptic of
non-explanations – the anonymous attacker “did not fear to hit him”. But why
did he want to hit him? Of course, in this specific case, we will never know, for
there  is  no  real  hope  of  finding  more  detailed  corroborating  evidence,  but
historians  have  remained  remarkably  content  not  to  think  about  how  such
apparently senseless acts of violence as this could come about as a product of
historical processes. This is all the more remarkable when we reflect on the fact
that this incident is only the most obvious case of what seems like a consistent
trend of unnecessary and inordinate violence in Gregory’s narrative.44
    Until the later twentieth century, there did not seem to any need to explain
such apparently spontaneous outbursts, for there was broad academic consensus
on the elemental and innate violence of the barbarians, and indeed of humanity
as a whole, in the absence of powerful systems of social control.45 Marc Bloch
43 Gregory of Tours, Histories VII.47
44 This point will be considered at length in Chapters 5-6.
45 Gibbon, E. The history of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, 1776-8, ch. 38; Freud, S.
Civilization and its Discontents, trans. and ed., James Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton, 
1961), pp. 58-63 etc
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famously referred to “...the emotional instability so characteristic of the feudal
era...The despairs, the rages, the impulsive acts, the sudden revulsions of feeling”
which “present great difficulties to historians, who are instinctively disposed to
reconstruct the past in terms of the rational.”46 Since that time the image of early
medieval  violence  as  caused  by ‘rages’ and ‘impulsive  acts’ has  fallen  from
favour.  Conclusions  like  Bloch’s  were  viewed  as  too  deeply  entwined  with
scientifically unsound and politically unsafe discourses which opposed the image
of primitive violence to a mythical civilized and sophisticated peace that was
seen to be epitomized by modern western regimes.47 This rejection of previous
consensus was,  at  times, characterized by a certain defensiveness about early
medieval violence, as historians sought to clear the period of the still common
perception that it was characterized by “mindless macho thuggery”.48 Attention
has turned to explanations of violence which focus on self-interest – particularly
the political ambitions of leaders – and cultural demands and permissions. But
perhaps  the  baby  was  thrown  out  with  the  bathwater,  so  to  speak,  for  the
irrational image of motivation conceived by Bloch was based not so much on
assumptions  of  innate  violence,  but  more  on  the  idea  of  human  psychology
developing in response to physical conditions of life, which in this case included
frequent wars and other natural disasters. He insisted that “...the irrational is an
important element in  all history and only a sort of false shame could allow its
effects on the course of political events in feudal Europe to be passed over in
silence.” Although the links that he envisaged were in many cases  ad hoc and
unconvincing49 the basic point was well made. The objective of this chapter is to
once  again  place  the  psychological  aspects  of  violence  centre  stage,  and  to
explore  the  threads  that  connect  ‘irrational’ and  ‘rational’,  ‘legitimate’ and
‘illegitimate’ violence together.
46 Bloch, M.  Feudal society, Volume 1: The growth of ties of dependence (London 1961) , p. 
72-3
47 Cf. Riches, D. Introduction, in D. Riches (ed.), The Anthropology of Violence (Oxford 1986)
48 Halsall, G. “Reflections on Early Medieval violence: the example of the ‘blood-feud’”, in 
Memoria y Civilisacion 2:1 (1999); Wood, I. “‘The Bloodfeud of the Franks’: a 
historiographical legend”, in Early medieval Europe vol. 14 iss.4 (2006), p.493-4
49 For instance, such statements as “A low standard of hygiene doubtless also contributed to 
this nervous sensibility...”  – Bloch (1961), p. 74
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    This objective is linked to a corresponding a priori observation about the post-
Roman  military  establishment:  in  a  time  when  large-scale  warfare  was  so
dependent on the basic expedient of fighting with swords and other weapons,
people as willing to fight  (for such uncertain and dubious rewards,)  as those
portrayed in the Sichar affair, might be considerable assets to the royal army. In
particular, someone as willing to draw his sword and strike without warning as
the anonymous attacker portrayed above might be an especially useful person,
even a leader of men, ‘showing them how it’s done’.50 This is especially true for
the post-Roman hosts, who were short on regular discipline, pay or training to
motivate  them  or  hold  them  together.  And  such  unhesitant  fighters  are  not
produced merely by material and cultural incentives and permissions, but also by
experiences  of  violence,  re-iterated  over  time,  and culturally  encouraged and
endorsed, so as to create permanent physiological and psychological changes in
their participants.
1.1 – Present assumptions and their limitations
    As mentioned, present historiography has left behind the kind of reductive
accounts of violence which see it as originating in the secret and savage nature of
mankind. The post-war academic environment in the humanities was pervaded
both by doubts about modernist  claims of historical progress and other grand
meta-narratives,  and  a  related  tendency  toward  heightened  epistemological
scepticism.  Claims  of  historians  to  scientific  knowledge  were  compellingly
attacked  from  a  number  of  directions,  including  Karl  Popper’s  “critical
rationalism”  and  Michel  Foucault’s  “archaeology  of  knowledge”,  and  many
historians were increasingly estranged from the experimental and observational
sciences, whose methods were deprived of their air of objectivity.51 ‘Scientific’
deductions based on laboratory experiments were understandably deemed to be
inapplicable to historical source material, and even (by some theorists) to their
own subject-matter, as the artificial detachment of such experiments from real
50 See below, note 67-8, 85.
51 Foucault, M. (trans. S. Hand), The archaeology of knowledge (London 2002 [1969]); Popper,
K. The open society and its enemies [II Vols.] (London 2008 [1945]). Cf. Kuhn, T. S. The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, (Chicago 1970)
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social  settings was called into question.52 Instead,  historical investigation was
increasingly  informed  by  newly  emerging  disciplines  of  critical  theory  and
cultural anthropology. There has been a great movement toward historicisation of
every  concept  previously  taken  for  granted  by  historians,53 and  among  these
‘violence’ was of particular significance due to its powerful resonance and use as
a justification for imperialist discourses. Historians have both drawn upon and
contributed considerably to these directions of research, often with interesting
and informative results.54
    Present  historical  work  on  the  experience  of  early  medieval  warriors  is
decidedly  socially  constructivist,  in  that  it  tends  to  see  perceptions  and
manifestations  of  violence  as  extending  from  the  always  unique  cultural
interpretations of contemporary society, and therefore not susceptible to analysis
according to overarching and cross-culturally applicable principles.55 There is a
laudable desire  to see historical  cultures,  and the experiences  and feelings of
people  within  those  cultures,  without  preconceptions  derived  from  modern
examples.  But  as  Walter  Pohl  has  warned,  underlying  assumptions  are  very
difficult to avoid, and attempts “to ‘take evidence at its own terms’ easily leads
to the use of a theoretical model all the same”56. In this the study of violence is
no exception; on the contrary, it  may indeed epitomise this  problem. Thus in
talking about actual physical violence, while reductive biological explanations
have been rejected,  another,  and in some ways even more traditional,  line of
reductive reasoning has remained popular. This line of reasoning, supported by
52 Gergen, “Social psychology as social construction: the emerging vision”, in McGarty, C. & 
Haslam, A. (eds.) The message of social psychology: Perspectives on mind in society, 
(Oxford 1996), i.e. at p.7 – “Not only is the subject matter itself a social construction, thus 
not subject to empirical evaluation outside a particular tradition of interpretation, but such 
research represents the arrogation of a uniquely western ontology of the mind to the status of 
the universal.”
53 See Rheinberger, H.-J. On Historicizing Epistemology: An essay (Palo Alto 2010)
54 For instance, White, S. D. “The politics of Anger”, in Rosenwein (ed.), Anger’s Past, (1998); 
and more generally, Miller, W. I. “Getting a fix on violence”, in Humiliation and other 
essays on honour, social discomfort, and violence (Ithaca 1993), pp. 52-92. This lucid 
discussion parallels the concerns of my own thesis in some respects, and is a good example 
of how the same topics may be handled in a more dedicatedly constructivist way, as well as 
(in my opinion) the limitations implicit in such a perspective.
55 Airlie, S. “The history of emotions and emotional history”, in Early Medieval Europe, vol. 
10, no. 2 (2001), p. 235-6
56 Pohl, W. “Ethnicity, theory, and tradition: a response”, in A. Gillett ed., On Barbarian 
Identity (Turnhout 2002), p. 238-9
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the  influential  musings  of  Hobbes,  Marx,  Machiavelli,  Clausewitz,  and more
recently proponents  of  ‘rational  choice  theory’  and  ‘game  theory’,  views
violence not as the product of violent human natures per se, but rather as a result
of the universal social tendency to compete over finite resources.57 In identifying
the importance of ‘cultural capital’ in addition to actual material resources, and
their  close  interrelationship,  Bourdieu  extended  this  principle  to  forms  of
competition  which  may  not  be  readily  comprehensible  to  the  culturally
uninformed  mind.58 But  the  basic  logic  remains  the  same:  human  ambitions
clash, and violence is an inevitable outcome of those clashes. The surmises on
offer in two recent collections of articles directly taking on the theme of early
medieval violence are illustrative of this attitude (my emphases) – 
“Wars were undertaken to provide the booty so essential to early 
medieval politics (Reuter 1985; Reuter 1990 for the consequences of 
failing to take plunder), to provide opportunities to demonstrate valour 
or military prowess, and thus obtain rewards, and to display the military
ability of the leader to his followers (and potential rivals). This was a 
kind of ‘tension release’.”59
“Violence arose from ruthless competition between potentes as they tried
to gain for themselves the greatest amount of material resources, and the
highest number of dependants.”60
“Merovingian politics undoubtedly contained a violent element, for the 
organization of political power depended largely on rivalry between 
different factions of nobles, each of which could wield military force. 
Competitive nobles were, however, generally keen to do the bidding of 
57 Siegfried, T. A beautiful Math: John Nash, Game Theory, and the modern quest for a code of
Nature (Washington 2006); Mansbridge, J. J. “The rise and fall of Self-Interest in the 
explanation of political life”, in Mansbridge, J. J. (ed.) Beyond Self-Interest (Chicago 1990), 
p. 3-5
58 Bordieu, P. (trans. R. Nice) The logic of practice, (Stanford, 1990), p. 119-122
59 Halsall, G. “Violence and society: an introductory survey” in G. Halsall (ed.) Violence and 
Society in the early medieval West (Woodbridge 1998), pp. 1-45. (Emphasis added here and 
below). For a more recent restatement, Halsall, G. Barbarian Migrations and the Roman 
West, 376-568, (Cambridge 2007), p. 151
60 Garcia Moreno, L. A. “Legitimate and illegitimate violence in Visigothic law”, in Halsall 
(ed.) (1998)
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the kings and ‘mayors of the palace’, so that rivalry mostly worked to 
keep the peace and to enhance rather than weaken the rulers’ 
authority.”61
“…much of the violence in any period of history is of a sort inherent to 
this imperfect world in which we live …the sadly necessary violence that
accompanies the task of survival.”62
“Killing is always inevitable as an ‘option of human agency,’ it becomes 
cruel reality by means of ‘structural removals of the boundaries for 
possible action.’”63
    These kinds of conclusion are characteristic of an academic atmosphere in
which perceived differences in the prevalence of violence between the Roman
and post-Roman period have diminished, and extend partly from a widespread
reluctance  to  characterise  any period  or  culture  as  ‘particularly  violent’,  thus
‘othering’ it. In the first of the quotes, and in many treatments of early medieval
violence, the influence of Timothy Reuter’s two articles on Carolingian warfare,
or at least the popularity of their intuitively sensible position – that violence was
done primarily on the basis of a culturally conditioned ‘cost-benefit analysis’ – is
evident.64 The idea of violence issuing from innate human cruelty has lost its
61 Fouracre, P. “Attitudes towards violence in seventh- and eighth-century Francia”, in Halsall 
(ed.) (1998)
62 Drake, H. A. “Introduction: Gauging violence in Late Antiquity”, in Drake, H. A. (ed.) 
Violence in Late Antiquity: perceptions and practices, (Hampshire 2006)
63 Zimmermann, M. “Violence in late antiquity reconsidered”, in Drake (ed.) 2006, p. 356. For 
further examples, see for instance Van Dam, R. “Merovingian Gaul and the Frankish 
conquests”, in Fouracre (ed.) The New Cambridge Medieval History (Cambridge 1995), 
p.209-210; Mostert, M. “Introduction”, in M. Mostert (ed.), Medieval legal process: 
physical, spoken and written performances in the middle ages, (Turnhout 2011), p. 1-2; 
Shaw, B. D. “War and Violence”, in Bowersock, G. W., Brown, P. & Grabar, O. Late 
Antiquity: A guide to the postclassical world (1999), p. 159; Green, D. H. Language and 
History in the Early Germanic World (Cambridge 1998), p. 67-8; Collins, R. “The western 
kingdoms”, in The Cambridge Ancient History Volume 14: Late Antiquity: Empire and 
Successors, AD 425–600 (Cambridge 2001), p. 131; Goffart, W. “Rome, Constantinople, and
the Barbarians”, in AHR (1981), p. 281; Bispham, E. “Warfare and the army” in Bispham, E. 
(ed.) Roman Europe (Oxford 2008), p. 157-8. White (2016), p. 229-232; Sarantis, A. 
“Waging war in Late Antiquity”, in A. Serantis and N. Christie (eds.), War and Warfare in 
Late Antiquity (Leiden 2013), p. 22-3, 45-7
64 “Plunder and tribute in the Carolingian empire” (1985) and “The end of Carolingian military 
expansion” (1990), both reprinted in Rueter, T. (ed. J. L. Nelson) Medieval polities and 
modern mentalities, (Cambridge University, 2006).
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cache, but been supplanted by something strikingly similar in effect: the idea of
violence issuing from innate human self-interest and competitiveness. Violence
as an epiphenomenon of human biology has been done away with, only to be
replaced by violence as an epiphenomenon of socio-economic competition, and
while  the  former  of  these  positions  tended  artificially  to  exaggerate  the
characteristic violence of societies with relatively few social controls, the now
popular  latter  position  equally  tends  to  artificially  annihilate  the  differences
between the configurations and levels of violence in different societies. Thus in
recent times the famous conflict described by Gregory has been used to consider
other aspects of the period, in particular the ideological intentions of the author,
and, most frequently, the ways in which violence was limited through law and
custom.65 The underlying assumption, that the control rather than the generation
of violence requires detailed investigation, or that violence is an ordinary feature
of human conflict, requiring interpretation rather than explanation, persists.66
    To those academic realms concerned with the manipulation of violence in the
present  day,  however  –  for  instance  in  military,  criminal,  and developmental
psychology – the persistent  appearance of unwanted and seemingly irrational
violence (and non-violence) has remained the most pressing concern. As a result,
questions about “the social  uses of violence for building or limiting power”67
have  seemed  less  interesting,  for  much  of  the  violence  upon  which  modern
psychological  work  focuses  clearly  lacks  usefulness  in  those  terms.  In  such
disciplines,  cultural  differences  in  the valuation and meaning of  violence  are
ancillary  to  the  more  important  business  of  understanding  and  manipulating
violence  in  practice,  a  goal  which  simply  requires  working  and  workable
65 Goffart (1988); Halsall (1998); Liebeschuetz (2007); Wood (2006); Janin, H. Medieval 
Justice: Cases and laws in France, England and Germany, 500-1500, (Jefferson, NC 2004), 
p. 22-3; Bossy, J. Disputes and settlements: Law and human relations in the west 
(Cambridge 1983), p. 25-8. We will return to both these questions – the intentions of Gregory
as author, and the functioning of law and custom in relation to violence – in the next chapter.
66 For one recent exception, which argues that late medieval violence against peasants was 
formative of social habitus among the German nobility, see Gazi, A. “Pruning peasants: 
Private war and maintaining the lords’ peace in late medieval Germany”, in Cohen, E. & De 
Jong, M. B. Medieval Transformations: Texts, Power, and Gifts in Context (Leiden 2001), p. 
245-272
67 Pohl, W. “Perceptions of Barbarian Violence”, in Drake, H. A. (ed.) Violence in Late 
Antiquity: perceptions and practices (Aldershot 2006), p. 25
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concepts. This relative inattention to problems of cultural evaluation may be at
least partially attributed to the fact that many researchers work on the clearest,
most easily identified kinds of violence, such as shootings, gang fights, rape and
child-beating.  Their  data  and  conclusions  are,  understandably,  rarely  free  of
something that looks like value-judgement,68 and are occasionally unusable for
the culturally-informed historian due to their conflation of violence with such
obviously culturally constructed categories as ‘anti-social  behaviour’ (roughly
meaning anything that transgresses modern social norms, which violence clearly
need not  do).69 But  many modern approaches  are  now much more culturally
reflexive,  recognizing  the  potential  social  appropriateness  even  of  illegal
violence  in  a  range of  contexts.70 Therefore  they  offer  some possibilities  for
cross-cultural application.
    The causes and implications of violence, so practically and un-agonistically
defined,  were subjected to  some radical  reassessment  in  the post-war period,
with the observations of frontline troops’ behaviour by S. L. A. Marshall being
an  early  significant  step  toward  a  considerable  problematisation  of  the
comfortable  certainties  of  generations  of  thinkers  in  the  face  of  increasingly
detailed and sophisticated observation of violent incidents and individuals.71 The
idea  of  men  as  ordinarily  capable  of  violence  was  undermined  by  close
observation  of  men  in  battle,  which  revealed  a  frequency  and  degree  of
reluctance to hurt  and kill  that belies assumptions of thinly veiled primordial
destructiveness.72 Even the promise of relative advantage, and the presence of
68 For instance, Shaver, P. R. & Mikulincer, M. “Introduction” in Shaver, P. R. & Mikulincer, 
M. (eds.) Human aggression and violence: causes, manifestations, and consequences 
(Washington 2011).
69 The work of criminologist Greg Barak, which in some ways is extraordinarily broad and 
penetrating, presents a particularly infuriating case from the historian’s perspective. See for 
instance “A Critical Perspective on Violence” in DeKeseredy, W. S. & B. Perry (eds.), 
Advancing Critical Criminology: Theory and Application (Lexington 2006), pp. 133-154. 
70 See, for instance, Connor, D. F. Aggression and Antisocial behaviour in Children and 
Adolescents: Research and Treatment (New York 2004), p. 7-14
71 Marshall, S. L. A. Men against fire: the problem of battle command, (New York 1947). 
72 Although Marshall’s  conclusions were sketchy and overstated, his suggestions have been 
borne out by subsequent research – Chambers, J. W. “S. L. A. Marshall’s Men Against Fire: 
New evidence regarding fire ratios”, in Perameters 33 (Autumn 2003), 113-121; See 
Grossman, D. On killing: The psychological cost of learning to kill in war and society 
(Boston 1996); Collins, R. Violence: A Micro-Sociological Theory (Princeton 2009)
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incentives and punishments, have been found to be far from reliable means either
for eliciting or constraining violence.73 
    Thus, what Marshal’s research was already emphasising two generations ago
was the inadequacy of strategic explanations of violence under detailed scrutiny.
Clearly  some men could be induced to fight and kill with material and cultural
incentives – money, medals, and so forth – but equally clearly, many others were
not so easily persuaded. Since that time a growing body of detailed research has
reconfirmed and extended this line of observation, and often points to a complex
combination  of  psychological  and  other  factors,  in  addition  to  perceived
permissions  and  incentives,  as  contributing  to  combat  motivation and
breakdown.74 In  fields  such  as  criminology,  psychology  and  neuroscience,
increasing emphasis has been placed on an image of violence as emerging from a
multivariant  basis  that  cannot  be  reduced  to  biological  imperative,  strategic
expedient or cultural practice, necessitating approaches that simultaneously take
in all these aspects and acknowledge their dialectical interrelationship.75
    The long-term effects of previous experiences of violence have emerged as an
important  part  of  this  more  sophisticated  image  of  the  causation  and
consequences  of  violence.76 Ferdinand  Sutterluty,  a  researcher  working  with
criminally  violent  youths  in  modern  Germany,  aptly  sums up  the  position  –
“...when sociological research looks beyond the structural or cultural background
factors  that  influence  rates  of  youth  violence  and  examines  the  violent  acts
themselves, it finds that many aspects cannot be grasped using models of rational
73 Marshall (1947); Grossman (1996); Newsome, B. “The myth of intrinsic combat 
motivation”, The Journal of Strategic Studies 26: 24-46 (2003), p. 33; Bourke, J. An intimate
history of killing (London 1999), p. 72-4; Collins (2008).
74 Grossman, D. On killing: The psychological cost of learning to kill in war and society 
(Boston 1996); Collins, R. Violence: A Micro-Sociological Theory (Princeton 2009); Jacoby, 
T. Understanding conflict and violence: theoretical and interdisciplinary approaches (New 
York 2008), provides a good survey of the inchoate literature on violence. See below.
75 Niehoff, D. The biology of violence (New York 1999); Athens, L. Violent Criminal acts and 
actors revisited (Urbana 1997), p. 13-23; Abbink, J. “Violence and culture: anthropological 
and evolutionary-psychological reflections on inter-group conflict in southern Ethiopia” in 
Schmitt, B. E. & Schroder, I. W. (eds.) 2001, p. 127.
76 Huessman, L. R., Dubow, E. F. & Boxer, P. “The transmission of aggressiveness across 
generations: Biological contextual, and social learning processes” in Shaver, P. R. & 
Mikulincer, M. (eds.) Human aggression and violence: causes, manifestations, and 
consequences (Washington 2011)
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action.”77 In  accounting  for  urban  gang  violence,  Sutterluty  has  found  prior
experiences of violence, both as victim and perpetrator, to be more significant
factors  in  determining  future  violent  behaviour  than  calculations  of  material
profit  or  social  advantage.  His  research  complements  that  of  Marshal,  since
while the former was concerned with the failure of rewards and legitimation to
incite  violence,  the  latter  is  concerned  with  the  failure  of  punishments  and
illegitimacy  to  prevent  it.  This  multi-variant  conception  is  now  accepted  by
international institutions working to reduce violence globally.78
    The relevance of these observation-based conclusions to personal attacks like
that described in the opening passage of the chapter is clear. In attempting to
explain that incident or its violent consequences purely in terms of competition
and strategy, we risk imposing an artificially reductive logic upon the source
material. Such logic not only lacks support in contemporary evidence, but also
contradicts the findings of detailed observations of modern violence, which have
emphasised  the  potentially  irrational  behavioural  consequences  of  prior
experience and other situational factors. The relevance of the point to warfare at
the scale of regions and kingdoms may be less obvious, for while the motivation
of the individual warrior may be impossible to deduce in strategic terms, the
political  decisions  and  conflicts  which  result  in  war  are  considerably  less
spontaneous and more strategic.  Thus, warfare may fairly be seen as a much
more technical affair than personal violence, which is therefore more susceptible
to strategic analysis.
    But the importance of objectively ‘irrational’ (i.e. non-strategic) factors, even
to large-scale warfare, should not be ignored, for two reasons. The first and most
self-evident relates to morale and willingness to participate in combat actively
and enthusiastically, for attending the royal host and fighting effectively on its
behalf are two very different things. A post-Roman army needed active fighters
77 Sutterluty, F. “Understanding Youth Violence: Rationality and its Limits”, in Illinois Child 
Welfare, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2009–2010), p. 47–64. It should be clarified that Sutterluty is not here
referring to “rational choice theory” or any such narrow instrumental conception, but rather 
to the more general idea of violence as a means for the achievement of social advantage. See 
also, Horowitz, D. L. The deadly ethnic riot (Berkeley 2001), p. 553-560; Stewart, P. J. & 
Strathern, A. Violence: Theory and ethnography (London 2002), p. 7
78 Krug, E. G. et al, “World Report on Violence and Health”, (Geneva, World Health 
Organization 2002), p. 12-15
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to succeed, and a mass of half-hearted and flighty warriors was not a formula for
military effectiveness.  As John Keegan observed in an analysis of both ancient
and modern accounts of battle, it is literary convention more than anything else
which tends to minimize and annihilate the thoughts and feelings of individuals
on the battlefield, and their importance to the overall outcome.79 Therefore the
question of motivation at an individual level remains crucial to military success,
possibly  all  the  more  so  at  a  time  of  irregular  military  discipline  and
organization, such as the one under investigation.
    The second reason relates to the first, and concerns the question of agency in
the post-Roman hosts - in other words, the question of who really made the late-
Roman  wars  and  battles  happen  in  the  first  place.  There  is  a  virtually
unavoidable tendency in political history to follow the conventions of Gregory of
Tours et al in offering a vision of military decision-making as the personal and
nearly exclusive domain of kings and other commanders.80 In the midst of such
smooth ‘great man’ narratives, the thoughts and feelings of individuals and small
groups of warriors fade into obscurity and apparent insignificance. But as the
opening of the Sichar affair illustrates, nameless men, as well as great leaders,
can be instrumental in determining not just the outcome of a fight, but whether it
happens in the first  place. Several pieces of circumstantial  evidence from the
late- and post-Roman narratives of wars would seem to confirm the validity of
this  observation  even at  the  level  of  what  we might  call  high politics.81 The
military tales of Gregory of Tours are replete with instances of kings struggling
to control their armies, in some cases because the warriors insist upon battle, in
others where they refuse it, and most often in struggling to prevent looting of
friendly territory.82 We should not contrast this state of affairs too starkly with
Rome’s  armies  – Ammianus gives  many indications  that  the army frequently
forced decisions upon their commanders, and Tacitus describes a serious mutiny
against the easy-going Trebellius as stemming from the fact that “...the troops,
79 Keegan, The face of battle (1978), p. 12-30. The importance of this perspective to the study 
of warfare in late Antiquity is beginning to be acknowledged – see Sarantis (2013), p. 45-58, 
74-80.
80 For instance, in Wood, I. The Merovingian Kingdoms, 450-751 (New York 1994), p. 38-50
81 Whitby, “Armies and Society” (2001), p. 480. See Chapter 2.
82 Histories IV.14, IV.49, IV.50, VI.12, VI.31, VII.24, VIII.30, X.3, X.9.
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accustomed to campaigns, got out of hand when they had nothing to do.”83 This,
despite  the  fact  that  the  Roman armies  were  subject  to  a  more  sophisticated
regime of central  control than those of the post-Roman kingdoms.84 Thus we
should  imagine  that  the  proportion  of  dissatisfied  and  unwilling  warriors
required to paralyse the post-Roman armies and make them ineffective would
have been considerably lower than their earlier counterparts. If the majority of
Franks  had  been  happy  with  their  lot  and  reluctant  to  fight,  the  remaining
minority  would  have  had  great  trouble  rounding  them  up,  since  they  were
essentially  self-sufficient  and  thus  materially  independent.  Michael  Whitby’s
comparison of the post-Roman armies of the west and their counterparts in the
eastern  empire  concluded  that  western  armies  were,  in  relative  terms,  “...an
independent  force capable of  dictating to  its  nominal  masters.”85 For  wars to
happen, a considerable critical mass of active consent to participation in combat
and  other  violence  was  necessary,  and  modern  research  militates  against  the
assumption that such a critical mass would have been composed purely on the
basis of a community of interests.
1.2 – Physiological and Psychological aspects of violent behaviour and combat
         motivation
    All we have demonstrated so far is that the desire to fight, and the reluctance
to  fight,  may have  less  to  do  with  strategic  thinking –  even  by a  culturally
informed metric – than historians have been conventionally disposed to assume.
The  task  of  comprehending  the  missing  pieces  of  this  motivational  puzzle
remains. Of course, to synthesise the vast and inchoate data gathered on violence
from the many academic fields in which it is studied would require a substantial
book in itself, and the intention here is merely to highlight some aspects of the
generation of violence which have been under-appreciated to date, but which are
particularly germane to the study of the post-Roman warrior societies. In this
83 Tacitus, Agricola, p. 67. For the third century, see for instance, Herodian, 6.8. For 
Ammianus, see Chapter 2
84 Whitby, “The Army, c. 420-602” (2001), p. 297; Pohl, W. “Introduction: strategies of 
distinction”, in Pohl (ed.) Strategies of Distinction, (2002), p. 4. There is considerable 
disagreement on how different the late- and post-Roman armies of the West were in terms of 
organization. See Chapter 2.
85 Whitby (2001), p. 308. This point will be taken up at length in the next chapter.
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section, the extent to which of violent behaviour is a product of physiological
responses and developmental processes will be brought into relief. It is important
to be clear from the outset that this re-introduction of automaticity and biology
into  the  canon  of  explanatory  factors  for  violence  in  no  way  represents  an
attempt to supplant existing conceptions of violence as a strategic and cultural
phenomenon.86 We are not here ‘pulling back the curtain’ of rational culturally-
informed analysis to reveal the ‘true’ biological causes of violence; the focus is
upon  behavioural  development  in  relation  to  experience,  which  is  of  course
culturally evaluated and constructed, if not entirely determined. The purpose is to
set  out the case for  the cross-cultural  relevance of non-rational  physiological
factors in the generation of violence – in particular those by which it is more or
less  automatically  reproduced  and  transmitted  between  individuals  –  and  to
explain their operation.
    The  adaptation  of  human  psychology  and  behaviour  towards  increased
resistance to violent experience and increased aggression can be quite clearly
observed  in  a  range  of  pre-industrial  ‘warrior’  cultures,  modern  military
establishments, and criminal violent subcultures, in the present day. In all these
settings, persistent inclinations toward violence can be seen to develop through
experience, which are then expressed in other contexts. Anthropological work
has shown how pre-industrial cultures prepare themselves for war with violent
ritual practices:  the Yukpa of Venezuela prepare for raids by firing arrows at
each-other, and hit each-other over the heads with bows as a test of manhood.87
The  Suri  of  Ethiopia  engage  in  ritualized  duelling  between  periods  of
inconclusive warfare against neighbouring groups.88 The Nuer groups of Sudan
shifted between phases of external warfare and local ‘feud’, the latter being more
typically  conducted with less lethal weaponry.89 A regression analysis  of data
86 For a lucid general discussion of the automatic aspects of human decision-making, and their 
dynamic relationship with more deliberate, cognitive processes, see Kahneman, D. Thinking,
Fast and Slow (New York, 2011)
87 Halbamayer, E. “Socio-cosmological contexts and forms of violence: War, vendetta, duels 
and suicide among the Yukpa of north-western Venezuela”, in Schmidt, B. E. & Schroder, I. 
W. Anthropology of violence and conflict (London 2001)
88 Abbink (2001), p. 130
89 Gluckman (1955), p. 4-5
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from ninety pre-industrial  societies  found that  “harsh socialization practices”,
including (but not limited to) pain infliction and violent punishments, correlated
strongly with broader social propensities to both internal and external warfare.90
It is important to emphasise that many of these social practices are not entirely
ritualized or even necessarily sanctioned by the community.91 In all these studies
we can see warriors – in the sense of men psychologically willing and able to
fight – being made through a process of repeated and systematic, although often
incidental,  exposure to  (usually  non-lethal)  violence.  Or,  to  take the opposite
perspective, we may see a social environment characterized by violent practices
being perpetuated and reproduced by the warrior groups.
    Statistical work on modern armies has highlighted analogous trends, despite
the efforts of western societies to establish strict conceptual and legal boundaries
between mundane personal violence and official collective violence. A study on
childhood trauma among the US military found that volunteers were much more
likely to have suffered physical abuse in early life than the general population,92
while  statistical  research on the British and Israeli  armed forces  has  found a
strong  relationship  between  military  experience  and  violent  crime.  A Lancet
study found that while British army enrolment in itself did not have a statistical
impact on later violence, combat roles and exposure to ‘traumatic events’ carried
with them a substantially increased risk of future violent crime.93 And an analysis
of Israeli  homicide and robbery statistics showed a solid  correlation between
periods of high military activity and spikes in the murder rate, concluding that
“...in the long run, violence resulting from conflicts with outgroups (‘enemies’)
is generalized also toward in-group members of society. In other words, there is a
gradual...process  of  erosion  of  basic  social  norms  regarding  violence  within
society.” The fact that these trends are in evidence where they are so clearly
socially  unwanted,  in  societies  which  do  everything  within  their  (very
90 Ross, M. H. “A Cross-Cultural Theory of Political Conflict and Violence”, in Political 
Psychology, vol. 7 no. 6 (1986), p. 447-453
91 See for instance Abbink (2001), p. 133-5
92 Rosen, L. N., Martin, L. “The measurement of childhood trauma among male and female 
soldiers in the U.S. Army”, Military Medicine, 161:6 (1996), p. 342-345; Khawand, C. “The 
Cycle of (Legal) Violence? Child Abuse and Military Aspirations” (2009) [unpublished, 
Florida International University], citing the 1957 Wisconsin Longitudinal Study.
93 Macmanus, D. “Violent offending by UK military personnel deployed to Iraq and 
Afganistan: a data linkage cohort study”, in The Lancet vol.381, iss.9870 (16 March 2013)
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considerable) powers to prevent elision of conduct between the battlefield and
social life, makes these observations all the more striking.94
    All this suggests that the experience of violence, under certain conditions,
somehow stays with many individuals, potentially to re-emerge in the form of
violent behaviour at a later date. The consistent refrain of studies of criminal
violence in particular, which evidently also applies to military contexts, is that
not  only  tolerance  of  violent  experience,  but  enhanced  inclination  to  violent
behaviour, can be picked up and passed between people like a virus95 constituting
a ‘cycle of violence’.96 It also tends to confirm the impression that the resulting
manifestations  of  violence  are  not  necessarily  socially  conventional,  entirely
voluntary,  or  rationally  beneficial  to  their  perpetrators.  Individuals  who have
been  violently  socialized  through  experience  may  join  the  ranks  of  those
involved in legitimate and profitable violence, or express their inclinations in the
form of illegitimate and irrational outbursts, or do both.
    How exactly these processes work is suggested by more detailed research on
human  psychology  and  physiology,  in  terms  of  behavioural  conditioning,
94 Landau, S. F. & Pfeffermann, D. “A time series analysis of violent crime and its relation to 
prolonged states of warfare: the Israeli case”, in Criminology 26:3 (1988); see, also Mullins, 
C. W. & Young, J. K. “Cultures of violence and acts of terror: applying a legitimation-
habituation model to terrorism”, in Crime and Delinquency 58 (2010). Cf. Macek, I. 
“Predicament of war: Sarajevo experiences and the ethics of war” in Schmidt, B. E. & 
Schroder, I. W. Anthropology of violence and conflict (London 2001), p. 208-9. Apocryphal 
evidence from the SS Einsatzgruppen charged with carrying out massacres in the Second 
World War presents a more extreme version of the same process, as (for instance) estimated 
by one commander in 1939 - “...The worst damage affecting Germans which has developed 
as a result of the present conditions, however, is the tremendous brutalization and moral 
depravity which is spreading rapidly among precious German manpower like an epidemic...It
is surprising how quickly such people join forces with those of weak character in order, as is 
currently happening in Poland, to give rein to their bestial and pathological instincts.” - 
Rhodes, R. “Violent socialization and the SS-Einsatzgruppen”, in Athens, L. & Ullmer, J. T. 
(eds.) Violent acts and violentization: assessing, applying, and developing Lonnie Athens’ 
theories, Oxford 2003, p. 93-106
95 A comparison influentially made by Dr James Gilligan on the basis of his work with 
incarcerated violent criminals in the US: Gilligan, J. Violence: reflections on our deadliest 
epidemic (Philadelphia 1999). These ideas have recently become influential in the UK debate
on violence reduction, following highly successful interventions in Glasgow based on the 
conception of violence as a “public health problem”. See, for instance, Skae, T. “The 
violence virus: A community response to reducing youth violence in London”, report for The
London Community Foundation (2017) 
96 Widom, C.S. “The cycle of violence”, in Science 244:4901, (1989) p. 160-166; Khawand 
2009; cf. Athens & Ullmer (ed.) 2003. Not to be confused with the occasional use of the term
by historians to describe feuds between individual families, for instance in Austin, G. 
“Vengeance and law in eleventh-century Worms: Burchard and the canon law of feuds”, in 
Pennington, K. et al Medieval church law and the origins of western legal tradition 
(Washington 2006)
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desensitization,  trauma,  and  ‘learned’ intrinsic  motivation.  These  conceptual
categories  are  to  a  certain  extent  superimposed  upon  the  variegated  studies
employed below for  the sake of  clarity,  since  many of  those studies  employ
different semantic and conceptual frameworks in assessing their subject matter.
Some, for instance, speak in terms of ‘post-traumatic stress disorder’ (or PTSD),
which may rightly be viewed as a culturally defined category embracing a wide
range of symptoms,97 or refer to the development of violent behaviour in value-
laden terms which  are  inappropriate  to  an  early  medieval  context.98 Detailed
analysis of the activity and development of specific brain regions, such as the
hippocampus  and  amygdala,  has  also  been  simplified  and  rendered  in  more
general terms.
    The most  central  themes in  understanding both the  intrinsic  difficulty  of
violence, which makes behavioural conditioning necessary, and the processes by
which conditioning operates, are the concepts of  arousal and  imitation. These
concepts appear prominently in one form or other in all the studies referred to
here.  Extreme  physiological  arousal,  which  is  a  characteristic  response  to
experiencing physical violence whether as participant or witness, among both
humans and other mammals,99 is associated with the release of a potent cocktail
of  chemicals  in  the  brain,  among which  adrenaline  is  the  best  known if  not
necessarily the most important.100 Most people in the present day might describe
the feeling of these processes as discomfort, panic, fear, or possibly (depending
on person and specific scenario) excitement. As we shall see, others, much less
common  in  ordinary  society,  might  even  describe  the  feeling  as  one  of
enjoyment. All these terms, as Dave Grossman aptly puts it, are cultural labels
for what is, on a biological level, a nonspecific threat response. But whatever
97 Awareness has grown that PTSD is a term that conflates a range of symptoms which are not 
necessarily comorbid. See Taft, C. T. & Kaloupek, G. et al, “Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
symptoms, psychological reactivity, alcohol problems, and aggression among military 
veterans”, in Journal of Abnormal Psychology 116:3 (2007), p. 498-9; Garfinkel, S. & 
Liberzon, I. “Neurobiology of PTSD: A review of neuroimaging findings”, in Psychiatric 
Annals 39:6 (June 2009); Macmanus (2013); Jones, “Historical approaches to post-combat 
disorders”, (2006)
98 E.g. Huessman et al (2011)
99 Jansen, A., Nguyen, X., Karpitski, V. & Mettenleiter, M. “Central command neurons of the 
sympathetic nervous system: Basis of the fight-or-flight response”, in Science Magazine 
5236:270 (27 October 1995)
100 Niehoff (1999), p. 121-126
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cultural  labels  are  attached to  these  feelings,  they  are  unusual  and powerful,
making  violence  a  uniquely  challenging  experience  psychologically.101 The
exceptional  human  capacity  for  imitation  may  also  act  as  a  brake  on  the
enactment of violence, since it has been shown to extend to the capacity and
indeed the innate inclination to internalize the feelings of others, including their
pain  and  suffering.102 Thus  both  intense  and  overwhelming  arousal,  and
appreciation of the pain of others,  frequently make humans highly unreliable
fighters  and  killers.103 To  this  extent  we  may  view  the  different  cultural
constructions of intense physiological arousal under conditions of violence or
threat,  as  well  as  cultural  diminishment  of  the  suffering  of  others,  as  social
attempts to cope with the extreme and unfamiliar physiological states entailed in
violence.
    Severe or frequent exposure to violence and threat, and the accompanying
states of arousal, result in a broad range of long-term changes in the brains and
bodies  of  humans  and other  mammals,  producing highly  diverse  behavioural
outcomes. These range from increased fearfulness, in the sense of inclination and
tendency to flee, to heightened aggression, in the sense of inclination to attack
and  fight,  as  well  as  to  a  range  of  other  symptoms  associated  with  mental
‘trauma’ in the scientific literature.104 Historical and sociological work provides
101 Grossman, D. “Psychological effects of combat”, in Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace and 
Conflict (2000)
102 Iacoboni, M. “Imitation, empathy, and mirror neurons”, in Annual Review of Psychology 60 
(2009), p. 653-670
103 Some examples are collected in Collins (2009), p. 18-20
104 In fact trauma can result in both increased and reduced fearfulness in the same individual, by
producing a generalized disregulation of fear responses that results in exaggerated threat 
perception in non-threatening scenarios, and suppressed threat perception in threatening 
scenarios – see Garfinkel, S. & Abelson, J. L. et al, “Impaired Contextual Modulation of 
Memories in PTSD: An fMRI and Psychophysiological Study of Extinction Retention and 
Fear Renewal”, in Journal of Neuroscience 34:40 (2014). Typical symptoms in modern 
warfare are categorized by recent research as “re-experiencing, avoidance, numbing, 
dysphoric-arousal and anxious-arousal” – Osario, C., Jones, N. et al, “Combat Experiences 
and their Relationship to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Symptom Clusters in UK Military 
Personnel Deployed to Afghanistan”, in Behavioural Medicine 44:2 (2017), p. 131-140; 
Garfinkel et al, (2009); Niehoff (1999), p. 48-9. For a critical view of the PTSD concept, and
qualified acceptance of the general concept of trauma, see Argenti, M. & Schramm, K. 
“Introduction”, in M. Argenti & K. Schramm (eds.), Remembering Violence: 
Anthropological Perspectives on intergenerational transmission (New York, 2010), p. 1-22. 
The question of whether and to what extent we can think of individuals in late antiquity as 
“traumatized”, particularly in the sense of subjective emotional distress, is a difficult one, 
and for the purposes of this thesis the concept of adaptation and maladaptation will generally 
be preferred.
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evidence  for  the  central  role  of  culture  in  determining  which  kinds  of
behavioural development become dominant. In different cultural and subcultural
contexts, either ‘flight’ or ‘fight’ can become more or less conventional forms of
behaviour  in  scenarios  of  threat  and  potential  conflict.105 There  is  always  a
spectrum of reactions to experiencing serious violence, but in contexts where
exposure to (and demands for) violence are persistent and relatively normal, the
symptoms associated with psychological trauma shift in emphasis from anxiety
to aggression and loss of empathy.106 Inevitably, the complexities of social life
make  more  variegated  demands,  making  fear  and  revulsion  appropriate
responses to some violent contexts, and aggression and enthusiasm appropriate
to  others,  but  what  the  research  into  violence  cited  above  illustrates  is  the
difficulty  of  maintaining  such  cultural  boundaries.107 This  is  because  the
adaptation  of  behaviour  and  feelings  is  only  partly  the  work  of  culture,  and
remains  partly  an  outcome  of  non-cognitive,  unconscious  and  automatic
biological processes, which are imperfectly adapted to the sophisticated demands
of complex societies.108
    The mechanisms by which adaptations responding to experiences of violence
produce future violent behaviour are in some ways intuitively comprehensible.
Human capacities for imitation and internalization of the feelings and actions of
others, which (as we have seen) can act as a restraining force on violence, can
also help to generate it. Albert Bandura’s famous bobo doll experiments were the
105 Lutz, C. Unnatural emotions: everyday sentiments on a Micronesian atoll and their 
challenge to Western theory, (Chicago 1988), p. 185; Papachristos, A. V. “Murder by social 
structure: Dominance relations and the social structure of gang homicide”, in American 
Journal of Sociology 115:1 (2009), p. 74-128
106 Roach, C. B. “Shallow Affect, No Remorse: the shadow of trauma in the inner city”, in 
Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 19:2 (2013), 150-163. Combat trauma 
associated with modern warfare would also, for instance, presumably be more associated 
with anxiety than its more primitive counterparts, since such symptoms are particularly 
associated with encountering explosive devices – Osario et al (2017), p. 6
107 For an opposing view, see Knauft, B. M. “Reconsidering violence in simple human 
societies”, in Current Anthropology 28:4 (Aug-Oct 1987), p. 473. His argument against 
“strict ecological determinism” and explanations that rely on evolutionary psychology is 
compelling, and he establishes that not all serious social violence is the result of harsh 
socialization in early life. But his argument for the “psychological compartmentalization” of 
violence which can isolate ritual practice from more ordinary life is not fully sustained by the
data he provides, which shows non-ritual murder to also be unusually high among the 
Gebusi.
108 Richardson, P. J. & Boyd, R. Not by genes alone: How culture transformed human evolution,
(Chicago 2005), p. 151-162, provides an illuminating discussion on this topic.
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first  to  illustrate  clearly  how  human  proclivities  to  imitation  make  repeated
exposure  to  violence  a  potential  cause  of  future  violence,  as  behaviours
witnessed are deeply encoded in young brains in particular, and may be quasi-
automatically expressed at a later time.109 ‘Mirror neurons’ observed in primate
brains, and thought to exist in humans, make witnessing actions almost like a
form of practice: some of the same regions of the brain activate for observation
as for performance of the action itself.110 This effect is especially evident where
the violent role-model is a senior or respected figure.111 Desensitization and loss
of  empathy  for  the  fear  and  pain  of  victims  can  also  result  from  frequent
exposure  to  violence  and  other  cruelty.  And,  of  course,  violence  becomes
increasingly habituated through practice, as neural pathways involved in violent
behaviour are strengthened at the expense of other regions: aggressive responses
can be ‘hardwired’ through repetition.112 None of these effects are, however, free
from cultural influence: negative assessments of violence drastically reduce the
effect sizes of automatic learning and desensitization, and a culturally conducive
environment  is  required  to  transform aggression  and  violence  into  relatively
ordinary outcomes.113 Thus the results of the natural human propensity to imitate
are shaped by their subject-matter; in the absence of violent role models, violent
outcomes become overwhelmingly unlikely.
    But passive learning and desensitization are not  the only mechanisms by
which violence is ‘transmitted’ between individuals, nor would they alone serve
to  explain  the  kind  of  sudden outbursts  which  characterise  so  much modern
violent  crime,  and  which  would  seem  to  characterize  the  Sichar  affair.  The
extreme  arousal  associated  with  the  experience  of  violence  also  potentially
109 Bandura, A., Ross, D. & Ross, S. A., “Transmission of aggression through the imitation of 
aggressive models”, in Journal of Abnormal & Social Psychology 63: 3, p. 575-82
110 Iacoboni 2009, p. 653-7. The difficulty of establishing the existence of mirror neurons in the 
human brain with absolute certainty extends from the illegality of invasive experimentation 
on live human subjects.
111 Bandura (1961), p. 579; for military contexts, Kellet, A. Combat motivation: the behaviour 
of soldiers in battle (Boston 1982), p. 307-8
112 Sterling Jr, J. & Amaya-Jackson, L. [American Academy of Pediatrics], “Understanding the 
behavioural and emotional consequences of child abuse”, in Pediatrics 122:3 (Sep 2008), p. 
668-9
113 Dodge, K. A. “Social information processing patterns as mediators of the interactions 
between genetic factors and life experiences in the development of aggressive behaviour” in 
Shaver, P. R. & Mikulincer, M. (eds.) Human aggression and violence: causes, 
manifestations, and consequences (Washington 2011), p. 168-176
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provokes other physiological and psychological changes which go beyond mere
‘hardening’ and actually  make individuals  a  danger  to  those around them. A
principle factor by which such behavioural transformations can occur is threat
sensitivity,  which  can  become  over-developed  under  conditions  of  persistent
threat and violence, leading to increased vigilance or ‘hyper-vigilance’.114 This
can manifest itself as a tendency to see threats and challenges everywhere, and
such ‘hostile attribution biases’, as psychologists have labelled them, can result
in what, to the victims, often seem like unprovoked attacks. A perfectly innocent
and incidental meeting of eyes may be interpreted as an aggressive challenge.
This kind of heightened threat-sensitivity and hyper-vigilance is a common effect
of exposure to military violence, childhood abuse, and a range of experiences of
violence in other settings.115
    Another  salient  factor  in  the  quasi-automatic  social  reproduction  and
transmission of violent behaviour,  alluded to earlier,  is the important issue of
subjective interpretations of the arousal associated with experiences of violence.
As  mentioned,  many  in  the  West  would  probably  describe  the  physiological
arousal associated with participation in real and immediate violence as fear, but it
need  not  be  described  in  this  way.  The  testimonies  of  people  who  have
participated  in  frequent  and/or  extreme violence  often  reveal  their  subjective
perception  of  the  experience  as  thrilling  and  even  intensely  pleasurable.116
Participants from military and criminal settings have described these feelings as
a kind of ‘high’ akin to a powerful drug, which,  given the potent cocktail  of
chemicals involved, is not an entirely inaccurate description.117 Participants in
violence  can  also  become  psychologically  addicted  to  the  social  power  and
114 Niehoff (1999), p. 121-6. See above, note 104.
115 Kimble, M., Fleming, K. & Bennion, K. A. “Contributors to hypervigilance in a military and 
civilian sample” in Journal of Interpersonal Violence 28:8 (2013); Sterling Jr, J. & Amaya-
Jackson, L. (2008); Mat Saat, M. B. & Geshina, A. M. S.  “The risk of hypervigilance among
police personnel”, in Beyond (PDRM Selangor Bulletin) 4 (2013), p. 22-4; Maruna, S. & 
Butler, M. “Violent self-narratives and hostile attribution biases”, in D. Youngs (ed.),  
Behavioural Analysis of Crime: Studies in David Cantor’s Investigative Psychology 
(Aldershot 2017), p. 27-48; Dodge, K. A. & Malone, P. S. et al, “Hostile Attribution Bias and
aggressive behaviour in global context”, in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
of the United States of America 112:30 (2015); Orobio de Castro, B. & Veerman, J. W. et al, 
“Hostile attribution intent and aggressive behaviour: a meta-analysis”, in Child Development 
73:3 (2002), 916-934; Huessman et al, (2011)
116 Athens (1998); Bourke (1999), p. 18-20; Nadelson, T. Trained to kill: soldiers at war 
(Baltimore 2005), p. 23-5, also citing Bufford, B. Among the thugs: the experience, and the 
seduction, of crowd violence (1992); Sutterluty (2009)
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respect  that  accompanies  a  fearful  reputation,  internalizing  their  ‘violent
notoriety’ in the construction of identity.118 We may view these traits, once again,
partly  as  an  act  of  sub-cultural  construction,  and  partly  as  a  process  of
physiological adaptation, which allows individuals to cope more effectively with
repeated exposure to intense and visceral experiences,  but at  the cost of also
making  them  more  prone  to  desire  and  actively  seek  to  provoke  such
experiences.
    It is important to stress the variability of these processes not only between
subcultures,  but  also  between  individuals.  Under  the  same  conditions,  some
individuals  are  more  biologically  disposed  to  developing  violent  behavioural
profiles than others in any given context. In the modern West the most important
biological  factor  identified  in  these  differences  is  what  is  known as  ‘affect’,
meaning  the  degree  of  physiological  intensity  with  which  emotions  are
experienced in violent or other intense situations.119 Less sensitive ‘low-affect’
individuals are less likely to find experiences of violence overwhelming, and are
therefore more capable of enjoying them, than others, and such physiological
profiles  are  inordinately  represented  among  modern  violent  criminals.120 The
most extreme end of ‘low-affect’ is one of the defining physiological markers by
which violent psychopaths are identified.121 But evidence from the US prison
system and elsewhere implies that ‘low-affect’ and psychopathy is not only made
genetically, but also can come about through social processes.122 In short, people
can learn not only to tolerate violent experience but to love it,  and once the
117 Nadelson (2005); Sutterluty (2009). Foucault’s concept of ‘limit-experience’ is relevant here 
in that the powerful feelings involved in participation in serious violence shows a capacity 
for breaking through ordinary thresholds of morality - “Interview with Michel Foucault”, in 
Michel Foucault: Essential Works, Volume 3; Power (London 2000)
118 Athens, L. & Ullmer (2003), p. 17-18
119 Roach (2013); Niehoff (1999), p. 129-130.
120 Ibid.
121 Herve, H. “Psychopathy across the ages: A history of the Hare Psychopath”, in H. Herve and 
J. C. Yuille (eds.) The Psychopath (New York 2007), p. 31-56; Hakkanen-Nyholm, H. & 
Nyholm, J.-O. Psychopathy and Law: A Practitioner’s Guide (New York 2012), p. 146
122 Huesmann, L. R. & Kirwil, L. “Why observing violence increases the risk of violent 
behaviour by the observer”, in D. J. Flannery, A. T. Vazsonyi, & I. D. Waldman (eds.), The 
Cambridge Handbook of violent behaviour and aggression (Cambridge 2007), p. 545-570; 
Raine, A. “Autonomic nervous system factors underlying disinhibited, antisocial, and violent
behaviour: biological perspectives and treatment implications”, in Annals of the New York 
Academy of Sciences 794:1 (September 1996), p. 46-59; cf. Palmeri Sams, D. & Truscott, S. 
D. “Empathy, exposure to community violence, and use of violence among urban, at-risk 
adolescents”, in Child and youth care forum vol.33 iss.1 (Feb 2004), p. 33-50
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experience of violence has been subjectively constructed so as to be associated
with such psychologically and physiologically intrinsic rewards, no material or
cultural motivations may be necessary to provoke it.123
    A considerable quantity of research also points to the powerful role of the
immediate  social  group  in  generating  violence.  Ever  since  observations  of
battlefield behaviour in detail undermined military confidence in the capacity of
soldiers  to  perform  their  combat  duties  reliably,  the  instrumentality  of  the
immediate  social  group  or  ‘primary  group’ has  been  a  principle  and  highly
effective  means  by  which  such  reluctance  has  been  overcome  in  practice.124
Albert J. Glass commented that “even the poorly motivated soldier is literally
forced to adopt the prevailing group attitude because the battle situation is hardly
the place to be left alone.”125 Such reasoning certainly would apply to the pre-
industrial battlefield every bit as much, and would not have been unfamiliar to
Vegetius, who suggested that inexperienced warriors must be prepared for battle
by participation in minor skirmishes in the company of veterans.126 Through such
group dynamics, the principles of arousal and imitation can be harnessed to bring
the group into step with its most active members, as those who feel the least
discomfort  and the  most  enthusiasm set  examples  which  drag  the  remaining
members in their wake, so to speak. Similar conclusions have been reached in
studies of criminal violence, with association with violent peers being identified
as an important ‘risk factor’.127 The results of this kind of kind of ‘entrainment’
within groups can potentially go far beyond ordinary or ordinate violence and
verge into what in modern terms would be described as atrocity.128
123 Roach (2013), p. 6; Sutterluty (2009), p. 49-50
124 Bourke 1999, p. 87, citing Kellet, A. “Combat motivation”, in Belenky, G. Contemporary 
studies in combat psychiatry (New York 1987)
125 “Preventive psychiatry in the combat zone”, in US Armed Forces Medical Journal vi.683 
(1953), p. 689
126 See Introduction, note 1.
127 Hemphill, S. A. & Smith, R. et al, “Modifiable determinants of youth violence in Australia 
and the United States: A longitudinal study”, in Australian and New Zealand Journal of 
Criminology 42:3 (2009), p. 289-309
128 Bourke (1999), p. 179; Horowitz (2001); Collins (2008). The latter describes such scenarios 
persuasively in terms of ‘forward panic’, that is, a kind of violent emotional entrainment in 
which participants’ psychologies are subsumed into the group under the influence of the 
chemicals produced by the brain in such ‘fight-or-flight’ conditions.
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    In all these ways, violent behaviour is passed between individuals as a social
product in human cultures and sub-cultures, and transformed from an exceptional
and shocking experience into a relatively normal one. Clearly there are important
elements  of  culturally  conditioned  strategy  here.  But  the  process  is  neither
straightforward  nor  under  the  full  conscious  control  of  participants,  and  its
outcomes  include  not  just  enhanced  capacities  to  enact  violence  where  it  is
deemed culturally appropriate, but also increased tendencies to enact violence
where it is not. This returns us to Marc Bloch’s seldom-quoted maxim, that “the
irrational  is  an  important  element  in  all history”,  to  which  we  should  add,
“especially  where  violence  is  involved”,  since  the  physiological  effects  of
experiencing  violence  can  include  the  loss  of  capacities  for  what  would
commonly be called rational  decision-making among its  participants,  as their
subjective  perceptions  of  threat  and  challenge  fall  out  of  step  with  their
contemporaries, and the development of intrinsic motivations for violence goes
far  beyond  what  is  commonly  deemed  to  be  socially  appropriate.  The  same
processes  that  produce  ‘hard  men’  capable  of  enacting  necessary  violence
without hesitation also produce a dangerous effluent of indifference to suffering,
aggressiveness, high reactivity and enjoyment of violence.
    Violence, then, is a product not just of socio-economic competition, or even of
cultural habitus, but also of adaptation to experience. The processes by which it
is  socially  reproduced  have  much  to  do  with  automatic  physiological
mechanisms of response and development, which interact dynamically with the
cognitive processes taken for granted in human motivation. In the simplest terms,
people do not only fight for discrete goals, or because society tells them to fight,
as  very  reasonable  and  often  repeated  a  priori  understanding  of  human
motivation might deduce. They also fight because they have been primed – both
at  a  psychological  and a  physiological  level  –  to  react  violently,  to  interpret
situations  in  terms  of  violence,  and  even  to  positively  enjoy  and  look  for
opportunities  for  violence,  by  their  prior  experiences.  The  hitherto
underappreciated  physiological  parts  of  this  process  are  all  related  to  the
similarly  underappreciated,  though  not  unappreciated,  powerful  states  of
physiological arousal associated with violent experiences, and the ways in which
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the human body and brain adapts in response to them. These include exaggerated
perception  and  response  to  threat,  diminished  empathy  and  fear,  increased
aggression, and positive interpretations of the experience of violence itself, as
well as the psychological dynamics of the violent group. In all these ways, the
violence of warfare may insinuate itself into ordinary social life, and the violence
of social life may contribute to enthusiasm and competence in war.
    Returning to the specific discussion of how post-Roman armies were prepared
for battle, what the sociological and psychological work suggests is that there
may  be  a  much  greater  quantity  of  evidence  for  the  causes  of  military
participation in the late- and post-Roman Frankish kingdoms than a conventional
understanding of the phenomenon of violence would imply. Since preparation for
war can be deeply embedded and integrated into social (including political) life,
sources relating to the violence of social life may in fact be precious evidence for
a unique social system by which competences and inclinations to violence were
reproduced and propagated in the absence of constant centralized organization
and more conventionally professional military training. And since experiences of
military violence can profoundly influence the behavioural  and psychological
development of individuals, sources relating to warfare may have more to tell us
about  the  social  development  of  the  affected  communities  than  has  been
appreciated hitherto.
    In the following chapters we will look again at the warrior elites of late- and
post-Roman Gaul and Germany through this lens, connecting their  social and
cultural evolution with the exceptional exposure of the regions in question to
warfare. And we will reconsider their laws and social conventions, to explore
whether and in what ways they can help us to understand the process by which
violence  and  aggressive  personality  types  were  continually  reproduced,  and
psychological readiness for war was maintained. We will use this evidence to
think about  the specific  social  configuration of  violence by which social  life
prepared post-Roman warriors for war, and vice-versa.
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Chapter 2: Franks and Roman armed forces around the 
Western Frontiers to c. 395
“It is their sport to send axes hurtling through the vast void and
know beforehand where the blow will fall, to whirl their shields, to
outstrip with leaps and bounds the spears they have hurled and
reach the enemy first. Even in boyhood’s years the love of fighting
is full-grown. Should they chance to be sore pressed by numbers or
by the luck of the ground, death may overwhelm them, but not
fear;  unconquerable  they  stand  their  ground,  and  their  courage
well-nigh outlives their lives.”129
   -    Sidonius Apollinaris, Panegyric for the Emperor Majorian
    This passage, from Sidonius Apollinaris’s panegyric to Majorian, illustrates
both the interest of the Franks, for the purposes of this thesis, and the difficulty
of studying them prior to the sixth century. Although written in the context of
two centuries of continuous and intimate contact between the Franks and the
Romans,  Sidonius’  description  remains  an  infuriatingly  ossified  stereotype,
which obscures as much as it illuminates. And this is true for all of our sources
prior to  Lex Salica, which universally come from within an empire for which
barbarians served not just practical but also ideological purposes. So in a sense,
while we can address the realities of the late empire, we cannot but view the
Franks through the distorting lens of imperial perception. Nonetheless, even a
jaundiced  view can  be  of  use  in  understanding  the  relationship  between  the
empire  and  the  Franks.  And one  stereotype  that  the  Franks  were  deemed  to
epitomize – the suitability and enthusiasm for war – was provably related to
reality, for it shaped Roman military policy profoundly in the fourth century. It
formed  a  vital  plank  of  the  relationship  of  the  Franks  to  the  empire,  and
influenced the development of military subcultures close to the frontiers, who
were sometimes characterized in similar terms. It is with this stereotype, its basis
in reality, and its effects, that this chapter is principally concerned.
129 Sidonius Apollinaris’ Panegyric for Majorian, in W. B. Anderson (trans.) Poems & Letters, 
(1936) p. 82-3
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    This chapter traces, as far as is possible in light of the one-sided evidence, the
development of the Franks to the end of the fourth century. It also traces the
much better attested, but no less contested, development of various armed groups
which comprised the armies of northern Gaul, who fought alongside and against
Franks  throughout  the  period,  and  who  would  ultimately  make  important
contributions  to  the  character  of  the  Frankish  kingdoms.  In  the  process  the
discussion engages with the debates surrounding the extent and nature of the
violence affecting the north-western empire, and the identity of the Franks and
other groups whom the Roman armies sought to recruit. It will be argued that the
regions close to the Rhine frontier were marked out by an apparent proliferation
of violent subcultures, which produced a large quantity of fighters who were a
source both of strength and of trouble to the empire. And it will be argued that
the  identities  of  these  subcultures,  while  not  inimical  to  Roman  military
effectiveness, were somewhat estranged from Roman-ness – particularly in their
reputation  for  unrestrained  violence  –  in  a  way  that  laid  the  ground for  the
takeover of warrior elites who claimed self-consciously non-Roman identities.
2.1 – The Franks, Gaul, and the Gallic Armies to the Mid-Fourth Century
    The Franks were a relatively late development on the Rhine frontier, only
emerging after centuries of contact between the Empire and various Germanic
groups.  An  apparent  supra-tribal  group  that  included  a  number  of  local  and
‘ethnic’ identities, they were seemingly more or less synonymous with a number
of tribes who had existed on the fringes of the empire since its first occupation of
northern  Gaul,  including  Chamavi,  Chatti,  Amsivarii,  Bructeri,  Sicumbri  and
Batavi.130 The process by which these groups were brought together is obscure,
but the manner of the Franks’ arrival in the empire suggests it was not entirely
peaceful.131 It would seem that the Franks were to some extent the institutional
product of the longstanding relationship between the Germanic peoples and their
130 Halsall, G. Barbarian migrations and the Roman West, 376-568, (Cambridge 2007), p. 118-
119. The panegyricist Nazarius adds the Cherusci and “Lancionae” to this list, but the former
is thought to have ceased to exist sometime earlier, and his inclusion of the Alamanni in the 
supposed coalition weakens his already questionable evidence – Pan.Lat. VI.18
131 See below, p. 51-2
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more sophisticated southern neighbours.132 Large agglomerations of tribes had
coalesced several times north of the Rhine over the centuries,  but the Franks
were  symptomatic  of  a  more  general  trend  by  which  larger  political  bodies
emerged who could more effectively deal with – and take on – the empire and its
armies.133
    The evolution of larger and more militarily threatening groups beyond the
Rhine  was  associated  with  social  and  economic  developments  which  were
influenced by contact with the empire. Archaeological evidence illustrates the
growing  populations,  as  well  as  the  increasing  quantity  and  quality  of
manufactured  wares  north  of  the  Rhine.134 This  demographic  and  economic
growth was a contributory factor to the growth of Germanic military retinues,
which  were  able  to  take  the  lion’s  share  of  the  opportunities  for  enrichment
through trade,  subsidies, and violent raiding, provided by the empire.135 What
was  more,  the  empire  systematically  intensified  the  social  and  economic
incentives for violence for barbarians on both sides of the frontier.136 Enhanced
opportunities  for  slave-trading  made  predatory  raiding  more  economically
attractive, while contact with the empire stimulated the opening of mines which
(if  anything  like  their  Roman  counterparts)  must  have  entailed  considerable
brutality.  A massive votive weapon burial  from early-third century Jutland is
illustrative of the increasing size and sophistication of barbarian armed forces.137
It  also  serves  as  a  reminder  that  throughout  the  imperial  period,  wars  of
considerable scale and potential historical significance were taking place beyond
the Rhine that went unnoticed by the literary sources.
132 Todd, M. “The Germanic peoples and Germanic society”, in CAH 12 (Cambridge 2005), p. 
441-2; Pohl, W. “Frontiers and ethnic identities: some final considerations”, in Curta, F. 
(ed.), Borders, Barriers and Ethnogenesis: Frontiers in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages 
(Turnhout 2005), p. 263
133 Heather, P. “The Late Roman art of client management: Imperial defence in the fourth 
century West, in W. Pohl, I. Wood and H. Reimitz (eds.) The Transformation of Frontiers: 
From Late antiquity to the Carolingians (Leiden 2001) p. 44-6
134 Whittaker, C. M. Frontiers of the Roman Empire, (Baltimore 1994), p. 220
135 Heather (2009), p. 77-8
136 Shaw, B. D. “War and Violence”, in Bowersock, G. W., Brown, P. & Grabar, O. Late 
Antiquity: A guide to the postclassical world (1999), p. 156-160
137 Hedeager, L. “Empire, frontier and the barbarian hinterland: Rome and northern Europe from
AD 1-400”, in Rowlands, M., Larsen, M. & Kristiansen, K. (eds.), Centre and Periphery in 
the Ancient World, (Cambridge 1987) p. 132-139
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    In social-psychological perspective, it is clear that material products were not
the only things being transported across the highly volatile border regions. There
was also a grim traffic in violent experiences across the frontier with deep and
lasting psychological repercussions for all involved. The lands beyond the Rhine,
in particular, were periodically exposed to punitive campaigns of destruction and
enslavement  by  massed  imperial  armies  in  the  course  of  imperial  “frontier
management”138. The consistency of these activities across regimes, as well as
their medium-term political effectiveness, has been pointed out.139 However, in
the  face  of  totally  one-sided  accounts,  there  are  reasons  for  pessimism both
regarding the justifications and the long-term results of imperial campaigns. The
ideology of military victory was so strong, so fundamental to imperial prestige,
that historians and panegyricists felt no shame in claiming that their emperors
were not merely looking to restore order in Gaul, but was also spoiling for a
bloody fight.140 The frequency with which civilian populations were apparently
surprised by the legions implies that  many of the regions caught  up in these
‘reprisals’ had not been participants in the prior provocations.141
    However, even if the Roman justifications for their periodic massive military
incursions into barbarian territory were questionable, we should be careful not to
under-estimate the damage done by Germanic raiders who crossed the Rhine in
search of combat and plunder. Archaeological traces of raiding loot confirms the
impression that attacks from east of the Rhine, which were ordinarily carried out
by small raiding-parties, were often undocumented.142 The inveterate continuity
of barbarian attacks on the empire, in spite of strong defences, crushing defeats
138 Heather (2001), p. 20-23; Seager, R. “Roman policy on the Rhine and Danube in 
Ammianus”, in The Classical Quarterly, 49:2 (1999), p. 579
139 Heather (2001), p. 67-8; for the development of the frontier prior to the fourth century, see 
Wilkes, J. “Provinces and Frontiers”, in CAH vol. 12 (2005)
140 Lee (2012), p. 37-50; cf. McCormick, Eternal Victory, (1990), p. 36-41; Whittaker (1994), p.
208. In his characterization of Julian, Ammianus reveals the ideological dimension of these 
campaigns… “Urged on by his native energy, he dreamed of the din of battle and the 
slaughter of savages.”Ammianus, XVI.1; see also, Pan.Lat. VI.11, 16, where imperial 
reluctance to participate in civil war is contrasted with the unhesitating and cruel destruction 
of the Franks and their leaders.
141 Pan.Lat. VI.12; Ammianus XVI.11; Zosimus III.68. The Historia Augusta claims that Probus
instituted a policy of offering rewards for severed barbarian heads to the soldiers – Probus 
XIV
142 Heather, P. “Imperial centre and northwest frontier, A.D. 300-476” (Unpublished), p. 7-10 & 
n. 21
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and vicious retaliatory campaigns of terror and destruction north of the limes, is
difficult to explain in terms of clear-eyed strategy.143 This raises a significant but
neglected question: given their terrible consequences and frequently disastrous
outcomes, why did these attacks continue? 
    One incident in Ammianus, which gives a momentary glimpse of a barbarian
viewpoint  on  tit-for-tat  conflict  across  the  frontier,  may  be  instructive.  The
Quadi, challenged by an enraged emperor Valentinian to justify their pleas for
peace, “gave the usual series of excuses... They declared that there had been no
common consent of the chiefs of their race in any wrong that had been done us,
but  that  the  hostile  acts  had  been  committed  by  bands  of  foreign  brigands
dwelling near the river.”144 Ammianus seems incredulous toward these denials of
responsibility by the Quadi leadership for attacks across the frontier, and it may
be that they were falsely pleading their innocence in this case.145 But the scene is
far more interesting for what it highlights in military affairs at the frontier, which
comes through consistently in the sources. The larger political and ethnic units
north of the limes, even if joined by some basic bonds of political loyalty, did not
possess the degree of organizational capacity or unity necessary to control the
actions  of  the  small  fighting  groups  from  the  which  the  larger  army  was
occasionally composed. Even Roman military commanders enjoyed considerable
freedom of action in the absence of the emperor.146 This made it  consistently
likely – from either side of the frontier – that some group or other would cross
over  in  search  of  plunder  without  the  consent  or  knowledge  of  the  wider
community. But reprisals on both sides were innately unlikely to recognise these
distinctions. In fact, when the legions arrived in force, the very people for whom
they  were  ostensibly  looking  –  inevitably  highly  mobile  groups  of  men  of
fighting age – would be the least likely to fall victim to the consequences of their
143 Elton, H. “Imperial Campaigns between Diocletian and Honorius, A.D. 284-423: The Rhine 
Frontier and the Western Provinces”, in Sarantis, A. and Christie, N. (eds.) War and Warfare 
in Late Antiquity: Current Perspectives (Leiden 2013), p. 656-660; Sarantis, A. “Waging war
in Late Antiquity”, in A. Sarantis and N. Christie (eds.), (2013), p. 22-3; Pan.Lat. VII.4
144 Ammianus XXX.6
145 Ibid.
146 Heather (2001), p. 40
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actions. Instead, the most vulnerable non-combatants would have been the most
likely victims on both sides.147
    Thus, while raids into the empire formed a less-than-zero sum game for the
populations north of the limes as a whole, they could still be highly profitable to
the groups that  undertook them, who were generally capable of avoiding the
brunt  of  the  empire’s  military  retaliations.  However,  the  assumption  that
barbarian raids and larger attacks were motivated by economic gain and glory
cannot be taken for granted.148 Clearly, there was much wealth to be plundered
within  the  empire.  But  equally  clearly,  northern  Gaul  was  less  abundantly
stocked with precious objects in the late-third and fourth centuries than it had
been  in  the  second,  and  raiding  armies  and  smaller  groups  were  frequently
caught, defeated and enslaved or slaughtered unmercifully. Even if they escaped
the empire unscathed and avoided the inevitable reprisals, their extended families
and communities would be liable to suffer severely. Such likely consequences
could hardly be justified by the hope of modest economic gain. What all this
suggests is that among the Franks, the profits of raiding had acquired a social
value that far exceeded their purchasing power. And that this value was closely
associated with the violence by which they were acquired.
    The population north of the Rhine was therefore relatively exposed to the
psychological consequences of extreme violence. And, as importantly in terms of
the development of violent subcultures, Roman attacks and economic incentives
to violence were probably interacting with a pre-existing set of Germanic social
mores that already prized martial courage and ability highly.149 Of course, we
cannot be sure of the accuracy of Tacitus’ reports of Germanic social life in the
early phases of contact with the empire.150 He was quite certainly ensconced in
Roman prejudices regarding the northern barbarians, and the agenda of glorious
warfare and military recruitment by which they were driven. But his description
147 For instance, Ammianus XVIII.2
148 See Chapter 1.
149 Green, D. H. Language and History in the Early Germanic World (Cambridge 1998), p. 67; 
Tacitus, Germania VI-VIII, XIV
150 For criticism of Tacitus’ evidence and its use in assessing the early Germans, see for 
instance, Goffart, W. “Two notes on Germanic antiquity today”, in Traditio 50 (1995), 9-30; 
cf. O’Gorman, E. “No place like Rome: Identity and difference in the Germania of Tacitus”, 
in Ash, R (ed.), Oxford Readings in Tacitus (Oxford 2012)
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of Roman relations with the Batavi – who were destined to remain in service to
the  empire  for  another  four  centuries  –  is  highly  instructive  in  terms  of  the
Roman input to Germanic social development: “…they are not subjected to the
indignity of tribute or ground down by the tax-gatherer...they are like weapons
and armour – ‘only to be used in war’”.151 This brief statement distils Roman
prejudice and the invidious position in which it placed the tribes of the northern
frontiers  over  which  the  empire  loomed  so  large.  The  only  way  to  avoid
subjugation and humiliation at the hands of the empire – on both a personal and
collective  level  –  was  the  warrior  lifestyle,  because  warriors  were  the  only
uniquely  valuable  human  resource  that  the  frontiers  could  provide.152 By
becoming the violent archetype of the Roman imagination,  Germans could at
least become valuable and highly prized creatures, rather than a disdained and
abject chattels.
    In  the  previous  chapter,  we  saw how Lonnie  Athens  identified  “violent
notoriety” as a key basis for identity among persistently violent individuals.153
The evident fear and respect commanded by a dangerous reputation is a powerful
basis of self-perception, which can be very difficult to shake off even when it
also comes attached to all the attendant inconveniences and dangers of existence
as part of an officially proscribed criminal subculture. An elite Germanic warrior
faced  greater  dangers  still,  but  like  some modern  criminal  groups,  they  also
enjoyed unchallenged supremacy in their local milieus. And if the Roman empire
sometimes  hunted  these  warriors  and  sought  their  destruction,  they  equally
sometimes sought their  service and favoured them with gifts  and preferential
treatment relative to other, non-militarized barbarians.
    By defining the utilitas of the Germanic peoples according to their capacities
for  armed  combat,  the  Roman  empire  was  creating  powerful  psychological
factors  driving  violent  behaviour  among  the  tribal  elites  around  the  Rhine,
effectively pushing the process of elite identity-formation toward an exclusively
militant model. If Germanic elites wished to be recognized and taken seriously
151 Tacitus, Germania XXIX
152 Shaw (1999), p. 159, concludes that through these systematic incentives, violence “became 
part of the frontier groups’ learned behaviour”.
153 Chapter 1, p. 15
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by their Roman counterparts, the empire made it consistently clear that this could
only be achieved by proving their military worth. We are provided with precious
little evidence of non-military elites in the Roman sources,  but the rare first-
century  example  given by Tacitus  of  revered  women credited  with prophetic
powers,  finds  no  parallels  in  accounts  of  the  Germanic  tribes  from the  third
century onward.154 More concretely,  evidence of the shifting nomenclature of
leadership betrays the increasingly militarized character of Germanic elites into
the fourth century.155 Thus, contact with the empire was acting as a powerful
stimulant  for  the  development  of  violent  behavioural  profiles  among  the
Germans. To the extent that Frankish identity was a novelty, subsuming other
more ancient identities which had existed since at least the early imperial period,
it  is likely that is its  military and violent connotations exceeded those of the
cultures encountered by Tacitus.
    Frankish armies burst onto the Roman scene in an incredibly audacious, albeit
strategically  inept,  campaign  of  raiding  that  penetrated  as  far  as  the
Mediterranean  in  the  later  third  century.156 The  Frankish  incursions  were  a
somewhat belated contribution to a much wider malaise that gripped the empire
in the third century, in which the frontiers were compromised in both east and
west, Roman armies oscillated between external warfare and internal rebellions,
and  small  armies  of  latrones –  sometimes  called  Bagaudae or  Bacaudae –
terrorized the countryside.157 Throughout  this  period,  the Roman armies  were
instrumental not just in dealing with the chaos, but also in causing it in the first
154 Tacitus, Histories IV.61. The later evidence of Gregory of Tours implies that such  customs 
were not totally eradicated – see Histories V.14; VII.44; VIII.33
155 See Green (1998) p. 128-136; Heather (2009), p. 46, 65
156 Todd, M. The Early Germans, (Hoboken 2009), p. 180-181; Pan.Lat. IV.17; Aurelius Victor, 
XXXIII
157 Ibid. XXVI-XXXIII; Southern, P. The Roman Empire from Severus to Constantine (New 
York 2001), p. 83-210. There is considerable debate over the social character of the 
Bagaudae/Bacaudae (see Halsall 2007 p. 218, for a summary). Their Celtic-sounding name 
has given rise to etymological speculation that they were a quasi-ethnic group, but this has 
been substantively questioned on the basis of possible errors in manuscript transmission – 
see Minor, C. E. “Bacaudae: A reconsideration”, in Traditio 51 (1996), p. 297-304. However,
a reference in Salvian, though it confirms Minor’s impression of the correct spelling, tends to
reinforce the idea that the Bacaudae were (at least by the fifth century) culturally distinct to 
the point where they might be thought of as barbarians – Salvian, De Gubernatione Dei, V.5. 
See next chapter, n. 302
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place.158 The majority of emperors were chosen by the armies they led in the
field,  and died  at  the  hands of  assassins  from within  the ranks of  their  own
disaffected  legions.  The  later-3rd century  in  particular  yields  considerable
archaeological evidence of destruction, including a glut of coin-hoards within the
empire, pointing to increased economic insecurity. And these were particularly
clustered between the Seine and Rhine, indicating that this was the zone exposed
to the most intensive disruption in the late third century.159
    A series of military reorganizations, combined with effective campaigning
between the reigns of Diocletian and Constantine, restored a measure of political
stability to empire and frontier in the fourth century.160 The military also became
a more ubiquitous presence in Northern provinces as a biproduct of the efforts to
create a more effective system of defence and minimize the disruptive tendencies
of massed frontier  legions,  as  larger  units  were broken down and distributed
more widely across Gaul.161 Large mobile  comitatenses were billeted on cities,
while the ordinary work of frontier defence was done by less elite local forces of
limitanei. The threat of the Franks was turned to the empire’s advantage, as a
series of aggressive imperial campaigns between the late-third and early-fourth
centuries repeatedly denuded their heartlands of warriors, many of whom were
used to fill the ranks of the depleted Roman armies.162 
    The experiences of the third century not only led to military reforms, but also
permanently changed the landscape and society of the regions within striking
distance of the frontiers. Not only were fortifications on the limes renewed and
enhanced, but local populations which had relied on the  pax Romana for their
security increasingly looked to their own defence, tending to fortify themselves
158 See de Blois, L. “The military factor in the onset of crises in the Roman empire in the third 
century AD”, in L. de Blois & E. lo Castro (eds.), The Impact of the Roman Army (200 BC–
476 AD), (Leiden 2007), p. 497-509
159 Cleary, S. E. The Roman West, AD 200-500: An Archaeological Study (Cambridge 2013), p. 
32-39; Whittaker, “Landlords and Warlords”, in J. Rich and G. Shipley (eds.), War and 
Society in the Roman World (London 1993), p. 292; Wightman, E. M. Gallia Belgica, 
(Manchester 1985), p. 196-7.
160 Lee (2007), p. 10-11
161 Cleary (2013), p. 43
162 Historia Augusta: Probus, XIII; Zosimus 1.68; Pan.Lat. VI.12; VII.4; VIII.9; Lee (2007), p. 
413-415, against the opinion of Zosimus 2.33.
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with  ditches,  towers  and  walls.163  And  in  the  fourth  century  these  regions
remained  relatively  economically  and  demographically  retarded,  never  fully
regaining the prosperity achieved in the second century.164 Trier and its environs
were exceptional in this respect, having been made the seat of imperial power in
region,  and  a  few  other  urban  centres  recovered  somewhat.  But  where  the
emperor and his armies did not act as patrons, urban populations north of the
Loire  declined  and  such  quintessentially  Roman  crafts  as  mosaic  and
monumental architecture in stone died out.165 Several regions of northern Gaul
were virtually abandoned and had to be repopulated with barbarian settlers, and
the  villa  was  widely  replaced  with  other  cruder  architectural  forms  more
reminiscent of pre-Roman or contemporary German examples.166 The failure of
northern Gaul to ever recover fully after the crises of the third century provides
circumstantial support for the notion that the region was troubled by small-scale
raiding that generally went under radar of the narrative sources.167
    Auxiliaries  and  federate  groups  still  revolved  around  a  core  of  soldiers
recruited and trained within the empire.168 But the social profile of the army had
163 Wilkes (2005), p. 258-260; Schonberger, H. “The Roman Frontier in Germany: An 
archaeological survey”, in The Journal of Roman Studies, vol. 59, no. 1/2 (1969), p. 144-197,
p. 178-186; Wightman (1985), p. 222; Whittaker (1993), p. 292; Sarantis, A. and Christie, N. 
“Fortifications in the West: A bibliographical essay”, in A. Sarantis and N. Christie (eds.), 
War and Warfare in Late Antiquity (Leiden 2013), p. 268-277. Some of these fortifications 
were not very effective, but their frequently hasty construction, using spolia from fine 
Roman architecture and funerary monuments, illustrates that they were not mere exercises in 
civic display. For evidence of fortification of private residences, which tended to focus on the
defence of food storage facilities, see Van Ossel, P. & Ouzoulias, P. ‘Rural settlement 
economy in Northern Gaul in the Late Empire: an overview’, in Journal of Roman 
Archaeology, 13 (2000), p. 143-6
164 Wightman (1985), p. 227-246; Halsall (2007), p. 83-86, 346-9. For a good summary of the 
difficulties and shortcomings of the archaeological evidence (many of which stem from the 
regional diversity in quantity and quality of archaeological work), which nonetheless 
concludes that there was indeed an overall fall in settlements in the period, see Van Ossel & 
Ouzoulias (2000), p. 134-8
165 Ibid.; Cleary (2013), p. 94-5. Constantine’s decree of 320, freeing veterans from participation
in public works, may have contributed to this problem – Cod.Theo. VII.20.2
166 Pan. Lat. VIII.18 lists “the territory of the Ambiani [Amiens], Bellovaci [Beauvais], 
Tricasses [Troyes], and Lingones [Langres]” as the worst affected by abandonment of 
agricultural land. See Wightman (1985), p. 229-230. For archaeological evidence in the 
Aisne valley, see Haselgrove, C. ‘La Romanisation de l'Habitat Rural dans la Vallée de 
l'Aisne d'Aprés les Prospectations de Surface et les Fouilles Récentes’, in Revue 
Archeologique de Picardie Special, 11 (1996), p. 109-114
167 Wightman (1985), p. 246
168 Elton (2013), p. 659-660; There is considerable debate around this point, which generally 
revolves around the weight placed on the various impressionistic surmises contained in the 
narrative evidence. See, for instance Lee (2009), p. 12; Liebeschuetz (2006), p. 266
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been  shifting  in  other,  possibly  more  significant  ways,  since  the  early  third
century. The conceptual link between citizenship and honourable service in the
military had deteriorated, senators no longer took military commands, and the
recruitment base of the army was increasingly “narrow and regionally specific”
to the regions close to the frontiers.169 Equipment characteristic of Roman armies
had altered considerably by the late fourth century. Shields had become rounder
and  lighter,  while  the  short  gladius was  replaced  by  the  longer  and  more
characteristically  Germanic  spatha as  the  principle  side-arm.170 The  cause  of
these changes – which made the Roman soldiers appear less distinct from their
barbarian  allies  –  is  not  discussed  in  the  written  sources,  but  it  is  not
unreasonable to infer  that  they were associated with the cultural  influence of
Germanic military traditions  on the Roman armies.171 And their  practical  and
psychological  implications  for  massed  ranks  in  combat  would  have  been
profound. The rounder shield impeded the ability of closely packed soldiers to
form  an  impenetrable  wall  of  shields,  whilst  facilitating  greater  freedom  of
movement to the individual fighter. The longer sword, similarly, made fighting in
tight formations awkward, being better suited to slashing attacks the required
greater  clearance,  while  providing the  individual  warrior  with better  reach.172
Roman armour remained superior both in quality and quantity to their barbarian
adversaries.173 But in psychological terms, the move toward longer swords and
rounder  shields  served  to  isolate  the  individual  from  the  wider  unit  on  the
battlefield,  increasingly  forcing  him  to  fall  back  on  his  own  physical  and
psychological resources rather than being subsumed into the crowd.174
169 Liebeschuetz, W. “Citizen status and law in the Roman empire and the Visigothic kingdom”, 
from W. Pohl and H. Reimitz (eds.), Strategies of Distinction: the construction of ethnic 
communities, 300-800 (Leiden 1998), p. 135-8; Jones (1966), p. 219, citing Vegetius; Shaw 
1999, p. 135
170 See Southern, P. & Dixon, K. R., The Late Roman Army (New Haven 1996), p. 89-127; 
Coulston, J. C. N. “Late Roman military equipment culture”, in Sarantis and Christie (2013), 
p. 475-482; Kazanski, M. “Barbarian Military Equipment”, in A. Serantis and N. Christie 
(eds.), (2013), p. 504
171 Although other influences, including internal evolution, were also significant – Coulston 
(2013), p. 475-482
172 cf. Kazanski (2013), p. 501. Vegetius’ advice, “not to cut but to thrust with the sword”, which
self-consciously harks back to ancient military convention, adds to the impression that the 
image of a tightly packed formation based on efficient sword-thrusts was an anachronism by 
this time – Vegetius IX.11
173 Kazanski (2013), p. 503
174 Attempts to link shields were ineffective against the Alamanni at Strasbourg (357), and the 
Goths in 376 – Ammianus, XVI.12.36, 44; XXXI.7.12
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    Both close to the Rhine and much further south, Franks and other barbarians
became an integral part of the refounded military establishment from at least the
time of their  participation in  Constantine’s  seizure of  sole  power by military
force.  By the  middle of  the  fourth century  the highest  offices  of  the  Roman
military were frequently held by men of barbarian stock, and a general of partly
Frankish  descent,  Silvanus,  was  “traversing  Gaul  in  the  service  of  the
government and driving forth the savages” at the head of Rome’s armies. He
could claim a proud tradition of military service inherited from his father, who
had fought under  Constantine.175 In a  more spectacular  example,  Charietto,  a
probable Alaman living in the Trier region, was apparently able to rise from the
leader of a freelance band of head-hunters to the position of comes per utramque
Germaniam in the space of just a few years.176
    The sources provide no certainty over the technical conditions upon which
Frankish  and  other  barbarian  settlers  were  integrated  into  the  military
establishment, and the process by which they ascended to the highest commands
is obscure. Certainly, the evidence of named tribunes does not find a significant
proportion  of  barbarians  lower  down  the  chain  of  command.177 The  lack  of
technical precision in the sources may be a partial result of irregular and ad-hoc
arrangements that saw some Franks being enrolled as complete auxiliary units,
while others were split up and settled as laeti, or enrolled in the regular army.178
The  possibility  arises  that  Constantine  and  his  successors  elevated  Franks
directly to the upper commands, without them first passing through the lower
echelons of the command structure.
    In psychological perspective, the rapid rise of some Franks through the ranks
of the Roman armies in the fourth century should be placed firmly in the context
of  their  exceptionally  intense  exposure  to  Roman  military  violence,  both  as
175 Ammianus, XV.5; Geary (1999), p. 114-116.
176 Zosimus, III.71; Ammianus XXVII.1; Whittaker (1994), p. 192-3. See below, note 189-191
177 Although this lack of barbarian names among tribunes may have more to do with epigraphic,
as opposed to ethnic, conditions. See Jones (1964), p. 135
178 One unit of laeti are referred to as Franci, although this implies that most were not thought 
of as such. There are also a considerable number of individuals with Germanic names in the 
ranks of the ostensibly Roman units – Jones (1964), p. 620
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victims and perpetrators, from the late-3rd century onward. The Frankish groups
that  raided into the empire in  the 260s cannot  have represented more than a
fraction  of  total,  but  all  were  punished  together  when  successive  emperors
embarked on campaigns of destruction across the Rhine, carrying away many
young men to fight  in  their  armies.179 Politically,  these campaigns,  combined
with the extra fortifications established by the early fourth century, may have
achieved the aim of persuading the Frankish leadership that incursions deep into
the empire were a very bad idea. It is even possible that the Roman attacks were
so  successful  that  a  whole  generation  of  elite  Frankish  warriors  were  either
killed, co-opted or enrolled into the Roman armies, for the lower Rhine region
apparently  saw  no  more  major  conflict  for  a  generation  after  Constantine’s
campaigns.180 But in the long term, they did nothing to diminish, and may indeed
have substantially aggravated, the propensity of the Frankish domains to produce
an abundance of warriors.
    In terms of grand strategy, the diffusion of military forces through the interior,
and stationing of the largest army groups well within the empire, was a success:
when the Franks and Alamanni again attacked in force in the mid-fourth century,
their  penetration into the empire was much shallower than their  third-century
predecessors.181 But  it  also  represented  a  change  in  priorities  by  which  the
regions closest to the frontiers – Belgica and northern Gaul – were effectively
treated as a kind of buffer zone for the interior, and small-scale, shallow breaches
of the frontier were accepted as unfortunate inevitabilities. Such incidents are not
much  mentioned  in  the  narrative  sources,  but  the  emphasis  of  the  narrative
sources is apt to entirely miss the kind of small-scale raiding that other evidence
implies may have been the bread-and-butter of conflict across the frontier.182 
179 Geary 1999, p. 114; Elton (2013); Constantine and Magnentius were particularly prolific in 
drafting Franks into the armies – Whittaker (1994), p. 230
180 Although the frontier may not have been as quiet as the narrative evidence suggests. 
Constans celebrated a triumph over the Rhine barbarians in 342 – Blockley, R. C. “Warfare 
and Diplomacy”, in A. Cameron and P. Garnsey (eds.) The Cambridge Ancient History, 13: 
The Late Empire, AD 337-425 (Cambridge University, 1998), p. 421. And see below.
181 Ammianus XV-XVII; Julian, “Letter to the Senate and People of Athens”, in W. C. Wright 
(ed. and trans.) Works, 2 Volumes, (London 1913). See below.
182 Whittaker (1994), p. 194-242
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    Thus, by the later-fourth century, military establishments on both sides of the
Rhine  had  been  substantially  remodelled.  The  barbarian  groups  had  been
subsumed into broader ethnic-political affiliations, under the influence of Roman
stimulus,  cultural,  economic  and  (we  must  now  add  in  psychological
perspective) experiential. Meanwhile the northern Roman armies had devolved
into  smaller  units  and  been  distributed  across  northern  Gaul,  integrating
themselves  into  communities  and  barbarians  into  the  military  command
structure.183 A denser network of fortifications had sprung up across the region.
And  much  of  the  region  was  demographically  and  culturally  altered  by
widespread displacement and resettlement.
    
2.2 – Barbarians, Provincials and Frontier armies in the later fourth century
    After  the  campaigns  of  Constantine,  which  may  have  substantially
depopulated large areas  north of the Rhine in  the short  term,184 the threat  of
attack  en masse by the northern barbarians was temporarily extinguished. But
they  returned  in  force  in  the  350s,  first  as  supporters  and  opponents  of  the
imperial usurper Magnentius, and then as independent groups.185 For the third
quarter of the fourth century, we are provided with an unusually large quantity of
information  regarding  military  affairs  in  Gaul.  The  archaeological  remains,
Notitia Dignitatum,  laws  and panegyrics  are  complemented  by the  relatively
detailed narrative accounts of Ammianus and several other near-contemporary
writers.186 This allows us to see a little more of the Franks, and very much more
of the Roman armies. And what emerges from this more detailed picture is an
impression of the regions close to the frontier as a special zone, which was more
exposed to violence than the inner empire, and produced a relative abundance of
military recruits who were regarded as particularly enthusiastic fighters.
183 Jones (1964), p. 125; Sarantis (2013), p. 2
184 Pan.Lat VI.12 - “Now you do not even dare to live at a distance from the Rhine, and can 
scarcely drink in safety from the rivers of the interior…”
185 Whittaker (1994), p. 161, citing Libanius, Oration 18.33-35 (“Funeral Oration for Julian”), in
A. F. Norman (trans.), Selected Orations (Cambridge, Mass. 2003)
186 See Jones (1964), p. 115
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    The devastation inflicted by the late-fourth century incursions of the Franks
and Alamanni was confined much more strictly to northern Gaul, affecting forty-
five  cities  and  extending  approximately  170km  from  the  Rhine  frontier,
according to the eyewitness account of the emperor Julian.187 The threat was also
largely diffuse, and with the disastrous exception of the battle of Strasbourg, the
barbarians  tended to  avoid  massing  in  their  thousands,  complicating the task
faced  by  the  Roman  forces.  A Frankish  raiding  party  of  six  hundred  men,
mentioned in Ammianus,  Zosimus and in a  panegyric for Julian (which duly
inflates the numbers of Franks) exemplifies this problem, as well as the difficulty
in assessing the narrative evidence for barbarian military activity.188 This group,
too large  to  thought  of  as  an ordinary band of  latrones,  but  too small  to  be
described as a major army, only comes to the attention of the sources at the point
of coming into contact  with the all-conquering emperor and his forces.  Even
such  a  substantial  group  was  unlikely  to  have  attracted  the  attention  of  the
Roman narrative sources, had they not happened to cause a substantial problem
for the imperial army by taking up residence in some abandoned fortifications
and holding out under siege for nearly two months.
    A further illustration of the threat posed by small, mobile raiding groups to
northern Gaul is provided by the story of one Charietto, related by Zosimus. This
barbarian had settled permanently in the Trier region, and turned his hand to
attacking raiding groups of his fellows on behalf of the beleaguered local towns,
returning with the severed heads of the bandits. Soon Charietto is leading a large
group of men, “robbers” as Zosimus would have it, destroying raiding parties
throughout the area. When the group present themselves before Julian, he does
not hesitate to grant them imperial sanction, since he is “...at this time unable to
restrain  the  nocturnal  and  clandestine  incursions  of  the  barbarians,  as  they
robbed in small parties, straggling from each other, and when day appeared, not
one of them was visible, all hiding themselves in the woods, and subsisting on
187 Julian, “Letter to the Athenians” - “...those who were settled nearest to us were as much as 
three hundred stades from the banks of the Rhine, and a district three times as wide as that 
had been left a desert by their raids; so that the Gauls could not even pasture their cattle 
there.” The Alf valley region, upstream from Trier, was particularly severely devastated – 
Van Ossel and Ouzoulias (2000), p. 138
188 Ammianus XVII.2; Libanius, Oration 18
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what they gained by robbery.”189 The implication – which finds support in a law
of Constantius which sought to deal with banditry by veterans – is that not only
was  the  state  struggling  to  contain  raiding  across  the  border,  but  also  that
independent armed groups were operating within the frontier, sometimes with
the  tacit  or  explicit  approval  of  the  authorities.190 Libanius  praised  Julian’s
decision to offer rewards for barbarian heads,191 but if Zosimus is to be believed,
this was a practice accepted as a fait accompli rather than a policy imposed from
above.  Although  such  measures  were  apparently  effective,  they  nonetheless
represented an acceptance of the proliferation of independent armed groups, and
the  increasingly  imperfect  imperial  control  over  its  own  armed  forces.
Ammianus’s  report  of  an  upsurge  in  banditry  in  Gaul  during  the  reign  of
Valentinian suggests the difficulty of confining the violence of these groups to
legitimate targets.192
    All of this hints that Julian’s large-scale northern campaigns were not entirely
based on strategic concerns, but in fact proceeded more from the political and
military exigencies of imperial rule over Gaul and its armies. Julian’s campaign
against  the  Salian  Franks  is  justified  with  reference  to  their  importunate
occupation of Toxandria, which cut Julian’s forces off from British supply ships
in the mouth of the Rhine,193 but it is not clear that the Salii had occupied the
region by violence. According to Zosimus, the Salii had arrived as refugees after
a vicious war against the Saxons had driven them from Batavia, a territory which
189 Zosimus III.70-71. A person of the same name, and a similar description, is describes by 
Ammianus as a comes in the frontier army a short time later, in a possible illustration of the 
potential for barbarians to be promoted directly to senior commands – Ammianus XXVII.1; 
Whittaker (1994), p. 202
190 Cod.Theo VII.20.7; Southern & Dixon (1996), p. 43; Whittaker (1994), p. 192-228
191 Libanius, Oration 18 - “and a great eagerness for cutting off heads was the natural result – 
for that most clever man purged their souls of cowardice with the lust of gain, and the wish 
to get something incited them to be courageous.”
192 Ammianus, XXVIII.2 - “...throughout Gaul there spread, to the ruin of many, a savage frenzy
for brigandage, which kept watch of the frequented roads and fell indiscriminately upon 
everything profitable that fell in its way.” Symmachus’ panegyric for Valentianian (c. 360), 
confirms the impression that northern Gaul was regarded as a particularly troubled region 
after Julian’s campaigns - “For you there are no holidays from combat and you chose this 
above all in Gaul, that here one may not be at rest: necessity grants you no truce. Now you 
bring the lustrum of your regnal years to a close where an equal chill envelops earth and sky, 
under dense clouds, perpetual cold, fierce enemies, devastation far and wide.” – Orations I: 
to Valentinian (trans. B. S. Rodgers 2009)
193 Ammianus XVII.8. See Heather, “Northwest” (2018), p. 12-13
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they may have already held with Roman permission.194 Ammianus makes no
secret of the fact that the Salian pleas for peace are totally ignored by Julian, who
indeed uses a false treaty to set up a lightning ambush of the already quiescent,
and totally unprepared, Franks. The same treatment – a false peace followed by
sudden  attack  on  the  unprepared  enemy  –  is  inflicted  on  the  Chamavi
immediately  afterward.  The  words  of  Vegetius,  alluded  to  in  the  previous
chapter,  positively  ring  in  the  ears  -  “...he  [the  general]  must  watch  for  the
opportunity when the enemy… think themselves in  security,  and attack them
with detachments of tried cavalry or infantry, intermingled with young soldiers,
or such as are under the military age…”195 Julian’s hastily reconstituted forces
must have included not a few such “young soldiers”, in need of blooding through
such easy military victories.
    A further exigency of Roman military leadership at the frontier is illustrated by
Julian’s problems in keeping the large armies supplied and compliant. Ammianus
tells us that the army became seditious in the face of Julian’s attempts to stretch
their supplies further by storing a portion of them in local forts. Julian hoped that
“what  had  been  deducted  might  be  replaced  from  the  harvests  of  the
Chamavi”,196 but since these harvests were not yet ripe the soldiers were going
hungry.  Thus  the  Chamavi  are  revealed  as  not  merely  a  troublesome people
being punished by Roman might, but also a potentially vital source of plunder by
which the Roman army was being maintained. If the suggestion that Constantius
had sent no pay to the northern armies for some time is correct,197 it is probable
that such supply problems were a more pressing spur to military action than any
immediate provocation on the part of the Chamavi or the Salii. 
    In social-psychological perspective, the most significant point that emerges
occasionally from the detailed narrative evidence provided by Ammianus is the
fact  that  bellicosity  of  the  soldiers  was  not  simply  confined  to  the  targets
designated  by  imperial  fiat.  In  consequence,  the  rank-and-file  and the  minor
commanders  who  led  them  enjoyed  considerable  agency,  and  exerted
194 Zosimus III.70-71
195 Vegetius III.9
196 “nec donativum nec stipendium” - Ammianus XVII.8-9
197 Ammianus XVII.8
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considerable influence, in terms of military decision-making and outcomes. The
Roman  Frankish  general  Silvanus,  having  declared  independence  from  the
emperor,  is  egged on by “the uproarious  complaints of the soldiers  on every
hand,  pleading their  destitution  and eager  to  burst  through the  passes  of  the
Cottian Alps with all speed.”198 And ‘uproarious’ remains the adjective that best
describes the atmosphere of the army whenever the rank-and-file come into view
in Ammianus’ account through Julian’s reign and after. They clash their shields
to acclaim Julian’s elevation to supreme command, as they also do to register
their dissatisfaction in other circumstances.199 And the rumour of his death sends
some  units  into  a  murderous  frenzy,  which  is  only  calmed  by  his  personal
appearance.200 When lack of supplies caused hunger,  the troops,  “resorting to
outrageous threats...assailed Julian with foul names and opprobrious language,
calling him an Asiatic, a Greekling and a deceiver, and a fool with a show of
wisdom.”  No  punishment  is  apparently  meted  out  for  these  excesses  and
seditious  words,  which are taken quite  in  stride by Ammianus,  “as  some are
usually  to  be  found  among  the  soldiers  who  are  noteworthy  for  their
volubility”.201 It was frequently the soldiers who pushed for engagement with the
enemy against the better judgement of their generals, and more often than not
they got their way.202
    Thus levels of insubordination that would be viewed as signs of exceptional
and cataclysmic crisis  in any modern military establishment are portrayed by
Ammianus as the more-or-less ordinary rough and tumble of military command.
Further examples of generals acting under apparent duress from the army abound
in the late empire, the most famous being the usurpation of Constantine III, the
third man in a year to be elevated to power by the British legions.203 The overall
impression is that military policy periodically came under the influence of the
198 Ammianus XV.5




202 Seager (1999), p. 589
203 Zosimus, VI; and also for instance, Ammianus XXX.10; cf. Hydatius 84 (430). It is also 
likely that the revolt of Silvanus was a result of unrest among his troops – see den Boer, W. 
“The Emperor Silvanus and his army”, in Acta Classica vol.3 (1960). In 397 the Gallic 
soldiers, in another period of relative inactivity, killed the Praetorian Prefect, Exuperantius, 
in a mutiny at Arles – Prosper, Chronicon, a.424 (Castinus & Victor)
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masses  of  armed  men  whom the  generals  ostensibly  commanded,  especially
under conditions in which pay was in short supply. But even where they were not
dominant,  the  feelings  of  the  rank-and-file,  affected  as  they  were  by  all  the
factors listed at the beginning of the chapter, were an important driving force
behind  military  decision-making.  Even  when  his  army  is  compliant,  Julian
refuses to march them through the territory of tribes with whom he is at peace,
“...for  fear  that  (as  often  happens)  through  the  rudeness  of  the  soldiers,
destroying everything in their way, the treaties might be abruptly broken.”204 This
destructiveness, and the general turbulence of soldiers’ behaviour,205 should be
located firmly in the context of the psychological pressures and shocks entailed
in military life.
2.3 – Frankish and Gallic armed forces in the later fourth century:
          How ‘barbarian’, how ‘Roman’?
    One theme that has pervaded debate around the decline of the Western Empire
is the question of the nature and extent of “barbarization” in the Roman armies
and the regions closest to the northern frontiers. A formerly popular view, still
maintained by some historians, is that the Roman armies came to be increasingly
dominated by barbarian elements during the fourth century. And, following the
opinions of the likes of Zosimus and Vegetius, barbarian influence is seen to
have contributed substantially to a loss of discipline and effectiveness that in turn
facilitated serious military defeats and the collapse of the frontiers in the late-
fourth and fifth centuries.206 But most historians now consider this position to be
ill-founded, relying as it does on a few scattered contemporary opinions with no
particular claims to expertise.  There is  plenty of evidence to suggest that the
Roman armies  were still  larger,  better  supplied and more effective than their
northern adversaries in the fourth century, and the accounts of military insider
204 Ammianus XVIII.2.7; see also XXVII.10. This was not an invariable tendency – Ammianus 
XVIII.2
205 See Lee (2012), p. 168-173
206 For a recent summary, see Carey, B. T. et al, Warfare in the Ancient World, (2005), p. 136-
148
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Ammianus  give  no  clear  indications  that  barbarian  influence  undermined
military unity or effectiveness.207
    Nonetheless, northern Gaul and the Gallic armies do appear to have undergone
some substantial cultural changes by the later fourth century, which emerge in
contemporary narrative, legal and archaeological evidence. These developments
were indeed thematically associated with barbaricum,208 and this association may
be regarded as at least partially an outcome of a subtle transformation of Roman
prejudices  regarding  the  barbarians  since  the  early  empire.  Writers  of  the
Principiate, whose views are echoed in the  anachronistic musings of Vegetius,
characterized the barbarians  as physically  powerful,  impetuous and ferocious,
but  ultimately  inferior  to  the  Romans  in  war  due  to  their  irrationality  and
unpredictability.209 Roman legionaries were better able to tough it out under the
stresses of long campaigns and pitched battles because they were cool-tempered,
and  knew  how  to  submit  properly  to  the  rigours  of  military  discipline  and
organization that subsumed the individual warrior into the host.210 In the early
fourth century, a panegyric of Constantius still denigrated barbarian recruits as
little better than slaves.211
    But  by  the  mid-fourth  century,  elite  assessments  of  barbarian  military
capacities were considerably more favourable, as evinced by the rapid progress
of recently imported Franks and other barbarians to some of the highest military
207 Jones, A. H. M. The Decline of the Ancient World (1966), p. 214; Lee, A. D. “Warfare and 
the State”, in The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare (2007), p. 417-8; Elton 
(2013), p. 665, 674-5; Serantis (2013), p. 50-68
208 Kazanski (2013), p. 504-505, concludes on the basis of a thorough survey of weapon finds 
that “military equipment found in [4th century] northern Gallic tombs closely resembles that 
found in ‘Germania’”.
209 Mattern, S. P. Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the Principiate (Berkeley 1999), p. 
203-205, quoting Strabo, Geography, 7.3.17; Tacitus, Annals 2.14, etc; Vegetius, II - “Little 
can be expected from forces so dissimilar in every respect [barbarian ‘auxiliaries’], since it is
one of the most essential points in military undertakings that the whole army should be put in
motion and governed by one and the same order. But it is almost impossible for men to act in
concert under such varying and unsettled circumstances.”
210 In psychological perspective we can detect in Roman culture an idealization of impassivity in
the face of the horrors of battle that comes close to the modern concept of ‘low-affect’ and 
psychopathy; contrasted to an idealized barbarian disposition that is more reactive, 
corresponding more closely to modern concepts of ‘learned’ aggression. See Chapter 1, 38-
40
211 Pan.Lat. VIII.9 - “...if he is summoned to the levy, he comes running and is crushed by 
discipline; he submits to the lash and congratulates himself upon his servitude [servire] by 
calling it soldiering [militiae].”
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positions.212 We have seen how Silvanus was admired by Ammianus as a loyal
and effective general. Arbogast, eventual sponsor of the usurper Eugenius, was
similarly admired by Zosimus for his courage and lack of cupidity.213 Treaties
between the empire and its northern neighbours consistently included grants of
military recruits from the latter.214 Libanius, in extolling Julian’s defeat of the
small Frankish raiding army mentioned earlier, testifies to the extent to which
such men were prized as recruits - “...it is a law with those warriors either to
conquer or perish… Now the emperor, who received these prisoners, styled them
a gift, and incorporated them with his own legions, believing that he was placing
amidst the latter towers of strength: so much was each of these Franks a match
for many ordinary mortals!”215
    How homogeneous were the barbarians serving in the Roman armies, and how
strong were their  connections to their  counterparts  in  barbaricum? While  the
strength and unity of Frankish ethnic identity was once relatively unquestioned,
the nature of the identities of this relatively new group and their contemporaries
is now a matter of considerable and justified debate.216 Archaeologically, it  is
impossible to identify distinct zones where the bases of Frankish power were
supposed  to  have  been  located.217 Neither  do  contemporary  literary  sources
mention distinct appearances or customs that clearly separated Franks from their
Gallic  neighbours.  This  is  especially  true  for  Franks who integrated  into  the
empire:  it  is impossible to tell  by what means,  or even if,  Silvanus could be
spotted for a Frank by any stranger, or if this was simply a widely known fact
about his ancestry.  This certainly has something to do with the nature of the
available  sources,  which  show  nothing  like  the  curiosity  of  Tacitus  in  their
212 Geary (1999), p. 115; and see above.
213 Zosimus, IV
214 Heather, P. “Foedera and foederati of the fourth century”, in T. F. X. Noble (ed.), From 
Roman Provinces to Medieval Kingdoms (London 2006), p. 293-302
215 Libanius, Oration for Julian, 144; see also, Ammianus XXXI.10; and Liebeschuetz (1993), 
p. 274-5
216 Geary (1999), p. 110; Pohl, W. “Introduction: strategies of distinction”, in Strategies of 
Distinction: the construction of ethnic communities, 300-800, (Leiden 1998), p. 4
217 Theuws, F. "Grave goods, ethnicity, and the rhetoric of burial rites in Late Antique northern 
Gaul" in Derks, T. & Roymans, N. Ethnic constructs in Antiquity, (Amsterdam 2009), p. 290-
296; Schmauder, M. “The relationship between Frankish gens and regnum: a proposal based 
on the archaeological evidence”, in Goetz, H.-W., Jarnut, J. and Pohl, W. (eds.), Regna and 
Gentes: The relationship between Late Antique and Early Medieval (Leiden 2003), 271-306, 
p. 299-302
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treatment of their barbarian subjects. We must be cautious about minimizing the
extent of Frankish distinctiveness simply on account of a lack of information; it
is possible that it  was so obvious to contemporaries that explicit  descriptions
seemed superfluous. 
    In several instances, we encounter men whose barbarian ancestry is evoked in
a moment of crisis, mostly as an ideological weapon to impugn the reputation of
a Romanized barbarian, and occasionally as a strategy for self-defence through
identity-based  solidarity.  Stilicho  was  to  be  the  most  prominent  victim  of
collective  prejudice  against  barbarian  ancestry,  which  was  used  to  effect  his
downfall when his political position was weakened by military crisis.218 And the
usurpers Magnentius and Arbogast were both condemned as savage barbarians
by  their  imperial  opponents.  The  former,  like  Stilicho,  was  born  within  the
Roman empire and probably had only one barbarian parent,219 suggesting that he
was  well  assimilated  to  Roman  culture.  Nonetheless,  the  apparently  widely
known barbarian ancestry of such men could clearly be deployed as a rhetorical
strategy by their enemies.
    Accounts of barbarian identity being deployed positively are much rarer, but
not  entirely  absent.220 Ammianus  provides  one  striking  example  relating  to
Silvanus,  who,  fearing  for  his  position  in  the  empire,  is  said  to  have
contemplated attempting to join his fellow Franks on the far side of the Rhine.221
The fact that he was persuaded in the event to abandon the venture on the basis
that  the  Franks  would  either  kill  him  or  sell  him  back  to  the  Romans,  is
commonly  held  to  be  illustrative  of  the  weakness  of  any  vestigial  bonds  of
loyalty between Romanized Franks and their barbarian counterparts. And it is
possible  that  Ammianus  was  reporting  a  rumour  that  once  again  played  on
Silvanus’  supposedly  barbarian  nature  to  suggest  a  non-existent  feeling  of
218 Zosimus V.159-161; Sozomen, Ecclesiastical History, IX.4
219 Aurelius Victor, Liber de Caesaribus LXI, on Magnentius - “utpote gentis barbarae, diro 
atrocique ingenio...”; Zosimus II.64-65
220 For a thorough treatment of a number of debatable examples, see Barlow, J. “Kinship, 
Identity and Fourth-century Franks”, in Historia: Zeitschrift fur Alte Geschichte, Bd. 45, H. 2
(2nd Qtr 1996), 223-239, p. 230-238
221 Ammianus XV.5
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affinity  with  the  barbarian  enemy.222 But  if  Silvanus  was  indeed  willing  to
contemplate such a move, the prospect arises that he did share some recognizable
cultural traits with the Franks beyond the Rhine, even if Frankish solidarity that
transcended the frontier was a myth. And what Ammianus does make perfectly
clear is that the Franks at the court of Constantius did share a meaningful sense
of solidarity with both Silvanus and each other - “Malarichus… called together
the Franks, who at that time were very numerous and influential in the palace…
And on learning this, the emperor decided that the matter should be investigated
searchingly through the medium of his council and all his officers.”223
    The  Franks  and  other  barbarians  from the  beyond  the  Rhine  were  not,
however,  the  only  groups  in  the  armies  of  Gaul  credited  with  exceptional
enthusiasm and aptitude for warfare.  Roman citizens of  Gaul,  born and bred
within the  limes, were considered to possess similar attributes.224 According to
Ammianus, the Gauls were “...terrible for the fierceness of their eyes, fond of
quarrelling,  and of overbearing insolence… All ages are most fit  for military
service… Nor does anyone of them, for dread of the service of Mars, cut off his
thumb, as in Italy.”225 The ethnographic flavour of the description is reminiscent
of stereotyped descriptions of the barbarians, but Ammianus was not the only
one to  observe  the  unusual  aggression  of  the  Gauls,  and the  relatively  stern
penalties  proscribed  for  Gallic  self-mutilators  implies  their  reputation  had
meaningful consequences in respect of Roman military policy.226 
222 Jones (1964), p. 622; Liebeschuetz, J. H. W. G. Barbarians and Bishops. Army, church and 
state in the age of Arcadius and Chrysostom (Oxford 1990), p. 8.
223 “Haec Malarichus...adhibitis Francis, quorum ea tempestate in palatio multitudo florebat... 
Hisque cognitis statuit imperator dispicientibus consistorianis et militaribus universis in 
negotium praeterinquiri.” - Ammianus XV.5. Barlow (1996), p. 233, suggests persuasively 
that the fabricated plot that brought about the downfall of Silvanus, and nearly claimed his 
fellow Frank Malarichus, may have exploited common knowledge of solidarity among 
Frankish commanding officers in the imperial armies.
224 A panegyric of Constantius credits the Gauls with his victories over the northern barbarians –
Pan.Lat. VIII.9
225 Ammianus XV.11
226 Aurelius Victor, De Caesaribus XLII - “...Gallos natura praecipites novaretur, praesertim 
Germanis pleraque earum partium populantibus”; Cod.Theo. VII.13.4-5 – A message to the 
Vicar of Rome prescribes the use of mutilated recruits in non-combat roles, while another 
addressed to the praetorian prefect of Gaul a year later insists that offender be burned alive.
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    Further evidence from Ammianus buttresses the impression that the Gallic
units were somewhat culturally ‘othered’ and alienated from the imperial centre,
particularly  in  respect  of  their  turbulence  and  enthusiasm for  combat.  When
referring to the army in broad terms, Ammianus does not hesitate to bracket the
Gallic  units,  or  indeed  the  barbarian  auxiliaries  which  certainly  also
accompanied the army, with the Romani.  But when Julian attempts to persuade
the Gallic army to demure from engaging the massed Alamanni in battle until a
more propitious moment, the forces are portrayed as an impatiently aggressive
mob – “...The  soldiers  did  not  allow him to  finish  what  he was saying,  but
gnashed their teeth and showed their eagerness for battle by striking their spears
and shields together.” Julian’s commander, Florentius, is of the opinion that if
deprived of a victory, “...the resentment of the soldiers, who, he said, are inclined
by their native hotness of temper towards insubordination, would be impossible
to  withstand…  they  would  hardly  endure  this  without  recourse  to  the  last
extremity.”227 The parallel with Ammianus’ characterization of the battle-hungry
Frankish commander, Mellobaudes, is striking.228
    In  the  east,  the  ‘Gallic’ units  are  picked  out  by  Ammianus  as  the  most
uncontrollable  and  combative.  Besieged  at  Amida,  “with  a  reasonable  but
untimely impulse”, they insist on being allowed to make a direct attack on the
numerically superior enemy - 
“And just as ravening beasts in cages, roused to greater fierceness
by the odour of carrion, in hope of getting out dash against the
revolving bars, so did they hew with swords at the gates, which (as
I said above) were locked, being exceedingly anxious lest, if the
city  should  be  destroyed,  they  also  might  perish  without  any
glorious action, or if it were saved from peril, they should be said
to have done nothing worth while,  as Gallic greatness of heart
demanded; and yet before this they had made frequent sallies and
227 “...motum militis  in seditiones nativo calore propensioris...” - Ammianus XVI.12
228 Ammianus XXXI.10 - “...Mallobaudes, commander of the household troops and king of the 
Franks, a brave man, always ready for fighting. Accordingly, while Nannienus weighed the 
changeable events of fortune and hence believed that they ought to act deliberately, 
Mallobaudes, carried away (as usual) by his strong eagerness for battle and impatient of 
postponement, was tormented with longing to go against the foe.”
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attempted  to  interfere  with  the  builders  of  mounds,  had  killed
some, and had suffered the like themselves.”229
Commending Julian’s plan to invade Persia in force, the Gallic troops “maxime
omnium…fremitu laetiore monstrabant”230. And in the disorderly retreat of the
defeated army, now under Jovian, the Gauls emerge as the principle source of
insubordinate turbulence in the ranks - 
    “...the army, with mutinous bluster, demanded that they be
allowed to cross the Tigris. The emperor, as well as the generals…
begged them not to trust  themselves  to the dangerous currents,
declaring that  very many could not  swim, and adding that  the
scattered bands of the enemy had beset the banks of the swollen
stream in various places. But when these warnings, though several
times repeated, had no effect, and the loud shouts of the excited
soldiers threatened violence, Jovian reluctantly consented that  the
Gauls, mingled with the northern Germans, should enter the river
first of all, to the end that if these were swept away by the force
of the stream, the obstinacy of the rest might be broken down; or
if they accomplished their purpose without harm, the rest might try
to cross with greater confidence.231
As we have seen, turbulence, unchecked violence and insubordination were by
no means a unique invention of the late imperial armies. But the Gallic units
“mixti cum Germanis” are clearly identified by Ammianus as particularly fierce
and prone to trouble, so much so that their removal from the host makes the rest
of the army more compliant.
229 Ammianus XIX.5
230 Ammianus XXIII.5
231 “...exercitus vociferans inmodeste dari sibi copiam transeundi Tigridis flagitabat. Quibus 
oppositus cum rectoribus imperator, tumentemque iam canis exortu sideris amnem 
ostendens, ne se periculosis committerent gurgitibus exorabat, nandi inperitos adserens esse 
conplures, simulque adiciens hostiles manus hinc inde margines superfusi fluminis 
occupasse. Sed cum haec saepe congeminando refragaretur in cassum, milesque conclamans 
magno contentionis fragore minaretur extrema, id impetratur aegerrime, ut mixti cum arctois 
Germanis Galli amnem primi omnium penetrarent, ut his magnitudine fluentorum abreptis 
residuorum pertinacia frangeretur, aut si id perfecissent innocui, transitus fidentior 
temptaretur...” - Ammianus XXV.6
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    At times, Ammianus lapses into stereotyped and traditionalistic descriptions of
battle, reflecting antiquated ideas about cultural and physical contrasts between
the ‘Roman’ armies their ‘barbarian’ adversaries - “...the Alamanni were stronger
and  taller,  our  soldiers  disciplined  by  long  practice;  they  were  savage  and
uncontrollable, our men quiet and wary, these relying on their courage, while the
Germans  presumed  upon  their  huge  size.”232 But  the  details  of  Ammianus’
accounts of Julian’s armies reveals subtleties that the binary idealizations offered
in  this  description  of  battle  tend  to  obscure,  and  the  apparent  clarity  of  the
Roman/barbarian  distinction  is  undermined  even  before  it  is  proposed.
Notwithstanding Ammianus’ description of the Romans as “quiet and wary”, he
makes it perfectly clear that Roman success in this battle was at least partially
attributable  to  the  “Cornuti  and  the  Brachiatti”,  who,  “toughened  by  long
experience in fighting, at once intimidated [the Alammani] by their gestures, and
raised their mighty baritus.”233 
    The ‘Cornuti’ and ‘Brachiati’ are two of three “fancy names” that appear
among apparently recently raised auxiliary units in the campaigns of Julian. The
other belongs to the ‘Petulantes’, who were twinned with the (also new) ‘Celtae’
in several of Ammianus’s accounts.234 As we have seen, the former were picked
out for their contribution at the battle of Strasbourg, and were also used to launch
a  surprise  attack  on  a  Rhine  settlement  that  resulted  in  the  indiscriminate
slaughter of the inhabitants.235 Of this, Ammianus warmly approves, but he is
less complementary about their role in the death of Silvanus, a man he clearly
admired despite  being tasked with his  destruction.  The Cornuti  and Brachiati
were identified as the units most likely to betray their commander for a hefty
bribe.  His  characterization  of  them  as  “fluxoris  fidei”  precisely  matches  a
negative barbarian stereotype cited later on in the Res Gestae.236 Ammianus does
232 “...Alamanni robusti et celsiores, milites usu nimio dociles: illi feri et turbidi, hi quieti et 
cauti: animis isti fidentes, grandissimis illi corporibus freti.” - Ammianus XVI.12
233 Ammianus XVI.12
234 Jones (1964), p. 98, who is of the opinion that these units were formed under Constantine (p. 
357). There is no direct evidence to this effect, and the letter of the Petulantes may refer to 
the hostages reclaimed by Julian from the Franks and Alamanni in the late 350s – Julian, 
Letter to the Athenians, p. 270-272. On a possible etymology of the Brachiatti, cf. Gregory of
Tours, Lives of the Fathers XII.2 (p. 82, n. 3)
235 Ammianus XVI.11
236 Ammianus XV.5; XVIII.2
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not hesitate to include the Cornuti and others in the Roman army, but cannot fail
to register, perhaps even deliberately emphasise, the barbarity of their behaviour.
    We first hear of the Celtae and Petulantes when they appear as a principle
bone of contention between Julian and Constantius, but report of their fearsome
reputation implies that they had existed for some time. In an act that evokes a
certain tension between ‘Roman’ and ‘barbarian’ identity, the Petulantes produce
a “secret letter” complaining of their posting far from home, and demanding the
same terms of service commonly afforded to barbarian warriors, i.e. that they not
be removed to fight in distant provinces.237 One of their standard-bearers then
crowns Julian with his neck-chain, after which they are stirred into a riot by a
false report of their new emperor’s death, chasing the palace guards away. In a
subsequent conflict with the Alammani, we find the commander Libino rashly
leading the Celtae and Petulantes, “who, though fewer in nembers, were inspired
with  an  ardent  longing  for  battle”,  into  an  ill-fated  engagement.238 Having
followed Julian to Antioch, the same groups are named and shamed as the worst
offenders in a general breakdown in military discipline brought on by a surfeit of
meat and alcohol.239 
    The geographical and ethnic origins of these units is  unknown, and their
‘fancy’ names do not attach them to any specific region, but in the case of the
Petulantes at least,  we have a clue in the form of their letter of complaint to
Julian. In it, they plead that if they are taken away from the northern frontier,
“...our dear ones, whom we freed from their former captivity after mortal battles,
will again be slaves to the Alamanni.”240 The implication is that the Petulantes
were formed either from the remains of partially destroyed groups of  limitanei
and  laeti,  or  more  likely  from  provincials  from  the  regions  within  striking
distance of the frontier. As such they are likely to have included descendants of
237 “Hocque conperto apud Petulantium signa famosum quidam libellum humi proiecit occulte, 
inter alia multa etiam id continentem: 'nos quidem ad orbis terrarum extrema ut noxii 
pellimur et damnati, caritates vero nostrae Alamannis denuo servient, quas captivitate prima 
post internecivas liberavimus pugnas'.” - Ammianus XX.4. The frequent guarantees of 
service close to home granted to barbarians is cited in the same chapter.
238 Ammianus XXI.3
239 Ammianus, XXII.12. They appear for a final time as participants in a victory over the 
Alamanni – Ammianus XXXI.10
240 “caritates vero nostrae Alamannis denuo servient, quas captivitate prima post internecivas 
liberavimus pugnas'” - Ammianus XX.4
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barbarian settlers,  Gauls resettled under the right  of postliminium after  being
displaced,  and  military  veterans  of  Roman  origin.241 We  have  already  seen
evidence that banditry was becoming a serious problem in Gaul in the mid- to
late-fourth  century,  connected  not  just  to  outsiders  but  also  potentially  to
veterans  of  the  Gallic  armies.242 And  Zosimus’ account  of  Charietto’s  career
implies that it was possible to create an armed band within the Roman frontiers
by  gaining  a  reputation  for  successful  military  adventure,  without  imperial
assistance or even permission. These were the conditions under which at least
some of the newly raised units of the later-fourth century were recruited.
    Thus, the Roman empire was drawing auxiliary recruits from within its own
borders,  many  of  whom  were  from  communities  that  had  been  violently
victimized by marauding armies, and were troubled by raiding both from outside
the frontiers and within them. Their deployment in river ambushes suggests that
they fought in the lighter armour characteristic of traditional auxiliary troops,
like the more obviously ‘tribal’ units, the Heruli and Batavi. And their collective
solidarity and apparent common regional origin imply that they were drafted as
relatively  coherent  regional  groups.  Their  members  were  literate  and  were
regarded,  broadly,  as  Romani,  but  they  were  also  perceived  to  be highly
aggressive and turbulent.  And although they were seen as Roman,  they were
frequently  viewed –  like  the  barbarians  –  with  a  mixture  of  admiration  and
suspicion. 
    None of this adds up to ‘barbarization’ of northern Gallic culture, however, if
by barbarization what is meant is a sense of affinity between these internally-
recruited auxiliaries and the barbarians.  There is no evidence whatsoever that
these groups shared any meaningful sense of cultural identity or corresponding
solidarity  with  the  barbarians  north  of  the  frontiers.  Their  names  were  not
contrived to evoke any ancient Germanic heritage, preferring to look at back into
a semi-mythological Gallic past or evoke their martial qualities. And although
their  loyalty  to  individual  generals  was  called  into  question,  it  was  never
suggested that they might defect to the barbarians; in any case their commanding
241 Pan.Lat. VIII.18; Jones 1964, p. 685
242 See above, p. 14 and notes
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officers were probably imposed from above.243 The letter of the Petulantes and
the  indiscriminate  slaughter  of  barbarians  by  the  Cornuti  suggests  that,  if
anything, they felt even more animus toward their northern adversaries than the
regulars of the comitatenses. 
    But the appearance of these units in the fourth-century armies nonetheless
look like examples of military subcultures developing in northern Gaul under the
influence of the barbarians, and (possibly more importantly) of Roman concepts
of ‘barbarian-ness’ that increasingly viewed the barbarians as superior military
recruits.  With the breakdown of the ideological connotation of citizenship with
honorable,  self-motivated  military  service  into  the  fourth  century,244 and  the
decline in real-terms pay and status for the frontier forces in particular, the pull
of such relatively independent and un-Roman models was likely to increase. The
barbarian enemy across the Rhine would not  be viewed as a model.  But  the
barbarians fighting for the empire, who were able to avoid camp discipline, to
negotiate the terms of their service to preclude long-distance transportation, and
whose identity was a potential source of solidarity in the face of the fickle power
of  the  Roman  high  command,  could  not  go  unnoticed  by  their  Gallic
contemporaries.245
    In  social-psychological  perspective,  a  further  influence  may be  detected,
namely the probable subjection of the communities from which these units were
formed to the destruction and constant insecurity associated with raiding warfare.
In the face of such experiences, physiological and psychological developments
resulting in volatile and aggressive behaviour are predictable subsets of the range
of  developmental  outcomes  observed  across  cultures.246 In  traditional  Roman
culture, such behavioural traits were ‘othered’ as characteristic of the barbarian
enemy,  but  in  an  era  in  which  many  suspected  that  barbarians  made  better
recruits than Romans, the cultural stigma associated with such traits would have
been diluted.
243 Jones (1964), p. 621
244 Liebeschuetz (1998). See above, p. 54
245 Jones (1964), p. 619-620
246 See Chapter 1, n. 87-94
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2.4 – Weapon Burials in Northern Gaul
    More signs of significant  changes in  northern Gaul may be found in the
archaeological evidence, which again implies the growth of subcultures in which
social  and  military  life  were  increasingly  elided,  and  a  degree  of  regional
estrangement  from traditional  Roman culture.  We have already seen how the
villa and traditional Roman crafts went into recession in the fourth century, but
this loss was partially compensated by the rise of other architectural forms and
handicrafts that more closely resembled the material culture of free Germany.247
House-hall  buildings  and  others  with  sunken  features  appear  not  just  in
Toxandria, where Franks were settling with imperial agreement, but much further
south.248 Hill-forts  built  both  on  imperial  and  private  initiative,  appeared  in
several regions.249 Forms of pottery associated with the northern barbarians were
increasingly present in cemeteries within the frontiers. Settlements with “non-
Roman” features proliferated, but the presence of distinct Roman elements calls
into question the identification of these features with barbarian settlers.250
    The later fourth century also witnessed the beginning of new burial practices
between the Rhine and the Seine (with a few appearing as far south as the Loire),
which  broke  from  Roman  tradition  by  interring  the  dead  with  weapons  in
addition to more benign household objects.251 Some historians, to some extent
reading back from later Merovingian burial habits, have associated these new
developments with settlements of barbarian laeti within the imperial frontiers in
the late-third century, or otherwise with federate groups of barbarians brought
into  the  empire  in  the  later  fourth  century.252 But  since  these  finds  do  not
correspond to any known contemporary equivalents on the far side of the limes,
such theories of barbarian origins for the weapon-burials of the fourth century
have fallen from favour in more recent scholarship.253 It is additionally pointed
247 Cleary (2013), p. 93-95; Van Ossel & Ouzoulias (2000), p. 140-144, 149-151
248 For instance at Saint-Ouen-du-Breuil – Ibid, p. 391-4
249 Johnson, S. Late Roman Fortifications (London 1983), p. 231-288
250 Cleary (2013), p. 391-4; Rich, J. & Shipley, G. (eds.), War and Society in the Roman World 
(1993), p. 292
251 Macgeorge, P. Late Roman Warlords, (2002), p. 140-144; Theuws, (2009), p. 284-309
252 Early and influential exponents of these theories were, respectively, Hans-Joachim Werner 
and S. W. Bohn – see Heather (2009), p. 313-315; cf. Whittaker (1994), p. 220
253 Halsall (2007), p. 155-7; Heather (2009); Cleary (2013), p. 81-83; Wightman (1985), p. 253
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out that such burials actually appear to have declined in frequency in precisely
the period – from c. 400-450 – in which the barbarians were ostensibly pouring
across the frontier and occupying Roman territories en masse.254
    The difficulties of interpreting the archaeological evidence are deeper than
these particular points imply, however, extending to fundamental and arguably
unresolvable  questions  surrounding  the  relationship  of  funerary  culture  with
living  culture,  and  the  relationship  of  archaeological  evidence  to  literary
evidence. Buried items cannot be seen simply as reliable reflections of the range
of  accoutrements  sported  by  contemporaries,  but  may  instead  constitute  a
symbolic system, the syntax of which is now irretrievably lost. Furthermore, the
concept of ascribing ethnic identities according to the profiles of archaeological
finds has been substantively criticised as irreconcilable with the many glaring
mismatches between various gentes painted in the sources and the archaeological
cultures  of  northern  Europe.255 Any  identification  between  the  fourth-century
weapon burials  and Frankish settlement  in  northern  Gaul  must,  therefore,  be
abandoned. But the suggestion of Franz Theuws, that these burials should not be
thought of as signs of warrior culture, is much less convincing.256 As we have
seen, northern Gaul in this period was particularly exposed to banditry, raiding
and warfare,  and was regarded as a fertile  recruiting ground for the imperial
armies. The temporal and geographical association between these conditions and
the burial of weapons is difficult to ignore.257 The fact that swords, shields and
helmets  are  not  found among the  early  burials  gives  the  impression  that  the
warriors concerned were neither elite nor heavily armoured troops. But the idea
that axes and spears should not be connoted to organised violence in this period
tests the limits of credulity.
    The minimal interpretation we are left with, then, is that these burials were the
product  of  emerging  minority  warrior  subcultures  concentrated  between  the
254 Theuws (2009), p. 297
255 Ibid, p. 289-290
256 Theuws (2009), p. 308, followed by Cleary (2013), p. 83
257 Christie, N. “Wars within the frontiers: Archaeologies of rebellion, revolt and civil war”, in 
War and Warfare in Late Antiquity (2013), p. 953-5; James, E. “The militarization of Roman 
society, 400-700”, in A. N. Jorgensen & B. L. Clausen (eds.), Military aspects of 
Scandinavian society in a European perspective AD 1-1300, National Museum Studies in 
Archaeology and History 2 (Kopenhagen 1997), 19-24, p. 19
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Seine and the Rhine, who were defining their identities in a way that  diverged
from Roman tradition, but were not an imitation of anything from the far side of
the frontier. Their locations, which clustered around imperial military centres and
on the rivers that fed into the Rhine delta and litus Saxonicum,258 suggests that
they were associated both with the imperial army and with independent groups
raiding around the frontiers. This sits quite comfortably with what we have seen
in the contemporary narrative evidence:  in  the army,  new and revived quasi-
ethnic  units  were  emerging  or  had  recently  emerged  as  key  components,
alongside  more  traditional  looking  Roman  troops  and barbarian  allies;  while
local  militias  were  forming,  drawing  on  both  barbarian  and  Roman-type
elements, to take on – and sometimes become – raiding parties that troubled the
countryside. 
    In such a context, binary distinctions between Roman and barbarian seem
totally inadequate to describe the spectrum of identity formation, modification
and  mixture  suggested  by  the  sources.  This  did  not  necessarily  imply  any
particular political affinity between these emerging groups and barbaricum. But
it does imply that warrior subcultures in northern Gaul were being integrated to
an  unprecedented  extent  into  ordinary  social  life,  as  they  were  beyond  the
frontiers,  rather  than  being confined to  the  institutional  contexts  traditionally
defined by the Roman state.
    Thus at the end of the fourth century, populations on both sides of the Rhine
frontier were exceptionally exposed to raiding warfare. For the ‘barbarians’, this
was a continuation of conditions established in  the early empire.  But  for the
‘Romans’ west of the Rhine, the high degree of exposure to raiding attacks was a
relatively  new situation brought  about  by a  combination  of  more threatening
barbarian groups, military reforms, and endogenous cultural changes that tended
toward militarization. The two regions underwent considerable cultural elision,
driven by the sharing of artefacts  and populations in both directions,  but the
abandonment of traditional forms of architecture and craft was more evident on
258 See Theuws (2009), fig.5 & fig.9
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the  Roman side  of  the  frontier.  Most  importantly  from our  perspective,  both
regions apparently produced an abundant supply of warriors, whose reputation
for effectiveness leant heavily on their enthusiasm for battle and unwillingness to
refuse a fight, which sometimes went beyond the bounds of strategic advisability.
In social-psychological perspective, these features suggest that the both regions
were host to high levels of social violence and violent socialization practices.
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Chapter 3: From Western Empire to Frankish kingdoms, c. 395-511
 “He who kills a free Frank or other barbarian who lives by Salic
Law, and it is proved against him, shall be liable to pay eight
thousand denarii, which is two hundred solidi...
          ...If a Roman landholder who is not a table companion of
the king is killed, he who is proved to have killed him shall be
liable to pay four thousand denarii.”259
   -    Lex Salica, XLI.1, 9, c.500
    This passage from the laws created by the early Frankish kingdoms marks an
astonishing turnaround in the social hierarchy that had existed in northern Gaul
and Germany for the best part of  half  a millennium. In all that time, Roman
citizenship was virtually synonymous with the full protection of the law, while
barbarians were frequently abused, both rhetorically and materially, as unworthy
of the same consideration. Yet by the sixth century, self-declared Romans in the
former  provinces  on  the  north-west  had  yielded  pride  of  place  in  the  social
hierarchy to self-declared barbarians, and one group in particular: the Franks.
But the Franks and their laws were not, as was once averred, an alien import
superimposed  the  ruins  of  the  western  empire.260 They  were  a  product  of  a
complicated and tumultuous process of interaction of cultural forces from either
side of the frontier, which was characterized above all by the participation of
dominant  social  groups in  collective violence,  within,  across  and beyond the
frontier.
    The fifth century witnessed the final dissolution of the Western Empire, and its
replacement in Gaul by Frankish kingdoms which placed self-consciously non-
Roman  military  elites  at  the  apex  of  the  political  and  economic  order.  This
section  will  consider  the  process  by  which  this  change  came  about,  as  the
Western Empire was supplanted in Gaul, and the Frankish kingdoms grew in its
259 Ekhardt, K. A. (ed.), Pactus Legis Salicae. MGH, Legum Sectio I (Hanover 1962). Translated
by Drew (1991), p. 104-5
260 For instance, by Delbruck, H. (trans. W. J. Renfroe) History of the Art of War, volume II: The
barbarian invasions, (Lincoln 1990 [1920])
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place. This analysis will reflect on debates raised in recent historiography on the
degree of violence, upheaval, consent and assimilation involved in this process,
principally from three thematically contiguous and chronologically overlapping
perspectives.  First,  the  end  of  the  Western  Roman  army  and  questions  of
militarization and changing attitudes to violence in the late empire, c. 375-475.
Second, the degree of material, political and cultural continuity versus disruption
and  upheaval  between  the  late  Roman  Empire  and  the  Frankish  successor
kingdoms, c. 405-486. And third, the character of the Frankish kingdoms as they
emerged at the turn of the fifth and sixth centuries relative to the former empire
and their fellow successor states, c. 455-511. 
    It is important to emphasise, at the outset, the incompleteness and ambiguity
of  the  evidence  for  the  fifth  century  in  particular.  Narrative  accounts  of  the
period are late, Christianizing, and/or perfunctory, offering nothing like the detail
and expertise provided by Ammianus for the fourth century. Military conflicts
are  often  dismissed  in  a  few words,  or  merely  alluded  to  indirectly,  leaving
plenty of room for interpretation as to their severity, the territorial extent of their
impact,  or  the  number  of  participants.261 The  archaeological  remains  of  the
period  are  similarly  partial  and  ambiguous  compared  with  earlier  and  later
phases,  although a number of  significant  finds and their  analysis  in the later
twentieth century has served to remedy this imbalance somewhat.262 
    These  limitations  further  complicate  the  already  difficult  business  of
attempting  to  reconcile  sometimes  contradictory  literary  sources  with  the
material remains of the period. Given these difficulties, the conclusions of this
analysis are necessarily tentative. Nonetheless it will be argued that the evidence
implies that the transformation of the former empire in Gaul was accompanied
by  considerable  institutional  discontinuity,  as  well  as  violence  and  social
261 Detailed contemporary narrative of non-fragmentary nature ends with Ammianus and 
Zosimus, the Notitia Dignitatum only covers the army up to perhaps 420, and few novels are 
added to the Theodosian Code in the fifth century West. For a summary of the written 
sources see Jones, A. H. M. The Later Roman Empire, 284-602: A Social, Economic, and 
Administrative Survey, (Oxford 1964), p. 115-6
262 See Dierkens, A. and Perin, P. “The fifth-century advance of the Franks in Belgica II: history 
and archaeology”, in E. Taayke and J. H. Looijenga et al (eds.), Essays on the Early Franks 
(Eelde 2003), p. 173-5 for a list of efforts to make the period less archaeologically enigmatic,
and remaining problems.
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upheaval. And that the Frankish takeover may have benefited from cooperation
with  the  conquered  military  subcultures,  facilitated  by  and  facilitating  a
considerable degree of cultural accommodation and assimilation.
3.1 – The End of the Western Roman army, c. 375-475
    As the previous chapter showed, Roman armies were substantially functional
and effective in the late fourth century. They may well have contained a large
proportion  of  self-consciously  barbarian  troops,  but  not  necessarily  to  a
substantially greater degree than the fifty percent recorded for the early empire.
As we have seen, they also included a further class of provincial auxiliary units
which were similar in character to barbarian troops, and whose discipline and
obedience in the field was open to question.263 But there is little evidence that the
increasing emphasis on ethnic-type elements in the Gallic armies, and indeed
throughout the empire in the late fourth century, resulted in particular problems
of loyalty or effectiveness for the Roman military. It may indeed have made the
imperial armies more flexible and better adapted to the vicissitudes of frontier
warfare. Above all, Roman forces remained distinct from Frankish ones in one
key respect: they still drew upon regular systems of supply, pay and discipline
underpinned by the bureaucracy and infrastructure of the empire. These systems
allowed larger forces to be kept in the field for longer, and made them better
organized than their barbarian opponents. But most importantly they formed an
iron  chain  by  which  the  culturally  diverse  units  of  Gaul  were  joined  to  the
imperial court.
    The sources for the history of the Roman armed forces deteriorate badly for
the fifth century,264 leading to widely divergent views on its fate. But the Notitia
Dignitatum indicates  that  the  structure  of  the  Western  Roman  military  was
substantially altered between the late-fourth and the mid-fifth century, partly as a
result of losses amounting to perhaps half of all its combat units.265 By the 420s,
263 See previous chapter, p. 69-72
264 Wightman, E. M. Gallia Belgica, (London 1985), p. 300-301; Jones (1964), p. 170-171
265 The distributio numerorum, the latest part of the Notitia, shows numerous units being 
promoted to the status of palatinae, comitatenses, and pseudo-comitatenses from less senior 
status, apparently to replace recently destroyed or disbanded units – see Jones (1964), 
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the  Western  Empire  was  apparently  relying  on  federate  allies  to  sustain  its
military efforts against  the interlopers of the 406 Rhine crossing; when those
allies  abandoned  the  army  of  Castinus  in  Spain,  it  was  catastrophically
defeated.266 Mauritania and Africa Proconsularis were so poorly endowed with
soldiers, and the empire so unable to move its armies quickly and effectively
between regions, that the introduction of ten thousand Vandal warriors entirely
transformed  the  fortunes  of  the  region,  despite  its  evident  centrality  to  the
imperial fisc.267 Aetius, the most successful Roman magister militum of the early-
mid fifth  century,  relied on a  group of Hunnic allies both to  achieve victory
against the barbarians, and to secure his position within the empire in the face of
imperial  hostility.  When it  became necessary  to  defend the west  from Attila,
Aetius was forced to assemble a coalition in which barbarians were recognised
as junior partners rather than clear subordinates.268 By the 460s the parts of Gaul
still not directly controlled by barbarian elites were effectively independent, and
the empire was reduced to playing the new de-facto rulers of the West off against
one-another.269 The overall impression is that the effectiveness of the Western
armies declined precipitously in this period.270
    The basic reason for this decline is relatively straightforward. The western
empire was, in the course of the fifth century, catastrophically impoverished by
the  loss  of  revenue-producing  territories  in  Western  Europe,  Africa  and  the
Mediterranean, and ultimately became unable to afford to offer the steady stream
of pay and supplies that had been so central to the loyalty and effectiveness of its
vast armies.271 The underlying reasons for this fiscal collapse are, however, much
less  clear  and  cannot  be  taken  for  granted.  The  battles  of  Adrianople  and
Frigidus,  and  the  civil  wars  of  the  early  fifth  century,  are  offered  as  key
Appendix II, p. 351-358
266 Hydatius 68-69 (422); Liebeschuetz, W. “The end of the Roman army”, in Rich (ed.), War 
and Society in the Roman World (1993), p. 266
267 Procopius, Wars III.3-4; Hydatius, 80, 107
268 Priscus, Fragments, 64
269 Heather, P. The Fall of the Roman Empire: A new history of Rome and the Barbarians 
(Oxford 2006), p. 394
270 Prominent dissenters from this point include Bachrach and (to a lesser extent) Walter Goffart 
and Micheal Kulikowski. See below.
271 Jones (1964), p. 612, highlights a passage in Eugippius’s Life of Severinus (XX), which 
neatly places the end of regular pay for troops guarding the upper Rhine around the late-460s
or 370s.
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watersheds in military decline, due to the damage that they did to Roman forces
and the veterans in particular.272 To this, if the fragmentary but credible Sulpicius
Alexander is to be believed, we may add a serious defeat in Frankish territory of
the imperial  armies stationed at  Trier in  the late-380s,  in which many of the
officers  were  killed.273 However,  it  is  difficult  to  determine  whether  these
reverses were any worse than those of the late-third, or indeed the late-second,
century. The impact of Adrianople was felt predominantly by the Eastern army,
while the damage done in terms of casualties at Frigidus is not as clearly attested
and may not have been especially profound, given that the battle was swung by
the  defection  of  western  Roman  troops  and  the  only  numerically  recorded
casualties were the deaths of 20,000 gothic federates.274 Likewise the degree of
attrition  entailed  in  the  early-fifth  century  wars  and  invasions  cannot  be
ascertained. The Roman army had suffered massive losses in previous civil wars,
not  demonstrably  less  severe,  but  had  always  regained control  in  the  past.275
Nonetheless, the evidence of the distibutio numerorum – that the army lost over
fifty percent of its fourth-century combat units  by 420 AD – and the evident
subsequent inability of the Western empire to defend or retake precious territory
in Spain and Africa, cannot be ignored.276 
    The notion that the Roman armies could be permanently damaged by the loss
of experienced officers and the temporary failure of organizational systems is
supported by the apparent lack of a written tradition of military organization and
discipline. It is an extraordinary fact that, though some legislation was laid down
for the armed forces, so literate and centralized a society as that of the Roman
empire apparently made no attempt to fully codify and regulate its regimes of
military training and discipline, as it did in the case of the civil laws. Vegetius
272 Tomlin, R. “A.H.M. Jones and the Army of the Fourth Century” in D. Gwynn (ed.) A.H.M. 
Jones and the Later Roman Empire (Leiden 2008), p. 159; Southern, P. & Dixon, K. R., The 
Late Roman Army (New Haven 1996), p. 38-40
273 “Perturbatis ergo ordinibus, caesae legionis. Heraclio Iovinianorum tribuno ac paene 
omnibus qui militibus praeerant extinctis, paucis effugium totum nox et latibula silvarum 
praestiterunt.” – Sulpicius Alexander, III, in Gregory of Tours, Histories II.9
274 Campbell, D. “Review article: The later Roman Army”, in Britannia 30 (1999), p. 391-4, 
dissenting from Southern & Dixon 1996. Zosimus, IV; Orosius, Historiae adversum 
paganos, VII
275 Christie, N. “Wars within the frontiers: Archaeologies of rebellion, revolt and civil war”, in 
War and Warfare in Late Antiquity (2013), p. 952
276 Heather, P. Empires and Barbarians (Oxford 2009), p. 175
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provides some signs of a now largely lost tradition of military writing, but he
equally makes clear that it  was not widely known or influential.277 Thus it  is
possible  that  profound  inter-generational  changes  in  the  organizational  and
disciplinary structure of the Roman hosts might have come about without being
fully appreciated by contemporaries. 
   
    The Theodosian Code implies that the problems of the Roman armies were
associated with difficulties in securing and retaining willing recruits to replenish
the  depleted  ranks:  As  we  have  seen,  367  witnessed  legislation  aimed  at
preventing self-mutilation to avoid conscription, and in the same year the height
requirement for potential recruits was reduced.278 A rash of measures set out to
prevent desertion between 379 and 383, although a law of 380 restated the long-
standing ban on slaves being used as military recruits, implying that difficulties
in recruitment were still limited. In 394 a measure permitting the enrolment of
infantes vel pueri  indicates further problems, and a second group of measures
against deserters followed in 403-406 was this time accompanied by the reversal
of the ancient prohibition of slave-soldiers… 
“In the matter of defence against hostile attacks, We order that
consideration be given not only to the legal status of soldiers, but
also  to their  physical  strength [vires].  Although we believe that
freeborn persons are aroused by love of country, we exhort slaves
also, by the authority of this edict, that as soon as possible they
shall offer themselves for the labours of war, and if they receive
their arms as men fit for military service, they shall obtain the
reward of freedom, and they shall also receive two solidi each for
travel money. Especially, of course, do we urge this service upon
the slaves of those persons who are retained in the armed imperial
service, and likewise upon the slaves of foederati and of dediticii,
since it is evident that they are making war also along with their
masters.”279
277 Vegetius, Epitoma I.1
278 Cod.Theo. VII.8.3
279 Cod.Theo. VII.1.14; VII.13.16
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We cannot know whether this measure was the culmination of growing pressure
or an emergency measure aimed at the specific exigencies of the Gothic attacks
on Italy,280 but whatever the case, its final clause illustrates that the admission of
slaves into the imperial armies was not a total volt-face. Clearly at least some
slaves (and presumably half-free men) were already accompanying their masters
into battle. And several other laws imply a subtle shift in the recruitment and
discipline of the Roman armies, from a system emphasising regular conscription
to a greater emphasis on recruitment pools based on hereditary and local military
subcultures281. 
    Further evidence for this shift comes from the regulations regarding absence
from  the  Roman  armies.  Measures  enacted  under  Constantine  dictated  that
tribunes  who allowed their  troops to  temporarily  absent  themselves  from the
army were to be punished with dispossession and deportation in peacetime, death
in  wartime.  In  the  middle  of  the  fourth  century,  however,  the  penalty  was
radically reduced, to a hefty fine. A further law of 413 did not even hold tribunes
responsible for the departure of their  soldiers, instead threatening the soldiers
themselves with demotion.282 Several laws of the 360s to 390s insisted that the
sons of veterans enrol in the military, reinforcing an existing trend; the last of
these  forbade  the  sons  of  veterans  from  assuming  non-military  government
roles.283 And a measure of 372 declared the end of payments of annonae for the
upkeep and equipment for the military reserves (accrescentes);  from now on,
they were to be maintained by their parentes.284
    We have already seen how barbarians were penetrating the ranks of the regular
army; how, in addition to the barbarian and foederati  and semi-barbarian  laeti,
citizens  of  the  empire  were  enrolling  as  auxiliary  units  with  strong  regional
280 It cannot have been a response to the Rhine crossing, which it predated by some months.
281 James, E. “The militarization of Roman society, 400-700”, in A. N. Jorgensen & B. L. 
Clausen (eds.), Military aspects of Scandinavian society in a European perspective AD 1-
1300, (Kopenhagen 1997), p. 20
282 Cod.Theo. VII.12.1; VII.1.2; VII.18.16
283 Cod.Theo VII.1.5; VII.1.8; VII.22.12. 
284 Cod.Theo. VII.1.11 - “Ii, qui inter adcrescentes matriculis adtinentur, tamdiu alimoniam a 
parentibus sumant, quoad gerendis armis idonei fuerint aestimati, ita ut cesset super eorum 
nomine praebitio fiscalis annonae.” For further measures which tacitly acknowledged the 
attachment of soldiers to wider familial groups who provided their batmen, see Barlow J. 
“Kinship, Identity and Fourth-century Franks”, in Historia: Zeitschrift fur Alte Geschichte, 
45.2 (1996), p. 234
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characteristics; and how independent armed groups were operating in northern
Gaul.  These  trends  ran  in  parallel  to  changes  in  Roman  law that  apparently
tended  to  accept  a  greater  degree  of  independence  among  the  soldiers,  and
encouraged them to draw on their families and communities for their military
preparation.  But  such  social  traditions  of  military  participation  were  heavily
concentrated  in  the  frontier  regions,  and  the  result  seems  to  have  been  an
increasing reliance by the armed forces on the Gallic and barbarian levies. The
Notitia Dignitatum shows that units of Cornuti, Celtae, Petulantes, and Batavi
had been integrated into the Italian and Eastern armies sometime between the
late fourth and early fifth centuries.285 The recruiting pools of northern Gaul were
thus exploited to restore the ranks of the wealthier and more populous parts of
the empire.286
    Wolf Liebeschuetz has persuasively suggested that the late empire saw a de-
militarization  of  the  Roman  citizenry,  especially  the  aristocracy  who  had
historically formed the officer class.287 The psychological perspective, which sees
violent experiences as a key factor in the mental and physiological formation of
willing military recruits, adds considerable weight to his theory. The changes in
equipment of the late Roman period, which favoured looser formations on the
battlefield, added to the psychological problem of recruitment by removing the
ability of the impenetrable formation to subsume the psychological frailty of the
inexperienced  individuals  within  the  ranks.288 Under  these  conditions,  the
imperial core was still capable of producing some enthusiastic soldiers, but the
relative peace that it had enjoyed in the fourth century, and the more effective
prohibition of weapon-bearing outside of official military roles, meant that they
were both fewer and less conveniently concentrated than they were closer to the
frontiers.
285 Southern & Dixon (1996), p. 48-57; ND VII.
286 Orosius, Histories, VII.42; Heather, P. “Imperial centre and Northwest frontier, A. D. 300-
476”, (forthcoming) p. 19-20, who points to the formation of the Italian field army in the 
early fifth century as a strong candidate for the moment when several Gallic units were 
transferred into Italy. 
287 Liebeschuetz, W. “Citizen status and law in the Roman empire and the Visigothic kingdom”, 
from Pohl and Reimitz (eds.), Strategies of Distinction: the construction of ethnic 
communities, 300-800 (Leiden 1998)
288 See Chapter 2, note 174 
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    At the level of the Christianizing Roman elite of the later-fourth and fifth
centuries, there are some signs of sense of estrangement from the armies that
dominated  the  frontiers.  Themistius’  Oration  for  Valentinian  revealed  a
constituency of opinion among the senatorial elites that chafed at the financial
demands of the military, and even called into question the utility of their efforts
to  the  empire  as  a  whole.289 Aurelius  Victor  made  no  attempt  to  hide  his
resentment of the political dominance of the military over the imperial office,
and occasionally disdained the soldiery as rash and ignorant.290 And although
Augustine  clearly  approved  of  properly  justified  and  mandated  warfare,  his
writings occasionally display a sense of discomfort with personal violence and
its executors, even when their actions are legitimate and authorised - 
   “...a judge [iudex] considers it unworthy and heinous to kill
with his own hands someone who has been sentenced to death; at
his command, though, an executioner [carnifex] does it  who by
reason  of  his  temperament  has  been  appointed  for  the  task  of
killing,  in  conformity  with  the  law,  a  person  who  has  been
sentenced to death; but he could as well, because of his cruelty,
kill an innocent person… Hence it is also that we use irrational
beings for those things that it would be heinous for human beings
to carry out. For, to be sure, it is right for a thief to be badly
bitten, yet a person does not do this by himself, nor is it done by
a son or by a member of his household or even by his slave but by
his  dog,  which  is  fitting  for  this  animal  to  do  because  of  its
nature.”291
289 “Booty and prisoners profit only those who bear arms… The point is not to recover 
Mesopotamia or to bring back to reason the Scythians beyond or to rebuild the cities ruined 
by the Germans; even if we succeeded in doing so, the only ones to notice would be the 
Syrians, Thracians, and Gauls” - Themistius, Orations VIII.170-4 translated in Goffart, W. 
“Rome, Constantinople and the Barbarians”, in AHR vol.86 no.2 (Apr. 1981), 275-306, p. 
290. For further discussion of the specific contextual demands that framed Themistius’ 
oration, see Heather, P. & Matthews, J. The Goths in the Fourth Century (Liverpool 2010), p.
11-21
290 Aurelius Victor, De caesaribus, XI (“milites...more suo seditiosius”), XXXIV (“milites, quos
fere contra ingenium perditae res subigunt recta consulere”), XXXVII (““Verum dum 
[senatores] oblectantur otio simulque divitiis pavent, quarum usum affluentiamque 
aeternitate maius putant, munivere militaribus et paene barbaris viam in se ac posteros 
dominandi.”)
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    To a certain extent, Augustine’s reflection was neither novel nor particularly
Christian.  Ostentatious  displays  of  personal  clemency  by  Roman  generals,
displaying an empathy for the condemned enemy that distinguished them from
the rank-and-file, were older than the empire itself, and Ammianus had recorded
that the proudly un-Christian emperor Julian had made one such gesture when a
convicted  rapist  was  brought  before  him  in  Gaul,  against  the  wishes  of  his
troops.292 What  was  new  was  the  extent  to  which  Augustine  demeaned  the
executors of admittedly desirable violence, describing them as brute animals that
would as readily kill the innocent as the guilty, and rhetorically eliding them with
the barbarian ‘other’. 
    It  should be noted that  there is  a certain psychological  credibility  to this
pessimistic perspective: as the first chapter illustrated, once a person is in the
habit of violence, there can be no guarantee that this learned behaviour will not
be expressed in morally or legally inappropriate contexts.293 While Polybius had
admitted that men could become inveterately violent, becoming like animals, as
a result the of psychological conditioning, he had been careful to reserve such
condemnations for the enemies of Rome.294 But Augustine goes further, in that he
291 Augustine (trans. Ramsey, B.), Responses to Miscellaneous Questions, (New City Press 
2008), LIII (p. 58). Augustine subsequently expressed a more sanguine view on the business 
of killing, but never fully reconciled himself to it, given his psychologically naive insistence 
that all violence must be done out of the love of God. See Clark, J. “Desires of the Hangman:
Augustine on Legitimized Violence”, in Drake, H. A. Violence in Late Antiquity, (Aldershot 
2006), p. 140-145. Further possible evidence for this trend appears in the letters of Avitus of 
Vienne, (Ep. 95) (p. 322), who refers to a young man called Ceratius thus - “...He inherits 
from the wisdom of his mother the fact that he willingly flees barbarians, and from the 
courage of his father that he does not turn his back on literature”. The editor suggests a 
possible stinging rebuke, based on satire or irony, in this, but the first part is thought to be 
earnestly stated - Avitus of Vienne (trans. Shanzer, D. & Wood, I.), Letters and Selected 
Prose (Cambridge 2002), p. 322
292 Ammianus XVI.5.12.
293 See Chapter 1, p. 33-4
294 Polybius’ psychologically insightful reflection on the potential alterations of character and 
behaviour associated with exposure to violence, which draws a medical analogy, deserves to 
be quoted in full - 
   "…not only do men's bodies and certain of the ulcers and tumours afflicting them become so 
to speak savage and brutalized and quite incurable, but that this is true in a much higher 
degree of their souls. In the case of ulcers, if we treat them, they are sometimes inflamed by 
the treatment itself and spread more rapidly, while again if we neglect them they continue, 
in virtue of their own nature, to eat into the flesh and never rest until they have utterly 
destroyed the tissues beneath. Similarly such malignant lividities and putrid ulcers often 
grow in the human soul, that no beast becomes at the end more wicked or cruel than man. In
the case of men in such a state, if we treat the disease by pardon and kindness, they think 
we are scheming to betray them or deceive them, and become more mistrustful and hostile 
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also ‘others’ the violent men on whose necessity he insists, adding a kind of caste
gloss  to  the  invective  by  placing  them  below  slaves  in  a  sketched  moral
hierarchy. And he shows a revulsion at the prospect of ‘getting your hands dirty’,
as  a  soldier  might  have  it,  which  would  not  readily  reconcile  itself  to  the
practice, as opposed to the principle, of military service. Given what we have
seen of the importance of cultural attitudes in shaping developmental reactions to
the  experience  of  violence,  such  reservations  must  have  contributed  to  the
growing  tendency  of  landlords  in  Italy  to  withhold  their  peasants  from
conscription by subterfuge.295
    This sharper sense of opposition between senatorial elites of the imperial core
and the dirty work of military service coincided with a separation of Western
emperors from active military commands and the migration of the imperial court
toward Italy.296 This development put a series of generalissimos in charge of the
Western empire by virtue of their power over its armies, whose political careers
hinged  on  their  personal  relationship  to  those  armies,  and  whose  personal
reputations seemed self-consciously designed to identify them with the rank-and-
file. The Frank, Arbogast, ostentatiously rejected the power of Roman literate
culture over the military when he publicly destroyed the imperial rescript that
was meant to depose him, and was rumoured to have personally assassinated the
emperor  thereafter.297 But  his  removal,  and  the  general  backlash  against
barbarians holding the highest commands, did not put an end to the trend. The
magister militum Boniface  appropriated  an  army  meant  for  war  in  Spain  to
to their would-be benefactors, but if, on the contrary, we attempt to cure the evil by 
retaliation they work up their passions to outrival ours, until there is nothing so abominable 
or so atrocious that they will not consent to do it, imagining all the while that they are 
displaying a fine courage. Thus at the end they are utterly brutalized and no longer can be 
called human beings. Of such a condition the origin and most potent cause lies in bad 
manners and customs and wrong training from childhood, but there are several contributory 
ones, the chief of which is habitual violence and unscrupulousness on the part of those in 
authority over them."  The Histories, Book 1, 81
295 Southern & Dixon (1996), p. 53
296 The Praetorian Prefecture of Gaul was also relocated to Arles in the 390s – Heather, 
“Northwest”, p. 18-19
297 Zosimus, IV.53-54, who also claims that “the soldiers submitted to this audacious action, not 
only because he was so brave and warlike a person, but because they were attached to him 
through his contempt of riches.” Some centuries later, the ritual violent destruction of 
illegitimate documents appears as an ordinary feature of Frankish jurisprudence – Nelson, J. 
“Dispute Settlement in Carolingian West Francia”, in J. Nelson, The Frankish World 
(London 1996), p. 65
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establish his own power in Africa. His personal behaviour stands in very striking
contrast to Augustine’s concept of proper conduct in office, and to the example
of  Julian  half  a  century  earlier:  according  to  the  admiring  report  of
Olympiodorus, upon hearing a plea that a barbarian federate had taken the wife
of a local farmer, Boniface found the barbarian and decapitated him personally in
the dead of night, gleefully presenting the severed head to the offended farmer
the next day.298 His subsequent death from wounds sustained during a battle in
which his army was victorious suggests that Boniface was putting himself close
to the action on the battlefield. Aetius, (though less self-consciously ‘barbarian’
in his  public conduct)  like Arbogast,  attempted to use the army to install  his
choice of emperor, relying on them subsequently to protect his position, and also
enjoyed a reputation for military lifestyle.299
    Between Augustine on the one hand, and the likes of Arbogast and Bonifacius
on the other, what emerges is an apparent bifurcation in elite values that contrasts
with the Old Roman cursus honorem, which aimed at seamlessly combining civil
and military careers.300 The late Roman empire was an era of lifelong soldiers
and lifelong civilians, with most of the former being concentrated near to the
frontiers, and most of the latter dwelling in the interior, and this contrast was
resulting  in  two  parallel  and  antagonistic  cultural  trends.  In  civil  society  –
particularly  in  the  core  provinces  –  admiration  of  the  military  had  come  to
become tinged with suspicion and disdain for soldiers,301 who were sometimes
thought  of  as  a  less  Roman  or  un-Roman  ‘other’,  doing  the  necessary  but
unpleasant work entailed in maintaining the empire. It must be stressed that this
contrast was far from absolute. The more Romanized communities of the interior
continued to produce some military recruits. But in the frontier provinces – and,
298  Olympiodorus, Fragments, in R. C. Blockley (ed. and trans.), The Fragmentary Classicising
Historians of the Later Roman Empire: Eunapius, Olympiodorus, Priscus and Malchus 
(Liverpool: 1981)
299 Flavius Merobaudes, Panegyric I - “...your breastplate is not so much a defense as a 
garment… not a magnificent display but a way of life; finally… what is readiness for battle 
to others is routine for you.” (translation from Clover, F. L. “Flavius Merobaudes: A 
translation and historical commentary”, in Transactions of the American Philosophical 
Society 61:1 (1971), p. 1-78
300 Liebeschuetz, W. “The end of the Roman army in the Western empire”, from Rich and 
Shipley (eds.), War and Society in the Roman World, (London 1993), p. 274
301 Cameron, The Later Roman Empire (London 1993), p. 146-7; Lee, A. D. War in Late 
Antiquity: A Social History (Oxford 2009), p. 153-170
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increasingly as the fifth century wore on, in the imperial heartlands – military
subcultures  were  becoming  established  in  which  the  military  and  their
characteristic violence were dominant forces in society.  In the midst of these
dominant violent subcultures, leaders made efforts to identify themselves with
the de-facto military elites, who had become inured to being ruled by their own.
    It is perhaps in this context that we should view the somewhat hysterical
claims of Salvian, that Roman citizens were joining the barbarians en masse due
to the tyranny of the empire –
“So you find men passing over everywhere, now to the Goths, now
to the  Bacaudae,  or  whatever  other  barbarians  have  established
their power anywhere… Hence the name of Roman citizen, once
not  only  much  valued  but  dearly  bought,  is  now  voluntarily
repudiated and shunned, and is thought not merely valueless, but
even almost abhorrent… even those who do not take refuge with
the barbarians are yet compelled to be barbarians themselves; for
this is the case with the greater part of the Spaniards, no small
proportion  of  the Gauls,  and,  in  fine,  all  those throughout  the
Roman world whose Roman citizenship has been brought to nothing
by Roman extortion.”302
These  claims  are  presented  in  support  of  a  broader  moral  argument,  and
doubtless should be taken with a grain of salt, but they nonetheless imply that
some of the free natives of the empire were preferring ‘barbarian’ identity which,
interestingly, did not necessarily entail joining one of the outside groups that had
established  themselves  in  the  empire.  If  the  deduction  of  M.  Charles  that
Vegetius’ De Re Militari dates not from the late fourth century, but to the 430’s
or 440’s, is correct, then his claim – that Romans were enrolling in the Roman
armies as Auxiliaries rather than under ordinary terms – dovetails with Salvian’s
allusion.303 The overall impression is of an unknown proportion of men suitable
to military service in the ordinary ranks of the Roman army joining themselves
302 Salvian, De Gubernatione Dei, V.5
303 Charles, M. Vegetius in Context: Establishing the date of the Epitoma rei Militaris (Stuttgart 
2007), p. 16-22
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to groups who took a greater sub-cultural pride in their military work, and could
resist the demands of the Roman state and collectively negotiate with it.304
3.2 – Discontinuity and Violence in fifth-century Northern Gaul, c.405-486
    The collapse of imperial military dominance in the West provides the context
for the momentous political, social and economic changes which transformed the
region between the Rhine and the Loire – the area which would later form the
seat  of  Frankish  royal  power  –  in  the  fifth  century.  But  the  nature  of  these
changes remains the subject of vigorous debate. At one pole of this controversy
are those who see the Frankish kings as provincial governors acting with the
consent of the empire, their armies as highly confined elite groups, billeted on
the  rural  population  in  an orderly  fashion that  only marginally  disrupted  the
socio-economic status quo.305 At the other pole are those who see the period as
one particularly troubled by warfare, involving widespread economic and social
upheaval  as  the  Frankish  kings  aggressively  asserted  their  power  over  pre-
existing elites and the character of local society was profoundly transformed.306
This section will assess these changes through the literary and material evidence,
and weigh the arguments for continuity and disruption, consent and violence, in
304 Drinkwater & Elton offer a different explanation of Salvian’s claims, based on the premise 
that Roman were preferring “less complicated economic life under peaceful barbarian rule.” 
But this does not reconcile to Salvian’s clear statement that some Romans were separating 
themselves from Roman identity without accepting the overlordiship of incoming barbarian 
rulers. Drinkwater, J. & Elton, H. Fifth-Century Gaul: A crisis of identity? (Cambridge 
2002), p. 130
305 For instance, Kulikowski, M. “The archaeology of war and the 5th century invasions”, in A. 
Serantis and N. Christie (eds.), War and Warfare in Late Antiquity (Leiden 2013); Goffart, W.
The Narrators of Barbarian History (AD 550-800): Jordanes, Gregory of Tours, Bede, and 
Paul the Deacon, (Princeton 1988); Bachrach, B. S. Merovingian Military Organization 
(University of Minnesota, 1972)
306 For instance, Heather, P. Empires and Barbarians: The Fall of Rome and the Birth of 
Europe, (Oxford 2009), Liebeschuetz, W. “Citizen status and law in the Roman empire and 
the Visigothic kingdom”, from W. Pohl and H. Reimitz (eds.), Strategies of Distinction: the 
construction of ethnic communities, 300-800 (Leiden 1998); Ward-Perkins, B. The Fall of 
Rome: And the End of Civilization (Oxford 2005); Whitby, “Armies and society”, in 
Cameron, A., Ward-Perkins, B. & Whitby, M. (eds.) The Cambridge ancient history volume 
14: Late Antiquity: Empire and successors, AD 425-600 (Cambridge 2001), p. 481. Halsall 
stands somewhere between these positions, arguing that barbarian takeover was a bi-product 
of imperial collapse - “The Barbarian Invasions”, in Fouracre (ed.), The New Cambridge 
Medieval History (Cambridge 2007), p. 55; see also, Christie, N. “Wars within the frontiers: 
Archaeologies of rebellion, revolt and civil war”, in A. Sarantis and N. Christie (eds.), War 
and Warfare in Late Antiquity (Leiden 2013) p. 961-3
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the period. It will conclude that there is a strong case for seeing the period as one
of  socio-economic  disruption,  collapse  and  transformation,  out  of  which  a
society  emerged  that  was  less  literate,  less  comfortable,  and  more  violence-
oriented at its elite levels.
3.2.1 – Literary Evidence
    From the fragmentary notices provided by the literary evidence, it is quite
clear  that  fifth-century  northern  Gaul  and the  Rhine  region played  host  to  a
fractured  political  scene,  and  a  significant  number  of  military  conflicts.  The
Rhine Crossing of 405-6, which occasioned a major battle between the Franks
and a coalition of Vandals and Alans, was rapidly followed by the invasion of
Constantine III, who abortively employed armies from the region in his attempt
to seize the western empire.307 While the broader civil wars were settled by the
420s, The Rhine Franks were again active by the end of the decade,  causing
Aetius to campaign on the Rhine in 428 and/or 432.308 The attacks of another
Frankish group – possibly the Salians – in northern Gaul led to the conquest of
Cambrai and Arras in the 430s, requiring an imperial counter-attack that drove
them back to Tournai in the 440s.309 The region was further exposed to military
depredations  with  the  invasion  of  the  Huns  in  the  early  450s,  the  probable
occasion of a Hunnic intervention in Frankish politics in their own territories.310
The subsequent political scene was complicated by the separation of the ‘Roman’
enclave of Aegidius from central imperial control after the death of Majorian,
and  subsequent  conflicts  saw  territories  between  the  Somme  and  the  Seine
change  hands,  possibly  more  than  once,  over  a  thirty  year  period,  with  the
politics of the region only stabilized by the triumph of Clovis over Gallic and
Frankish rivals in the 490s.
    The last phase of this narrative – the part comprising the Frankish takeover of
Belgica  Secunda  –  is  the  most  controversial  due  to  the  late  and  confused
307 Hydatius (406-411); Zosimus V-VI
308 Gallic Chronicle of 452
309 Histories II.9; Dirkens and Perin (2003), p. 165-170
310 Thompson, E. A. The Huns (Oxford 1996), p. 137-149, principally citing Priscus, Fragments
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narrative  in  Gregory  of  Tours’  Histories that  provides  the  most  extensive
description. Where some historians see an often bitter territorial war culminating
in Frankish conquest of the region, others see a broadly consensual and ordered
process occasionally punctuated by political  antagonisms and battles. Michael
Kulikowski’s statement  that  “many  of  the barbarians  in the 5th century West,
whom we are conditioned to think of as invaders, were in fact first-, second- and
third-generation  inhabitants  of  the  imperial  provinces”311 may  be  seen  as
particularly resonant in relation to the Franks, who, unlike the Vandals and Goths
who took over the southern provinces, had long been in intimate cultural and
political contact with the regions that they came to rule. A famous letter from
Bishop  Remigius  of  Reims  welcomed  Clovis  as  the  legitimate  governor  of
Belgica, and Remigius later baptized him and many other elite Franks, leading
some historians to conclude that the Frankish king remained a servant of the
admittedly  defunct  western  Empire,  ruling  along  essentially  Roman  or  “sub-
Roman”  lines.312 The  narrative  evidence  of  Frankish  conflict  with  imperial
forces, and the Life of Saint Genovefa, which states that Clovis was “king by
right  of  war”,  contradict  this  rosy  impression,313 but  none  of  the  sources  is
sufficiently detailed and reliable to settle the issue once and for all.
    Reading back from legal evidence of the Carolingian period, Walter Goffart
has extended the picture of consensual and ordered takeover considerably with
his theory that the incoming Frankish warriors were settled in  the empire on
strictly  designated lands  that  would be exempt from taxation on the basis  of
military  service.314 Goffart  states  that  the  “belief  in  an  extension  of  Roman
administrative structures is unappealing to those who wish Rome to really fall...
Either inclination, for survival or against, needs a basis in evidence.”315 But this
is to ask the impossible of those arguing for a collapse in administrative culture,
which  process  would,  by  its  very  nature,  result  in  a  dearth  of  documentary
311 Kulikowski (2013), p. 685
312 MGH III Epistolae Austrasicae 2, p. 113; Bachrach (1973), p. 7-8, 17
313 MacGeorge, P. Late Roman Warlords, (Oxford 2002), p. 128, citing Vita Genovafae (ed. 
Krusch.), ch. 56. The Vita (ch. 35) also reports a lengthy Frankish siege of Paris sometime in 
the late-5th century. See also Gregory of Tours’ Glory of the Martyrs (LIX), in which Clovis 
abortively besieges Nantes.
314 Primarily from Capitulary evidence - Goffart, W. “Frankish military duty and the fate of 
Roman taxation”, in Early Medieval Europe 16:2 (May 2008), p. 166-190
315 Ibid.
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evidence.  Goffart  also  draws  a  false  dichotomy  between  a  bureaucratically
organized land-based levy system and a so-called “Tacitean” mode of service
based on the abstract principle of loyalty to the warlord to the death.316 As the
first chapter illustrated, the promotion and organization of violence never takes
place under such simplistic conditions, but instead constitutes a variable blend of
psychological  conditioning,  social  expectation,  fear  of  punishment  and  the
promise  of  reward.  If  we  accept  that  such  complex  causes  of  military
participation – which were not imitations of Roman types and did not rely on
documentary records, but are not simply based on abstract notions of loyalty –
can and did exist, the argument for a regular military administration as the only
alternative loses its force.
    The continuity theory is also weakened by what we know of the survival, or
otherwise,  of  the  civitas structure  that  had formed the  basis  for  taxation and
military levies, as well as religious organization, in the late empire. By the sixth
century, while this structure was largely preserved (in some form) south of the
Loire,  in  northern  Gaul  it  was  apparently  radically  disrupted,  with  literary
sources  indicating  that  levies  were  now organized  on a  more  irregular  basis
focused on a new class of duces. Only Trier and a few other major civitates stand
out as exceptions to a general decline in the Roman system between the Rhine
and the Loire,  and even south  of  this  line,  the  survival  was not  complete.317
Therefore it is more apt to see the Frankish kings as presiding over a patchwork
of territories with various degrees of bureaucratic competence, and the vestiges
of Roman institutional culture, rather than taking over a smoothly operating and
universal system as the Ostrogoths did in Italy or the Normans would later do in
Anglo-Saxon England.318
    The  most  fundamental  assumption  made  by  Goffart  about  the  Frankish
takeover, which appeals even to some of his opponents, is that neither Franks nor
native  landowners  would  want  to  make  the  process  of  settlement  any  more
316 Goffart (2008), p. 178
317 Heather (2009), p. 312; Macgeorge (2002), p. 125. See Bachrach (1973), p. 65-73 for a full 
list, derived from Gregory of Tours, of towns which continued to serve as centres of taxation 
and military organization.
318 For further discussion of this question, which arrives at similar conclusions, see Macgeorge 
(2002), p. 125-128
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difficult or violent than they had to.319 For him, “their goals tended to be the
same as those which the imperial government had already shown itself willing to
grant, namely, an advantageous place within an undamaged Roman society”.320
From  this  extends  the  argument  from  silence  as  to  the  probable  degree  of
accommodation  between  incoming  Franks  and  Roman  landowners,  and  its
analogue  of  assumed  administrative  continuity,  confirmed  and  extended,  in
Goffart’s  view,  by  the  Carolingian  evidence.321 From  the  perspective  of
behavioural psychology such an assumption appears simplistic and reductive – it
is  a  variant  of  the  economic  self-interest  conceptions  of  human  motivation
criticised in the opening chapter.322 As that discussion showed, individuals and
groups only consistently avoid violence for the sake of economic self-interest in
theoretical models, which are wildly disrupted by non-rational behavioural and
psychological inclinations, in particular those developed through experiences of
violence under conducive cultural conditions. The incoming Frankish elites in
northern Gaul and the Rhine region were culturally militarized groups who had
been  frequently  exposed  to  violence  in  myriad  forms,  and  as  such  form
particularly poor candidates for the kinds of rational self-interest model assumed
by Goffart.
    On  the  contrary,  from  the  perspective  of  behavioural  conditioning  and
developmental psychology, it is more likely that the process of Frankish takeover
(under  legally  ambivalent  conditions)  would  have  been  characterized  by
numerous acts  of violence and aggression against their  new, often vulnerable
hosts.323 The invading Frankish armies did not benefit from the elaborate systems
of  supply  enjoyed  by  the  Roman  armies  of  the  late  fourth  century,  whose
319 Liebeschuetz, W. “Cities, taxes and the accommodation of the barbarians: the theories of 
Durliat and Goffart”, from Pohl (ed.), Kingdoms of the empire: the integration of the 
barbarians in Late Antiquity (Leiden 1997), p. 135-6
320 Goffart, W. Rome’s Fall and After (London 1989), p. 129-130
321 Liebeschuetz (1997), p. 141-142
322 See Chapter 1, p. 27-31
323 Again, the Normans in England make an interesting point of comparison. In this better-
documented process, even a relatively orderly transition that saw the machinery of 
government pass quite smoothly under the power of the incoming Norman kings was the 
occasion of considerable violent conflict according the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, an image 
confirmed by the widespread loss of ploughs attested in the Domesday Book on lands taken 
over by new Norman lords – Morris, J. (ed.), Domesday Book: Cambridgeshire (Chichester 
1983)
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volatility and excesses we have already witnessed. The patchy, but still  more
numerous  and  detailed,  narrative  sources  for  fourth  century  Gaul  allude  to
frequent small- and medium-scale raiding warfare that innately tended to slip
under  the  notice  of  the  politically  and  ecclesiastically-oriented  fifth-century
historians and chroniclers.324 Nothing about the politically fractured scene of the
later  fifth  century  indicates  that  the  cultural  and  political  conditions  that
permitted and encouraged this activity had diminished. If anything, the situation
was more chaotic, providing more opportunities and incentives for raiding. The
imperial  city of Trier,  which had already come under attack twice in the late
fourth century, was assaulted by the Franks five more times between 405 and
455.325 If  there  were  forces  large  enough  to  take  on  this  ambitious  target
throughout the period, what we have seen of Frankish political organization so
far  implies  that  smaller  parties  were  raiding  more  humble  and  less  well-
documented settlements much more frequently. Thus, predatory raiding of these
regions was already a sub-cultural tradition among many of the new settlers, and
the fact that they now intended to remain rather than carry their loot away would
not in itself have brought about any profound change of psychological profile
from the ones which had pertained to the Frankish warriors hitherto.
3.2.2 – Archaeological Evidence 
    While the literary evidence offers a number of ambiguities with respect to
continuity  and  violence  which  permit  a  wide  range  of  interpretations,  the
archaeological evidence – much less frequently cited by the advocates of the
continuity thesis  – presents a multi-faceted picture of socio-economic change
marked by clear signs of discontinuity, decline, and militarization. Recessionary
trends in Gaul and Belgica which had been halted (but not fully reversed) in the
late empire were resumed in this period. However, the processes attested in the
archaeological record do not, in many cases, map neatly onto the reports of the
narrative record, and there was considerable variation between regions.
324   Histories II.9-10; See Chapter 2
325 Salvian, De Gubanatore, VI; Dierkens & Perin (2003), p. 169 (n. 21)
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    The numismatic evidence indicates that the fifth century witnessed a drastic
decline in both the quantity and quality of coin production in northern Gaul. The
mints of Britain had already closed down in the late fourth century, and in the
early fifth century the northern recession in coin production was extended and
compounded by the closing of the mints at Trier and (somewhat later) Arles.326
These events presaged a currency squeeze that by the end of the century severely
restricted the numbers of silver and bronze coins in particular. The quality of
coin  production  was  apparently  no  longer  subject  to  much  regulation,  and
increasingly inept forgeries of imperial coinage became widespread; similar but
less dramatic effects may be observed further south.327 In terms of availability of
small  denominations,  there  is  a  marked  contrast  between  northern  Gaul  and
Aquitaine, where bronze coins continued to circulate relatively vigorously. In the
north the lack of availability of small denominations that could be practically
employed for everyday transactions must have resulted in a rising emphasis on
barter and local trade.328 The contemporary decline in imported Mediterranean
amphorae  in  the  region  tends  to  confirm  the  impression  of  an  increasingly
localized  and  primitive  economy.329 The  recession  in  coinage  also  speaks
volumes about the (in)ability of government to levy taxes in northern Gaul, since
new issues were so intimately associated with an effective system for collecting
existing moneys.330
    The tendency toward diminuation and fortification of settlements, which had
begun during the barbarian incursions and civil wars of the third century and
continued  into  the  fourth,  accelerated  during  this  period:  a  law  of  420  AD
permitted  the  fortification  of  private  premises.331 As  significantly,  the  fifth
century  saw an  apparent  radical  acceleration  in  many regions  in  pre-existing
326 See Cleary (2013), p. 348-351
327 Blackburn, M. “Money and Coinage”, in Fouracre (ed.), The New Cambridge Medieval 
History (Cambridge 1995), p. 667
328 Drinkwater & Elton (2002), p. 128-130. No silver coin was apparently minted in the Gaul 
after the reign of Jovinus (411-413), while the production of gold coin at Arles continued 
until the third quarter of the fifth century – Macgeorge (2002), p. 142. Imitations of imperial 
silver coin were still being produced in southern Gaul until the middle of the century – 
Halsall (2007), p. 349-350
329 Ibid.; Ward-Perkins (2005), p. 98-105
330 See Jones (1964), p. 108-9; Cleary (2013), p. 349-350
331 Whittaker (1993), p. 292; Sarti (2013), p. 39
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patterns  of  reduction  in  both  the  number  and  size  of  towns  and  rural
settlements.332 As  always,  there  was  considerable  local  variation  in  these
processes, with some of the worst affected regions being those in which political
control  was  contested  between Franks  and Romans.  The  Aisne  valley  saw a
dramatic collapse in the number of settlements, which had peaked at twenty-one
in the third century, from fifteen settlements in the fourth century to just six in
the  fifth;  the  Ardennes  saw  a  similarly  marked  process  of  apparent
depopulation.333 These developments coincided with the demise of the  civitas
structure that was the basis of Roman government north of the Loire.334
    The traditional Roman villa, which had already been declining in favour of
simpler and more fortified models in the fourth century, disappeared altogether
in many parts of northern Gaul in this period; more than a few villas, ominously,
were replaced by cemeteries.335 There was a generalized shift toward hill forts
and  ‘Germanic’-type  sunken  buildings,  and  although  some  regions,  like  the
hinterland of Trier and Moselle valley, were less seriously affected, even these
areas saw a definite shift toward fewer and more strongly fortified buildings.336
Building  materials  employed  in  settlements  shifted  almost  everywhere  away
from quarried stone, which was evidently no longer widely available, to wood;
and decorations and amenities like bath-houses became less common, even as
practical structures for purposes like metal-working became more frequent.337 
    It has been suggested that this was more to do with a shift of aristocratic
interests  under  the  influence  of  Christianisation,338 and  it  is  true  that  some
Christian writings show a degree of disdain for ‘profane’ Roman arts such as
332 Halsall (2007), p. 348-351; Wightman (1985), p. 307-9, who also presents evidence for the 
conversion of the ampitheatre at Trier into a defensive structure in this period.
333 Haselgrove, C. ‘La Romanisation de l'Habitat Rural dans la Vallée de l'Aisne d'Aprés les 
Prospectations de Surface et les Fouilles Récentes’, in Revue Archeologique de Picardie 
Special, 11 (1996), p.109-114; MacGeorge (2002), p. 137-138; Wightman (1985), p. 308-9
334 Heather (2009), p. 313
335 Percival, J. “The fifth-century villa: new life or death postponed?”, in Drinkwater and Elton 
(ed.) (2002), p. 163-4
336 Ibid.; Heather 2009, p. 312; Collins, R. & Weber, M. “Late Roman Military Architecture: An 
Introduction”, in Collins, R., Symonds, M. & Weber, M. (ed.), Roman Military Architecture 
on the Frontiers: Armies and their architecture in late Antiquity (Oxford 2015), p. 3
337 Van Ossel, P and Ouzoulias, P. ‘Rural settlement economy in Northern Gaul in the Late 
Empire: an overview’, Journal of Roman Archaeology, 12 (2000), p. 133-160
338 Lewit, T. “Vanishing Villas: what happened to élite rural habitation in the West in the 5th-6th 
C?”, in Journal of Roman Archaeology 19 (2006), p. 162-171
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mosaic.339 But  the  decline  of  bath-houses  and  other  amenities  is  less  easily
explained in terms of Christianizing cultural preference, and mosaic was already
absent in northern Gaul before the region was Christianized. Nonetheless, it is
clear that although skilled manufacturing experienced a recession in this period,
it did not die out, and some skills such as metalworking remained widespread.
This, as the last section showed, occurred in the context of a widespread shift
from  shorter  and  more  easily  manufactures  sword-blades  to  longer  blades
requiring greater effort and metallurgical sophistication.340 Thus, the craftsmen of
Gaul did not become technically inept so much as disinterested in work aimed at
producing comfort. Ordinary social life apparently did not permit the time and
luxury necessary for the perfection of many technical proficiencies, other than
the manufacture of implements of combat.
    Weapon burials, which had been increasingly evident in northern Gaul at the
end of the fourth century, virtually died out in the middle of the fifth, before
returning – or beginning again – on both sides of the Rhine at the end of the
century,  as  the  Frankish  kings  assumed  unchallenged  control  over  the  wider
region.341 Franz Theuws contends that the mid-fifth century recession in burials
contradicts the impression of a militarizing and barbarizing society, but this is
not  a  necessary  conclusion.342 These  late-fourth/early-fifth  century  weapon
burying cultures – which we have seen were probably not ‘Germanic’ in origin –
apparently experienced a recession similar to that in other aspects of material
culture  under  the  turbulent  conditions  of  the  mid-fifth  century.343 Most  were
concentrated in the areas – like the Meuse, Somme and Ainse valleys – that had
been previously been somewhat insulated from the frontier in the fourth century,
but became regions of contested political  control  in  the fifth.344 But  after  the
339 Sidonius Apollinaris, Epistulae II.2
340 See above, p. 54-5. Pattern welding in weapon manufacture is first attested in the Rhineland 
and Northern Germany, radiating out into Gaul in the 4th-5th century. However, swordsmiths 
of the post-Roman period made much use of scrap metal, implying a decline in the mining of
ores – see Tylecote, R. F. A History of Metallurgy, (London 1992), p. 64-75
341 Halsall (2010), p. 175-6.
342 Theuws (2009), p. 297
343 Macgeorge (2002), p. 137. ‘Germanic’ settlements in Toxandria also show signs of 
discontinuity in this period – Whittaker (1994), p. 166-7
344 Theuws (2009), p. 309. This, incidentally, somewhat undermines Halsall’s argument (2007, 
p. 351) that weapon burials were a response to political crisis and insecurity, since the 
recession in burials corresponds to the probable intensification of upheavals of these kinds.
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Franks  assumed  unchallenged  political  power  late  in  the  century,  burials  of
weapons and other accoutrements of the warrior class, unlike deposits of most
other crafted artefacts, began again in greater numbers. Thus the recession in
weapon burials of the mid fifth century begins to look more like a lacuna in the
development  of  burial  practices  denoting  martial  subcultures  rather  than  a
permanent decline.345
    Certainly,  the  new  generation  of  burials  from  the  period  of  Frankish
dominance display qualitative differences from their earlier counterparts. Many
are significantly more lavish than anything found among the cultures that grew
up under Roman power – the former had contained only spear heads, arrows,
axes  and  in  a  few  later  cases  swords  and  shield  bosses,  whereas  the  latter
contained  more  elaborate  swords  and  bosses,  spurs  and  horse  furniture,  and
richer scabbards and dress items featuring jewels and precious metals.346 Peter
Heather  has  argued  that  the  burial  of  Childeric  at  Tournai  in  c.  481  was  a
watershed in this respect, resembling as it did in some of its features the splendid
eastern burials of the Huns who had so recently intervened in Frankish politics.
This deduction is persuasive, especially in light of burial sites like Gelduba, a
Roman fort on the left bank of the Rhine taken over by the Franks in the later
fifth century. Here, burials apparently informed by that of Childeric coexisted
with Roman inhumations in  the fifth  century,  which then began to adopt  the
same funerary items, attesting a high degree of acculturation to the new burial
practices among the pre-existing population.347
    But the pre-existence of weapon-burying subcultures in northern Gaul, which
receded but did not entirely die out in the early fifth century; and the frequent
proximity  of many  later  fifth-century  burials  to  these  earlier  fifth  century
345 In support of this position, see Effros, B. Merovingian mortuary archaeology and the making
of the early middle ages (Berkeley 2003), p. 108-110, citing Halsall in Pohl & Reimitz (ed.) 
(2000).
346 Halsall (2010), p. 173; Whittaker (1993), p. 293
347 Heather (2009), p. 318-320; . The dating of all lavish late-5th century burials after 481 is not 
universally agreed – See Halsall, G. “Childeric’s grave, Clovis’ succession, and the origins of
the Merovingian kingdom”, in G. Halsall, Cemeteries and Society in Merovingian Gaul 
(Leiden 2010), p. 184-5, who persuasively calls into question the somewhat circular 
arguments for regarding Childeric’s burial as the first of an entirely new kind. See also, 
Schmauder, M. “The relationship between Frankish gens and regnum: a proposal based on 
the archaeological evidence” in Goetz, H.-W., Jarnut, J. & Pohl, W. (ed.), (2003), p. 305
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predecessors  –  including  at  Gelduba  –  should  not  be  ignored.348 In  the  last
chapter we noted that the weapon-buriers of the fourth century, who extended
from the Rhine to the Loire (being concentrated in the river valleys connected to
the Rhine frontier and the  litus Saxonicum) were most likely overwhelmingly
mixed and native Gallic  rather  than imported  groups.349 The  recession  in  the
physical traces of these cultures, which coincided with a generalized recession in
material remains, did not mean that these groups had disappeared. And it may be
that  the weapon burying of the incoming elite  Franks was influenced by the
traditions of the militarized subcultures of the lands they occupied as well as the
more lavish burials of Scythia. Childeric’s burial – possibly the first of the new
distinctly  Frankish  kind  –  and  his  probable  capital,  was  located  not  in  the
traditional Frankish heartlands of the Rhine or even Toxandria, but in the south-
east  of  the kingdom at  Tournai.  This  site  was well  within the bounds of  the
former weapon burying cultures of northern Gaul,  virtually equidistant to the
Seine  and  the  Rhine,  and  with  easy  access  to  the  litus  saxonicum.350 It  was
apparently from here that the new style of burial  radiated out northward into
more traditional Frankish territory and southward into Gaul. Thus if there was
indeed an aspect of public spectacle to these elaborate burials, that spectacle was
inclusively  aimed  at  Clovis’s  Frankish  and  Gallic  subjects  in  common,  and
would have held more cultural resonance with the latter.
    It should also be noted that, even given the clear gaps in the archaeological
research, weapon burial was not a trait typically associated with Frankish power
evenly throughout their domains, but apparently was only practised by a section
of  the  warrior  class  under  Frankish  power,  just  as  it  had  only  represented  a
fraction  of  the  militarized  cultures  of  late-Roman  Gaul.351 Thus,  rather  than
seeing a militarized subculture entailing burials disappearing in northern Gaul in
the  mid  fifth  century  and  being  succeeded  by  a  separate  Frankish  weapon
348 Ibid., Map 12; Theuws (2009), Figure 8; Heather (2009), p. 320
349 See previous chapter.
350 In striking distance, indeed, to two late-4th/earlier-5th century weapon burials, although such 
burials were not as common around Tournai as they were in the Meuse region. See Theuws 
(2009), p. 309-311 & Fig. 8, citing Böhme, H. W. Germanische Grabfunde des 4 und 5 
Jarhunderts zwischen unterer Elbe und Loire (Munich 1996).
351 Ibid.; cf. Theuws, F. & Alkemade, M. “A Kind of Mirror for Men: Sword depositions in Late 
Antique northern Gaul”, in Theuws, F & Nelson, J. (eds.), Rituals of Power: From Late 
Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages (Leiden 2000), 401-476, p. 426-7
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burying culture, we should picture a process by which some – but not all – of the
incoming Frankish elites came under the influence of weapon burying traditions
both from the east and from northern Gaul, sparking a modified revival of those
traditions  among newly combined incoming and native  warrior  groups.  Such
mutual influence between new elite Frankish and older Gallic weapon burying
cultures would have helped to smooth the process by which the incoming Franks
assimilated with the existing military subcultures of northern Gaul, in a similar
way to that in which the adoption of Christianity (also associated with certain
grave goods) helped to fuse incoming and existing military elites. 
3.3 – The Political and Social character of the Frankish Kingdoms
         and their Armies
    The later-fifth and early sixth centuries witnessed the creation of extensive
domains  under  Frankish  kings  with  highly  heterogeneous  populations.  The
Frankish armies, too, absorbed an unknown but certainly substantial quantity of
warriors from the conquered regions. It was in this context that the Salic Laws
and the  social  life  described in  Gregory of  Tours  emerged.  According to  the
persuasively argued schema of Patrick Geary, such moments of legislation set the
cap on the development of the new barbarian kingdoms’ identities, which were
forged through collective participation in warfare.352 What, then, was the specific
character of the Frankish kingdoms under Clovis, relative to their neighbours and
predecessors?  This  section  will  focus  on  the  themes  of  identity,  political
coherence, and synthesis between incoming and pre-existing military cultures in
northern Gaul.
    A recurrent theme in discussion of the emerging Frankish kingdoms is the
difficulty of the evidence for their sense of ethnic identity prior to,  and even
after, their takeover of northern Gaul.353 Archaeologically, the emergence of signs
of  specifically  Frankish  elite  material  culture,  in  the  form  of  furnished
352 Geary, P. J. “Barbarians and Ethnicity”, in Bowersock, G. W., Brown, P. & Grabar, O. Late 
Antiquity: A guide to the postclassical world (Cambridge 1999), p. 108
353 Goetz, H.-W. “Gens, kings and kingdoms: the Franks”, in Goetz, H.-W., Jarnut, J. & Pohl, W.
(ed.) (2003), p. 310-318; Pohl, W. “Telling the difference: signs of ethnic identity”, in Pohl &
Reimitz (eds.) (1998), p. 17-51
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inhumations, are (as we have seen) belated and uneven, occurring mainly within
a hundred kilometres of the Franks’ original lands between the Somme and the
Lower Rhine.354 This may have more to do with the fact that the Franks did not
practice  inhumation  before  their  movement  southward  and  Christianisation
brought them under the influence of these types of funerary practice,355 but the
fact  remains  that  the  narrative  record  of  Frankish  power  is  only  fractionally
reflected  in  the  archaeological  evidence  of  Frankish  settlement.356 We  are
similarly bereft of evidence for the Frankish language – which seems in any case
to have been divided into several  dialects  – until  the scattered phrases made
available through the ‘Malberg Glosses’, and certainly we have no such detailed
guide as that provided for the Goths by Ulfilas’ biblical translations.357
    There is also a lack of literary evidence that the Franks placed much emphasis
on their ethnic affiliations. Outsiders like Cassiodorus, who wrote to Clovis on
behalf of king Theodoric of the Ostrogoths, continued to define the Franks as a
Germanic  warrior  race  just  as  his  fourth  century  predecessors  had  done,  but
whether this attitude had more to do with present knowledge or a classicizing
archaism is open to question.358 The laws produced by the Franks, unlike those of
their contemporaries in Visigothic Spain, certainly did not show much interest in
Frankish identity. Only in the later prologue appended in the seventh century was
the military might of the Frankish people stridently evoked.359 In fact it is the
term ingenuus – freeman – rather than Francus that forms the key legal category
in  the  Salic  Law.  And  unlike  the  Roman  laws,  which  were  imitated  by  the
Visigoths, the Salic Law placed no restrictions on intermarriage between Franks
and Romans.360 It has been observed that Gregory of Tours’ Histories, unlike the
later chronicle of Fredegar, actually shows scant concern for ethnic qualities.361
354 Heather (2009), p. 346-7; Schmauder (2003), p. 299-302
355 Cf. Halsall (2010), p. 174
356 Effros (2003), p. 109; Schmauder 2003, p. 280-1, 305
357 Goetz (2003), p. 314
358 Cassiodorus, Letters, II.41
359 Wood (1994), p. 109. On Lex Salica, see below.
360 Leges.Visig. 3.1.2 / Cod.Theo. 3.14.1 (373); Liebeschuetz (1998), p. 139-140
361 Goffart, W. “Foreigners in the Histories of Gregory of Tours”, in Florilegium 4 (1982), p. 96-
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    None of this, however, adds up to a positive case that Frankish ethnic identity
was not a source of political solidarity or military loyalty, or that it was not based
to some extent on a core of traditions originating beyond the Roman frontiers.
The Franks of the fifth century had no reason to forget – and many causes to
resort to – the kind of ethnic claims to loyalty alluded to in Ammianus’ account
of Silvanus and Malarichus in the fourth. The letters of Cassiodorus and Bishop
Avitus of Vienne to Clovis illustrate that the Frankish identity continued to be
thought  of  by  their  neighbours  as  culturally  and politically  important.362 And
while a distinctly Frankish funerary culture was late in developing and probably
not universally adopted, it is much more plentiful than the ephemeral remains of
the Burgundians, or the Goths in Aquitaine.363 The distinctly non-Roman features
of the Salic Laws suggests that their ascription to four Frankish wise men ‘from
beyond the Rhine’, though late, related to a genuine claim to origins in Frankish
folk memory.364
    Thus in considering Frankish identity we are left in the somewhat unintuitive
position  of  at  once  concluding  that  it  was  a  real  and  relevant  factor  in  the
formation of their kingdoms, but at the same time that it was not clearly based in
the most common markers of shared identity assumed in modern scholarship:
language  and material culture. This problem may, however, have more to do
with the flawed nature of our anthropological assumptions than anything else. It
has been observed that peoples differing in language and material life are quite
capable of thinking of themselves as sharing identities, and that shared material
trappings  can disguise multiple  distinct  identities.365 The Nuer  tribe of  Sudan
may be particularly instructive: they are archaeologically indistinguishable from
their  ancestral  enemies  and neighbours,  the  Dinka,  while  their  languages  are
362 Goetz (2003), p. 329
363 Nixon, N. E. V. “Relations between Visigoths and Romans in fifth-century Gaul”, in 
Drinkwater, J. & Elton, H. (eds.), Fifth-century Gaul: A crisis of Identity? (2002) 2002, p. 
64-5
364 Wormald, P. “The Leges Barbarorum: law and ethnicity in the post-Roman West”,  in Goetz, 
H.-W., et al. (eds.), Regna and Gentes: the Relationship between Late Antique and Early 
Medieval Peoples and Kingdoms in the Transformation of the Roman World (Leiden, 2003), 
p. 23-30
365 Heather (2009), p. 14, citing Edmund Leach; Schmauder (2003), p. 283, citing Aouni, “Das 
spatantik-frumittelalterliche Graberfeld von Julich – die ‘einfachen’ Gurtelgarnituren” 
(1998), Siegmund, F. Alemennen und Franken, and Bohme, “Der Frankenkonig 
Childerich...” (1994)
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sufficiently similar to facilitate mutual communication.366 If we were looking for
them a thousand years hence, nothing in the archaeological record would betray
their unity and sense of difference and hostility to their neighbours. The shared
markers of distinct Frankish identity in the fifth century may similarly have been
embodied in practices and signs too ephemeral to be preserved.
    Politically speaking, it  is  perfectly clear that the ethnic affiliations of the
Franks were not of such a kind as to inspire unwavering unity. While Franks had
frequently troubled the empire in the fourth century, other Franks had served its
interests  just  as  effectively,  and those who did  oppose the empire  had never
formed such a large coalition as that assembled by the Alemanni at Strasbourg or
the Goths under Radagaisus.367 Historians have traditionally divided the Franks
into the south-western Salii and the north-eastern Ribuarii, but even this is now
seen  as  a  potential  misreading  of  an  inconsistent  Roman  nomenclature  that
disguises a more complicated tapestry of subgroups.368 This basic picture does
not seem to have changed much by the late fifth century: Childeric may have
styled himself king, in contrast to most of his ancestors, but he remained the king
of just one Frankish subgroup.369 Gregory of Tours even describes his antagonist
Aegidius as being acclaimed king of the Franks in his absence, hinting that more
than a few Franks were still serving in the armies of his ‘Roman’ domain.370
    This rule of disunity was broken under Clovis, who reportedly led the Franks
in a series of increasingly ambitious campaigns from the 480s to the 500s.371 But
the extent and quality of the political unity brought about even in this period is
open to question. If we accept the general sequence of conquests proposed by
Gregory, it looks as though many of the victories attributed to Clovis were more
likely collective enterprises that brought coalitions of Frankish leaders – several
of  whom may  have  styled  themselves  kings  –  together  for  joint  campaigns.
366 Evans-Pritchard, E. The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political 
Institutions of a Nilotic People (Oxford 1940), p. 125-6
367 Campbell (1999), p. 393-4; Heather, “Northwest” (2018), p. 16-17
368 Goetz 2003, p. 313-314, citing Springer, M. “Riparii – Ribuarier – Rheinfranken nebst 
einigen Bemerkungen zum Geographen von Ravenna”, in Die Franken und die Alemannen 
(2000)
369 Heather (2009), p. 307
370 Gregory of Tours, Histories, II. 27
371 Geary (1999), p. 124
104
However,  Gregory’s timeline,  which puts Frankish external conflicts  first  and
leaves the dirty work of internal unification until later, is dubious.372 Whatever
the case, the Frankish move toward political unity was belated and equivocal.
Given his subsequent division of the kingdom between his sons, the campaign
against internal rivals that saw Clovis emerge as unchallenged king of all the
Franks  looks  like  an  aberrant  deviation  from  the  ordinary  rule  of  political
fragmentation, which even Clovis himself saw as a personal campaign intended
to place his sons at the apex of – rather than an attempt to fundamentally change
– the multipolar structure of Frankish politics.373
    There is a clear contrast here between the Franks and the other barbarian
groups that were granted or carved out domains in the empire in the fifth century.
The  Goths,  Burgundians  and  Vandals  had  all,  from  a  quite  early  stage,
established a unitary leadership based around a single royal dynasty who formed
the unchallenged core of their armies and domains, but among the Franks such
processes were late and partial. This surely had much to do with the contrasting
geographical and political circumstances of Frankish settlement: the Goths and
Vandals, travelling thousands of miles from their original homelands, had unity
imposed upon them as an exigency of the vicissitudes of negotiation, service and
conflict with an empire by which they were surrounded on all sides; while the
Burgundians may also have been forced to  politically  coalesce under  Roman
auspices  in  the process  of  their  settlements  by Jovinus  in  407 and Aetius  in
443.374 Settlement of the Franks on Roman lands, by contrast, had occurred in a
piecemeal  fashion,  on  relatively  familiar  territory,  without evidence  for  clear
agreement  on  the  nature  of  the  relationship  between  incoming  and  existing
groups.375
    However, somewhat counter-intuitively, the Franks’ relative lack of political
unity did not necessarily inhibit their military efforts against external rivals. Even
if Gregory’s timeline artificially prioritises the external conquests of Clovis, it
looks like the Frankish leadership remained divided when they fought the Gallic
372 Wood (1994), p. 45-8. For Gregory’s clear ideological preference for external warfare, which
may have coloured his reconstruction of Clovis’s career, see Chapter 5.
373 Heather 2009, p. 307; Goetz 2003, p. 326
374 Frassetto, M. The Early Medieval World (Santa Barbara 2013), p. 132-3
375 Wood (1994), p. 38-40; Heather (2009), p. 317
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kingdom of Syagrius, if not the Alamanni and the Visigoths.376 Thus it seems that
the Franks came together more frequently for joint military adventure than as a
single political unit under the undisputed power of one leader. There is a stark
contrast  here between the political  behaviour  of  the Franks and their  Roman
predecessors,  whose  demise  has  been  persuasively  linked  to  a  persistent
tendency to prioritise internal conflict over the defeat of external enemies.377
    Another feature of the Frankish kingdoms was a lack of Roman culture and
institutions relative to their  southern counterparts,  who were able to draw on
considerably  more  complete  systems  of  taxation  and  administration.378 As
mentioned earlier, only a few enclaves in northern Gaul retained the trappings of
Roman material culture, and Roman administrative practice seems similarly to
have  lapsed  throughout  most  of  the  region.379 Aquitaine,  which  fell  under
Frankish control a little later, was much more Romanized (though by no means
free of militarization) at the end of the fifth century, and this expansion lent the
emergent kingdom a much more Roman character: Clovis accepted an honorary
consulship  the  following  year,  and  processed  through  Tours  clad  in  imperial
garb.380 But the capital never moved further south than Paris, and the regions
south of the Loire were never as securely held as the lands further north. Neither
376 Some internal evidence implies that his Gregory’s ordering of events is not entirely 
innaccurate – see Wood (1994), p. 49, 102
377 cf. Ibid. Again, the Nuer of Sudan provide an interesting comparison. Obviously the 
“ancephelous kinship state” of the Nuer is much more politically fractured than that of the 
Franks, but it is not necessarily less literate, and it illustrates the extent to which cultural 
tradition can make military coalitions and concerted action possible even in the total absence 
of clear rulers or bureaucracy. (Evans-Pritchard 1940, p. 140-148.) This point again raises the
question of how far the military leaders of the period were actually able to simply use their 
armies, as opposed to negotiating with the collected inclinations and demands of those 
armies, including their learned inclinations to violence. (See previous Chapter, p. 30-31) We 
saw how when accounts of the northern Roman armies become detailed in Ammianus, the 
agency of the army came into sharp relief as the army repeatedly forced their commanders’ 
hands. He also relates how before the battle of Strasbourg, an Alemannic leader was 
overthrown by his men after refusing to participate in the joint venture, (History, XVI) and 
we may wonder if similar pressures were operating among the Franks of the late fifth and 
early sixth centuries. Certainly Gregory of Tours, though failing to provide anything like the 
detail of Ammianus, implies that a certain degree of aggressive insubordination was fairly 
ordinary among the Franks at this time: the man who Clovis slays for demonstratively 
destroying a vase does so in the context of an apparently semi-democratic process of division
of spoils, and he evidently does not expect the equally demonstrative punishment suddenly 
meted out on him by Clovis subsequently. (Histories, II, 27)
378 Pohl (2002), p. 4
379 See above, p. 52-3, 95-8.
380 Gregory of Tours, Histories II.38; see McCormick (1986), p. 335-7
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did weapon burials proliferate south of this line as in northern Gaul, suggesting
that the native population did not as readily accept their new political elites, and
that cultural assimilation was much more limited.381
    This returns us to the theme of the integration of the incoming Franks with
their host populations in northern Gaul, and the central role that may have been
played  by  cultural  similarities,  in  particular  the  comparable  and  mutually
influential  traditions of armed violence among the Franks and the militarized
Gallic  subcultures.  The  timeline  of  Frankish  conquests  indicates  that  this
integration, though achieved only with considerable difficulty and not without
recourse to war, was exceptionally successful. In fact, the addition of Syagrius’s
defeated  forces  to  the  Frankish  hosts  appears  to  have  imbued  them with  an
unprecedented ambition for territorial expansion. After a twenty-year struggle for
control  over the region between the Somme and the Seine,  armies under the
Frankish kings went on to conquer the Thuringii and Alamanni within ten years,
subjected the Burgundians to tribute within fifteen, and drove the Visigoths from
most of Aquitaine in just over twenty.382 In other words, even taking into account
subsequent losses to the Ostrogoths, the armies of Clovis conquered more than
four times as much territory in the generation after their takeover of the kingdom
of Syagrius in 486 than they had done in the generation prior to 486.
    This extraordinary military success has been attributed to the relative political
and military weakness and disunity of the regions penetrated by the Franks.383 In
the case of the Burgundians, who were clearly a highly opportune target, this is a
persuasive suggestion. But Visigothic and particularly Alamannic vulnerability to
attack prior to the Frankish invasions only seems to be established by reading
back after the fact: there is no evidence that the Alamanni were substantially
weaker  in  late  fifth  century than  they had been a  century earlier,  when they
survived repeated attacks from large Roman forces384 with better  supply lines
381 Goetz (2003), p. 320-321; Heather (2009), p. 308
382 Gregory of Tours II.27-37
383 Heather (2009), p. 306
384 Ammianus XV-XVI; see previous chapter. For an extensive discussion of this question in 
relation to the Franks and Alamanni in particular, which persuasively undermines claims that 
the Franks won out because of superior organization, but does ultimately conclude that the 
Alamanni were militarily vulnerable, see Drinkwater, J. F. The Alamanni and Rome, 213-496
(Caracella to Clovis), (Oxford 2007), p. 350-363
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than  the  Frankish  armies  under  Clovis.  Moreover,  the  image  of  the  divided
former  provinces  of  the  empire  weakly  capitulating  under  Frankish  pressure
should be qualified by the observation that each of those regions was comparable
in size to the Frankish power base between the Seine and the Lower Rhine, the
dominance  of  which  had  taken  a  generation  to  establish.  The  Visigoths  in
particular controlled a vast region extending from Spain to Aquitaine, but while
this  extensive  territory  apparently  did  nothing  to  enhance  Visigothic  military
might, the Frankish armies apparently benefited considerably from their northern
Gallic acquisitions.
It is in this context that we should view the often discussed passage in Procopius,
which offers a brief but fascinating summary exposition of the Frankish takeover
of northern Gaul…
  “By that time it so happened that the Arborychi had become
soldiers of the Romans. And the Germans [Franks], wishing to make
this people subject to themselves, since their territory adjoined their
own and they had changed the government under which they had
lived from of old, began to plunder their land and, being eager to
make war, marched against them with their whole people. But the
Arborychi  proved  their  valour  and  loyalty  to  the  Romans  and
showed themselves brave men in this war, and since the Germans
were not able to overcome them by force, they wished to win them
over  and  make  the  two  peoples  kin  by  intermarriage.  This
suggestion the Arborychi received not at all unwillingly; for both,
as it happened, were Christians. And in this way they were united
into one people, and came to have great power.”385 
Procopius, writing in the mid-sixth century in Constantinople, was certainly not
the best-informed commentator, but his description has value for the conceptual
schema it applies to the Frankish takeover of northern Gaul. The ‘Arborychi’ are
portrayed as a Gallic gens, clearly grown up in the empire and not described as
barbarians, yet also totally distinct from the ‘Roman’ soldiers of Gaul, who are
385 Procopius, Wars V.12; for a brief discussion of his perspective and possible sources, see 
Cameron, A. Procopius and the Sixth Century (Berkeley 1985), p. 210-212
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described  by Procopius  as  self-consciously  retaining  the  trappings  of  Roman
military  culture.386 Thus,  rather  than  a  bipartite  division  between  incoming
Franks and occupied Romans, Procopius offers us a tripartite division of Franks,
Romans,  and  culturally  independent  Gallic  people  who  had  long  served  the
empire,  but  were  nevertheless  similar  enough  to  the  Franks  to  be  rapidly
integrated into their society through intermarriage. And he clearly considers the
growth of Frankish military power to have been primarily founded upon their
fusion with this independent culture, rather than the addition of self-consciously
Roman units to the Frankish armies.387
    This tripartite image chimes with the evidence of the development of semi-
independent militarized quasi-ethnic subcultures emerging in northern Gaul in
the later fourth and fifth centuries.388 A few of these were doubtless already self-
consciously Frankish, making assimilation a matter of course after 491. But these
represented the beginning of a continuum of militarized subcultures within Gaul,
which resembled that of the Franks to varying degrees and therefore could be
assimilated with varying degrees of alacrity. Again, the example of the Nuer of
Sudan  may  be  instructive:  despite  their  inter-generational  hostility  to  the
neighbouring  Dinka  tribe,  the  paucity  of  linguistic  and  material  differences
between  the  bitter  rivals  made  possible  the  the  rapid  assimilation  of  former
Dinka to Nuer ethnic identities where Nuer political power was established over
Dinka areas.389 In northern Gaul, the ‘Arboychi’ - which we might identify with
the  weapon-burying  subcultures,  with  the  recruiting  pools  that  provided  the
Cornuti, Celtae, Batavi etc, and with the kind of paramilitary groups licensed by
Julian – were similarly linguistically and materially comfortable with the newly
dominant  Frankish  subculture,  and  had  already  lost  much  of  their  sense  of
cultural identity with the empire, even if they had continued to serve it loyally
until  Syagrius’s  defeat.390 And  the  Franks,  having  already  absorbed  several
neighbouring tribes in the course of the fourth and early fifth centuries, were a
386 Ibid; James 1997, p. 22
387 Cf. Bachrach (1973), p. 5-6
388 See previous chapter, p. 63-76
389 Evans-Pritchard 1940, p. 126
390 cf. Schmauder (2003), p. 281-3, n. 40/42, citing Bohme, “Soldner und Siedler” (p. 92), who 
concludes that the weapon-burying cultures of the late fourth century enshrined gentile 
identities, but was careful to describe these as ‘non-Roman’ rather than ‘Germanic’ in nature.
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relatively broad and inclusive group already.391 This was a familiarity that the
new ruling gentes of the other barbarian kingdoms did not enjoy with their new
subjects.
    Thus the proliferation of Frankish-type burials in the sixth century among
apparently  non-Frankish  native  groups  –  even  in  places  like  Frenouville  in
Normandy,  where  such  weapon  burials  appeared  without  apparent  Frankish
immigration  to  the  area392 –  seem to  describe  part  of  the  process  by  which
northern  Gallic  militarized  subcultures  assimilated  with  the  newly  dominant
political class.393 It may be relevant that the renaissance in weapon burials in the
new Frankish kingdom is did not take off until the 520s, in that this implies that
the inhumations were likely veterans of the combined forces of 491 and after,
rather than the more exclusively Frankish veterans of Syagrius’ defeat. It is also
noteworthy that the new generation of burials began before the conversion of
Clovis,  but accelerated thereafter,  implying that  Christianization catalysed the
spread of the Frankish-type inhumation rituals that marked the assimilation of
Frankish and Gallic militarized subcultures. This provides some circumstantial
support for the claim of Procopius that the fusion of the Franks and ‘Arborychi’
was facilitated by their shared Christianity, although not all weapon-buriers were
necessarily Christian.
    This returns us to the persuasive suggestion – which is emphatically supported
by the perspective of developmental psychology – that the collective identities of
the  barbarian  gentes in  the  context  of  the  newly  formed  kingdoms  were
profoundly shaped by their shared experience of war.394 Indeed, the success of
Frankish culture was probably contingent on Clovis’s military victories after 491,
which would have formed seminal moments in the psychological development of
many warriors in his heterogeneous armies. Clovis was also surrounded by the
391 Ibid, p. 276-8
392 Gardner, A. An archaeology of identity: Soldiers and society in Late Roman Britain (Oxford 
2007), p. 259
393 Perin, P. & Kazanski, M. “Identity and ethnicity during the era of migrations and barbarian 
kingdoms in light of archaeology in Gaul”, in R. W. Mathisen & D. Shanzer, Romans, 
Barbarians, an the Transformation of the Roman World: Cultural interaction and the 
creation of identity in Late Antiquity (Farnham 2011), p. 302; Schmauder (2003), p. 284, 
with citations - “...behind the political term ‘Merovingian realm’ one cannot archaeologically
recognise a closed ethnicity during the fifth and sixth centuries.”
394 A perspective influentially argued by Geary (1999), p. 108
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same reputation for personal participation in battle and other violence by which
some of the fifth century magistri militum had established a sense of affinity with
their warriors, demonstratively slaying enemies, erstwhile underlings, and even
relatives by his own hand.395 Thus the Frankish leadership was culturally well-
placed to command the loyalty of the Gallic militarized subcultures: where the
late  empire  had  stratified  society  according  to  a  schema in  which  killing  in
service of the state was rather low on the social spectrum, the reputed conduct of
the Frankish kings made violence a central plank of elite conduct.
    Another significant achievement of Clovis’s generation for the establishment
and promotion of Frankish identity was the Pactus Legis Salicae. This law code,
probably produced shortly before Clovis’s death, will be fully treated in the next
chapter, but should be introduced here. In this law code, the term ‘freeman’ or
simply ‘man’ is generally preferred to ‘Frank’, and an explicit legal definition of
the term is not provided, although the two are quite clearly interchangeable. A
third  term,  which  sounds  more  technical  –  barbarum  Salicum –  is  also
occasionally used, again interchangeably or sometimes additionally to the other
two. These terms are contrasted to ‘Romans’ in the law, who only enjoy half the
wergeld of their fully free counterparts.396 Thus the Salic Law set out in its pages
a bipartite division between Romans and barbarians. But as we have seen, it was
established in a context where many of the Franks’ most important new subjects
were  were  already  somewhat  estranged  from  Roman  identity,  forming a
continuum  of  subcultures  that  variously  displayed  ‘Roman’ and  ‘barbarian’
features. In reducing such a complicated cultural milieu to this binary opposition,
in which everything that was not ‘Roman’ was ‘barbarian’ and vice versa, the
laws may have been instrumental in subsuming these many subcultures into the
already quite open Frankish identity.
    The other potentially important innovation of Salic Law with respect to the
growth of Frankish identity, which will be fully considered in the next chapter,
was its  approach to  violence.  For  even as the conduct  of the Frankish kings
seemed  to  validate  personal  violence  as  an  elite  and  Frankish  activity,  the
395 Gregory, Histories II. 27, 37, 40-42; see above, p. 87-90
396 Pactus XIV.2, XLI.2. On wergeld, see next chapter.
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Frankish laws represented a substantial  withdrawal  of public  power from the
control of social violence.397 This basic fact has been frequently observed, but its
psychological  relevance  in  the  context  of  cultural  rapprochement  between
incoming militarized elites and existing militarized subcultures has not yet been
discussed.  We saw in  the  first  chapter  how those  who have been frequently
exposed to violence – such as combat veterans – become more likely to commit
further  acts  of  violence,  including  in  illegitimate  contexts,  and  how  ancient
warfare was a particularly intense theatre of violence with especially profound
psychological implications for its participants.398 Thus, those most likely to fall
foul  of  the  Roman  laws  against  violence  were  the  very  soldiers  who  were
expected to enforce those laws. Therefore by softening the legal consequences of
violence,  the  Frankish laws demonstrated an empathy and solidarity  between
lawgivers and the violent subcultures whose loyalty they sought to command that
had not existed under imperial rule.
    In psychological perspective we can see this change of emphasis in legal
responses  to  violence not so much as an alien import  arbitrarily  imposed on
Roman society,  and more as a  set  of rules which were better  adapted to  the
changing sociological conditions of the western armies, which were increasingly
integrated into local civil society. Under such conditions of integration, in which
serving  warriors  increasingly  carried  their  accoutrements  (both  physical  and
psychological)  into  ordinary  social  life,  the  Roman  principle  of  confining
violence  to  officially  sanctioned  contexts  had  become  something  of  an
anachronism, against which a paradigm shift was arguably overdue by the end of
the fifth century. Barbarian laws were better adapted to the natural tendency of
violence  to  move  from  official  to  unofficial  contexts,  and  easier  on  the
psychologically  predictable  excesses  of  the  warriors  who  the  new  barbarian
kings sought to rule and command.
397 This is discussed in detail in the next chapter.
398 Chapter 1. The general observation that veterans are more violence prone is borne out in the 
late-Roman context by the legislation of Constantius – Cod.Theo. VII.20.7.
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                                 *                                       *                                     *
    At  the  start  of  the  fifth  century  the  Roman  imperial  system of  military
administration  and  supply  was  still  in  working  order.  But  the  army  was
increasingly  relying  on  militarized  subcultures  from  beyond  and  within  the
frontiers  –  which  disdained  the  trappings  of  Romanitas and  were  somewhat
disdained by those who still embodied it – to provide its manpower. Quite early
in  the  century,  the  tax  base  was  undermined,  and  the  prospects  of  holding
together a large army in northern Gaul whose continued existence relied on the
prospect  of  regular  pay  quickly  faded.  But  another  model  of  military
organization was now available in the form of the barbarian groups that were
now encroaching  into  Roman  territory.  In  this  model  military  service  was  a
cultural norm and social privilege rather than a form of paid employment, and
there  are  many signs  that  such a  cultural  conception of  military service  was
already gaining  traction  within  Gaul  prior  to  the  invasion  of  the  Franks  and
others, not only among imported barbarian groups, but also among native Gallic
peoples, and indeed in the Roman army itself.
    We cannot know the proportion of fighting and agreement entailed in this
process, though it seems certain that both were involved. But given the evident
decline in material culture, reduction in population, and disruption of systems of
imperial  taxation  and  administration,  the  argument  that  the  Frankish  kings
consensually  took  over  Roman  provinces  and  armies  cannot  be  sustained.
Nonetheless, the Franks, who already in the course of the fourth century had
probably absorbed several other archaeologically indistinguishable groups – the
Bructerii, Chamavi, and Ampsivarii – proved after their entry into northern Gaul
to be similarly open and capable of assimilating once hostile warrior groups.
Probably  the  most  vital  part  of  this  process  of  integration  was  the  shared
experience of war, for which the Frankish kings provided plenty of opportunities.
But we need not regard this either as a deliberate ploy by Clovis or a happy
coincidence.  It  was  the direct  result  of  the  parallel  and so often  antagonistic
development of violent subcultures on both sides of the Rhine, whose shared
affinity for warfare was the outcome of their violence-oriented interaction over
decades.
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    This  newly  formed  kingdom,  with  its  uneven  administrative  basis  and
heterogeneous patchwork of  military  subcultures,  many of  which  were  being
absorbed into  the  newly dominant  Frankish  identity  with  varying degrees  of
alacrity,  formed the context within which the Salic Laws were produced.  We
have already seen how these laws may have aided the integration process by
implying that everything non-Roman was Frankish,  and by regarding personal
violence with relative equanimity. The next chapter will examine those laws and
their provisions in detail,  seeking to understand the social – and, for the first
time,  their  psychological  –  implications  for  the  growing  class  of  Frankish
warriors  who  were  their  principle  subject.  It  will  be  suggested  that  the
permissions and incentives for violence presented in the  Lex Salica provide a
window into the mechanisms by which military preparedness – including the
associated violent behavioural profiles – was continually reproduced among a
social elite who were frequently involved in war but did not employ the kind of
military training and camp discipline associated with earlier Roman armies.
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Chapter 4: Violence in the Salian Laws
    So far all of our information about the Franks and other military subcultures
who  comprised  the  post-Roman  Frankish  kingdoms  has  come  from  sources
which look askance at them from the outside, so to speak. The creation of  Lex
Salica at  the  beginning  of  the  sixth  century  offers  us,  for  the  first  time,  an
expression of  the  rapidly  evolving culture  of  the  nascent  Frankish  kingdoms
which is internal and sympathetic to their culture. The laws have sometimes been
disdained as a source for the cultural and legal history of the kingdoms, but from
the perspective of the evaluation and psychology of violence in contemporary
warrior  culture,  they  are  quite  impossible  to  ignore.  For  the  laws present an
incredibly detailed picture of the respective values of a wide array of violent
acts, both in relation to one-another, and in relation to various mundane non-
violent offences. Not only did the killing of a freeman have a price – the wergeld
or  leodi399 –  but so too did all kinds of other acts, each of which was thereby
located on a specific rung of a ladder of perceived seriousness.  In creating this
scale, the Frankish laws construct exactly the kind of “strict laws of equivalence”
between the material and symbolic values which Pierre Bourdieu considered to
be constitutive of cultural habitus.400 Therefore in this chapter, the provisions of
the  laws  will  be  assessed  in  detail,  considering  their  implications  for  social
relations between participants and victims of the elite subculture of violence in
the  early  Frankish  kingdoms.  But  first  it  will  be  necessary  to  consider  the
objections to the use of Lex Salica as an historical source, and to make the case
for their vitality and utility.
4.1 – The Utility of  Lex Salica
    Historians have long struggled with the Salian laws as an historical source.
There is considerable uncertainty and debate surrounding the text in terms of
399 The latter term is that used in the ‘Malberg Glosses’, which give apparently Frankish 
equivalents of the Latin terms employed in the laws. See below.
400 Bourdieu (1990), p. 122. See Section 2.
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both authorship and audience.401 Even the earliest preamble is a probable later
interpolation, and evidence for the reception, use and development of the laws is
lacking. And while internal evidence dates the Pactus to the early sixth century
at  the  latest,  the  earliest  extant  manuscripts  are  of  the  later-seventh  century,
confuting any attempt to conclusively estimate the practical availability and use
of  the  written  laws  in  the  Merovingian  period.402 The  historian  working  on
barbarian codes cannot but look with envy on the relatively plentiful evidence of
legal development and records of judicial process provided to students of Roman
and  later  medieval  legal  systems.403 Indeed,  the  barbarian  law  codes  have
struggled to step out of the shadow of their much more influential and (in most
respects) thorough, Roman counterparts, in comparison to which they are apt to
appear  somewhat  primitive  and  inept.404 Prior  to  the  1960s,  the  opinion
nonetheless prevailed that the laws provided an accurate guide to the ancient
traditions of the barbarian tribes, but since the arrival of anthropology on the
methodological  scene  these  comfortable  certainties  have  been  called  into
question, as awareness has grown of the potential distance between normative
prescriptions  of  the type contained in  the codes and the practical  realities  of
dispute settlement.405
401 Charles-Edwards, T. M. “Law in the Western kingdoms between the fifth and the seventh 
century”, in A. Cameron, B. Ward-Perkins and M. Whitby (eds.), The Cambridge Ancient 
History Volume 14: Late Antiquity: Empire and Successors, AD 425–600 (Cambridge 2001), 
p. 273-5
402 Wormald, P. “The Leges Barbarorum: law and ethnicity in the post-Roman West”,  in Goetz,
H.-W., et al. (eds.), Regna and Gentes: the Relationship between Late Antique and Early 
Medieval Peoples and Kingdoms in the Transformation of the Roman World (Leiden, 2003), 
p. 28-9. For a good summary discussion of the extant manuscripts, see McKitterick, R. The 
Carolingians and the Written Word (Cambridge University, 1989), p. 40-60. Faulkner, T. 
Law and Authority in the Early Middle Ages (Cambridge 2016), p. 13-15 points to more 
recent developments in scholarly thinking on the origins and functions of Lex Salica. A 
discussion of its influence and comparison of its provisions on injury to those of other 
barbarian leges may be found in Oliver, L. The Body Legal in Barbarian Law, (Toronto 
2011). It has also been suggested that the laws could originate in earlier, unattested military 
laws used among barbarian dediticii of the Roman army – See Poly, J.-P. “Liberté, lien des 
guerriers, livre de droit. La Lex Salica entre coutume barbare et loi Romain”, in Clio Themis 
10 (2016)
403 Harries, J. “Violence, victims and legal tradition in Late Antiquity”, in Drake (ed.) (2006)
404 Charles-Edwards (2001), p. 277
405 Lambert, T. “Theft, homicide and crime in late Anglo-Saxon law”, in Past & Present 214.1 
(2012), p. 3-4. For an early twentieth century assessment of the utility of the laws, see for 
instance Dill, S. Roman Society in Gaul in the Merovingian Age (London 1926), p. 40-48
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    According to one popular  line of historiographical  thought,  suggested by
Patrick Wormald and extended by several others, the law codes represent little
more than barbarian kings playing at Romanitas, aping the Roman legislators to
enhance their reputations, without the capacity and perhaps without the intent to
see  the  laws  broadly  implemented  and  enforced  in  a  meaningful  way.406 In
support of this argument, lack of manuscripts prior to the ninth century casts
doubt upon their use up to that time, while problems of omission, confusion and
repetition within those manuscripts  have been deemed to imply that the laws
were not intended for practical use.407 The employment of Latin as the principle
language of all the continental law codes was also considered by Wormald to
indicate  a  lack  of  practical  utility  to  elites  who  communicated  primarily  in
Germanic dialects. Most importantly, as Wormald observed, the greater emphasis
on oral culture in the post-Roman kingdoms should cause us to doubt whether
the whole gamut of law is either represented in or based upon written texts. The
opinion  prevails  among  many  that  the  law-codes  should  be  seen  more  as
ideological attempts to assert the pre-eminence of the barbarian kings than as
practical  guides  to  dispute and settlement.  As a dual  result  of  these types of
criticisms,  and  the  growing  anthropological  emphasis  of  research  into  post-
Roman legal process, the evidence of law in action provided by charters has been
preferred  by  some  historians  seeking  to  comprehend  conflict  and  dispute
settlement.408
    But not all historians have turned away from the post-Roman law codes as
sources for the social history of the barbarian kingdoms. Some have continued to
treat the laws as vital clues to contemporary mores and practices. Ian Wood and
Warren Brown, for instance, have used the Salian laws to think about various
aspects  of  judicial  process  and  violent  dispute,  unpersuaded  by  arguments
406 Wormald, P. “Lex Scripta and Verbum Regis”, in P. Wormold, Legal culture in the early 
medieval West, (London 1999) [1977]; Gerberding, R. “The later Roman empire”, in 
Fouracre, P. (ed.) The new Cambridge medieval history volume 1: c. 500-c. 700 (Cambridge 
1995), p. 32; Rio, A. “Charters, law codes and formulae: the Franks between theory and 
practice”, in Fouracre, P. & Ganz, D. (eds.), Frankland. The Franks and the world of the 
early middle ages: essays in honour of Dame Jinty Nelson (Manchester 2008), p. 9-10
407 Wormald (1999), p. 14-15. For a detailed discussion of the some of the discrepancies and 
errors in the early manuscripts of Lex Salica, see Hessels and Kern (1880), p. xi-xxii
408 See the essays collected in Fouracre, P. & Davies, W. (eds.) The settlement of disputes in 
Early Medieval Europe (Cambridge 1986); idem (eds.) Property and power in the early 
middle ages (Cambridge 1995).
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against their historical utility.409 Others have taken on the criticisms levelled at
the post-Roman laws more directly. In his article on the Burgundian laws, Peter
Heather  demonstrates  that  the  Book  of  Constitutions  was  most  likely  the
outcome of a developing legal tradition, which was responding to complications
arising  from  real  cases.  This  observation,  which  finds  some  circumstantial
parallel in the Lombard laws, belies the argument that barbarian law-making was
always a purely ideological rather practical exercise. Although this process of
development is not equally apparent in the Pactus Legis Salicae, this may have
to do with the greater influence of Roman legal tradition upon the codification of
Burgundian law, which caused it to more closely imitate the Theodosian code in
the  ordering  of  its  provisions.410 Heather  also  argues  that  lack  of  thematic
organization would by no means have made the codes unduly difficult to use
practically,  given their  brevity.411 The same observation applies to the  Pactus
Legis Salicae, which displays a certain amount of thematic organization, and is
straightforward enough to navigate in spite of its inconsistencies.
    Tom Lambert has made a similarly positive case for using the Anglo-Saxon
codes, via a different argument, better to understand the transition from a culture
of personal revenge to one in which king and state, rather than the family of the
victim, became the principle agents in the punishment of homicide.412 He points
out that while the evidence of charters offers perspectives on legal process not
provided by the law codes, their evidence is similarly limited, and potentially
distorted, by the specific circumstances of their recording and preservation. The
overwhelming  majority  address  property  disputes  involving  ecclesiastical
institutions,  their  interest  in  the  world  beyond  this  narrow  realm  being
understandably  curtailed  by  the  nature  of  their  economic  purpose  and  the
409 Wood, I. “Jural relations among the Franks and Alamanni”, in I. Wood (ed.), Franks and 
Alamanni in the Merovingian Period: An Ethnographic Perspective (Woodbridge 1998); 
Brown, W. C. Violence in Medieval Europe (New York 2011), p. 47-60
410 Heather, P. J. “Law and Society in the Burgundian kingdom”, in Rio, A. (ed.), Law, Custom 
and Justice in the early middle ages (London 2011), p. 118-124. Robert Latrouche has 
suggested that the inclusion of denarius equivalents of the solidus compositions in the Salic 
Laws represented a seventh-century update, reflecting the decline of gold coin in favour of 
silver under the Merovingians – The Birth of the Western Economy: Economic Aspects of the
Dark Ages, (New York 1961), p. 130-132. Certainly northwestern provinces of the late 
empire were not producing silver coins in large quantities or particularly regular weights.
411 Ibid.
412 Lambert (2012), p. 20-24
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monastic context of their preservation.413 The Anglo-Saxon laws on homicide, in
Lambert’s opinion, should be viewed as a representation and vehicle of the living
customary arrangements surrounding feud. As evidence he cites the repetition of
the  same  wergeld values  across  the  centuries,  which  finds  parallels  in  the
Frankish kingdoms, albeit with much greater lacunae.
    Indeed, Wormald himself was not convinced of the total practical inutility of
the laws as sources for social history, the formulation of which he considered to
be  “...inconceivable without the assistance of men to whom Salic custom was
directly familiar.”414 In reading the Pactus and other barbarian codes, with their
many eccentric intricacies, he sensed a body of custom to which the laws have a
connection, but which they do not wholly reflect. In a later paper, he also argued
the case for viewing the seventh-century Kentish law codes as showing a marked
line  of  development  which  strongly  indicates  that  they  had  some  practical
purpose.415 There is also the distinct possibility, pointed out in Wormald’s work,
that once written, the laws would have exerted a continuing influence upon the
development of the customs from which they were derived. In a world of orally
transmitted  custom which  was  mutable  by virtue  of  its  orality,  the  relatively
ossified presence of the written law codes would exert a gravitational effect upon
disputed and ambiguous cases, when and where the codes were available for
consultation.416 Of course this last point – the availability of the law-codes to
those actually seeking to settle disputes – will remain a matter for dispute. But
the attention the Pippinids, as well as several Merovingian kings, devoted to re-
issuing and updating the laws, strongly implies that they lost none of their cachet
among  the  elites  of  the  Frankish  kingdoms  in  the  centuries  after  their
composition, and possibly even became more prominent over time.417
413 The Introduction to Davies & Fouracre (1995, p. 1-16), for instance, boldly opens with the 
statement that “charters…are much closer than are laws to the daily practices of men and 
women in the early middle ages”, but goes on to narrow this conception of ‘daily life’ to 
transactions, disputes and rights over land.
414 Wormald (1977), p. 28-9; Rio, A. “Introduction”, in Rio (ed.) (2011), p. 5-13
415 Wormald, P. “‘Inter cetera bona...genti suae’: Law-making and peace-keeping in the earliest 
English kingdoms”, in La Guistizia Nell’Alto Medioevo XLII (1994)
416 Wormald (1977), n. 31, citing T. M Clanchy, “Remembering the Past and the Good Old 
Law”, in History 55 (1970), p. 165-176
417 Drew (1991), p. 52; Einhard, The Life of Charlemagne, ch. 29
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    The debate about the codes has perhaps suffered from the tendency to measure
them according to the standards of their Roman predecessors,418 and it may also
be unduly harsh to dismiss the laws as symbolic rather than practical for want of
written  evidence  of  their  use  and  reproduction.  This  is  fundamentally  an
argument from silence. Lack of Merovingian manuscripts has been offered as
evidence  that  the  laws  were  not  used  sixth  century,  but  the  survival  of
Merovingian  written  material  in  general  is  so  poor  that  the  value  of  this
observation  is  dubious.  Older  manuscripts  may  also  have  been  lost  due  to
Carolingian efforts to eliminate inaccurate and defective examples of the laws.419
And  even  in  the  Carolingian  period,  when  the  copying  and  preservation  of
manuscripts  assumed  a  new  degree  of  importance,  literate  aspects  of  legal
process were not dominant. In the immediate post-Roman period we have every
reason to suspect that the significance of written documents to the operation of
law had declined sharply.420 In one of the few provisions on what  looks like
judicial process in the Pactus, for instance, failure to attend the mallus is to be
established by the oaths of witnesses, and no reference is made to any written
court  record that  should or could be cited to  replace or  supplement  this  oral
expedient.421
    Thus it may be somewhat naive to expect the operation of such a legal – or
perhaps it is more appropriate to use the term customary – system to be well-
represented  in  written  form.  It  may  even  be  fundamentally  misguided  to
conceive of the customary system represented by the Pactus as something which
was expected to play out in writing or even necessarily in court.422 Again, the
little procedural evidence offered us by the  Pactus strongly implies a lack of
bureaucratic  means  to  ensure  the  involvement  of  the  courts  in  dispute.
Complainants were expected to make their own summonses, there do not seem to
418 Charles-Edwards (2001), p. 260; Wormald (2003), p. 21
419 Einhard, Life of Charlemagne, ch. 29; McKitterick, R. The Carolingians and the written 
word (Cambridge 1989), p. 42
420 Hen, Y. Culture and religion in Merovingian Gaul: A.D. 481-751 (Leiden 1995), p. 41-2
421 Pactus LVI.2-3. Procedure for issuing summonses and demanding judgements was also 
apparently oral – Pactus I.3; LVII.1-3. For comparison of the summons procedure of Lex 
Salica to other contemporary codes, see Wood, I. “Disputes in late-fifth and sixth-century 
Gaul: some problems”, in Davies, W. and Fouracre, P. The Settlement of Disputes in Early 
Medieval Europe, (Cambridge 1986), p. 10-11
422 See below.
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be anything resembling dedicated  court  officials  to  bring disputing  parties  to
book, and even when a suspect failed to come to court for eight weeks, he was
not subject to centrally organized pursuit and arrest, but to the more negative
expedient of being placed ‘outside the king’s protection’.423 Thus the judgement
of T. M. Charles-Edwards, that the Frankish laws were “not so much a part of a
bureaucratic  state  as  a  partial  written  expression  of  the  way  in  which  legal
tradition  is  handed  on”,  seems  apt.424 The  lack  of  centrally  controlled
bureaucratic enforcement methods certainly diminishes the laws as a source for
legal history in the conventional sense, but it does no harm to their value as a
source for social and  cultural history. In fact the opposite may be true. To the
extent  that  the  law-codes  represented  efforts  to  practically  and  ideologically
buttress the position of the barbarian kings,425 and bearing in mind the evident
absence of bureaucratic enforcement mechanisms, we should reasonably expect
the  laws  to  have  merely  reiterated  pre-existing  norms  as  perceived  by  the
legislators,  where  those  perceived  norms  did  not  directly  impinge  upon  the
interests  of  the  law-giver.  Otherwise  both  laws  and  law-makers  would  risk
becoming redundant and exciting opposition and hostility. The repeated renewal
of the laws by Frankish kings over centuries implies that this was not the case. In
short, Frankish law-givers, without the means to effectively impose legislation
upon  the  public,  would  have  had  every  reason  to  reflect  pre-existing  social
conventions as faithfully as possible if the law were intended to cement their
position.
    The choice of Latin for the recording of the laws also seems like a much less
forceful  argument  against  their  utility  than  it  was  when  the  barbarians  were
thought  of  as  culturally  independent  masses  who replaced the  native  Roman
population wholesale.426 Since (as we saw in the previous chapter) the barbarian
kingdoms – and possibly the Frankish ones in particular – were formed to some
extent from the Latin-speaking inhabitants of the northern frontiers, including
423 “extra sermonem suum” - Pactus LVI, 5-6
424 Charles-Edwards (2001), p. 284; cf. Wormald (1977), p. 8
425 Which the very high tariffs attached to attacks on those “in the kings trust” strongly imply 
was the case, despite lack of direct statements of royal involvement. E.g. Pactus, XLI.5. See 
Wormald (1977), p. 4-8
426 Wormald (1977), p. 13
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former  soldiers  of  the  late-Roman  armies,427 it  would  seem  a  most  rational
expedient to compose the written laws in the native language of the newer, and
possibly  numerically  dominant,  Latin-speaking  constituency.  It  would  also
facilitate the comprehension of the laws, in subsequent generations,  in newly
conquered areas like Aquitaine where Frankish settlement had been minimal, but
where  Salic  law  had  certainly  gained  traction in  secular  contexts  by  the
Carolingian period. The Malberg glosses, which provided Frankish equivalents
of many of the Latin definitions provided in the laws, indicate the availability of
a non-Latin terminology which was self-consciously integrated and subordinated
to Latin. By writing the Frankish customs in Latin, its authors were bridging the
gap between an oral  culture and a  more literate  society.  Not only could less
experienced members of the gens be familiarized with its ‘ancient’ customs, but
those customs could also be made available to those Gallo-Romans who had not
adopted Frankish identity, but might yet do so. 
    In other words, rather than seeing the choice of Latin as evidence of their
impracticality  for  use  by  an  established  and  decidedly  non-Roman  elite,  we
might view it instead as evidence of their relevance to an elite that was coming
into existence in a predominantly Latinate social context. Laws in the Frankish
language might have been suitable to a closed and permanent ethnic group, but
they  would  have  been  counter-productively  exclusive  for  a  group  constantly
expanding through the addition of new members for whom the  lingua franca
was, in fact,  Latin. And the Latin of  Lex Salica  actually shows more signs of
adaptation to local provincial usage than the other barbarian codes, preferring a
number of vulgar dialect terms and Germanic loan-words that were regionally
specific to Gaul, to their more conventional and respectable alternatives.428 Thus,
far from being an inept and impractical imitation of Roman legislative tradition,
427 Though there are considerable differences in views on how large a proportion they 
comprised - Wormald (2003), p. 31-32; Heather, P. J. “Ethnicity, group identity, and social 
status in the migration period”, in Garipzanof, I. H., Geary, P. & Urbanczyk, P. (eds.), 
Franks, Northmen, and Slavs: identities and state formation in early medieval Europe 
(Turnhout 2008); Halsall, G. “Social identities and social relationships in Merovingian 
Gaul”, in I. Wood (ed.) Franks and Alamanni (1998), p. 151
428 Probable vulgar Gallic variants include spicarium for ‘granary’ (Pactus XVI.3); sutis for 
‘pigsty’ (Pactus II.3 & 16.4); and the Germianic loan-words, wargus for outlaw (Pactus 
LV.4); and skreunia for ‘hut’ (Pactus XXVII.29) –  see Adams, J. N. The regional 
diversification of Latin, 200 BC – 600 AD, (Cambridge 2007), p. 313-320
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the  laws  may  constitute  a  uniquely  valuable  window  into  the  developing
traditions of a ‘people’ coalescing in the frontier society of northern Gaul.
    Although clearly composed under the influence of Latin culture, and possibly
influenced by Roman models in terms of structure, the provisions of Lex Salica
show  many  signs  of  originality  and  independence  from  Roman  precedent.
Nowhere is the originality of the Frankish laws clearer than in their provisions on
violence.  In  this  respect,  the  Frankish  and  other  barbarian  codes  are  unique
among  pre-modern  legislation  in  the  detail  and  sophistication  of  their
categorizations. The laws classify a wide array of injuries and acts of physical
abuse, ranging from punches to coordinated attacks on country estates, ascribing
monetary values to each one so as to construct a hierarchy of severity which is
measurable in numerical terms. These provisions  are not derived from Roman
precedents, which suggests  prima facie that they were meaningfully related to
existing and vital – though not necessarily longstanding – customary practice.429
It is important to emphasise that it is the vitality, rather than the antiquity of the
laws,  which is  being asserted  here.  Notwithstanding the vague parallels  with
some of Tacitus’ reflections on the customs of the northern tribes, the Salian laws
may have much more  to  tell  us  about  contemporary  conditions  than  ancient
Germanic origins.430
    There is a small amount of additional support for the practicality of the laws
on violence, from an entirely different perspective, in a study of 304 skulls from
6th-8th century Alamannia, which display a high rate of traumatic injury.431 A few
hundred  skulls  is  obviously  far  too  few  to  draw  any  firm  comparative
conclusions,  and  there  are  risks  in  interpreting  such  evidence,  but  it  is
nonetheless  a  larger  and  more  reliable  sample  than  those  provided  by  the
429 Drew (1991), p. 30; cf. Wormald (2003), p. 23
430 cf. Kulikowski, M. “Nation versus army: a necessary contrast?”, in Gillette, A. (ed.) On 
Barbarian identity, (2002), p. 71-80
431 Weber. J & Czarnetzki, A. “Neurotraumatological Aspects of Head Injuries Resulting From 
Sharp and Blunt Force in the Early Medieval Period of Southwestern Germany”, in 
American Journal of Physical Anthropology 114 (4) (2001), p. 352-356; cf. Timmins, S., 
Sereville-Niel, C. and Brickley, M. “Childhood cranial trauma from a late Roman and 
Merovingian context from Michelet, Lisieux, France”, in International Journal of 
Ostoarcheaology 27 (2017), p. 717-718
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narrative  sources.432 The  sample  features  thirty  three  ‘sharp-force’ traumas,
which  are  good  candidates  for  the  results  of  blows  with  edged  weapons.433
Compared to the evidence provided by this sample of early medieval skulls, the
provisions on head injuries found in the law codes appear to be rooted in the
physical reality of attacks in the period. The legal assumption implicit in the law
codes that severe skull damage would not normally lead to death, even if the
brain was exposed, might strike the modern reader as far-fetched, but matches
the preponderance of survivors among victims of a single sharp force trauma.434
And while the identification of “three bones” in the skull by the Salian law may
seem anatomically naive,435 in the Alamannic sample 94% of all injuries to the
skull affect just three bones, the frontal, and the two parietal, neatly matching the
assumptions of the Pactus.436 In these respects the provisions of the laws appear
to reflect the actual conditions of contemporary physical violence, attesting their
grounding in realistic and relevant knowledge.
    Thus there would seem to be sufficient cause to take a serious interest in the
Salian laws as evidence for violence and its evaluation in the Frankish kingdoms.
Even if they do not provide certain evidence of judicial practice, they do offer a
uniquely  detailed  and  systematic  contemporary  construction  of  violence  in
principle,  and  are  possibly  the  only  documents  to  do  so  from  a  genuinely
Frankish perspective. For the Frankish laws in particular, we are also fortunate to
be provided with the relatively plentiful accounts of civil dispute and violence
offered by Gregory of Tours, allowing us to consider the laws in light of the
432 A discussion of the difficulties of inferring traumatic injury from skeletal remains can be 
found in Friedl, L. “Confounding factors in determining fracture frequencies in skeletal 
populations”, in AntropoWebzin 2 (2011). For a general consideration of some difficulties of 
combining documentary and archaeological evidence, from an archaeological perspective, 
see Johnson, M. H. “Rethinking historical archaeology”, in P. P. A. Funari et al (eds.), 
Historical Archaeology: Back from the Edge (New York 1999), p. 29-33
433 See Boylston, A. “Evidence for weapon-related trauma in British archaeological samples”, in
Cox, M & Mays, S. (eds.), Human Osteology in Archaeology and Forensic Science (London 
2000), p. 361-2. Injury caused by the edge of a stone, horse’s hoof, or even a ploughshare, 
for instance, would ordinarily be classed as blunt-force trauma.
434 Of twenty-one cases of sharp force trauma in the sample, only eight were fatal (no evidence 
of healing), and six of those showed signs of multiple trauma rather than a single blow. Thus,
only two of thirteen instances of single sharp force trauma to the head (15.4%) apparently 
resulted in death. Missing fragments of skull in healed injuries are quite common in the 
sample - Ibid, p. 353-4; Pactus XVII.3-5; cf. Edictum Rothari 47, which goes so far as to 
distinguish between the size of the missing skull fragments.
435 Pactus XVII.5. The cranium actually contains eight separate bones.
436 Weber and Czarnetski (2001), p. 352 (Table 1)
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“snapshots of Frankish law in action” contained in his narrative.437 In the most
literal terms, the laws constitute a still under-investigated value system, by which
acts of violence and other offences can be compared in great detail, in relation to
each-other,  to  narrative  evidence  and  to  other  near-contemporary  law-codes.
Furthermore there is no need to suggest that this unique social configuration was
the inheritance of a semi-mythical Tacitean past: the laws, and the society they
inhered to, were not the product of the savage primordial German forests, but nor
were they a mere descendant and pale shadow of late-Roman precedents; they
were  rather,  to  use  Wallace-Hadrill’s  phrase,  “a  sociological  experiment
instructive in itself”.438 It should be emphasised that Lex Salica is being treated
here not as a complete or exact embodiment of the customary justice of the fifth-
sixth century Franks, but rather as an illustration of the logic of that system and
its valuations of violent acts relative to other offences, and to each-other.  Our
previous discussion of the causes of violence has brought to light the possibility
that the way in which social violence was constructed in the codes may have
been  an  important  factor  in  the  military  competence  and  enthusiasm  of  the
Franks, as well as a partial consequence of their frequent military involvements.
We will now analyse this system as described in the Pactus, and its implications
for the social construction of violence, in greater detail.
4.2 – The Economics of Violence in  Lex Salica
    The barbarian law codes present numerical valuations of a broad and diverse
array  of  violent  actions,  both  relative  to  one-another  and to  a  range of  non-
violent activities, in terms of gold  solidi and silver  denarii. They more closely
resemble the tort law than the criminal law of the present day, in that almost any
offence,  no  matter  how  severe,  can  apparently  be  redeemed  with  a  certain
quantity of money.439 In this the Pactus goes much further than the neighbouring
437 Wood, “Jural relations” (1998), p. 214. The reliability and value of Gregory as a source is 
discussed at length in the next chapter.
438 Wallace-Hadrill, J. M. “The Bloodfeud of the Franks”, in Bulletin of the John Rylands 
Library, 41:2 (1959), p. 459
439 The value of solidus is impossible to determine with precision, but some clues are available. 
A course of medical treatment for a serious debilitating injury is valued in the Pactus at 9s 
(XVII.7; XXIX.18), while slaves are generally valued at 25s, with some commanding a 
lower price of 15s (X.6). The much later Lex Ribuaria (XL.11-12) gives values of 1s for a 
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Burgundian and Visigothic codes, each of which punishes a range of the most
severe offences with dispossession and death.440 Indeed, the Pactus contains no
explicit reference to the violent punishment of freemen at all, but merely states
that  in  each  case  the  offender  will  be  liable  to  pay  such-and-such  in
compensation.  Personal  retaliation is  not mentioned, either  as a demanded or
prohibited action. 
    Thus it might seem that the provisions of the  Pactus offer no parallels to
Gregory of Tours’ tales of violent dispute.441 Some historians have therefore been
inclined to believe that Frankish custom thus automatically made settlement the
first legal option, prior to any attempt to take revenge.442 Much has been made
likewise of a reference in Gregory of Tours’ hagiography to a man punished by
the count for seeking revenge without the judgement of the court. This, however,
is an isolated instance which is not necessarily indicative of ordinary practice.443
The  shadow  of  the  Roman  legal  system,  as  well  as  later  Carolingian
developments,  not  to mention modern legal  thinking,  hangs over  the field of
historical assumptions.444 But the laws nowhere state the automatic requirement
to use the  courts,  or  prescribe  punishments  for  seeking justice  through ‘self-
help’.445 Only in the later prologue is peace offered as an aspiration, and later
cow; between 3s and 12s for a hawk; 2s for a spear and shield; 6s for a helmet or leg guards; 
7s for a sword and scabbard; and 12s for a mail shirt (brunia) -  How reflective this is of the 
situation of three centuries earlier is open to question. See Wood (1998), p. 218-221. In a 
more contemporary, but very politically and economically different context, a land 
transaction in 6th-century Italy priced arable land at 5.5s for each iugerum, meaning that a 
farm large enough to sustain a family would cost at least 70s – Jones (1964), p. 821-2; 
Kehoe, D. P. The Economics of Agriculture in the Imperial Estates in North Africa 
(Gottingen 1988), p. 15-16.
440 Lex Gundobada, II.1, 3, 4; XXXV.2; XXXIX.1
441 A view taken by, for instance, Patricia Skinner – Living with disfigurement in early medieval 
Europe (New York 2016), p. 69
442 Wallace-Hadrill (1959); Wood (1998), p. 218
443 Sarti 2013, p. 210 (n. 278); Halsall, G. “Reflections on Early Medieval violence: the example
of the ‘blood-feud’”, in Memoria y Civilisacion 2:1 (1999). The claim is further complicated 
by the fact that the incident in question is set in Lyons, where Burgundian, rather than 
Frankish, custom may have applied; neither is it made clear whether the antagonists were 
Franks or Burgundians – Gregory of Tours, Lives of the Fathers, VIII.7 [Greg.Patr. 8.7 
(MGH SRM 1.2)]. For overt reference to Burgundians being judged according to their own 
customs at Lyons, see VP VIII.9
444 Charles-Edwards (2001), p. 260; cf. Lambert (2012), p. 10-11
445 Contrast the Visiothic Forum Iudicum, VI.4.3 - “...he who suffered from his violence, or 
endured insult… shall be entitled to recover such a sum as he may estimate will compensate 
him for the injuries he has sustained. We forbid, however, retaliation to be made for a blow 
with the fist or with the foot, or for any stroke upon the head; lest, when the retaliation is 
inflicted, a greater or more dangerous injury may result.”
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additions  imply,  in  keeping with the evidence of  Anglo-Saxon laws,  that  the
concept  of  ‘peace’ here  is  associated  more  with  the  absence  of  theft  than
violence.446 Certainly there is nothing comparable to the explicit logic laid out in
the Visigothic laws: “from legislation the strengthening of behaviour; from the
strengthening  of  behaviour,  harmony  among  the  citizens;  and  from harmony
among the citizens, victory over enemies.”447 If we pay attention to the implicit
logic  of  the  Salian  laws,  rather  than  their  explicit  language,  a  different  and
decidedly less irenic picture emerges.
    The laws show a clear preference for monetary compensation in respect of
offences  committed,  and envisage its  payment,  at  times,  in  some detail.  One
measure  makes  extensive  arrangements,  including  a  ceremony  whose
eccentricity  makes  it  look  like  a  traditional  custom.448 Yet  while  the  overt
statements  of  the  laws do not  encourage private  revenge,  their  internal  logic
implicitly makes it a legally neutral exercise. The Pactus seeks to provide for the
settlement of grievances through payments, thus offering an alternative to violent
revenge. But in ascribing numerical values to every offence, it also establishes
‘laws of equivalence’ between offences, thus providing an implied sanction for
the  settlement  of  one  set  of  grievances  through  the  retaliatory  enaction  of
another. If a life and limb have a monetary value, then killings can be ‘lent’ and
‘redeemed’,  as  Bourdieu  put  it.449 But  the  internal  logic  of  the  Pactus in
particular goes considerably further than this in conceptual terms: non-deadly,
and indeed non-violent offences could also be exchanged in a legally neutral
way. If somebody steals my dog, and then I steal one of theirs, there really is not
any case to be brought before the court, since the two offences balance each-
other out on the theoretical ledger.450 I owe him fifteen  solidi  and he owes me
fifteen solidi, ergo nobody owes anybody anything. On the same basis, we might
446 Lambert (2012), p. 15-16; Lex Salica, Cap. II (“Pactus pro tenore pacis”)
447 Garcia Moreno, L. A. “Legitimate and illegitimate violence in Visigothic law”, in Halsall 
(ed.) 1998, p. 46-7
448 Pactus LVIII.1-6. The ceremony (3) requires a man who cannot afford a wergeld to gather 
dust from the four corners of his (presumably empty) house and throw it over his shoulder 
onto a relative.
449 Bourdieu, P. The logic of practice, (1990), p.122. For a stimulating discussion on this theme, 
which ranges from Hittite laws to the modern world, see Miller, W. I. An Eye for an Eye 
(Cambridge 2006), p. 31-45
450 Notwithstanding the potentially differing values of the dogs in question – Pactus VI.2
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exchange verbal insults, punches, or more serious physical attacks. Neither party
would have any incentive to make the matter official, since neither party would
stand to gain, and both would be required to sacrifice their time and to possibly
pay for the rachimburgis’ service.451
    Significantly  in  the  Pactus in  particular,  non-violent  offences  were
consistently ascribed the same value as violent ones. Adultery or marrying the
wife of a living man, for instance, creates a debt of two hundred  solidi, neatly
matching the price of a homicide.452 Entering a man’s house without permission
was priced at thirty solidi, the same tariff attached to a stabbing or a serious head
injury.453 And various petty insults carry the same tariff as a blow to the head
with a stick or a closed fist, at three solidi.454 This constructed a potentially stable
mechanism by which acts of violence might legitimately be measured against
non-violent provocations, and victims freed to take the law into their own hands
without  fear  of  judicial  censure. While  the  provisions  of  the  Pactus never
explicitly or formally affirmed the right to violent self-help, the internal logic of
measuring all offences according to the same basic monetary standard informally
legitimated and even systematically encouraged it.
    A clue to the principle of self-help implicit in the Salic law in particular may
be found in the provision on binding freemen and Romans with ropes, which
uniquely adds the sub-clause “sine causa”,455 implying that a man could bind
451 There are a few passages in the Pactus that refer to a fredus, or fine to be paid to royal 
officials rather than the victim, but it comes up so seldom, and under such specific 
circumstances, that it cannot be assumed to have been conventional when the laws were 
composed (for instance, Pactus, L.1-4) – see Brown (2011), p. 52-3. A further interesting 
reference appears in Gregory of Tours’ Miracles of St Martin, IV.26, where it is implied that 
the fredus may have been a payment in respect of the costs of royal or comital involvement 
in a case. In the Carolingian era fredus appears to have become a conventional facet of legal 
procedure, moving judicial practice toward what could be regarded as criminal law, but it 
still only amounted to a tenth of the composition - Esders, S. “Wergild and social practice in 
the Early Middle Ages: A 9th-century Reichenau fragment and its context”, in Entre texte et 
histoire: Études d’histoire médiévale offertes au professeur Shoichi Sato, (Paris 2015), p. 
118-121
452 Pactus XV. In fact the tariff for killing is superfluously repeated in the section covering 
adultery, further implying the perceived validity of the equation. Compare the Visigothic 
Code, III.5.4, which makes the permission of killing over adultery explicit.
453 Pactus XVII.5-6; XXVII.35
454 Pactus XVII.8, 10; XXX.2, 4-6. See below.
455 Pactus XXXII.1-4. We may observe that this was the method by which duke Dragolen 
intended to capture Guntram Boso on behalf of his king Guntram, and by which the pueri of 
Fredegund attempted to secure Leudast, in Gregory of Tours’ narrative – Histories VI.32, 
V.29
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another  without  paying compensation if  he had cause  to  do so. Many active
warriors  would  have  been  practised  in  such  violent  subjugation,  given  the
tendency of  armies  to  take  slaves,  “bound with  a  rope  around the  neck like
dogs”.456 Surely it  is  not coincidence that the  Pactus adds “sine causa” to its
prohibition on the binding of others: a victim of wrongdoing became, by that
token, a potential enforcer of customary justice against the offender; clearly the
‘arrest’ itself could not be counted as a retaliatory act. Importantly, there is no
attempt  in  the  law  to  address  the  question  of  when  said  causa should  be
established,  implying  that  there  was  nothing  beyond  the  loss  of  monetary
composition  to  induce  a  vigilante  to  seek  the  approval  of  a  court  before
embarking on his adventure, provided that he was confident of the right of his
cause.  In  fact  this  last  point  may  be  vital  in  understanding  the  general
implications of the Salic law on their own terms rather than according to modern
or Roman legal principle. For whilst there was a definite restriction on personal
revenge once the mallus had been convened,457 there was scant suggestion that it
must, or even should, be convened in the first place.458 And the procedure for
summoning an offender to court, which required the victim to visit their house
with  a  group  of  freemen,  actually  served  to  set  up  a  physical  confrontation
between  victim  and  offender  that  might  become  the  occasion  for  violent
retaliation, whether planned or spontaneous.459
    Indeed, there are signs in the Salic Laws that violent revenge was implicitly
permitted by the facility it provided for ‘balancing’ one offence against another.
Several recensions of the Laws contain a clause forbidding the removal of a head
placed on a spike by the victim’s enemies.460 The interest of this law is that it
appears to consider such brutal  treatment of a freeman as a legitimate action
456 Gregory the Great (Letters, 5.36) referring to Lombard captives being taken to Gaul. (Cited 
in Lee 2009, p. 138-9). The basic principle was presumably the same everywhere.
457 Wood (1998), p. 218, citing Pactus LXXX, LXXXIX.
458 A formula of Marculf (I.29) tends to confirm this notion: a letter from the king demands that 
a man who had violently robbed another subject on the road “without cause” pay him 
compensation – Rio, A. The Formularies of Angers and Marculf: Two Merovingian Legal 
handbooks (Liverpool 2008). Contrast the more Roman-style Visigothic Liber Iudicum – 
Garcia-Moreno (1998), p. 46-7; Visigothic Code, II.1.13. The capitulary of Childebert and 
Chlothar apparently attempts to modify this principle, but does nothing to curtail retaliation, 
only demanding that compositions be paid in the presence of a judge – Cap II, LXXX
459 Pactus I.3 - “He who summons a man should go with witnesses to that man’s house...”
460 “...quem inimici sui desederunt...” - Pactus XLI.11b
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rather than a heinous crime, with punishment meted out to the person who moves
the decapitated head, rather than the one who left it there in the first place. And
its implication is that private revenge – in this case presumably a killing for a
killing  –  was  possible  within  the  law.461 Another  clause  in  one  recension,
highlighted by Warren Brown in his recent discussion of violence in the Salian
law, puts the same prohibition on the removal of a freeman found at a crossroads
without hands or feet,462 an attack from which death might be expected to result
anyway,  although  this  is  not  assumed.  Nowhere  else  in  the  code  is  such  a
punishment prescribed for any offence, leading Brown to conclude that “there
was a world of legitimate violence in the society depicted by the Pactus beyond
that addressed directly by the  Pactus  itself.”463 If, however, we see the laws as
constituting a kind of balance sheet by which offences may be ‘resolved’ by
retaliatory acts of violence, a clear logic emerges which may serve to illustrate
how such a scenario could come about.
    The concept of offences  providing ‘credit’ that might be resolved by future
acts of violence may help to illuminate this mystery. According to a maximal
reading of  the compositions  for  amputations  and killing,  the  removal  of  two
hands and two feet, plus the death of the victim, would add up to six hundred
solidi  (100s  per  limb plus  200s  wergeld).464 Six  hundred solidi  was  also  the
composition attached to a range of what were apparently considered the most
severe offences – concealed murder, or the killing of a free boy, a woman of
childbearing  age  or  of  anyone  in  truste  dominica.  Indeed  the  last  of  these
provisions appears in the same chapter of the Pactus as the reference to freemen
without hands and feet, and in some versions of the Lex Salica so does that on
killing free women.465 In fact the 600 solidi composition is very prominent in the
Pactus, appearing nearly as often as wergeld/leodi, and connoting its own special
461 A further measure sets a tariff of 100s on unjustly accusing a freeman of a crime for which 
he is subsequently killed – Pactus XLI.14
462 Brown (2011), p. 56-7; Pactus XLI.11a
463 Further evidence for violent punishments which were customary but are not mentioned in the
Pactus appears in Gregory of Tours’ Glory of the Martyrs, LXVIII-LXIX, where he details 
two cases in which women miraculously survive sentences of death by drowning after being 
accused of adultery.
464 Pactus, XXIX.1, XLI.1
465 Pactus, XLI.5, and note 38 in Drew (1991). Also, killing a freeman in his own home is 
valued at 600s (XLII.1)
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term –  matteleodi –  giving the impression of a distinct concept rather than a
simple multiple of the traditional life-price.466 In conceptual terms this might be
compared  with  the  late  medieval  English  practice  of  hanging,  drawing  and
quartering, or the elaborate executions of the French Ancien Regime, discussed in
the opening chapter of Foucault’s Discipline and Punish467 – the gravest offences
seemed  to  merit  a  ‘triple  death’,  so  to  speak.  Yet  in  contrast  to  those  early
modern examples, which were unequivocal signs of governmental supremacy, in
this case the law implies a certain democratization of the right to carry out such
dramatic and horrific reprisals. 
    While Gregory of Tours’ Histories do not provide anything like what we might
call complete or solid evidence for the operation of Frankish custom along these
lines, the few examples that it does offer seem to bear out the implicit, retaliatory
logic of the laws, rather than their bland economic language. Most obviously,
and already noted  in  the  work of  J.  M. Wallace-Hadrill,  in  several  instances
killing is seen to answer killing between respectable individuals, even “under the
very  nose  of  the  king”  and  other  authorities.468 Two  incidents,  although  not
related in much detail,  also provide circumstantial support for the idea that a
killing could legitimately answer adultery, the tariff for which was also set at two
hundred solidi. In one instance, the count Eulalius kills his nephew, apparently
an independent freeman, for seeking to run off with his wife and marry her, but
there  is  no  sign  in  the  subsequent  litigation  of  his  being  punished  for  what
appears to be an unauthorised and none-too-formal act of revenge.469 Elsewhere
in Gregory’s narrative a similar fate is meted out, on the spot, to an abbot caught
in bed with the wife of another freeman.470 In each case, the logic of the laws
implies that the killers would be free of all liability. What would a court have to
add? The adulterer had taken out two hundred  solidi of ‘credit’, and his killer
was merely claiming, so to speak, what he was owed. Since in both cases the
466 The 200s penalty appears 22 times, compared with 19 appearances for the 600s. Warren 
Brown is of the view that matteleodi translates as “great man-price” - Brown (2011), p. 50-
51
467 Foucault, M. (trans A. Sheridan), Discipline and Punish: the birth of the prison (New York 
1995 [1978]), p. 3-12




facts were apparently manifest, there was no need to establish proof through the
courts, freeing the offended party to settle the balance without further ado. This
kind of incident should encourage us to suspect that the laws – which nowhere
set tariffs for acting without first appealing to the court – are neither referring to
nor constructing a system in which litigation necessarily precedes punishment.
    There are also distinct signs of the logic of ‘triple death’ in action in the
Histories,  albeit  almost  entirely  in  relation  to  the  royal  politics  for  which
Gregory of Tours shows so much concern. One of the sons of Guntram Boso’s
father in law, Severus, suffers amputation of hands and feet under charges of
maiestatis lesi,471 a crime which does not appear in the Salian law but which
Gregory implies is more serious than murder.472 A short time earlier the killer of
Chilperic’s rebellious son Merovech – a man presumably considered, at the very
least,  in truste dominica – suffers another quadruple amputation, in addition to
facial mutilation and torture.473 Some would-be assassins of Childebert have their
hands, ears and noses removed prior to death.474 There is one example further
down the social spectrum: in one of the very few accounts of violence toward
slaves contained in the Histories, Sichar’s pueri cut off the hands and feet of the
slave who had seriously wounded their lord, before his summary execution.475
None of these incidents fit precisely with the mathematical logic of the Salian
law, but all fall within the broad principle that the most serious offences provided
so  much  ‘credit’  to  the  avenger  that  a  quick  death  fell  well  short  of  an
appropriate response.476 Thus Gregory’s narrative evidence provides support for
the vision offered by the internal logic of the laws, that offences were potentially
deemed to constitute a kind of credit, which could be redeemed either through






476 Histories, V.5 is another possible case – “...parentes...extractis gladiis, eum in frustra 
concidunt membratimque dispergunt.”
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4.3 – Non-lethal Acts of Violence and their Equivalents 
    The ‘high peaks and low valleys’ of Gregory’s narrative inevitably only offer
us relatively detailed accounts of such spectacular violence as would probably
have  occurred  on  the  rarest  of  occasions.477 Our  previous  discussion  of  the
physiological  and  psychological  dimensions  of  violence  implies  that  violent
subcultures are sustained through more frequent and less spectacular acts of non-
lethal violence, the type of which were less interesting to Gregory of Tours. Thus
there may be more interest, from the perspective of a psychological investigation
of the warrior subculture, in the information provided by the Pactus on how the
logic of this value system was supposed to play out, if at all, beneath the level of
the carnage that preoccupies the narrative evidence.  What the Pactus illustrates
and constructs is the formal extension of the economic logic of revenge to the
scale  of  minor  disputes  and  assaults,  in  a  way  not  paralleled  in  the  near-
contemporary Visigothic and Burgundian codes.478
    The Visigothic code, while containing the same implicit equivalence of violent
acts, and even making it more overt than the Pactus, explicitly forbids retaliation
in  cases  of  petty  violence,  “lest...a  greater  and  more  dangerous  injury  may
result”.479 It also insists on both compensation for the victim and punishment by
the state for attacks, bringing them closer to what might be defined as crimes in
the modern sense.480 The Burgundian Book of Constitutions adds fines payable to
the Royal fisc to the ordinary compositions for minor assaults, similarly bringing
them closer to a more modern definition of crime; they even impose a fine on the
mere drawing of swords.481 The Burgundian laws also set composition tariffs for
most thefts at a multiple of the property stolen, rather than making them the same
as those for  assaults.  Thus in  most  instances  there  can  be no neat  monetary
equation in contemporary law codes between a non-deadly offence and a revenge
attack. The Pactus, on the other hand, constructs many more stable relationships,
477 Goffart, W. The Narrators of Barbarian History (AD 550-800): Jordanes, Gregory of Tours, 
Bede, and Paul the Deacon, (Princeton 1988), p. 174. This point, and Goffart’s wider 
critique of Gregory, is discussed at length in the next chapter.
478 Garcia Moreno, L. A. “Legitimate and illegitimate violence in Visigothic law”, in Halsall 
(1998), p. 47-8
479 See above, n. 44
480 See Lambert discussion of the use of this kind of terminology - Lambert (2012), p. 7-8
481 Lex.Burg. XXXVII
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with a large number of non-violent offences being placed into a small group of
numerical categories, each of which is associated with a certain range of violent
acts. These stand predominantly at seven key values: 100, 62.5, 45, 35, 30, 15,
and 3 solidi.482 In fact the range of compensations attached to offences is, for the
most  part,  rigidly  adherent  to  this  schema.  Of  the  over  three  hundred  listed
measures that command compensation amounts short of a full wergeld, less than
thirty do not fall into one of these value categories. And of these exceptions,
nearly half are either multiples of one of the seven key values,483 additions of one
key value to another,484 or can be attributed to scribal error.485
    Each of these key values is attached to specific acts of violence, as well as a
cluster of non-violent offences, in a way that seems to rank them according to
perceived severity. Aggravating factors can promote an offence by one, two or
even  three  grades,  depending  on  the  nature  of  the  aggravation.486 There  are,
however, clear limits to the degree to which an offence can be aggravated, and a
saliency of many of the chapters on non-violent offences – thefts in particular –
is  that  no  amount  of  aggravation  can  escalate  the  composition  beyond  62.5
solidi.  That is, to the point where it could provide a pretext for the killing of a
Roman or a half-free person – whose lives commanded a ‘semi’-wergeld of one
hundred solidi487 – or the most serious mutilations of freemen. The principle is so
strong that the laws call an unnatural halt to the progression of penalties attached
to large-scale animal rustling at 62.5s, where is it  implicitly clear that further
aggravation is possible.488 Later capitulary additions, which demand the death of
482 See Appendix – Graph 1.
483 For instance, Pactus III.11 (theft of a royal bull) doubles the 45s compensation attached to 
ordinary bulls (III.8). See also, XXV.5; XL.4; XLI.8; XLII.3; LXIIII.1-2
484 Pactus XXIV.5, XXXV.9
485 Pactus XXIX.4, where manuscripts A1 and A2 demand 50s in respect of an amputated 
thumb or toe, but other manuscripts set the price at 45s. Of the remaining examples, most 
occur in relation to the theft of pigs (Pactus II), of which there were apparently too many 
gradations at low values to be accommodated by the 3s/15s/30s scale.
486 For instance, Pactus XX, XXI. See below.
487 Called walaleodi in the Malberg Glosses – Pactus XLI.9
488 Thus, in Pactus II, if up to 25 pigs are stolen, the compensation is 35s ‘if some remain’, but 
62.5s if none remain. The chapter goes on to set the compensation for the theft of up to 50 
pigs, if some remain, at 62.5s, but the penalty if none remain, or if more than 50 are taken 
(which logically would represents an increased degree of aggravation) is never given. The 
same reservations are also evident in relation to cattle (Pactus III). The chapter on horse-theft
demands 62.5s for the theft of a stallion with less than seven mares, then gives the exact 
same penalty for the theft of more than seven mares – XXXVIII.5-6
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thieves, therefore represent an extraordinary volt-face from this implicit principle
that  a  theft,  no  matter  how  severe,  can  ever  (fully)  justify  a  killing.  Such
measures may represent a backlash by an increasingly economically stratified
elite against customs that were imposing unwelcome constraints on their ability
to punish violations of their property.489
    Some other crimes of the most dishonourable sort also command the one-
hundred  solidi tariff: robbing a body that is prepared for burial,  or a sleeping
man; killing an infant, newborn or in the womb; or throwing a freeman down a
well,  if  he  escapes  alive.490 And these  are  matched  to  what  must  have  been
regarded as the worst sorts of mutilation: cutting off the hand or the tongue, or
castration.491 As we have seen, the laws set the wergeld of a Roman or  letus at
one hundred solidi, putting their lives on par with the most serious injuries to a
freeman.  The  laws  make  clear  that  leti,  like  slaves,  but  apparently  unlike
Romani, were ordinarily expected to be in the service of freemen, meaning that
their  wergelds would be owed to their free lords.492 Thus the leti were regarded
by the laws, in a sense, as the limbs of their master.
    Sixty-two and a half solidi is, as we have seen, the tariff attached to the most
serious thefts. These are generally the sort of offences that could not be done
without help: rustling large groups of animals, abducting free women, robbing
free men on the road, or major acts of arson.493 In short, offences priced at 62.5s
are in many cases non-lethal acts associated with a  contubernium. As some of
these acts imply, the incipient risk of death, which is not ultimately realized, is an
evident  theme  in  this  category.  Such  acts  as  attempted  murder,  attempted
poisoning (by potion or with an arrow), unjustly accusing a man before the king,
or accusations of sorcery, all of which could potentially result in the death of
489 Pactus, Cap II; LXXX. A further capitulary similarly punishes the harbouring of stolen 
property - LXXXV
490 Pactus XIV.9, 11; XXIV.6; XLI.12-13. 
491 Pactus XXIX.1, 3, 15, 17, 18. Cutting off the entire penis in addition to castration was 
deemed worthy of a 200s tariff, making it the only mutilation assigned a full wergeld. For 
evidence that this distinction was meaningful to Gregory of Tours, see Histories VIII.39 - 
“...omnia pudenda cum ipsis ventris pellibus incidit.”
492 Thus, if a letus kills a freeman, the laws state that his lord must pay one hundred solidi in 
addition to handing him over to the parentes of the victim, while another measure forbids the
freeing of the letus of another Pactus XXXV.8; XXVI.1
493 Pactus II.18, 20; III.12, 14; IV.5; XIII.4-6, 12; XIV.1-2, 6, 8; XV.2; XVI.1-4
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victim, attract the 62.5s tariff.494 Other offences at this level are clearly associated
with the violation of honour: despoiling a dead body and withdrawing from a
planned marriage are both included in this category.495 And again, this group of
offences are the equivalent of a range of severe mutilations: piercing through the
hand, cutting out an eye, or amputating a foot.496
    A particularly interesting cluster of offences are found around the forty-five
solidi composition. A few of the most serious thefts attract this tariff497, with a
consistent theme emerging of the breaking of locks498 – vital for distinguishing a
deliberate theft from a potential misunderstanding. Aside from these, a cluster of
offences at the 45s value illustrate a clear and idiosyncratic theme: cutting the
hair  of  a  free  boy  or  girl;  touching  or  cutting  the  breast  of  a  free  woman;
blocking the road to a free woman or striking her;  voluntary sex with a free
woman  without  her  family’s  consent;  and  accusing  a  free  woman  of
prostitution.499 All offences against non-combatant free people, in other words,
beyond touching a free woman’s arm and short of rape, along with a number of
understandably infamous thefts, are subject to this one tariff. Meanwhile, on the
other side of the balance sheet, so to speak, the injuries associated with the same
composition seem to be of a kind most likely to come about incidentally, (i.e.
loss  of  three  fingers,  or  partial  amputation  of  the  foot,)500 with  one  striking
exception: the visually horrific removal of the nose.501 Could it be that the laws
here  allude  to,  and  encode  in  their  provisions,  a  traditional  customary
punishment for what were considered particularly shameful, but not especially
physically harmful, offences?502 The appearance of other violent acts at the same
494 Pactus XVII.1, 2, 7, 11; XVIII.1; XVIIII.1-4; XXVIII.1-3
495 Pactus LXI.2, LXVa.1
496 There is some ambiguity over whether certain mutilations, like the amputation of a foot, is 
priced at 62.5s or 100s, since both tariffs appear in Lex Salica, but the more detailed 
elaboration regarding the 62.5s tariff makes these look more likely – Pactus XXIX.1-3, 11-
12
497 Theft of a stallion or ploughing and sowing a field, for instance - Pactus, XXXVIII.2, 
XXVII.32
498 Theft of a locked-up piglet, covered boat or breaking into a locked workroom – Pactus II.3, 
XXI.4, XXVII.30
499 Pactus, XX.4; XXIV.2-3; XXXI.2; XV.3; XXX.3
500 Pactus XXIX.7; XXIX.10.
501 Pactus, XXIX.13
502 A Carolingian poem may be suggestive – “...when the count arrives, he orders the thieves be 
hanged, And that the cheeks of robbers be forever branded / That criminals be disgracefully 
maimed by having their noses cut off / This one loses a foot, and that one loses a hand.” – 
136
value suggests otherwise, but their presence may simply illustrate the difficulty
of reducing a complicated customary system of violent retribution to a linear
economic  formula,  or  otherwise  the  ambiguity  and  variability  of  underlying
custom.
    By far the largest groups of offences, however, come further still down the
scale. The most important threshold by far, in terms of number of references, is
the value of fifteen solidi associated with beating with a stick “so that blood
flows” and blows to the head with “an iron weapon”, including ones that cause
quite  serious  injuries.503 In  the  Pactus this  key  value  appears  as  a  possible
mathematical solution to a dizzying array of relatively mild offences, again with
a certain degree of thematic consistency. For instance, the theft of  a practical
items like a dog, boat or plough; or insults to personal honour, such as touching
the hand of a free woman, accusations of pederasty or lying, and waylaying a
freeman on the road (presumably for the purposes of extortion). So many petty
offences are assigned this tariff, however, that thematic coherence is ultimately
impossible.504 Interestingly, failure to pay debts, and the defiance of a summons
to the  mallus, are assigned the same tariff.505 Thus the normality of the fifteen
solidi value gives the impression, contrary to that of Gregory of Tours, but in
keeping with all detailed modern evidence for violence, as well as that of our
small sample of skulls,506 that the most conventional form of violent retaliation
might  have been the non-lethal  blood-shedding attack – a ‘good beating’,  by
contemporary standards – rather than actual killing.
    The lowest, but by no means unimportant threshold of violence in the Salian
law,  a  single  blow  with  stick  or  fist  not  shedding  blood,  is  assigned  a
Geary, P. “Judicial Violence and Torture in the Carolingian Empire”, in R.Karras, J. Kaye, 
and A. Matter, (eds.) Law and the Illicit in Medieval Society (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania, 2008), p. 82-3, citing Carmen de Timone Comite, in Ernst Dummler (ed.), 
MGH Poetae Latini aevi Carolini 2 (Berlin 1884), p. 120-124, at 122, l.65-68
503 Pactus, XVII.3-4, 9; also, XXIX.9, 14, 16. Gregory of Tours does not seem to be unaware of 
the significance of this threshold of violence, but generally only notes it in the context of 
more sensational events. For instance at Histories, IV.46. This is discussed at length in 
Chapter 6.
504 Pactus IV.1-3; XXI.2; VII.13; XX.1; XXX.1, 7; XXXI.1, 3. In all the 15s tariff occurs over 
80 times in Lex Salica, approximately four times as often as wergeld.
505 Pactus I.1; L.1-3
506 Weber & Czarnetzki (2001), p. 354-5
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composition of three solidi.507 In the Histories, attacks of this type are frequently
associated with the punishment of disobedient social inferiors.508 Examining the
provisions of the laws, we find that a number of trivial thefts and personal insults
are subject to the same tariff.509 It does not require a great leap of the imagination
to picture how such scenarios might play out without the involvement of either
the  rachimburgi  or  money.  Indeed,  for  a  free  person  of  substance,  taking  a
personal insult to the  mallus or other arbitration rather than simply giving the
offender a smack might be actively deleterious to their social position, since it
would  simultaneously  expose  their  lack  of  retaliatory  power,  and require  the
restatement of their humiliation before a crowd of local notables. This may have
been the customary logic at work in the escalation of “verborum obiectionibus”
to “manibus verberarent” between the royal courtiers Secundus and Asteriolus,
which presumably were played out in a public setting.510
   Another interesting point raised by the equation of non-blood shedding blows
with a range of petty offences at three solidi relates to a suggestion of Frank
Siegmund on the relationship of weapon-burials to the Salian laws. He observes
that juveniles are normally buried merely with arrows, rather than the seaxes,
spears  etc  which  characterise  adult  graves,  and suggests  a  link  between  this
practice and a reference in the laws to a three solidi punishment for ‘those with
arrows’ in the Pactus, mentioned as the least culpable partners in the offence of
abduction by multiple perpetrators.511 The implications are that juveniles might
be brought along with older men in the course of such abductions, and that their
youth limited the weaponry that  they were allowed to carry (at  least  to their
graves, since both law and burial custom might have been somewhat abstract
indexes of actual equipment) as well as their liability for the offence. The further
implication suggested by our analysis is that a non-blood-shedding attack might
be  considered  fair  retribution  for  the  kind  of  offences  more  associated  with
507 Pactus, XVII.8, 10
508 For instance, Histories IV.46; VII.47. See Chapter 6.
509 For example Pactus, II.1; III.4; IV.2; XXX.2, 4-6; XXI.1 
510 Histories III.33; see also, Histories VII.3
511 Siegmund, F. “Social structure and relations”, in I. Wood (ed.), Franks and Alamanni in the 
Merovingian Period: An Ethnographic Perspective (Woodbridge 1998), p. 179-180; citing 
Pactus XIII.3
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childish  misbehaviour,512 raising  the  possibility  of  a  customary  relationship
between age and degree of associated violence, both as perpetrator and victim. 
    Guy Halsall has already suggested such a relationship at the scale of warfare,
deducing the existence of “a military basis of masculinity and social age”, again
partly on the evidence of weapon burials.513 But the concept of age in this period,
as the description of subordinate followers of elite figures as pueri attests,514 was
also closely associated with social status. And another prominent class of offence
attracting  a  tariff  of  three  solidi  are  crimes  committed  by slaves.515 Thus the
possibility arises that “those with arrows” could be unfree dependents of an elite
warrior,  the  type  of  which  we  glimpsed  in  the  Theodosian  Code  a  century
earlier.516 This is not at all to deny the suggestion that the younger members of
free families could also join a raiding group, for it is quite possible that both
boys and slaves could have been attached to such groups as junior members.
4.4 – Violence Across Status Thresholds
    Most of what has been said of the logic of the laws on violence has reflected
upon its  potential  in  respect of free people well-matched in terms of wealth,
status and power. But between the free and the unfree, imbalances in legal status
created  massive  differences  in  how  these  value  systems  operated,  and  the
delicate sense of proportion in the law codes tended to break down.517 There is a
general tendency in the post-Roman codes (in line with Roman precedent) to
prescribe  corporal  punishments  to  people  of  low  status  where  compositions
would  have  been  demanded  of  free  people,518 removing  composition  as  an
512 For instance, the theft of a piglet, calf or lamb (Pactus II.1, III.1, IV.2) various small birds 
(VII1-10), or the bell from a cow (XXVII.2); and the medieval equivalent of a ‘joy ride’, 
taking a boat to cross a river (XXI.1).
513 Halsall (2003), p. 39
514 For instance, Histories V.48, VI.32, VII.3. Pueri are treated at length in Chapter 6.
515 Pactus XII.1 & XL.12 (theft); XXV (rape of another slave). See below.
516 Cod.Theo. VII.13.16. See Chapter 3.
517 Rio (2008), p. 20-21, who however points out some qualifying evidence.
518 Brown (2011), p. 53 Although as our discussion has shown, this may produce an impression 
of difference that obscures the potential similarity of approach to offences committed by 
people of differing statuses. It would seem, according to our analysis of the potential 
interchangeability of monetary and violent ‘resolutions’ of offences, that subjecting the 
unfree to corporal punishments is simply an obvious logical step given the probable absence 
of personal resources by which they could satisfy the demands of legal redress.
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option. And the physical violence prescribed for their offences is ordinarily far in
excess of that associated with the values demanded of freemen under the same
circumstances.  The Burgundian code enjoins  the  torture  of  slaves  accused of
crimes  to  extract  confession,  a  measure  never  prescribed  for  free  people,
although as the narrative sources attest it was occasionally used against freemen
by  royal  command  in  the  Frankish  kingdoms.519 The differing  wergelds of
various classes of people also gave the logic of the Pactus, with respect to deadly
violence in particular, a highly hierarchical bent: the killing or mutilation of a
Roman by a Frank, or a lesser Burgundian or Lombard freeman by another of
higher status, could not be properly ‘resolved’ with an identical revenge attack,
because the latter had a higher wergeld than the former.520 Conversely, if a half-
free or lesser freeman were to kill a greater one, the laws potentially permitted
retaliatory violence far in excess of the original crime. The barbarian codes thus
systematically discouraged retaliatory violence against higher status individuals
by their  inferiors,  and systematically encouraged inordinate violent retaliation
against lower status individuals by their superiors.
    When it came to punishment of slaves for a wide array of offences in  Lex
Salica, the range of numerical values were equated to an entirely different, more
severe,  scale  of  appropriate  physical  violence.  As  we  have  seen,  a  range  of
offences committed by slaves were priced at three  solidi, and slaves may have
not been held equally responsible to their masters in collective crimes. The same
principle can be seen to extend to personal offences committed by the unfree.
Where a freeman would pay fifteen solidi for a theft, a slave is required to pay
just three, and where a freeman would pay thirty-five  solidi, a slave must pay
just six.521 The willingness of the laws to take into consideration the confined
resources of the slave (who is clearly expected here to have personal wealth) is
admirable,  but for the unfree a three-solidi  tariff  was not – as in the case of
freemen – the equivalent of a single blow with a stick or fist. Instead the slave
could be subjected to  one hundred and twenty blows (one for  each  denarius
owed),  after  the  torture  conventionally  expected  to  elicit  the  confession.  An
519 Lex.Burg. VII, VIII
520 Drew (1972), p. 19-20 n.4; Ed.Roth. 10-14, 387
521 Pactus XL.2, 4
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offence of six solidi (the equivalent of 35s for a freeman) meant two hundred and
forty blows for a female slave; for a male it meant castration. And an offence that
would  attract  a  forty-five  solidi tariff  –  i.e.  a  grave  offence  to  honour or  an
aggravated theft522 – for a freeman justified capital punishment for a slave, who
thus in a sense could be said to possess a quarter-wergeld.523
    As in offences between equals, the offended freeman himself was apparently
expected to enact retaliatory violence against slaves personally.524 As we have
seen,  this  could  include  mutilation  and  execution,525 but  usually  consisted  of
extended beatings on a rack or post.526 Perhaps we should interpret the Salian
provision, demanding compensation of a single tremisses for beating a slave so
severely that they could not work for forty days, 527 as potentially relating to this
punishment  process  – a  hundred blows with almost  any implement  could do
substantial damage if the attacker was sufficiently enthusiastic. But the paucity
of the sum speaks to the helplessness of the unfree in the face of elite violence.
Other  codes  are  far  less  dismissive  of  non-lethal  violence  committed  against
slaves, demanding compositions for a range of specific injuries, at a considerable
fraction of that applied to the same injuries against freemen.528 Thus the social
logic of  Lex Salica is  that  freemen were positively expected to  respond with
inordinate violence to offences, including non-violent offences, by their social
inferiors. Furthermore, rather than confining the exercise of judicial violence to a
few  designated  state  officials,  like  the  Roman  carnifex529 or  the  modern
interrogator, the  Pactus positively encouraged and affirmed such violence as a
customary  social  practice  among  freemen.  From  the  perspective  of  social
preparation for military violence, we may view the beating of racked slaves with
522 See above, section 3
523 Pactus XL.1, 3, 5, 9. Elsewhere, however, the 3s required for a slave who rapes another is 
equated with 300 lashes (Pactus XXV.6). And, as we have seen, slaves are valued elsewhere 
as having an asset value of 25s or 35s (Pactus X.1). This might imply that the status of slaves
was in flux during the late fifth and early sixth centuries, although which direction their 
status was moving in is open to question.
524 Pactus, XL.6 demands that the offended party provide his own sticks with which to beat the 
offending slave.
525 Compare Lex.Luit. LXIV.11; Lex.Burg. XXXV
526 Pactus, XL; Lex.Burg. XV
527 Pactus, XXXV
528 Edictum Rothari 76-128; Bur.Cod. V.2-7
529 Clark, J. “Desires of the Hangman: Augustine on Legitimized Violence”, in Drake (ed.) 
(2006), p. 137-8
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sticks and lashes prescribed by the  Pactus as something like a psychologically
‘enhanced’ version of the Roman ‘exercise of the post’, by which recruits were
trained to strike,530 since it would have mentally prepared the freeman for his
later martial duties, particularly the abuse of rural and civic populations that so
often characterized aggressive campaigning.531
    Legal status differentiated freemen and slaves, but even among freemen of the
same technical status other factors could generate similarly extreme differences
in legal consequence for the same offences. The grim economic logic of  Lex
Salica dictated that the wealthy and powerful were free to perpetrate violence
without  fear  of  its  consequences,  since  they  had  large  entourages  and could
easily  pay  whatever  compensation  resulted  from their  violent  actions.532 The
economic incentive to accept the compensation due to victims would have been
similarly diluted by great wealth, for two hundred solidi would hardly replace a
son for a powerful noble, or a man who already had a stash of liquid assets.533
The Patrician Mummolus, certainly one the wealthiest non-royal individuals in
the late-sixth-century kingdoms, reportedly had a hoard of wealth that included
thirty talents of gold and two hundred and fifty talents of silver, which probably
amounted to 200,000 solidi, or a thousand wergelds, in gold alone.534 Of course
the logical conclusion of this line of reasoning is that the most powerful families,
who were wealthier than anyone else, might be quite impossible to satisfy with
standard compensations, and would therefore be proportionately more inclined to
prefer violent revenge to the acceptance of composition.  They would also be
liberated to indulge their inclinations to violence against lesser figures, who did
not have the wherewithal to retaliate, and for whom the compensation would
represent  a  really  substantial  sum.  Frankish  royal  responses  to  all  kinds  of
offences by their subordinates, and the behaviour of some well-connected elite
figures, would seem to support this impression,535 although we are not offered
530 Chapter 2, at notes 109, 147-152; Vegetius, p. 14 (“The Post”)
531 See Chapter 2.
532 Ausenda, in Wood 1998, p. 230-1
533 For instance, Waddo, former major-domo to princess Rigunth – HF, V.28, 38; X.21
534 Histories VII.40 - “Ferunt autem ducenta quinquaginta talenta argenti fuisse, auri vero 
amplius quam triginta.” The calculation is based on the assumption that a talent weighed 
around 30kg or perhaps slightly less. The value of the silver talents is impossible to quantify, 
due to the irregular weight of silver coin at the time.
535 See Chapter 6, part 1.
142
sufficient detail on relative wealth lower down the social spectrum to draw firm
conclusions.
                                         *                               *                               *
    Violence, as we have seen, is integral to the Salian code in particular not
merely as an offence to be paid for, but also implicitly as a ‘resolution’ of all
kinds of other offences, both violent and non-violent. The laws do not serve to
prohibit violence entirely, so much as to regulate it, pointing to appropriate levels
of violence in the face of a range of provocations, the overwhelming majority of
which  did  not,  however,  merit  deadly  retaliation.  This  last  observation  has
already been made but deserves emphasis given its lack of prominence to date.
Despite  the  impression  created  by  Gregory  of  Tours’  sensational  narrative
evidence,  the  laws  do  far  more  to  facilitate  non-lethal  violence  by  way  of
retribution than they do lethal violence. It has already been observed that the
term ‘feud’ is inappropriate to the period, because the word it refers to, faida, is
not one that defines an ongoing dialectical relationship so much as an act of
violent  revenge or  the  potential  for  such an  act.536 I  would  suggest  that  Lex
Salica did little to facilitate continuous ‘feud’ between freemen, but much more
to facilitate a kind of limited retributive justice. As importantly, in terms of the
social  production of competent warriors, it  made violent conflict more-or-less
legally neutral, provided the injuries to one side did not drastically outweigh the
other.  537 In  providing  such limited  licence  for  violence,  however,  there  was
always  the  potential  that  what  had  begun  as  a  mere  attempt  to  cause  an
effusionem sanguinis would accidentally or incidentally escalate into something
much more serious.
    Moreover,  the  ramifications of  establishing  a  mathematical  relationship
between the licence to do violence and the wealth and power of the subject, in
536 Halsall (1998), p. 28-9; cf. Wood (2006)
537 This helps to explain why the apparently non-lethal fight between the men of Sichar and 
Austregisel at the outset of their ‘feud’ was not mentioned in the subsequent court case; and 
why the “maiores et primi” of Chilperic, who came to blows before the altar in Paris, were 
referred to Church authorities by the king – Histories, VII.47, V.32.
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terms of the construction and maintenance of elite social identities, are worthy of
emphasis. The ‘conspicuous consumption’ theory of Thorstein Veblen, applied
by him to  compare  pre-industrial  cultural  display  to  the  modern  competitive
purchase of luxury goods,538 may be equally applicable here. If violence costs
money,  then  violence  thereby  becomes  a  spectacularly  conspicuous  form  of
consumption, provided the consumers have a sufficiently strong grasp of who
can be safely attacked without risk of composition not being accepted, which in
such  small  local  populations539 most  people  undoubtedly  would  have  done.
Public violence could become an arena for the competitive display of status,
whilst simultaneously asserting in an immediate and undeniable way the socio-
economic  hierarchy,  and  indeed  to  some  extent  constructing  it.  Thus  social
position  was  closely  related  to  duty,  licence  and  vulnerability  in  respect  of
violence in a wide range of contexts, with those of low status being most strictly
constrained and most completely vulnerable,and those of high status being not
just  relatively  unconstrained,  but  positively  encouraged  to  assert  and  display
their  status  through  violence.540 The  sources  imply,  in  other  words,  that  the
hierarchy of ethnicity, social status, and political position was, in an important
conceptual respect, a hierarchy of violent prerogatives and responsibilities. These
conditions would have been capable of accommodating the violent behavioural
inclinations and occasional outbursts of a violently socialized elite. They would
also have been most germane to the reproduction of violent socialization among
this elite.
    We are used to thinking of law as a system by which violence is restrained.
What this analysis suggests is that such a vision of law is inappropriate to  Lex
Salica in  particular.  This  code,  contrary  to  modern  legal  principle,  actually
constructed a system that implicitly permitted the redress of offences through
538 Veblen, T. The Theory of the Leisure Class, (Mineola 1994 [1899]), Ch. 4, especially p. 46 - 
“...The cannon of reputability [in this case the warrior culture] is at hand and seizes upon 
such innovations as are, according to its standard, fit to survive. Since the consumption of 
these more excellent goods is an evidence of wealth, it becomes honorific; and conversely, 
the failure to consume in due quantity and quality becomes a mark of inferiority and 
demerit.”
539 Siegmund (1998), p. 181-3
540 Cf. Halsall (2003), p.33; see Appendix – Graph 2
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violent ‘self-help’. A wide array of offences – both violent and non-violent –
were  thus  constructed  as  potential  causae  bellorum.  Furthermore,  by
constructing a value system in which violent retribution could be exchanged for
non-violent  offences,  the  Pactus facilitated  the  escalation  of  non-violent  into
violent conflict by those who elected to do so. It also gave tacit permission and
social incentives for violence by the wealthy and free against poorer and less
powerful social inferiors. As Chapter 1 showed, among those inured to violence
by military experience or otherwise, there will be those who will readily seize
such opportunities,  imposing their  learned inclinations  to  violence upon their
local social milieus in the process. Thus the laws systematically provided for the
social  iteration  of  experiences  of  violence  in  the  arena  of  low-level  socio-
economic conflict, in a way that went further than the Roman law or indeed the
codes  of  the  other  post-Roman  kingdoms.  And  in  doing  so  they  also
systematically reproduced behavioural adaptations to violence among the warrior
classes. The laws constructed a culturally limited tradition of violence by which
social  hierarchy and values were maintained,  and military readiness – a  vital
aspect of those social values – continually renewed.
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Chapter 5: Interpreting the Violence in Gregory of Tours’  Histories
    The  Histories of Gregory of Tours are the most complete single account of
secular events and individuals in the post-Roman West prior to the Carolingian
period. For the later sixth century and  especially the period c. 574-592, during
which time Gregory occupied the bishopric of Tours, they offer an incomparable
trove of information, not least in respect of their uniquely extensive treatment of
non-ecclesiastical  figures and their  affairs. General and political treatments of
sixth-century Francia are marked by their reliance on Gregory’s work and the
Histories in particular.541 They have also formed a central plank of more detailed
studies  of  various  aspects  of  Merovingian  society,  ranging from religion  and
literacy  to  law  and  taxation,  prosopography,  gender,  Jewish  history  and,  of
course, questions about the degree and nature of violence.542 This latter theme
preoccupies the Histories almost more than any other, but the study of Gregory’s
reports of violence has been especially complicated by Walter Goffart’s highly
influential  Narrators of Barbarian History,  which singled out “lurid passages
from the  Histories of Gregory of Tours” as the principle means by which the
post-Roman period was characterized as one of chaos and violence by those who
had taught him as an undergraduate…
541 For instance, the treatment of the sixth century in Geary, P. J. Before France and Germany: 
The creation and transformation of the Merovingian World (Oxford 1988), and Wood, I. The 
Merovingian Kingdoms (1994); Murray “The composition of the Histories of Gregory of 
Tours and its bearing on the political narrative”, in Murray, A. C. (ed.) A companion to 
Gregory of Tours (Leiden 2015), p. 95; Sarti, L. Perceiving war and the military in early 
Christian Gaul (ca. 400-700 A.D.) (Leiden 2013), p. 76
542 Wood, I. “Administration, law and culture in Merovingian Gaul” in Noble, T. F. X. (ed.) 
From Roman provinces to medieval kingdoms (New York 2006), and “Jural relations among 
the Franks and the Alamanni” (1998); Goffart, W. “Frankish military duty and the fate of 
Roman taxation”, in EME 16:2 (May 2008); Shanzer, D, Review Article on M. Heinzelmann,
Gregory of Tours: History and Society in the Sixth Century translated by C. Carroll 
(Cambridge 2001), in Medieval Prosopography 23 (April 2002), p. 248; Gradowicz-Pancer, 
N. “De-gendering female violence: Merovingian female honour as an ‘exchange of 
violence’”, in Early Medieval Europe 11:1 (2002), 1-18; McRobbie, J. “Gender and violence 
in Gregory of Tours Decem Libri Historiarum, PhD Thesis, University of St Andrews 
(2012); Dailey, E. T. Queens, Consorts, Concubines: Gregory of Tours and Women of the 
Merovingian Elite (Leiden 2015); Mezei, M. “Jewish Communities in the Merovingian 
towns in the second half of the sixth century as described by Gregory of Tours”, in Chronica 
vol. 5 (2005), 19-29; Bachrach, B. S. Merovingian Military Organization (Minnesota 1972), 
p. 11-12; Liebeschuetz, W. “Violence in the barbarian successor kingdoms”, in Drake, H. A. 
Violence in Late Antiquity: Perceptions and Practices (Aldershot 2006); Sarti (2013)
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“At this distance, I  cannot explain my negative reaction to the
package placed in my hands, but I do recall being convinced that
the selection was a caricature, no more representative of “The Dark
Ages” than of any other epoch. It has taken me a long time to
translate this hunch into a sustained argument.”543
    This final section of this thesis comprises a detailed analysis of the violence
presented to us in Gregory’s Histories, divided into two Chapters. This Chapter
engages with the debate surrounding the significance and utility of Gregory’s
frequent  references  to  violence,  considering  his  political  and  ecclesiological
position, his possible audience, and the values and agendas represented in his
work.  This  discussion  will  conclude  that  while  Gregory  certainly  used  his
material  for  didactic  purposes,  and  emphasised  the  violence  of  many  of  his
antagonists, he also demurred from describing violence in a range of contexts,
and was inconsistent in his moral tone, suggesting the ambiguous and variable
moral composition of Gregory’s expected audience, the people he described and
indeed the man himself.  Overall  it  will  be suggested that  the descriptions  of
violence in the Histories, while clearly not naively portraying the ordinary tone
of social life, are nonetheless highly instructive, and not as unrepresentative of
contemporary society as their critics have suggested.
    The next Chapter will analyse the range of violence presented in the Histories,
and the nature of its presentation,  in greater detail.  The language of violence
employed by Gregory of Tours and his protagonists will be closely analysed, in
order to better understand the significance and connotations of key terms. And
other  less  obvious  themes,  hinted  at  but  neglected  by  Gregory,  such  as  the
shadowy presence of the lower orders, questions about domestic violence, and
the possible role of exiles in the generation of violent conflict, will be brought
into relief in the process. It will be argued that the society that emerges from the
543 Goffart (Princeton 1988), p. 9. For his influence, see for instance I. Wood, “The secret 
histories of Gregory of Tours”, in Revue belge de philologie et d’histoire 71:2 (1993), p. 253-
5; Heinzelmann, M. (trans. C. Carroll) Gregory of Tours: History and Society in the Sixth 
Century translated by C. Carroll (Cambridge University, 2001 [1994]), p. 36-7; Murray, A.C.
Gregory of Tours: The Merovingians (2005), p. 3-7; Halsall, G. “The preface to Book V of 
Gregory of Tours’ Histories: its form, context and significance”, in EHR 122.496 (Apr 2007),
p. 297-9; Dailey (2015), p. 1-3; Pohl (2006), p. 23.
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Histories was one in which violence was frequent and accepted, even admired, in
a wide array of contexts; that hierarchy and impunity were so intimately linked
that violence could be, in and of itself, a manifestation of social status; and that
some  of  the  more  extreme  behaviour  reported  by  Gregory  may  be
comprehensible  in  terms  of  psychological  (mal-)adaptation  to  violent
circumstances.
5.1 – The Presentation of Violence in the  Histories
    The Histories have long been totemic among historians considering violence
in  the  post-Roman  centuries,  but  the  consensus  on  their  significance  has
undergone something of a  volt-face over the course of the twentieth century.
Gregory’s  self-presentation  as  an  intellectually  uncultivated  and  naively
spontaneous narrator, widely accepted in the 19th century, is now equally widely
derided as a deliberate  misrepresentation of his  literary abilities and sense of
narrative  mission.544 Walter  Goffart’s  Narrators  of  Barbarian  History,  which
substantially extended and elaborated this  conception of Gregory, remains the
most important contribution to the modern consensus on the Histories. And, as
we have seen, Goffart was in the vanguard of a new generation of historians who
were dissatisfied  with  the  traditional  impression of  the  post-Roman period  –
which depended, in part, on a relatively uncritical reading of the Histories – as
one of political, cultural and social decay, chaos, and unrestrained violence.545
    Of course, the approach of Narrators to the Histories is far more multi-faceted
and ambitious  than  a  simple  attempt  to  clear  the  Merovingian  period  of  the
perceived  charge  of  excessive  violence.  The  Gregory  of  Tours  described  by
Goffart  is  neither  a  compulsive  dissembler  nor  a  rank  fantasist  –  such  a
suggestion  would  fundamentally  undermine  our  ability  to  reconstruct  many
544 See for instance Brown, P. “Relics and Social Status in the Age of Gregory of Tours” (1977), 
p. 223; De Nie, G. Views from a Many-Windowed Tower: Studies of Imagination in the works
of Gregory of Tours, (1987); Murray (2015), p. 70; Heinzelmann (2001); Halsall, G. “The 
preface to Book V of Gregory of Tours’ Histories: its form, context and significance”, in 
EHR 122.496 (Apr 2007), p. 297-8; Goffart (1988), p. 114-116
545 See Introduction. The dominance of this interpretation is illustrated in P. Brown, “Gregory of
Tours”, and the other essays collected in K. Mitchell and I. Wood (eds.), The World of 
Gregory of Tours (Leiden 2002)
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important aspects of the period546 – but rather a gifted and intelligent narrator
with  such  mastery  of  his  craft  that  the  reader  must  distrust  anything  in  the
Histories that looks spontaneous or unguarded. Ultimately, Goffart invites us to
radically  reinterpret  the  apparently  chaotic  order  of  the  Histories’ work as  a
carefully  designed  indictment  of  the  futility  of  secular  ambition  juxtaposed
against the exemplary conduct and miracles of the righteous.547
    Goffart’s impression of the Histories was based on evaluating it side by side
with his other works, which were primarily concerned with the miracles of the
saints – “Gregory chose his miracles and their time frame, not they him, and the
witness he caused them to bear to divine power, generosity, and beneficence in
the here and now was, to Gregory at least, a thing of sublime beauty.”548 The
violence portrayed in the Histories was, Goffart suggested, selected in a similar
way,  for  purposes  that  complemented  the  presentation  of  sublime  beauty
embodied in the saints by juxtaposing them to the evil, corrupt and ultimately
tragic existences of their secular counterparts. Goffart picks out the preface to
Book II of the Histories as the vital statement of Gregory’s intention to place the
“felicem beatorum vitam” side by side with the “miserorum memoremus excidia”
for the edification of his audience.549 Thus, “[t]he seriousness of such history is
moral  and  didactic.  Thorough  representation  of  political  imperatives,  family
546 Including Goffart’s own assessment of Merovingian settlement and taxation, which 
inevitably partially relies on the few scattered references to tax and military obligation in the 
Histories - Goffart (2008), p. 181-186
547 Goffart (1988), p. 168-9 - “...So conceived, the Histories was meant to be, above all, a 
vehicle of Christian instruction.” See below. Cf. Heinzelmann, M. Gregory of Tours: history 
and society in the sixth century (Cambridge 2001), which also takes the view that the 
Histories are carefully contrived, but focuses more on Gregory’s biblical parallels. 
Heinzelmann’s analysis, which argues that the Histories are “schematically subjected to 
Gregory’s theology and methodology” (p. 127) has been considered the major rival to 
Goffart’s impression of Gregory as a satirist (see Brown 2002, p. 1-17). He nonetheless 
agrees with Goffart in tending to treat the episodes of violence that pepper the Histories as 
‘vehicles for leitmotifs’ rather than instructive examples of elite behaviour (Heinzelmann 
2001, p. 36-7). Therefore many of the objections to Goffart’s analysis presented here, which 
focus on the inconsistencies in Gregory’s sense of narrative mission, also apply to 
Heinzelmann (see Wood 2002, p. 29-30). For more detailed critiques of Heinzelmann’s 
schema, see Shanzer (2002) and Halsall, G. “Nero and Herod? The death of Chilperic and 
Gregory of Tours’ writing of history”, in Mitchell and Wood (eds.) The World of Gregory of 
Tours (2002).
548 Goffart (1988), citing Gregory of Tours, Glory of the Martyrs; Glory of the Confessors; 
Wonders.
549 A contrast repeated on several other occasions in the Histories – see Goffart (1988) p. 149, 
170, 181
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relationships, or other practical details is a secondary consideration.”550 Although
Goffart’s analysis has been disputed, the general impression of the Histories as a
fundamentally caricatured and unreliable guide to the violence of the period has
remained  popular.551 It  presents  a  powerful  challenge  to  the  idea  that  the
Histories  can be used to understand contemporary violence, and will therefore
form the starting point of the present analysis.
 
    The observation that Gregory is a highly selective author is incontrovertible.
Even for the years in the later 580s that he covers in the greatest detail, only a
few dozen incidents are recorded, and events below the level of royal intrigues
are scattered fleetingly, and often in the form of neatly self-contained vignettes,
across the work. The most obvious constraint of the Histories is its relentlessly
royal, ecclesiastical and noble focus. Gregory is not much interested in counts,
still less in wealthy freemen, and not at all in poor and ordinary free, semi-free or
unfree  people,  who  are  seldom  mentioned  as  individuals  and  almost  never
named. The strata of society dealt with in the  Histories are generally the few
hundred people in the top offices of church and state, and the closest thing to a
continuous narrative that unifies the later, more detailed books is the sequence of
civil  wars that  dominated the period.  Even such exalted figures as dukes are
patchily covered,  and generally  only enter  the narrative where they figure in
royal  politics.  The geographical  range of much of  the  Histories is  also quite
narrow. Other than a few digressions into the politics of Spain and the Empire,
the focus of the later books is largely confined to Gaul, rarely straying beyond
the borders  of  modern  France.552 Only in  the vicinity  of  Tours  itself  is  local
550 Ibid., p. 182
551 See Liebeschuetz (2006), p. 37-44; and the reviews of Roger Collins, in EHR vol.106 no.421
(Oct. 1991), p. 967, and (for a more favourable perspective) Averil Cameron in AHR vol.95 
no.4 (1990), p. 1172-3. Sarti (2013) evidently considers Gregory reliable, but does not 
address Goffart’s critique. Dailey’s recent treatment of the Histories also takes a positive 
view of their reliability, and makes several persuasive points to this effect – Dailey (2015), p.
161-163.
552 The most northerly reports of the Frankish kingdoms come from Tournai and Koblenz, the 
latter of which Gregory visited in 585 (VIII.14), the most southerly from Marseilles and 
Toulouse.
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politics treated with any frequency,  and even here the reports  are  partial  and
discontinuous.553
    Personal acquaintance is also an important and, thanks to the diffuse and
discontinuous quality of the narrative, easily underestimated factor in Gregory’s
selection  of  violent  characters  and  incidents.554 A  survey  of  the  violent
individuals who appear prominently in the Histories reveals that a considerable
number had occasion to meet Gregory in person, most often in the context of
seeking sanctuary at Saint Martin’s.555 The former count of Tours, Leudast “used
to  walk  into  the  church-house  in  his  curiass  and mail  shirt,  with  his  quiver
hanging round him, his spear in his hand and his helmet on his head”. The duke
Eberulf’s son was baptized by Gregory, and he attacked St Martin’s priests and
threatened Gregory’s life. Other characters, like count Eunomius and Pelagius
are not shown meeting Gregory, but must surely have done so.556 And many of
those who did not meet Gregory – like Mummolus, Desiderius and Avius – are
only divided from him by one degree of separation. The damning description of
Rauching’s personal behaviour could have come straight from the mouth of his
killer, Childebert.557 Indeed, the personal and political are difficult to separate,
since both Gregory and most of his subjects were personally connected to the
Royal family.
    Equally persuasive is the suggestion that Gregory is a consummate storyteller
with a penchant for the dramatic. The only episodes in the Histories that break
momentarily  from  the  preoccupation  with  royal  politics  tend  to  concern,  as
Goffart observes, miracles and acts of violence. Gregory is uninterested in the
ordinary – good harvests, the normal business of pastoral work, the attire and
daily  life  of  the  noble  classes,  and  other  mundane  matters  that  would  be
invaluable to the social historian entirely escape his attention. Notwithstanding a
couple of overlong digressions into some of Gregory’s inconclusive theological
553 See below.
554 cf. Heinzelmann (2001), p. 90-91
555 Guntram Boso (V.4), Leudast and Riculf (V.49); Bladast (VI.31, VIII.6); Eberulf (VII.21-22);
Sichar (VII.47); Childeric the Saxon (VIII.11); Clotild (IX.40)
556 Histories VII.23; VIII.40
557 Histories V.3; Mummolus and Desiderius were in league with Bladast prior to the latter 
seeking sanctuary at St Martin’s (VII.28); Avius was killed by Childeric the Saxon (VII.3). 
On Rauching, see below.
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debates with priests  and visiting dignitaries, the work sets  out consistently to
shock and amaze, sticking to the high peaks and low valleys of contemporary
life.558 The  most  important  question  for  our  present  purposes,  which  extends
naturally from Gregory’s omissions and flare for drama, is how this affects his
presentation of contemporary violence. In Goffart’s view, the consistent tendency
is toward caricatured over-representation, designed to cast shadows against the
light  of  saintly  miracles.  But  detailed  analysis  calls  this  damning  overall
conclusion into question.
    The  interpretation  of  the  Histories’  violence  as  a  vehicle  for  Christian
instruction is based on an examination of the supposed moral purpose behind
Gregory’s  omissions  and inclusions.559 Estimating  and evaluating  the  missing
material in the Histories is no easy task, given that they form the only source for
most of the contemporary incidents of violence which they report, so much of
Goffart’s assessment of omission rests on the more ancient and distant events
described by Gregory,  but he does  find a  few good candidates for deliberate
obfuscation. Certain events and figures deemed inconvenient or unnecessary to a
moralizing  Christian  narrative  by  Goffart  –  like  Constantius  II  and  Valens’s
Arian sympathies, and that “fine example of unpunished wickedness” Geiseric –
are conspicuously absent from Gregory’s account. In one demonstrable case of
literary distortion of contemporary events, Goffart catches Gregory sanitizing the
violent  conversion  of  the  Clermont  Jews  at  the  hands  of  bishop  Avitus’s
congregation.560
    In many instances, the self-conscious framing and moral purpose of the tales
of violence recounted in the  Histories is clear: A certain Duke Amalo is killed
with his  own sword by a  free  girl  during an  attempt  to  rape  her;  the  Abbot
Dagulf, a robber and a killer, is killed by a husband who discovers him in bed
with his wife; Avius, adulterer and murderer of a citizen of Tours in Book VI, is
himself stabbed to death in a chance encounter a few years later in Book VII;
Rauching, a duke condemned as proud and wantonly sadistic in Book V, involves
himself  in  an abortive conspiracy against  king Childebert  in  Book IX and is
558 Goffart (1988), p. 174
559 Ibid, p. 137-160
560 Ibid, p. 137-8, 163-4. See below.
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brutally  killed.561 In  each  case  Gregory  makes  overt  and  strident  moral
judgements - “In this way God in his majesty avenged the innocent blood which
this man had shed with his own hand.”562 The first two of these incidents, in
which neither the locations of the events in question nor the names of the other
protagonists are offered, seem like particularly good candidates for interpolations
by Gregory added to the text specifically for their moral value. And as the latter
two of these scenes make clear, there is a tendency in the Histories to divide the
story arcs of its doomed characters into far-flung chapters in a way that betrays a
high  level  of  narrative  craft  and probable  post-hoc re-editing.  The  Rauching
storyline,  in  which  Gregory  overtly  previews  the  duke’s  later  demise  in  the
earlier  chapter,  is  particularly  suspect,  and  this  is  only  one  of  several  such
instances.563 
    Gregory’s deployment of selection and omission for moralizing purposes is,
however, inconsistent.564 At times, the moral pretensions of Gregory’s prose are
not entirely obvious, and opportunities to craft narrative links between sin and
judgement are conspicuously missed. Pappolus, bishop of Langres, is bad and
dies miraculously, but for the sake of modesty Gregory declines to inform the
reader  what  he  actually  did  wrong.565 Bishop  Marachar  is  poisoned  by  his
successor,  who  in  turn  dies  “by  divine  judgement”,  but  the  manner  of  the
poisoner’s deserved death is not given.566 Nonnichius, count of Limoges, arrests
bishop Charterius in possession of letters which contain abusive remarks about
the king, but Charterius accuses the deacon Frontinus of fabricating them. In the
end  Charterius  is  cleared  and  the  prime  mover  of  the  plot  to  destroy  him,
Frontinus, is forgiven; but of the count, who on the face of it was doing more
than his duty, Gregory dryly remarks “Two months later Count Nonnichius, who
had started all this scandal, died of a stroke. He had no children.”567
561 Histories, IX.27; VIII.19; VI.13 and VII.3; V.3 and VIII. See also, VI.32; VIII.40; X.14
562 Histories, VII.3
563 Murray 2015, p. 86-88
564 This basic observation is not original. For complementary arguments see Wood, I. “The 





    Elsewhere the moral message is  obscure to the point of anonymity,  with
characters  who have been established sympathetically  meeting  bad ends,  and
others  who are clearly described as  villains  evading divine judgement.  Duke
Austrapius, after  miraculously escaping the wrath of prince Chramn, is made
bishop of Champtocaeux, but later dies “a cruel death from the blow of a spear”
in a local uprising.568 Duke Bladast devastates the Tours region with an army, and
later joins the rebellion of Gundovald, only to be pardoned after Gregory pleads
for his life.569 The saintly abbess Ingitrude bans her daughter Berthegund from
her nunnery, but upon her mother’s death Berthegund seizes her property with
the help of a “band of ruffians”. No vengeance,  human or divine,  apparently
makes good the misdeed.570 Count Eulalius of Clermont beats and mistreats his
wife, kills his nephew and several other men in separate incidents, and, when his
wife  absconds  to  marry  the  duke  Desiderius,  successfully  sues  her  before  a
council of bishops for stolen property and has her sons by Desiderius declared
illegitimate; this is the last we hear of him.571 And in possibly the most egregious
case  of  a  “fine  example  of  unpunished  wickedness”,  the  ineptly  named
Innocentius,  count of Javols,  beats up and decapitates an abbot,  and attempts
unsuccessfully to conceal the murder,  only to be elevated to the bishopric of
Rodez with the support of queen Brunhild a short time later.572
    The sense of moral variety in the  Histories is compounded by Gregory’s
occasionally ambiguous treatment of his characters. The examples of the kings
have been well-treated. Childebert is described, indirectly, as being replete with
virtues, but is also portrayed as weak and unable to rule without the help of his
uncle  and  mother.  Guntram  is  by  turns  generous,  merciful,  paranoid  and
bloodthirsty. And even the “Nero and Herod of our time”, Chilperic, is afforded
568 Histories, IV.18; see also V.5 and VII.25, where Chilperic’s former physician Marileif is 
robbed by Merovech’s men, treated kindly and sent back to Poitiers by Gregory, only to later 
be robbed even more thoroughly, so that he is reduced to servitude.
569 Again, this is the last we hear of him, other than the note that his mother was implicated in a 
plot against Guntram – Histories VIII.6, VIII.28
570 Histories X.12
571 Histories, X.8. We do hear earlier that Eulalius was humiliated by his wife’s relationship 
with Desiderius, but the conclusion that everything turned out alright for him is still difficult 
to resist.
572 Histories, VI.37, 38. See below, p. 164-5
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the odd moment of moderation and good judgement.573 The Duke Guntram Boso,
another sinner doomed to eventually die, is described ambiguously as “a good
enough man in other  ways,  but  too  much given to  breaking his  word.”  The
uncertainty over Boso’s place in the moral schema is sustained through his fight
with the man sent to arrest him, Duke Dragolen - “...he prayed to the lord and
invoked the miraculous power of Saint Martin.  Then he raised his spear and
jabbed Dragolen square in the throat.”574
    Goffart’s efforts to account for these inconsistencies in the moralizing tone of
the narrative centre on the theme of irony and the question of audience. Gregory,
it  is  claimed, is  writing for an “educated,  Roman-descended,  and hereditarily
Christian” audience, who share his sense of moral repugnance at the violence he
reports, and as a result there is no need for Gregory to state overtly the moral
implications  of  his  lurid  tales  –  “every  effort  is  bent,  as  irony  demands,  on
conveying  a  vivid  and  unforgettably  negative  impression  without  conveying
overt  disapproval.  The  details  of  any action  are  subordinated  to  the  reader’s
knowing  moral  colour.”575 Thus,  at  a  single  stroke,  Gregory’s  many  moral
understatements,  omissions  and  apparent  contradictions  are  accounted  for  by
attributing to the author a consistently subtle and ironic tone designed to convey
the futility of secular ambition to a learned and morally upright Gallo-Roman
audience.
    Gregory’s use of satirical irony is an evident feature of his writing,576 that first
emerges  spectacularly  in  his  treatment  the  greatest  Merovingian,  Clovis.  The
final  chapters  of  Book II  do not  shy away from the  merciless  treachery  and
double dealing by which Clovis  brought  all  the Franks under  his  sway,  in  a
process that involved the murder of many of his relatives. Some of the killings
are justified by circumstances or the character of the victim, others are not. At
the end of the saga Clovis makes a plaintiff cry for unknown relatives to come
573 For instance: Childebert - Histories, VII.33, VI.31. Guntram – VIII.5-6, X.10. Chilperic – 
VI.5, 10, 17 for a remarkably favourable portrayal of his conduct toward Jews and criminals,
in contrast to his apparently unreserved condemnation at VI.46. See Halsall (2002), p. 342-
344
574 Histories V.25; contra Dailey (2015), p. 149, who also points out that Gregory’s presentation 
of Guntram Boso in The Virtues of St Martin is remarkably positive – VM XI.17
575 Goffart (1988), p. 137-8, 182
576 See Heinzelmann (2001), p. 91-2, citing Histories VI.40, IX.20 and V.5
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forward, hoping, Gregory tells us, to lure them to their deaths. So it is not a little
strange  to  find  Gregory  declaring  in  the  same  sequence  that  God  gave  this
ruthlessly duplicitous  figure victory  because  “he  walked before  Him with an
upright heart and did what was pleasing in his sight.”577 Understatement is also
clearly  evident  at  times,  such  as  in  Gregory’s  description  of  the  genocidal
denouement of the siege of Comminges, on which he offers no overt statement of
condemnation, but lets the awful events stand alone.578 Or the violent death of the
merchant  Christopher,  which  is  juxtaposed  against  the  hoarding  of  food  by
merchants  during  a  time  of  famine,  without  drawing  an  overt  connection
between the two.579
    But  the  difficulties  of  universally  applying  such  an  interpretation  are
immediately evident, on close inspection of the text. As we have just seen, the
gamut  of  Gregory’s  moral  messaging,  or  lack  thereof,  is  very broad.  At  one
extreme – for instance in the deaths of the abbot Dagulf or the former count of
Tours, Leudast – he makes explicit moral judgements on scenes where the moral
subtext is achingly obvious. There is a tendency to hedge moral bets, so to speak,
as guilty figures are accused of all kinds of crimes in addition to the immediate
sin  for  which  they  are  divinely  punished  -  “The  miserable  creature  had
committed one crime after another, robberies, murders, and adulteries...”.580 As
this passage implies, Gregory’s accounts often leave some ambiguity over which
sin was most relevant to the sinner’s death, mixing mundane cautionary elements
with graver sins. The dangers of excessive drinking are a recurrent theme, which
is the undoing of dukes, priests and pious monks alike.581 And dissension and ill-
discipline resulting from hubris arise frequently as the immediate cause of death
in military contexts.582 Such heavy-handed bouts of moral condemnation, and the
blending of mundane folly with mortal  sin in the moralizing commentary,  sit
577 Histories, II.40-42
578 Histories, VII.38
579 Histories, VII.38; VIII.46; also V.17.
580 Histories VII.3; VIII.19; VIII.40; X.14
581 Alcohol is the immediate cause of the literal downfall of the deacon Theodulf (X.14), and 
Childeric the Saxon, and was also the sole factor implicated in the sad fate of the Breton 
monk Winoch (V.21). This is discussed further in the next section.
582 For instance, Terentiolus and Desiderius – Histories VIII.30, 35
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uncomfortably with the image of an author consistently deploying irony for the
entertainment of an intellectually and morally homogeneous audience.583
    At the other end of the moralizing spectrum – as in the cases of Eulalius and
Innocentius – the subtext is not only unstated, it is also more than a little obscure,
placing  considerable  demands  on  the  ironic  appreciation  even  of  the
theologically informed reader. Neither are the  Histories entirely free of secular
deaths which imply no moral judgement one way or other, since they are not
contextualized  in  any  events  or  personal  descriptions.  Of  duke  Bodegisil,
Gregory simply states that he “died, at an advanced age, and his sons inherited
his estate without having to forfeit any of it.”584 Overall the moral register of
Gregory’s prose, even in respect of characters who he considers to be beneath
contempt,  is  frequently inconsistent.  The picture that emerges is of an author
with a predilection for extracting Christian moral meaning from the incidents he
recounts, but not one whose moral aims are unerring, or who is always intent on
selecting events for those purposes.
5.2 – Gregory’s Attitude to Violence
    As the example of Guntram Boso’s fight with Dragolen implies, there are also
substantial question marks over Gregory’s feelings about the use of violence. At
one extreme, Gregory’s attitude and role in the narrative give the impression of a
man  who  abhors  violence  and  is  apt  to  criticise  even  its  most  esteemed
practitioners. He is not slow to report the excesses, mistakes and disasters that
characterize the warfare of kings,  and in many violent conflicts  on a smaller
scale  no  one  emerges  with  much  moral  credit.585 Gregory  himself  pleads  on
several occasions for the lives of guilty men, including the man who tried to
supplant  him as  bishop.586 But  at  other  moments,  Gregory  takes  unconcealed
pleasure in the violent deaths of sinners, even when that death comes about at the
583 For further arguments to this effect, in relation both to Goffart and to Heinzelmann, see 
Shanzer (2002), p. 262, who also cites Vinay, G. San Gregario di Tours (1940), p. 68 on the 
“lack of uniformity and parallelism in the disposition of prologues and first chapters.” 
584 Histories VIII.22
585 For instance, Histories VI.10; V.49.
586 Histories V.49; VIII.6.
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hands of equally reprehensible figures, who seem to become for a moment the
instruments  of  God’s  judgement.587 Goffart  refers  to  such  episodes  as  the
“encounter between bad and worse” that characterizes Gregory’s effort to convey
the futility of secular existence through his writing, but this interpretation is open
to question with regard to several executors of justified violence in the Histories,
about whom Gregory shows much more ambivalence.588
    A few cases involving the use of violence, that revolve around Gregory and his
fellow  bishops,  are  especially  interesting  and  instructive  with  respect  to  the
ambiguity of Gregory’s moral sentiments. The first is picked out by Goffart as an
example of a rare case in which omission from the Histories of some aspect of
contemporary events can be deduced by reference to an external source, in this
case Venantius Fortunatus.589 In the  Histories, Gregory relates how the Jews of
Clermont were converted by the efforts of the Saintly bishop Avitus – who stated
that they must do so or leave the city at once – after falling into conflict with
some of the local population. What Gregory leaves out, according to Venantius,
is that the Jews were converted under the swords of an angry mob.590 Goffart
suggests that the version given in the Histories “glows with the warmth and aura
of  miracle”  such  that  “we  almost  overlook  the  ultimatum  in  the  bishop’s
message”.  But  this  passes  over,  all  too  easily,  an  important  point  which  is
relevant both to the question of Gregory’s willingness to distort events to his
moral purposes and his attitude to the use of force. 
    The  late  sixth  century  was  a  period  in  which  the  Frankish  church,  with
occasional royal aid and approval, was ostentatiously renewing and extending
the  suppression  of  Judaism  and  Jewish  presence  in  public  life.591 Forced
587 Fredegund has Leudast and several others deserving miscreants killed; Childeric the Saxon 
cuts down Avius – Histories, X.27; VII.3
588 For instance, Chramnesind, killer of belligerent Sichar; and the Breton prince Thuederic, 
killer of the evil king Macliaw (V.16, IV.4). See below.
589 Histories V.11; Goffart 1988, p. 163-4
590 Fortunatus, Carmina 5.5, (ed. Leo), p. 107-112
591 Two Councils at Macon (583 and 585) restated the ban on Jews holding the office of iudex, 
and additionally banned them from acting as tolinarii (toll-collectors), and prohibited Jews 
from appearing in public between Maundy Thursday and Easter Sunday. The Councils of 
Orleans (533) and Clermont (535) had already prohibited marriages between Jews and 
Christians, and the Council of Orleans had prohibited Jews from converting Christians – 
Mezei (2005), p. 20-21. See, also, Halfond, I. G. The Archaeology of Frankish Church 
Councils, A.D. 511-768 (Leiden: Brill, 2010), p. 102-3 For king Guntram’s reported anti-
Jewish rhetoric, Histories VIII.1
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conversions  cannot  have  seemed  particularly  scandalous,  for  elsewhere  they
were mandated by royal decree, and Gregory reports Chilperic’s efforts to force
the Jews to “see the truth” with approval.592 Thus we have little reason to suspect
that Gregory would be particularly scandalized by the use or threat of violence in
the effort of conversion. And indeed, although Gregory effaces the direct link
between the violence of the Clermont congregation and the conversion of the
Jews, the fact that violence played a role in the process is not avoided, and the
subtext of forced conversion is hardly assiduously concealed. Gregory gives us
Avitus restraining the angry mob from killing a Jew, but the next day,  as he
informs us…
 “...The  crowd  following  him  attacked  the  Jewish  synagogue,
destroyed it down to its very foundations and levelled it to the
ground. On another occasion the bishop sent this message to the
Jews: ‘I do not use force or compel you to confess to the son of
God. I merely preach to you...”593 
The  passage,  which  runs  straight  from  Avitus’s  congregation  levelling  the
synagogue  to  Avitus  claiming  that  he  did  not  use  force  without  pausing  for
breath, is pregnant with irony. If accidental, this implies that Gregory was not
always aware of the ironic subtext of his prose, and if deliberate, it hints at an
author who was more mischievous, and more sanguine about the use of force,
than the concentrated moralist proposed by Goffart.
    A second, related incident concerns the treatment by bishop Aurelius of Le
Puy of a wandering miracle-worker from Bourges, whom Gregory describes as
causing some disruption in Aurelius’s diocese.594 There is some suggestion that
592 Histories VI.17. 
593 “Die autem beato, quo Dominus ad caelos post redemptum hominem gloriosus ascendit, cum
sacerdos de aeclesiam ad basilicam psallendo procederet, inruit super sinagogae Iudaeorum 
multitudo tota sequentium, distructamque a fundamentis, campi planitiae locus adsimilatur. 
Alia autem die sacerdos eis legatos mittit, dicens: 'Vi ego vos confiteri Dei Filium non 
inpello, sed tamen praedico et salem scientiae vestris pectoribus trado. Pastor sum enim 
dominicis ovibus superpositus; et de vobis ille verus Pastor, qui pro nobis passus est, dixit, 
habere se alias oves quae non sunt ex ovili suo, quas eum oporteat adducere, ut fiat unus grex
et unus pastor. Ideoque si vultis credere ut ego, estote unus grex, costodi me posito; sin vero 
aliud, abscedite a loco.”
594 Histories X.25
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the man’s followers pose a physical threat – they rob people on the road,595 and
they are described by Gregory as forming a kind of “army” seeking “war” with
the bishop – but overall the tone is comic rather than menacing. Certainly the
‘viros strenuos’ sent by Aurelius to investigate after the bishop is accosted by
some naked ‘emissaries’,  are  not  intimidated  by  the  enthusiastic  rabble.  The
inquiries are short-lived, and end with the bishop’s men bowing in a false gesture
of supplication, before rugby tackling the wanderer and stabbing him to death.
“So died this Christ, more worthy to be called an Antichrist...” says Gregory with
evident  satisfaction.  But  Gregory’s  praise,  as  so  often,  is  reserved  for  the
miserable  fate  of  the  victim  rather  than  the  virtues  of  the  killers,  and  the
subsequent passage again muddies the moral waters, as Gregory describes his
reaction to similar figures in his own diocese… “I did my best to argue with
them and to make them give up their inane pretensions.”596 Thus Gregory at once
shows  approval  for  the  unceremonious  killing  of  a  wandering  preacher,  but
almost in the same breath implies that he himself does not do such things under
similar  circumstances,  leaving the reader  in some doubt  about  his  attitude to
bishop Aurelius’s conduct.
    In the third case – the denouement of the princess Clotild’s rebellion at a
Poitiers nunnery – Gregory himself enters the fray as an instigator of violence.
Clotild, we are told, had taken over the nunnery and thrown out the Abbess with
the help of “a band of cut-throats, evil-doers, fornicators, fugitives from justice
and  men  guilty  of  every  crime  in  the  calendar.”597 Childebert  and  Guntram
convene a council of bishops, but Gregory refuses to attend until the rebels are
subdued by force - “‘I will not set foot in Poitiers’, I said, ‘until the local count
has used his authority to put down this bloodthirsty rebellion which Clotild has
stirred  up.’”  Gregory  describes,  with  considerable  candour,  just  what  that
“authority” amounts to in practice - “He crushed the rising, knocking some over
the heads with staves, running others through with spears and using swords to
cut down those who were really determined to resist… Some they roped to posts
and beat severely. Some had their hair cut off, others their hands, some even their
595 Although, in another moment of moral ambiguity, they give all their earnings to the poor.
596 Cf. Histories, IX.6, in which Gregory pleads for the life of another such man.
597 On the identities of these vaguely described figures, see next section, p. 208-211
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ears and noses.”598 Thus, Gregory claims vicarious credit for the ending of the
revolt, but in doing so he also takes vicarious credit for deaths, mutilations and
beatings that it entailed. The contrast with, for instance, the conduct of the saintly
hermit Eparchius, who rescues a guilty felon from death against the wishes of
locals, is stark.599
    These examples cast into doubt the concept of an audience, “as blameless as
Gregory himself”, who consistently looked askance at the violence portrayed in
the  Histories.  Avitus,  Aurelius,  and  Gregory  himself  were  esteemed  Gallo-
Romans  of  good  stock  and  high  dignity,  and  all  showed  an  occasional
predilection for countenancing the conspicuous use of force in the pursuit  of
their aims. The same may be said of the apparently Gallo-Roman Eunomius, who
replaced Gregory’s bete-noire Leudast as count of Tours; Eulalius, the count of
Clermont;  queen  Brunhild’s  favourite,  Innocentius;  and  so  forth.600 The
involvement in serious violence of these prominent and well-connected apparent
Gallo-Romans,  who  would  theoretically  be  ideal  candidates  for  members  of
Goffart’s assumed morally upstanding audience, undermines the contention that
Gregory’s  moral  understatements  regarding  violence  should  consistently  be
understood as winks to an audience who exist “on a higher plane” to the brutality
they  regard.601 Violence  was  apparently  distasteful  to  Gregory,  often
reprehensible,  but  by  no  means  automatically  evil,  and  neither  were  its
instigators  and  practitioners.  In  some  cases  his  feelings  about  violence  and
violent people are equivocal and ambiguous.  Therefore the argument  that his
evocations of violence were consistently expected to provoke moral revulsion in
his audience, or selected to cast shadows against the light of the saints’ miracles
–  and  the  corresponding  characterization  of  his  accounts  of  violence  an
unjustifiably exaggerated caricature – cannot be sustained.
598 Histories X.15
599 Histories VI.8
600 See above, n. 30-31
601 Goffart (1988), p. 179. Gregory shows a similar ambivalence toward justified violence in his 
hagiography, for instance in Lives of the Fathers VII, in which St Gregory of Langres 
punishes criminals mercilessly in life, but after death miraculously releases the same kinds of
people. See also, VP I; Glory of the Martyrs 5.
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    This is not at all to imply that Gregory’s moral pretensions do not profoundly
influence  his  portrayal  of  violence,  but  rather  to  suggest  that  those  moral
pretensions cannot be reduced to a determination to contrast the secular to the
divine, and that his motivations in describing violence were not limited to moral
edification alone.  The tendency to omission and interpolation for dramatic and
agenda-laden purposes is firmly established, but the character, scale and goals of
this tendency are more difficult to pin down. Goffart argues effectively that the
gaps in Gregory’s narrative cannot be accounted for purely on the basis that he
was  ‘at  the  mercy  of  his  sources’,  but  the  contention  that  the  Histories
consistently  include  such  moments  and  figures  as  are  convenient  to  a
presentation of a world divided between saints and sinners, and leaves out those
who are  inconvenient,  is  much less  firm,  and is  only one  among a  range of
possible explanatory factors. It is necessary to look for other motivations and
agendas in Gregory’s work, and to entertain the possibility that while he certainly
emphasised violence at times, he may also have effaced and ignored it at others.
5.3 – Political Pressures and Omissions
    Another potentially significant pressure on the  Histories emphasised by Ian
Wood  among  others  was  Gregory’s  political  position  as  bishop  of  Tours,
operating  under  turbulent  and  dangerous  kings  and  queens  who were  highly
sensitive to perceived slanders.602 The  Histories  are pitted with tales of this or
that  notable  figure  being  brutally  punished  for  alleged  slander  of  the  royal
family, and it is quite clear that written evidence could be deployed against its
authors to bring about their destruction.603 As Wood points out, Gregory’s loyalty
was suspected by some and his own position as bishop was not entirely secure,
having been seriously threatened by the machinations of the two Riculfs.604
602 Wood (1993), (2002); Dailey (2015), p. 149-152; Dolan, A. “‘You Would Do Better to Keep 
Your Mouth Shut:’ The Significance of Talk in Sixth-Century Gaul”, in Journal of the 
Western Society for French History 40 (2012), p. 9
603 Histories V.25; V.27; V.46; V.49; VI.22. Cf. VII.30; VIII.31.
604 The priest and subdeacon who nearly unseated Gregory at the instigation of Leudast - Wood 
(1993), p. 257; Histories V.49
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    Questions about how Gregory’s writing was affected by political pressures
have  been  answered  in  a  wide  variety  of  ways,  and  the  answers  are  deeply
entwined  with  the  torturous  arguments  about  the  dating  of  the  Histories’
composition.605 Goffart’s argument, that an attribution of saintly powers to a part
of  king  Guntram’s  cloak  in  book  nine  probably  dates  the  passage  to  after
Guntram’s death in 592, is persuasive.606 But the subsequent story, in book ten,
describing how Guntram rashly ordered the death of his Chamberlain, muddies
the waters.607 Ian Wood points out the change in tone between measured criticism
to outright condemnation of king Chilperic at the point of his assassination in
584, which might imply a certain constraint being lifted by his death,  although
we  have  already  seen  that  Gregory’s  moral  tone  in  relation  to  Chilperic  is
somewhat inconsistent.608 And Guy Halsall argues that the preface to Book V
was intended as a kind of sermon to the Frankish prince Merovech in the midst
of the political upheavals of the later 570s, endorsing a synchronic impression of
the composition of the last six books. But Alexander Callendar Murray argues
effectively – partly on the basis of the dating even of the earlier  chapters by
Childebert’s regnal years, rather than those of Chilperic or Guntram, who ruled
Tours prior to 585 – that composition of the last five books did not begin prior to
that date.609 
    Murray’s reasoning is most persuasive, and the suggestion that the Histories
was recording near-contemporary events in the final books, but not earlier,  is
circumstantially supported by the weather reports uniquely attached to the ends
of  Books  IX  and  X.610 The  overall  impression  is  of  a  composition  process
beginning in  the  580s,  then  being supplemented  quite  close  to  the  events  in
question, before being edited with hindsight in the last phase of Gregory’s life,611
albeit with all the constraints involved in the bishop’s many theological, pastoral
605 For a recent summary of the debate see Halsall (2007), p. 306-308, citing Heinzelmann 2001,
p. 114-115; see also, De Nie, G. Views from a Many Windowed Tower: Studies of 
Imagination in the Works of Gregory of Tours (Amsterdam 1987), p. 29-36
606 Goffart (1988), p. 176, citing Histories IX.21
607 Histories X.10
608 See above, n. 32
609 Halsall (2007), p. 314-316; Murray (2015), p. 91-4
610 Histories IX.9; X.30
611 cf. Wallace-Hadrill, J. M. “The work of Gregory of Tours in light of modern research”, in 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society vol. 1 (1951), p. 34-35
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and  political  involvements,  as  well  as  the  vicissitudes  of  editing  vellum
documents.  But  the  lack  of  early  manuscripts,  and consequent  possibility  of
undetected interpolations added to an early original at a later date, make these
questions impossible to resolve decisively. Whatever the exact dates, the latter
part of the Histories cannot but have been written close to the time of the events
that they described, and all these historians agree that Gregory and his work were
not free from the politics of his time.
    Murray’s most forceful argument relates to the relative inattention paid by
Gregory to the character of Childebert, the king who held power over Tours from
585 onward, and his mother, Brunhild.612 Childebert’s political involvements, and
his wars, are neither neglected nor treated favourably, but compared with his two
uncles, Chilperic and Guntram, who for better or worse are both subjected to
personal  judgement  by  Gregory,  the  account  of  Childebert  feels  decidedly
reserved. The Histories are not as disposed to put words in Childebert’s mouth
than  they  are  Guntram’s,  or  to  account  in  detail  for  his  conversations  with
Gregory,  and  the  same  contrast  may  be  observed  between  Brunhild  and
Fredegund,  the  latter  of  whom Gregory  condemns  with  some freedom.613 At
times the treatment of Fredegund seems positively gossipy, as in the accounts of
her conflicts with her daughter Rigunth, or that of her last recorded violent act,
which is one of the few instances in which Gregory bothers to name freemen
below the status of count (in this case her victims).614
    Even in Fredegund’s case, the Histories are more taciturn on the subject of her
sexual  behaviour  –  which  bore  on  the  legitimacy  of  the  prince  Lothar’s
succession – than they are about her sponsorship of violence,  which Gregory
speculates on without apparent compunction.615 And there is something in the
presentation  of  Fredegund  of  the  ambiguity  toward  violence  that  we  have
observed in the  Histories:  As we have seen, she appears as the instrument of
612 Ibid, p. 94-5; cf. Daily 2015, p. 141-3, who (following Heinzelmann) traces Gregory’s 
loyalty to Brunhild and Sigebert back to the 560s. Gregory’s attitude to both figures, 
however, was not entirely positive. See below, and (for Sigebert,) Histories VI.49-51
613 Not, however, without some qualification and restraint – see below and Chapter 6, p. 232-
234
614 Histories X.27
615 Wood (1993), p. 307; Dailey (2015), p. 154-6, who points out that Gregory subtly and 
indirectly calls Fredgund’s marital fidelity into question.
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divine vengeance against Gregory’s  bete noire, the former count Leudast. The
men of Tournai whom Fredegund kills are not portrayed sympathetically, leading
one to suspect that their end, too, was considered fitting. And although she is
made to condemn her own behaviour most stridently after the deaths of her sons,
Fredegund is given full credit for the subsequent decision to destroy the unjust
tax records held by king Chilperic.616
    In the case of Brunhild, Gregory provides nothing like the vividly personal
depiction offered of Fredegund or (much more briefly) Austrechild, but rather
generally portrays her  at  a  safe dramatic distance as a peacemaker  and loyal
protector of her royal son.617 The one personal description comes early in the
Histories, and offers us the youthful and still Arian Brunhild, just arrived from
Spain: “This young woman was elegant in all that she did, lovely to look at,
chaste  and  decorous  in  her  behaviour,  wise  in  her  generation  and  of  good
address.”618 After such an auspicious start (and given her influence in Gregory’s
diocese) we might expect further such complements to burnish Brunhild’s later
life, but, in contrast to king Guntram, no aura of benevolence and sanctity is
attached to her. On the contrary, Brunhild is implicated, by association, in the
violence of several of the other figures in the Histories and other undefined evils.
We have already seen how the murderous count Innocentius was elevated to the
bishopric  of  Rodez  with  Brunhild’s  assistance,  and  the  sequence  of  events
deploys a technique of moral understatement – the presentation of a story across
two  sequential  chapters  –  which  we  have  already  seen  in  the  case  of  the
merchant Christopher:  The abbot  of St Privatus is  accused by Innocentius of
slandering Brunhild, but appears before her and clears himself with an oath. On
his way home the abbot is killed by Innocentius. And finally, in the next chapter,
Brunhild helps to elevate Innocentius to the bishopric.619 In another suggestive
616 Histories V.34
617 Histories IX.38. See Dailey (2015), p. 141-153
618 Histories IV.26
619 Histories VI.36-37. Daily points to signs of form for this kind of act in Brunhild’s part in the 
murder of bishop Desiderius – which is referred to in Sisebut’s “Life and Sufferings of the 
Holy Desiderius”, the anonymous “Sufferings of the Holy Desiderius, Bishop and Martyr”, 
and the Chronicles of Fredegar – as well as noting the evil reputation ascribed to her 
posthumously by Fredegar. He takes the position that Gregory’s rather unsubtle implication 
of Brunhild in the murder of Lupentius is purely accidental, and (somewhat uncharitably) 
avers that the lack of positive references to Brunhild in the Histories may have resulted from 
an objective shortage of material, although he does agree that Gregory was politically 
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moment, Gregory reports that in the course of praising Brunhild’s son Childebert
king Guntram stated, in passing, that “it is true enough that his mother Brunhild
openly menaced my life, but as far as I am concerned this is a matter of small
moment”.620 Sometime later,  Brunhild is  revealed as the royal  sponsor of the
drunken and violent citizen of Tours, Sichar, whose death she attempts to avenge
against  the  better  judgement  of  her  son.621 The  overall  impression  is  that
Brunhild  was  a  formidable  and  occasionally  murderous  enemy,  but  this
impression  is  conveyed  subtly  and  indirectly,  with  no  overt  criticism  on
Gregory’s part.
    This careful deployment of understatement returns us to the theme of irony
and satire raised earlier, and particularly to the treatment of the Frankish founder
Clovis, who is praised as an exemplar of Christian uprightness in the midst of an
account  of  the murders  of  his  former allies  and extended family.  To a  mind
informed  by  the  moral  register  of  the  likes  of  Salvian  or  Eusebius,  such  a
juxtaposition would seem obviously satirical.622 But the fact that Gregory later
appeals to the example of Clovis, with no evident irony, in the preface to Book V
as  an  example  for  present  kings  to  follow,  implies  that  he  did  not  expect
everyone in his potential audience to appreciate the satirical implications of the
earlier passage, or indeed the inconsistency of describing Clovis as a king who
did not indulge in civil war with his fellow Franks. There is a sense that Gregory
is playing two moral games with Clovis: one that overtly accepts and endorses
violence  as  innate  to  his  virtue,  and  a  more  subtle  one  that  questions  and
undermines this connection. This may be reflective of the  tensions entailed in
writing  for  a  morally  heterogeneous  audience  with  varying  opinions  both  of
violence and of the Frankish royal family.
constrained in his criticism of Brunhild. See Dailey (2015), p. 119-126. The reliability of this
evidence is, however, questionable, given the political and moral agendas of the later sources
– see Nelson, J. L. “Queens as Jezebels: the career of Brunhild and Balthild in Merovingian 
History”, in J. Nelson (ed.), Politics and Ritual in Early Medieval Europe (London, 1986), p.
27-31. For a full list of sources for Brunhild, see McRobbie (2012), p. 131-2
620 “Verum quia mater eius Brunichildis me minatur interimere, sed nihil mihi ex hoc formidinis 
est. Dominus enim, qui me eripuit de manibus inimicorum meorum, et de huius insidiis 
liberavit me”. A similar personal conflict between Brunhild and Fredegund is also 
mentioned, but only fleshed out on Fredegund’s part.
621 Histories IX.19
622 Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History V.Intro; cf. Halsall (2007), p. 316; Goffart (1988), p. 168-9
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    It seems, then, that Gregory to some extent felt the constraints of the political
environment in which he wrote, resulting in a certain degree of understatement
and reticence regarding powerful figures about whom he must certainly have had
extensive knowledge. His handling of the local politics of his own Tours diocese
tends  to  confirm  this  impression.  In  Gregory’s  time  as  bishop,  Tours  had
probably three counts – Leudast, who held power until 580, Eunomius, who took
over by order of Chilperic and therefore was probably replaced not long after
584, and a probable third count who would have been in power at the time the
Histories were being completed. The first of these figures, a low-born man who
was  long  dead  by  the  time  of  the  Histories’ completion,  is  by  far  the  most
thoroughly treated, in terms of his background, personality and conduct in and
out of office. The second, probably of better family and certainly of more recent
providence,  is  given  only  momentary  attention,  primarily  to  document  his
involvement  in  the  murder  of  a  Jewish  merchant.  The  anonymous  third  is
conspicuous by his total absence from the narrative as a personality, remaining
unnamed  despite  the  fact  that  occasion  arises  to  identify  him,  again  under
dubious circumstances. In all, the politics of Tours is studiously avoided after the
early 580s, at which time Gregory was nearly deprived of his bishopric amid
accusations  of  disloyalty.  And given  the  apparent  constraints  associated  with
royal  politics,  we  may  wonder  whether  this  correlation  between  Gregory’s
willingness to calumniate his local counts and their ability to seek reprisals can
be regarded as mere coincidence.623
    Political pressures may, then, have affected Gregory’s editorial choices, but
they  were  not  the  only  factor  that  could  induce  him to remain  silent  on  the
subject of violence. On a dozen occasions in the Histories we are presented with
vague  allusions  to  extensive  records  of  vice  or  virtue,  upon  which  Gregory
frustratingly declines to elaborate.624 The Count of the Stables, Pelagius, provides
a typical example: “He was responsible for endless robberies, attacks, assaults,
woundings, and crimes of all sorts, on land and down the rivers”, Gregory tells
623 For Eunomius and his aptly named deputy, Injuriosus, Histories VII.23. Animodius, the 
deputy of the probable third count, is said to have aided in the escape of Chuppa after his 
plundering of the Tours region, but the name of the count is not reported – Histories X.5
624 Histories V.5; V.49; VI.8; VI.20; VII.13; VII.22; VIII.30 (Guntram’s army); VIII.32; VIII.40;
IX.12; X.8.
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us, but we must be satisfied with the couple of incidents that touched the bishop
personally  and  illustrated  God’s  vengeance.625 The  typical  reasons  given  by
Gregory for these failures to elaborate is lack of space, and fear of going beyond
what is decent, the latter reasoning being deployed most frequently in the cases
of the several bishops who Gregory accuses of undefined excesses.626 It might be
tempting to regard this kind of generalized condemnation as a mere convention
designed to  further  damn a  person to  whom Gregory  was  clearly  personally
hostile – and in some cases this seems likely627 – but a number of other moments
in the Histories imply that automatic dismissal of these generalizations would be
unfair. 
    First, Gregory does not merely employ this device of omission in condemning
sinners, but also on several occasions in praising the good. “I have heard many
other good reports  about Chrodin”,  Gregory tells  us, “but I have no space to
report them here.”628 Second, and more importantly, the subtext of some of what
Gregory  reports  implies  that  he  does  not  assiduously  document  even serious
collective incidents of violence. In the course of documenting Guntram’s much-
celebrated  visit  to  Orleans  in  585,  Gregory  informs  us  that  the  king  was
approached by the Jews of the city, who hoped “that their synagogue, which had
been destroyed some time ago by the Christians, should be rebuilt with public
funds.”629 Were it not for this petition, which was made almost under the eyes of
Gregory  himself,  it  is  quite  clear  that  we  would  have  heard  nothing  of  the
destruction of this synagogue, which is not mentioned anywhere else. The same
logic applies  to the destruction of the synagogue of Clermont,  which is  only
offered to us in the course of explaining how the local Jews were converted to
Christianity.630 The mere destruction of a synagogue by an angry mob, it seems,
was not sufficiently interesting to be worthy of mention without the addition of
the royal, saintly or personal elements that characterise the Histories, leaving the
625 Histories VIII.40
626 Histories V.5; VIII.39.
627 As in the miraculous story of the anonymous perjurer forced to tell the truth by the power of 
St Martin – Histories VIII.16




reader to wonder how many such incidents eluded Gregory’s pen for lack of
personal, political and moral resonance.
    Given that fairly spectacular and local incidents of violence are apt to escape
Gregory’s attentions, we should not be surprised if he generally ignores mundane
personal  acts  beneath  the  level  of  politically  consequential  and  morally
instructive murders. The overwhelming majority of non-lethal assaults reported
in  the  Histories are  committed  against  bishops and priests,  who were  surely
better protected than ordinary laymen by the power of the Church. Most of those,
and all of the non-ecclesiastical assaults mentioned in the Histories, occur in the
context of political intrigues, murders and miraculous deaths. And apart from the
uniquely  politically  significant  and  morally  convenient  case  of  duke  Amalo,
individual  instances  of  rape  are  entirely  unrepresented. The  same  silence
surrounds  marital  violence  and  that  between parents  and children,  with  each
being  mentioned  on  only  one  occasion.  Such  non-lethal  events  were  too
scandalous or too ordinary to figure among Gregory’s concerns,631 but the fact
that they are considerably more frequent than the severe violence preferred by
Gregory in almost every statistically measured society on earth should alert us to
the possibility that the Histories badly under-represents such behaviour.632 Thus
Gregory  may  have  been  sensationally  emphasising  politically  and  morally
spectacular moments of violence, but just as he obscured the ordinary business of
non-violent  daily  existence,  he  effaced  the  mundane  and  inconsequential
incidents of violence that lay beyond his dramatic scenarios.
                   
                              *                                          *                                        *
    The overall picture that emerges of the Histories’ approach to violence is one
driven  by  a  shifting  mixture  of  motives,  ranging  from the  highest  Christian
morality to political  commentary and more mundane personal interest,  which
frequently  overlap.  His  attitude  to  violence  is  frequently  hostile  but  varies
631 This question will be addressed in the next section.
632   The sole exception being the Gebusi of Papua New Guinea (Knauft 1987), although even 
here the evidence is questionable. See Chapter 1, p. 37
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according to context, and his work seems suited to consumption by an audience
whose literary sophistication and morality varied widely. Goffart is surely right
in crediting Gregory with a considerable flair for satire, but if that satire often
escaped the notice of several learned historians of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, it almost certainly went entirely over the heads of some contemporary
readers, particularly those whose stock-in-trade was exactly the kind of violence
to which the  Histories frequently register such carefully understated antipathy.
Importantly  for  present  purposes,  Gregory’s  criteria  for  selection of violence,
although not as narrowly didactic as Goffart proposes, was still quite strict, and
anything that fell outside of those criteria was liable not to be included. Thus,
while we cannot consider the Histories to be a reliable guide to the ordinary tone
of  social  life,  we  equally  cannot  assume  that  they  consistently  exaggerated
violence  and disorder,  and must  also  give  attention  to  the  many gaps  in  his
account.
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Chapter 6: Violence and Violent Individuals in the  Histories
    So far the Histories have been analysed primarily in terms of literary style and
authorial agendas, arguing against the negative case that the violence reported by
Gregory of Tours can be dismissed as a literary device deployed for moral effect.
As  we have  seen,  the  purposes  served  by Gregory’s  reports  of  violence  are
variable  and  often  multi-faceted,  with  personal  and  political  elements  mixed
seamlessly with Christian morality, cautionary tales, and satire. There are signs
of ambiguity in Gregory’s attitude to violence,  which is  sometimes endorsed,
even if its executors are not. And while Gregory often emphasised violence, and
selected  the  most  egregious  examples  for  moral  and dramatic  effect,  he  also
sometimes  effaced  it  for  political  or  ecclesiastical  reasons  or  ignored  it  as
unworthy of  his  attention.  The overall  impression was of  a  text  with a  clear
tendency  to  Christian  moralizing,  but  also  with  a  number  of  other  narrative
tendencies which sometimes conflicted with one another. 
    There  remains  the  question  of  what  can  be  positively  gleaned  about
contemporary violence and warrior  culture from the information provided by
Gregory of Tours. We have come full circle from the opening chapter, in which
an incident related by Gregory was used to open a discussion of the multi-variant
causation  of  violence.633 And  –  having  considered  some  of  the  most  salient
factors in the origins and mores of the military elites of the Frankish kingdoms,
through the late-Roman evidence and the Lex Salica – it is now possible to bring
our modified perspective on the causes and consequences of violence to bear on
the uniquely detailed narrative evidence of the  Histories.  But first it  is worth
briefly  recapitulating  the  conclusions  that  will  underlie  our  analysis  of  that
evidence.
    The world of violence that emerges from the Histories will be very different
from the psychologically simple and physiologically bland one interrogated by
historians who have taken on the task – in one form or other – to date. 634 Our
633 Introduction, p. 6-7
634 See Chapter 1, p. 22-28
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earlier discussion of violence revealed its deep and lasting impact on the mental
states  and  physiologies  of  witnesses  and  participants.  Importantly,  it  was
established  that  these  physiological  and  psychological  effects  are  both  a
consequence and a cause of violence. Far from eliminating cultural factors, these
observations  brought  into relief  the vital  role  played by culture in  subjective
interpretations of experiences of violence and its role in social relations, which
exert  a  profound  effect  on  the  behavioural  consequences  of  experiencing
violence.635 These findings promise to fundamentally alter our interpretation of
sources like the Histories, which provide us with relatively detailed accounts of
incidents of violence and the individuals involved in them. Where previously,
informed by cultural theory and the Clausewitzian dictum, “war is politics by
other means”, historians tended to view the robberies, assaults and killings in
normative and strategic terms, Chapter 1 brought into relief much more sharply
such factors  as  trauma,  learned aggression,  desensitization,  hostile  attribution
biases, ‘learned’ enjoyment of violence, and the interplay of these factors with
cultural mores and social practices. Without blithely seeking to ascribe all the
violence described by Gregory to such factors, we can for the first time treat
them  as  intrinsic to  the  phenomenon,  and  view  the  Histories  as  a  uniquely
valuable source of evidence for the interaction of contemporary norms and socio-
economic forces with the psychological and physiological aspects of violence.
    This  revised  field  of  fundamental  assumptions  about  the  causes  and
consequences of violence has already profoundly affected our interpretation of
the late-imperial origins of the Frankish kingdoms, and their laws. The argument
was made that the late-Roman army around the northern frontiers was already
moving away from reliance on professional training and camp discipline to a
system  that  delegated  the  creation  of  military  preparedness  to  local  and
‘barbarian’ groups, when the region was taken over by a Frankish elite for whom
military and ordinary social life were even less effectively partitioned.636 It was
proposed that the Salian Laws, interpreted from this perspective, constructed a
configuration  of  numerical  equivalences  between  all  kinds  of  offences  that
systematically encouraged the use of violence in settling scores, and gave the
635 Chapter 1, p. 28-37
636 See Chapter 2-3.
172
wealthy and powerful considerable freedom and even incentives to use violence
against  the  social  and  economic  inferiors,  making  relative  impunity  and
vulnerability to violence an important index of social status.637 
    From the outset, however, the conceptual difficulty of viewing the Histories
through the lens of modern research into violence must be acknowledged. The
conceptual categories for describing the causes and consequences of violence
which were available to Gregory are not those of the modern social sciences, and
as  a  result  his  appreciation  of  such  concepts  as  psychological  trauma  or
behavioural conditioning – for which direct equivalents do not exist in his Latin
vocabulary – is necessarily indirect.638 Indeed, Gregory is not concerned with
violence as  a  concept  that  spans the various acts  from murder  to  petty,  non-
injurious assaults in the way that modern researchers are, for the simple reason
that no such concept existed in his time. Nevertheless, a central argument of the
first chapter was that modern research into violence identifies physiologically
real  consequences  in  the  psychological  and  behavioural  trajectories  of  all
humans  and  indeed  many  other  animals,  which  exist  whether  or  not  such
concepts are fully intellectually appreciated.639 But this does not mean that we
should simply attempt to crudely super-impose our modern categories onto such
conceptually unsympathetic material as the Histories. If anything, our attempt to
deduce  a  more  theoretically  informed  picture  of  the  violence  portrayed  by
Gregory  will  be  enhanced  by  properly  appreciating  his  categories  and  their
practical and moral connotations. And coming to grips with Gregory’s culturally
informed conceptual schema does not preclude the possibility of considering his
evidence through the lens of modern research.  By comparing and contrasting
Gregory’s categorizations of violent acts, the moral judgement that he ascribes to
them, and the behavioural assumptions associated with those judgements, with
modern analyses of comparable behaviour,  we stand to learn much about the
differences between his society and our own.
637 Chapter 4.
638 This is not to say that Gregory had no appreciation of these concepts. See below, p. 213-214
639 Chapter 1.
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    Therefore it will be necessary to consider the information presented to us in
the  Histories on two levels,  so to  speak:  an ‘internal’ level  that  looks at  the
incidents  and  characters  in  question  through  the  language  of  Gregory  –  a
language which would have been more familiar to contemporaries and carries
vital information about their concepts and values, and those of the author; and an
‘external’ level that reinterprets those incidents and characters through the lens of
modern terminology, considering their social and psychological implications in
terms of social learning, behavioural conditioning, desensitization etc in light of
the values and concepts presented in the Salian Laws and the Histories.
    A first  and  preliminary  section  will  comprise  a  brief  discussion  of  the
frequency  and  severity  of  the  most  serious  and  frequently  studied  forms  of
violence – warfare and the killings of major political figures – suggested by the
Histories, as well as the degree of political disorder and fluidity that could create
the conditions for violence. It will be argued that the period was one of political
disorder, in which rural territory was frequently devastated by technologically
and logistically unsophisticated armies. And in which the greater military and
social  elites  to  whom Gregory  pays  attention  were  personally  proficient  and
involved in  violence,  and  were  consequently  frequently  exposed  to  its  most
lethal consequences.
    The second section will comprise a ‘internal’-level analysis of the Histories’
language, reviewing the terms deployed by Gregory to describe what we define
as  “violence”  and  “warriors”,  and  the  concepts  and  value-judgements  that
underlie them. Special attention will be paid to the contexts in which these terms
arise,  which  can  tell  us  much  about  Gregory’s  attitude  to  violence  and  its
perpetrators, as well as the sometimes discernibly different attitudes and habits of
his contemporaries. And these observations will be linked to an ‘external’-level
analysis which argues that the vagueness of Gregory’s terminology is indicative
of a culture pervaded by violence-linked concepts that suggest that small-scale
physical abuse and fighting was not just conventional but also integral to the
negotiation and maintenance of the social order, and vital to the inculcation of
practical  and  psychological  attributes  that  made  men  willing  and  able  to
participate in battle.
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    A third and final section will elaborate on this discussion, focusing on the
martial  and  retributive  values  that  promoted  violence  among  Gregory’s
contemporaries, and further evidence of elite impunity and hierarchical violence.
At the ‘internal’ level, the the careers of some of the better-documented violent
individuals  in  the  Histories,  as  well  as  Gregory’s  opinion  of  them,  will  be
evaluated in detail. And at the ‘external’ level, it will be argued that such socially
legitimate and necessary violence generated aggressive and volatile behavioural
profiles  among the elite,  which led to  ill-considered and pathological  acts  of
violence that understandably attracted Gregory’s moral concern. There is good
reason, in fact, to view such acts as indicative of what modern researchers would
describe as “maladaptive aggression”, “hostile attribution bias”,  “violent self-
image” etc among Gregory’s milieu, which are predictable outcomes of frequent
exposure to violence. In other words, it will be argued that the Histories provides
considerable and hitherto un-recognized evidence for what we would describe as
behavioural  conditioning  and  even  trauma  among  Gregory’s  contemporaries,
implying that the violence he described is the visible tip of an iceberg of physical
abuse and psychological adaptation experienced by his protagonists.
6.1 – Evidence for Violence and Disorder in the  Histories
    There is  a  wide range of  opinion on the extent  of violence and disorder
implied by the Histories. At one end, broadly, stand historians like Walter Pohl
and Wolf Liebeschuetz, who follow earlier historians like Marc Bloch in viewing
the conduct detailed by Gregory as indicative of a society where violence was
relatively frequent and ordinary.640 At the other are those, like Walter Goffart and
Guy  Halsall,  who  regard  the  Histories as  fundamentally  unreliable  on  this
subject, and the differences in contexts and agendas between Gregory and his
late-Roman predecessors to be too profound to extract any meaningful sense of
640 Wood, I. The modern origins of the early middle ages (Oxford 2013), p. 241-2, citing Bloch, 
M. “La societe du Haut Moyen Age et ses origines” (1926); Pohl (2006); Leibeschuetz 
(2006); Sarti (2013); cf. James, E. “The militarization of Roman society, 400-700”, in A. N. 
Jorgensen & B. L. Clausen (eds.), Military aspects of Scandinavian society in a European 
perspective AD 1-1300, (Kopenhagen 1997), p. 19-24.
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the relative violence of  the era.641 Arguments  against  the utility  of Gregory’s
work for comprehending contemporary violence have already been addressed,
but the question of difference between the Histories and earlier and later sources,
which together we might hope would give us some sense of direction of change,
is more insoluble. The differences between these other sources and the Histories
with  respect  to  violence  have  been  thoroughly  discussed,  and  need  not  be
recapitulated again here; suffice to say that with respect to warfare, comparing
the Histories to Ammianus, Hydatius, Fredegar or the Royal Frankish Annals is a
line of investigation that raises many questions and provides no solid answers.642
For our purposes, an even more profound problem with these other sources is
that they simply do not descend to the level of non-royal, small-scale conflict in
the  way  that  Gregory  does.  Therefore  we  must  accept  the  impossibility  of
establishing any firm quantitative sense of changes in social violence between
the late empire and Gregory’s time.
    This fact does not, however, stand in the way of a sustained analysis of the
information provided by Gregory to generate a sense of the extent of violence
and disorder in contemporary society. And we certainly cannot lightly aver, as
some historians have done, that the extent of violence may not be particularly
important to an overall analysis of the Frankish kingdoms or their warriors, or be
content with the untenable assumption that sixth-century Gaul was not more or
less violent than any other society.643 On the contrary, our discussion of violence
demands  that  we  treat  a  warrior  culture  and  the  lived  experience  of  its
participants as intimately linked, so that every effort must be made to understand
how they interrelate even if detailed and reliable data is unavailable. As a matter
of necessity, most of our analysis will concern the language of Gregory and – at
one degree of inference – that of the warrior culture to which he alludes. But it is
necessary to recognize that a culture that from one perspective might be viewed
as linguistically obsessed by violence – such as our own – can in fact reflect a
641 Goffart (2008); Fouracre (1998); Halsall (1998), p. 4; cf. Fouracre, P. “‘Placita’ and the 
settlement of disputes in later Merovingian Francia”, (1986), p. 38. Other historians do not 
explicitly comment on the question of extent of violence – See for instance, Wood (2006).
642 Fouracre (1998), p. 68-71
643 Halsall (1998), p. 4, explicitly states this position. The assumption underlies much of the 
work done by the low-violence school. cf. Liebeschuetz 2006, p. 38, citing Fouracre 1998, p.
60-61.
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society  in  which  violence  is  strictly  circumscribed  and  does  not  form  a
substantial aspect of the life experience of most people.644 In short, a relatively
non-violent  society  may  describe  itself  with  the  language  of  violence,  and
therefore the language of violence in and of itself does not necessarily tell us
very much about the broader place of violence in culture. To understand that, we
must take an interest in practical physical realities as well as the language used to
define them, even in the face of admittedly difficult evidence. And in fact, the
Histories do provide some instructive information that helps to build a tentative
picture of the extent of violence among the Frankish elites, and the weakness of
the institutional mechanisms that might have prevented it. This information is a
valuable complement to the cultural evidence, helping to contextualise it in the
practical exigencies of military and social life.
    Warfare constitutes a central theme of the Histories, being more extensively
accounted for than any other phenomenon, but even on this subject Gregory’s
coverage is partial and locally oriented, especially with respect to the levying of
forces and the depredations inflicted by armies. Nonetheless, for the Tours region
at  least,  we  are  well-provided  with  information,  which  illustrates  the
considerable exposure of the region both to military destruction and recruitment.
The forces of Tours, or a part thereof, were called to arms on behalf of Frankish
kings and their servants on ten occasions in the sixteen odd years (c.576-591)
covered  in  Books  V  to  X  in  the  Histories,  splitting  their  activities  equally
between internal and external campaigns.645 How general the call to arms was is
unclear,  but  in  some  instances,  as  when  Chilperic  orders  the  ‘pauperes’ and
‘iuniores’ of Tours cathedral to be punished for not joining his expedition against
Brittany, it is clearly not confined to a narrow professional class or social elite.646
Nonetheless, punishment for non-attendance is only mentioned occasionally, and
the  concepts  of  camp training  and regular  payment  in  exchange  for  military
service are never evoked, implying that the army was mostly self-motivated and
644 cf. Pohl (2006), p. 21
645 External campaigns – Histories V.26; V.29; VIII.30; IX.25; IX.29; X.3. Internal or defensive 
campaigns – VI.12; VI.31; VII.13; VII.24; VII.28; IX.12.
646 Histories, V.26. Although these obscure figures may not have been as lowly as their name 
implies – see below.
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socially prepared for war.647 In one incident, contingents from Poitiers and Tours
within  the  army  fall  into  conflict,  resulting  in  a  mass  desertion  by  the
Tourangeaux, but given the uniqueness of the circumstances it is hard to know
how  indicative  this  was  of  the  weakness  of  military  organization  and
discipline.648 Whatever  the  case,  the  clear  implication  is  that  in  this  period,
military service was a frequent and normative feature of elite social life.649
    In the same sixteen year period, the Tours region suffered the depredations of
visiting armies, half of which may be loosely described as non-hostile or friendly
forces,  on  at  least  another  ten  occasions.650 Beyond  such  basic  observations,
however,  there  is  much  uncertainty,  since  Gregory  is  not  much  disposed  to
estimating the size or impact of armies except in the vaguest terms; on some
occasions  he  offers  us  little  more  than  the  vague  accusation  that  the  army
committed “multa scelera”.651 As a result there is a tendency to concertina what
must  have been incidents  of  widely varying severity  into  an  indistinct  mass,
raising the question of whether his accounts of the activities of non-hostile forces
in particular  are  dramatically  over-sold.  While  we are not  provided with any
clear  demarcations  between  the  activities  of  hostile  and  non-hostile  armies,
Gregory does offer some indirect evidence in accounting for the depredations of
Desiderius and Bladast’s forces, who he accuses as behaving “just as if they were
in enemy territory”.652 Such an accusation, we are given to understand, consisted
in the fact that the army “set fire to everything, stole everything that they could
lay their hands on, and murdered the inhabitants out of hand… [and] captured
those who they did not kill”.653 When we compare this description to the other
647 Punishments mentioned at V.26, VI.31
648 Histories VII.13
649 This point is broadly agreed even among several historians who do not see the period as 
particularly violent – For instance, Halsall (1998), p. 30; Wickham, C. Framing the Middle 
Ages: Europe and the Mediterranean, 400-800 (Oxford 2005), p. 177-8
650 This was not a regular pattern: most of the incidents are concentrated in the period 576-585, 
before a five-year quiet period that comes to an end in the foreign campaigns of 590. For 
attacks by hostile forces – Histories V.1; V.4; V.14; VI.12; VII.12. For depredations by 
ostensibly non-hostile forces – V.2; VI.31; VI.45; VII.21; VII.24; X.9 and possibly at X.3. 
Whether the plundering of Riginth’s baggage train, moving from Paris to Toulouse (VI.45), 
affected the Tours region is open to question.
651 e.g. Histories V.1
652 “...sicut solet contra inimicos...” - Histories VI.31. Similar language is used in describing the 
actions of Childebert’s forces in the Metz region on the way to attack Italy in c.590.
653 “incendia, praedas et homicidia tanta fecerunt... nam et captivus adduxerunt, de quibus 
spoliatus plurimus postea demiserunt.” Ibid. On the descriptive terms used here see below.
178
accounts of ostensibly non-hostile armies, we find that accusations of robbery,
the  theft  of  animals  and  destruction  of  property  are  common  to  most  such
incidents.654 But arson, murder and the abduction of locals are not such familiar
tropes, generally arising only in the context of deliberate raids by hostile forces,
raising the implication that it was these practices that were seen to distinguish
hostile from non-hostile forces in the eyes of contemporaries.655
    Nevertheless, Gregory’s deployment of similar terminology to describe the
activities of hostile and ostensibly non-hostile armies, and the suggestion that
they sometimes behaved identically, should not be lightly dismissed. As we have
seen, Gregory did not reject the concept of war absolutely, specifically asserting
the  virtue  of  attacks  against  foreign  enemies,656 but  his  theoretical  optimism
about  external  campaigns  is  contradicted  by  his  specific  reports  of  those
adventures,  as  armies  returning  from  expeditions  in  Italy,  Brittany  and
Septimania are accused of the same excesses as those engaged in civil war within
Frankish territory.657 Therefore it appears that the pessimistic impression of the
conduct of armies given out by the  Histories is more a product of experience
than of ideological agendas, and should be taken seriously. There is a general
sense  that  supply  lines  for  the  Frankish  armies,  if  they  existed  at  all,  were
inadequate,  forcing  them  to  rely  on  local  populations  for  their  sustenance.
Almost every mention of the progress of armies is marked by the expropriation
and plundering,658 the question being not whether the local population will be
looted, but how many other violent excesses the process will entail.  On more
than one occasion specific chronic breaches of discipline, leading to threats or
punishments against dukes or counts, are referred to in royal armies.659 Frankish
forces also proved repeatedly unable to overwhelm or otherwise capture fortified
towns  on their  foreign  adventures  in  particular,  implying  that  they  were  not
repositories  of  technical  expertise  comparable  to  the  armies  of  the  Roman
654 For instance, Histories VII.12; VII.21; X.9
655 Histories IX.7, IX.25 for abduction and enslavement by foreign armies.
656 Histories V.Intro.
657 Histories VIII.30; IX.9
658 Which are not conceptually distinguished – see below, p. 193-195
659 Histories VI.31; VIII.30
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Empire.660 All  this  chimes  with  the  impression  established earlier  of  the  late
Roman armies,  and their  barbarian elements  in  particular,  as  more reliant  on
social  culture,  less  on  organization,  training  and  camp  discipline,  for  their
military effectiveness.
    How representative the extensive military experience of the Touraine – for
which  Gregory  was  best  provided  with  information  –  was  of  the  Frankish
kingdoms  in  general  is  open  to  question.  Attacks  on  the  Tours  region  are
evidently inordinately well-documented  in  the  Histories,  and there is  internal
evidence that this is not merely a result of the region being uniquely put-upon in
the period: Gregory tells us how Saint Salvius redeemed many inhabitants of the
Albi region who had been taken hostage by Duke Desiderius, but in his account
of the campaign to which this passage is linked, it is the Touriane rather than the
Albi region which is singled out as being victimized by Desiderius’s forces.661
Thus little can be said with confidence about how exposed the Touraine was
relative to other areas, short of the basic geographical observation that Tours’
centrality insulated it from non-Frankish raids from the Bretons or Goths, but
also made it a focal point of the Franks’ frequent civil wars. Tours might have
been among the most frequently vicitmized regions in the kingdoms, but we have
reason  to  suspect  that  its  experience  was  more  typical  than  its  inordinate
coverage in the Histories suggests, and that the frontier regions of the south, west
and north were more completely devastated by the foreign armies by which they
were assailed.662
    The image of frequent military destruction, often resulting from inadequate
supply  lines  and  indiscipline,  is  complemented  by  the  Histories’ reports  of
violence and social disorder emerging in the context of changes of leadership or
moments  of  uncertain  authority,  most  spectacularly  after  king  Chilperic’s
assassination  in  484.663 Gregory  informs  us  that  during  the  subsequent
660 For abortive attempts to capture fortified cities, see Histories VIII.30. X.3. The same is 
implied, though not explicitly stated, of Childebert’s other attacks on Italy – Histories IX.25. 
The siege of Comminges, which in any case was ended by the surrender of the besieged 
army, is a rare exception.
661 Histories VII.1; probably referring to the aftermath of the campaign referred to at VI.31.
662 e.g. at Histories IX.7, 18, 25
663 Histories VII.15, 19; Wood (1994), p. 91; cf. Van Dam, R. “Merovingian Gaul and the 
Frankish conquests”, in Fouracre (ed.) (2007), p. 220-221
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interregnum, the local cities of Orleans and Blois fell  into fighting with their
neighbour, Chateaudun, in a conflict characterized by looting, arson, assaults, but
not apparently by the abduction of people or the degree of killing associated with
many  larger-scale  campaigns.664 Atypically,  no  explicit  explanations  for  this
conflict are provided by Gregory, but it seems clear that it occurred against the
will of the local counts, raising the prospect that local armies could mobilize
themselves  without  the  intervention  of  their  appointed  commanders.  Nothing
comparable  to  this  incident  is  to  be  found in  any of  the  subsequent  sources
covering Frankish warfare, and it seems safe to assume that word of this event
would not  have reached our ears had it  not taken place down the road from
Gregory’s own see. But the incident presents the possibility that other such local
wars, perhaps of considerable historical consequence, may have been deemed
too insignificant to be included in the Histories.665
    The  death  or  replacement  of  local  power-holders,  particularly  dukes  and
bishops,  was potentially the occasion for similar outbursts  on a more modest
scale, and even a temporary lapse in authority could result in looting and other
local violence.666 On several occasions, Gregory reports royal appointees being
forced to  reckon with  local  groups,  whose  hostility  is  sometimes  capable  of
effectively reversing appointments by force.667 One of Gregory’s rare detailed
forays into social conflict below the level of regional authority figures implies
that this could be true yet further down the political scale: the rumoured death of
Sichar  after  his  attack  on  Austrechild’s  relatives  led  to  reprisals  against  his
664 Histories, VII.2; cf. Ausenda, G. “Current issues and future directions in the study of the 
Merovingian period”, in Wood, I. (ed.), Franks and Alamanni in the Merovingian Period: An
Ethnographic Perspective (Woodbridge 1998), p. 392 (Loseby’s comment)
665 See Halsall’s comment in Ausenda (1998), p. 393. This will be taken up below.
666 For instance, Histories VI.7, 11, 38. See Geary (1988), p. 133, specifically in relation to the 
consequences of the capture of bishop Theodore of Marseille by Dynamius. The Council of 
Orleans (533, c.6) sought to address the problem of the looting of church possessions after a 
bishop’s death by commanding that a descriptio of all church possessions should be made at 
such times; further measures against such looting in the early seventh century imply that the 
problem was intractable – see Halfond, G. I. Archaeology of Frankish Church Councils, A.D.
511-768 (Leiden 2010), p. 119-120. MGH Concilia I (1893), p. 62. 
667 Histories VIII.18; VIII.42. In a similar vein, the eviction of Bishop Quintianus from Rodez 
and his subsequent struggle to control the bishopric of Clermont in the face of local hostility 
are mentioned in Lives of the Fathers IV.1
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ostensibly  unprotected  estates.668 Former  office-holders,  like  Leudast  and
Chuppa, one-time count of Chilperic’s stables, were also apparently capable of
remaining  influential,  and  maintaining  independent  armed  forces,  after  their
official  relegation  to  private  life.669 In  a  particularly  interesting  incident,
Childeric the Saxon, exiled from Guntram’s lands, crosses into the realm of his
nephew Childebert,  and  is  immediately  made  a  duke  by  his  new lord,  with
authority over a vast swathe of territory.670
    A move such as Childeric’s would be inconceivable if he did not bring with
him into the service of his new lord many of the men by whom he had performed
his duties as duke under Guntram. The impression is of an unstable and fluid
political context, in which the functioning of ostensibly public power was based
upon the private capacities for violence among the personal retinues of a king’s
elite  subjects.671 And  this  impression  is  reinforced  by  the  frequent  incidental
references in the Histories to elite figures moving between regions and switching
their loyalties between rulers. In relating how Siggo, keeper of Chilperic’s privy
seal, defected to the young Childebert in 575, Gregory informs us in passing that
“quite a few of those who had emigrated from Sigibert’s kingdom and joined
Chilperic abandoned this latter king.”672 The original defections are not deemed
worthy of note in and of themselves, implying that this was a quite ordinary and
predictable process associated with the deaths of kings, and many signs of such
activity are provided elsewhere. On over twenty occasions in the second half of
the  Histories we  hear  of  men  wandering  between  kingdoms,  either  for
opportunity  or  to  avoid  the  wrath  of  their  sovereign.673 And such  wandering
exiles, sometimes with their own retinues, could themselves become a source of
disorder and violence in the lands to which they moved.674 Indeed, the written
pact  of  c.589 between Guntram and Childebert,  recorded in  full  by Gregory,
668 Histories VII.47. In a similar (if much less violent) vein, the Lives of the Fathers (XIII.2) 
documents the disorderly scramble for the effects of the recently deceased St Lupicinus by 
his devotees.
669 Histories V.49; X.5
670 Histories VIII.18, 42
671 See Irsigler, F. “On the aristocratic character of early Frankish society”, in Reuter, T. (ed.), 
The Medieval Nobility (Amsterdam 1978), p. 106-124
672 Histories V.3
673 For instance, after Chilperic’s death, duke Beppolen enters the service of Guntram and is 
immediately appointed to govern several cities. (Histories VIII.42). See also, V.25, V.27, 
V.28, V.29, V.38, V.48-9, VI.45, VII.4, VII.32, VIII.44, X.9
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made a point  of  prohibiting  similar  switches  of  loyalty  by the  leudes of  the
respective kings, suggesting that this was a widely recognized problem.675 Such
incidents suggest a political world in which the ‘machinery of government’, such
as it  was,  struggled to operate  independently of  the private  forces  who were
supposed to serve it, and the personal power of the individual leader – in terms
of followers, charisma and physical vigour – was essential in holding together
their territorial and legal domains. 
    These sudden moves and appointments to  high office,  over  the heads  of
potential local candidates, would have been extraordinarily unlikely unless the
men in question brought with them large and formidable private retinues.676 But
the elite figures portrayed in the Histories were also personally disposed to enter
the fray, becoming active participants in, and victims of, contemporary violence.
We should be careful not to exaggerate the evidence provided by Gregory of
Tours for personal violence among the political elites of Francia, since (as we
have seen) he shared with all narrative sources of the era a tendency to collapse
groups into the person of their leader. When we hear, for instance, how Vedast, or
Childeric the Saxon, or Chilperic’s one-time treasurer Eberulf, were committing
many crimes in the region of Tours,677 it is probably safe to assume that other
members of the groups which they respectively led were personally responsible
for most of these offences. Even in the famous brawl between the men of Sichar
and Austregisel,  there  can  be  no certainty  as  to  the  degree  of  their  personal
involvement.678 Nonetheless,  there  are  enough detailed  accounts  to  show that
such men took a personal hand in the perpetration of violence, military and non-
military:679 Former  duke  Guntram Boso  kills  his  pursuer,  duke  Dragolen,  in
apparent  single  combat;  duke  Ursio  personally  cuts  down  several  attackers
before being brought low by fatigue; the royal leude Claudius personally sees to
674 Histories V.5 for the killer of Gregory’s brother, who goes on to kill another man in exile. 
See also V.28-9 for the troublesome retirement of Leudast to the Bourges region.
675 Given the lack of comparable agreements from the period or testimony as to the impact of 
this one in practice, we have no way of knowing whether this represented a new and/or 
effective effort to prevent such changes of loyalty or the mere repetition of a familiar plaintiff
trope. Histories, IX.20
676 This tendency was already evident in the late Roman Empire, see Chapter 2. For further 
discussion of these retinues, see below.
677 Histories VII.3, VIII.18, VII.21-2
678 Histories VII.47
679 For instance, Histories V.36; V.49; VI.14; VII.22; VII.29; VII.38; IX.12. See below.
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the assassination of the former duke Eberulf, who proves quite able to defend
himself.680 And although Salonius and Sagittarius, the fighting bishops, look like
the exception that proves the general rule restraining the higher clergy from such
activities, the fact that they were able to resist demotion so effectively illustrates
that even for churchmen, demonstrative personal violence could be reconciled
with office-holding.681
    All these incidents imply an upper elite with considerable personal experience
and expertise  not only of command, but also of combat.  And the impression
given  by these  many  apocryphal  examples  is  reinforced  by the  considerable
attrition rate among the upper elite implied by the Histories. The deaths of kings
and  their  family  members  may  be  discounted  as  too  meagre  and  singular  a
sample to provide instruction, but the evidence for the most powerful non-royal
figures,  the  dukes,  may be  more  instructive.  In  the  period  575-591,  Gregory
records the violent deaths of no less than nine dukes and former dukes, split
more-or-less  evenly  between those  occasioned in  service  to  royal  power  and
those resulting from rebellion against  it.682 Given that  there were only a  few
dozen  such  figures  at  any  one  time,  this  represents  an  extraordinarily  high
casualty rate, more comparable to that expected in modern theatres of war than
in peacetime even in the most violent present-day societies,683 and of course there
680 Histories, V.25; IX.12; VII.29
681 Histories VIII.39. See below.
682 Histories V.25 (Dragolen); VII.29 (Eberulf); VIII.45 (Desiderius); IX.9 (Rauching); IX.12 
(Ursio and Berthefried); IX.27 (Amalo); X.3 (Olo); X.9 (Beppolen). This does not include 
Dacolen, who died in captivity after being captured (V.25) or the Patrician Mummolus, who 
was not a duke but whose position was seemingly of analogous importance.
683 Accurate estimating the total number of dukes is not possible. The general tenor of Gregory’s
reports, which focus on the central and southern parts of the Frankish kingdoms, shows 
dukes presiding over two or more civitates at a time, implying not more than twenty or thirty 
in total. However, the highest number of dukes mentioned at once in the Histories comes in 
the context of Childebert’s major invasion of Italy, which reportedly involved no less than 
twenty, suggesting that dukes were more densely distributed closer to the Rhine. Nonetheless
the total number of serving dukes was probably not more than about sixty and most likely 
much fewer. (cf. Lewis, A. R. “The dukes in the Regnum Francorum, A.D. 551-751”, in 
Speculum 51:3 (1976), p. 386). On the extremely liberal assumption that 200 men obtained 
the office of duke at some time during the period 575-591, this gives an annualized rate of 
violent death of 264 per 100,000. For comparison, the most violent modern peacetime 
society, Honduras, recorded murder rates of 86 per 100,000 in its worst year, 2011, falling to 
under 50 in 2019. (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/VC.IHR.PSRC.P5?locations=HN). 
The rate of violent deaths in the field for active US army combatants during operation Iraqi 
Freedom (2003-2007) was 335 per 100,000, while the rate of combat deaths in Vietnam was 
much higher, at 1,818 per 100,000. See Goldberg, M.S. “Death and Injury rates of US 
military personnel in Iraq”, in Military Medicine 175, 4:220 (2010)
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is a strong chance that Gregory’s account was incomplete. Bishops, whose deaths
are more assiduously recorded in the Histories, seem to have been considerably
safer, protected as they were by the sanctions of the Church and the sanctuary of
the cathedral. But given Gregory’s tendency to avoid scandalizing the Church, it
is  possible  that  this  difference  is  overstated,  and he admits  to  not  giving  an
exhaustive account of episcopal deaths and successions.684
6.2 – “Violence” and “Warriors” in the  Histories
    The  Histories thus provide considerable evidence for changes of allegiance
and  deaths  among  powerful  figures,  which  can  tell  us  much  about  the
institutional capacity of the kingdoms to prevent outbursts of fighting and social
disorder.  But  although  the  evidence  is  suggestive,  the  limitations  of  such an
exercise are clear given the partiality of Gregory’s coverage, and his relentless
focus  on  the  the  most  spectacular  forms  of  violence  and the  upper  elites  of
contemporary society.  The real value of the  Histories  is more qualitative than
quantitative,  offering  as  it  does  a  window into  the  mind  of  a  participant  in
Frankish political and social life, and with it the promise of seeing something of
the acts and attitudes of his contemporaries – including the warrior classes with
whom we are  centrally  concerned – albeit  ‘through a  glass  darkly’.  And his
terminology – or,  to use Foucaultian language,  his  discourse of violence and
warriors  –  stands  to  reveal  much  about  the  differences  between  modern
conceptions of violence and those of Gregory and his protagonists.
    The nature of the relationship between Gregory’s Latin and the languages and
dialects  spoken  by  his  contemporaries  in  the  warrior  classes  cannot  be
established with any precision.685 That the language used by Gregory was not
identical  to  that  employed  even  by  those  warriors  whose  speech  was
predominantly Latinate, much less that of those who spoke primarily in dialects
684 Histories VIII.39. Gregory’s hagiography makes occasional incidental references to violent 
ecclesiatical deaths: An abbot is slain “by the sword for reasons that remain obscure”, in 
Lives of the Fathers X.2
685 For a good discussion and guide to the inconclusive historiography of this subject, see Hen, 
Y. Culture and Religion in Merovingian Gaul: A.D. 481-751 (Leiden 1995), p. 21-29. He 
argues persuasively that the ‘Vulgarist’ position, which sees Latin as the spoken language of 
the Merovingian heartlands south of the Rhine until the eighth century, is the best supported.
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based on the Germanic language of the early Franks, is to be assumed. But that
his language would have been recognizable to secular contemporaries, the vast
majority  of  whom were descended from the soldiers  and citizens  of  the late
empire, is equally certain. And given the political sensitivities discussed in the
previous section, including Gregory’s overt appeals to the better natures of the
Frankish kings,  we have reason to  believe that his  language was deliberately
calibrated to account for the conceptual and moral sensibilities of contemporary
warrior  culture,  even  if  it  plainly  did  not  blandly  reflect  them.  Contextual
analysis of the terms deployed by Gregory holds out the hope of discovering
some of the instances in which unusual and tendentious uses of language reveal
Gregory’s personal, political and moral agendas.
6.2.1 – “Violence”: interficere, spoliare, adpraehendere, caedere
    The language of the Histories does not communicate any sense of a unitary
concept  of violence,  but  rather divides it  into a  wide array of terms that  fall
broadly  into  a  few  conceptual  categories:  lethal  attacks;  non-lethal  attacks;
robberies; and abductions. In general, killings are reported for their own sake,
and  are  associated  with  elite  political  contexts,  while  non-lethal  violence  is
reported incidentally in the course of other incidents, and is relatively taken for
granted, other than in special cases or in respect of particular people. This basic
hierarchical  distinction  is  obviously  familiar  to  the  modern  mind,  but  the
connotations and interrelations of the various  terms within these categories –
which can be inferred from an analysis of the contexts in which they occur –
present  many  interesting  contrasts  with  the  modern  field  of  terms  and
assumptions.  Most  importantly,  the  terminology  offered  in  the  Histories
frequently fails to distinguish clearly between what we would regard as official
and  unofficial,  legitimate  and  illegitimate,  even  violent  and  non-violent,
contexts, conceptually eliding various acts so as to blur the lines between them.
And the Histories present considerable evidence that these conceptual saliencies
were  not  merely  matters  of  semantics,  but  actually  manifested  themselves
practically in the ways that violence was done in the Frankish kingdoms.
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    The form of violence which most consistently concerns the Histories is killing,
and this is described with a variety of terms, the most frequent of which are (in
descending order) interficio, interimo, intereo, homicidia and their cognates. For
chapter headings, Gregory prefers the apparently formal interitu, and a few other
terms such as  nece and  occidere are employed occasionally.686 Altogether the
physically evocative  inter-stem terms – which conjure images of cutting apart,
making a hole, or ‘un-making’ a person – clearly dominate both Gregory’s own
descriptions and his accounts of reported speech. There are precedents for some
of these terms in the Old Testament, but others, and the particular passive forms
that frequently appear in the Histories do not occur often, or in some cases at all,
in the Vulgate.687 From the perspective of modern nomenclatures of violence, the
striking thing about these terms, which are used interchangeably,688 is the broad
range of  contexts  in  which  they  are  employed,  which  appear  to  straddle  the
modern  definitions  by which  violence  is  partitioned into  morally  and legally
loaded categories.
    At the most morally loaded end of the spectrum of contexts, the “inter-” terms
are frequently used to describe what we would define as ‘murder’. The chapter
describing the slaying of the citizens of Tours Lupus and Ambrosius in their beds
is entitled “De interfectis...”; Duke Dacolen is “interfectus” by Duke Dragolen
after being promised his safety; in reported speech, bishop Praetextatus “fuerit
interemptus...in aeclesia” on the orders of Fredegund; and Domnola, daughter of
bishop Victorius is “interfecta” along with her entourage by an armed gang led
by Bobolen.689 In  reported  speech,  too,  we see  the  term employed to  denote
illigitimate and morally outrageous killing: in a report of written correspondence
between kings, Chilperic states that “pater eius interfectus est”; Guntram accuses
686 Obitus, the other term for death preferred in Gregory’s headings, is also occasionally used in 
referring to deaths resulting from physical assaults (e.g. Histories VI.11), but such instances 
are exceptional. Generally the term refers exclusively deaths from illness and old age, and 
will therefore not be discussed here. For a more detailed treatment of the interitus/obitus 
dichotomy and its probable moral significance, see Heinzelmann 2001, p. 125-143; and 
Shanzer 2002, p. 256-7
687 Interimo and intereo are found nowhere in the Vulgate. Interficio is does appear frequently 
(most often in the book of Kings and Prophets) but the passive singular form interfectus most
often used by Gregory appears just three times.
688 Overtly at Histories V.17; VII.17; VII.47; VIII.5; VIII.18
689 “was killed...in church” Histories VI.13; V.25; VIII.5; IX.20; VIII.32. Lewis Thorpe 
translates all but one of these instances as “murder” (IX.20 is rendered “struck down”).
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Bishop Theodore of having his brother Chilperic “interfeci”.690 As some of these
instances  imply,  these  terms  can  also  carry  a  sense  of  ‘assassination’ and
‘ambush’:  a Saxon force allied to the Franks is  caught by surprise in Breton
territory and “maximam exinde partem interfecit”; the son of duke Beppolen, left
at Rennes to secure his authority, “interemptus est cum multis honoratis viris” at
the hands of the rebellious locals; and Guntram pleads with the people of Paris
not to “interematur” him as they did his brothers.691 And the inter-stems are used
on occasion to express the intention to kill by some of Gregory’s bêtes noires: in
reported speech, Fredegund instructs clerics to “interemere” her enemies; and
Eberulf, taking sanctuary in St Martin’s, promises that Gregory will be “prius
interfectum” if he is forced to come out.692
    These instances convey a sense of terms which, although clearly much broader
in  their  application  than  our  modern  terms  –  ‘murder’,  ‘assassination’  or
‘ambush’ – nonetheless carry a clear set of negative connotations which seem to
make those modern words the more-or-less appropriate translations. But further
uses of these terms in the Histories add more complexity to any attempt to render
them  satisfactorily  and  consistently  into  English, extending  them  more  into
relatively  legitimate  contexts  of  collective  violence  and  military  activity,
including  instances  where  Gregory  implicitly  approves  of  the  killings  in
question.  The  Breton  prince  Theuderic,  for  whom  Gregory  expresses  some
affection,  “interemet”  his  rivals.  Duke  Desiderius  “interfectus  est  cum  his
omnibus” after foolishly straying too close to Carcasonne on campaign. Two of
the  pueri of Chuppa are “interfectis” by locals after he raids the Tours region.
Gregory sermonizes over the sorry fate of the early Franks, who, because of their
disunity, “ab inimicis sunt interempti”.693
    And the range of the inter-stem terms for killing extends still further, into the
realm of  officially  sanctioned executions.  The kings  Guntram and Childebert
consult  together and decide that  Guntram Boso, in respect of his  crimes,  “ut
interficeretur”.  In  reported  speech,  Guntram  scolds  his  indisciplined  forces,
690 Histories VI.31; VIII.5
691 “was killed with many honourable men” - see below. Histories V.26; VIII.42; VII.8
692 Histories VII.22
693 “...they were killed by their enemies”. Histories V.16; VIII.45; X.5; V.Preface.
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warning that it will be an example to the whole army when “unus de prioribus
fuerit interfectus”. And in a dream Gregory warns the king not to cause God to
kill him (“interemere”) by violating the sanctuary of the church.694 Thus the same
words used to express illegitimate and morally repugnant killings – which would
typically be described in modern parlance as ‘murder’ or ‘assassination’– are
also used for those which might be regarded as expected and justified, including
what would today be ordinarily described as ‘execution’. The terms are also used
quite  indiscriminately  for  killings  that  are  spontaneous  or  pre-meditated,  and
without regard to whether they are done to helpless victims or in the context of
fighting.  Occasionally  the  adverb  ‘clam’ (‘secretly’)  is  added  to  intensify  an
“inter-” stem term – most notably in the self-justification of Chramnesind after
his fatal attack on Sichar – but such additions are exceptional.695
    The  morally  vacuous  terminology  of  lethal  violence  generally  used  by
Gregory and his protagonists stands in contrast to his less regular, but still quite
prominent, practice of describing killings as “homicidiis” and their perpetrators
as “homicidas”. These terms are, to all appearances, just as morally loaded as
their biblical and particularly New Testament precedents, which appear in the
context  Christ’s  preaching  against  sinfulness.  Where  Gregory  condemns  his
protagonists  in  absolute  but  vague  terms,  he  invariably  includes  homicidiis
among their crimes, in passages reminiscent of (though not identical to) one from
the book of Matthew696 - “...de corde enim exeunt cogitationes malae homicidia
adulteria fornicationes furta falsa testimonia blasphemiae”.  The abbot Dagulf,
the  bishops  Salonius  and Sagittarius,  Duke Childeric  the  Saxon,  the  sons  of
Waddo and a number of other dead or exiled individuals to whom Gregory was
evidently ill-disposed are accused of undefined  homicidiis in addition to their
other crimes.697 The sacrilegious killings at the tomb of St Radegund during the
dispute among the nuns at Poitiers, are described as homicidia.698 And (possibly
more  controversially),  Gregory  reports  that  armies  in  Frankish  territory,
694 “...one of the leaders were to be killed”. Histories IX.10; VIII.30; VII.22.
695 Histories VI.45; IX.9. Secrecy being a typical aggravating factor in determining the penalties
for killings in Lex Salica (e.g. XLI.2, 4, 6)





including royal  ones,  “homicidia  tanta  fecerunt”  on  several  occasions.699 The
word homicida – “killer” – is also used in condemnatory terms, including in the
reported  speech  of  Gregory’s  contemporaries:  count  Nantinus  describes  the
killers of his uncle, bishop Magnachar, as “homicidas illos”; messengers from
Childebert implore Guntram to hand over the “homicidam” Fredegund; the killer
of Praetextatus is a “crudelis homicida”. In contrast to the “inter-” stem killing
words, we never hear of laudable killings or their perpetrators being described in
terms of “homicidas” or “homicidiis”.700
    The availability of a religiously charged and morally loaded terminology for
describing killing raises the question of why Gregory – who as we have seen was
clearly intent on moral instruction, even if he did not have a consistent moral
agenda – so frequently preferred terms to which no apparent opprobrium was
attached, even when describing killings that he clearly considered to be immoral
and illegitimate. But detailed attention to the contexts in which the “homicid-”
stem appears implies that its usage was somewhat confined. In reported speech,
although  we  find  several  individuals  describing  their  hated  antagonists  as
“homicidas”,  on  only  one  exceptional  occasion  do we find  a  specific  killing
described as a “homicidia”.701 More often, we find the term “homicidias” used to
describe killings in the mouths of ecclesiastical figures: Salonius and Sagittarius
are  accused  by  a  council  of  bishops  of  “homicidiis”;  the  hermit  Hospicius
condemns the Franks as “promptus homicidiis”.702 And as we have seen, Gregory
reliably  uses  the  term  in  condemning  his  most  execrable  characters,  while
describing their individually enumerated killings using “inter-” stems.
    The suspicion arises, therefore, that this terminology is more characteristic of
ecclesiastical circles than the secular society described in the  Histories,  as its
prohibition  under  episcopal  sanction  at  several  Church  councils  of  the  sixth
699 Histories VI.31; VII.24; VII.39; VIII.30; X.3; X.9
700 Histories V.36; VII.7; VIII.31
701 The context is the reported speech of the Prefect of Carthage, referring to the killing of a 
merchant by a puer of one of Childebert’s envoys. Histories X.2
702 “quick to kill”. Histories VI.36
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century suggests.703 This is confirmed by the case of Salonius and Sagittarius,
against whom their fellow bishops add a charge of treachery against the king to
ensure their deposition, since their homicidias and aduletrium can be “purged by
penance”.704 This  is  radically  out  of  keeping  with  what  we  observe  of  the
retaliations resulting from  inter-stem killings, which are generally physical or
pecuniary.  The implication  is  that  homicidia is  a  definition of  killing  as sin,
whose  use properly  belongs  to  ecclesiastical  contexts,  rather  than  a  practical
definition  suitable  for  use  in  more  ordinary  life.705 And  this  conception  of
homicidia as a formal and ecclesiastical term not for use in ordinary descriptive
speech is buttressed by the fact that it appears just three times in the first four
books  of  the  Histories,  which  describe  more  distant  events.706 This  reflects
interestingly on Gregory’s attitude to illicit killings committed by warriors on
campaign, which could not have been subject to the ordinary conventions  of
retribution and restitution that regulated social violence. But the appearance of
homicida as  a  pejorative  –  roughly  equivalent  to  our  term  “murderer”  –  in
reported speech, implies that this term had penetrated common parlance. And
there is some overlap between the contexts in which homicidia and inter- stem
words appear, implying that had Gregory wished to do so, he could have used the
former more liberally  in describing the more obviously reprehensible  killings
that he recounts.707
    Therefore the ecclesiastical connotations of  homicidia do not fully explain
why  Gregory  so  frequently  prefers  the  physically  evocative,  matter-of-fact
terminology apparently preferred by his protagonists, even where the killings in
question  are  clearly  reprehensible  by  contemporary  standards.  But  in  fact
703 Orleans (511), 1; Epauna (517); Orleans (541), 28; and Macon (583), 7. The brief decree of 
Epauna is particularly telling - “De paenitentia homicidarum, qui saeculi leges evaserint, hoc
summa reverentia de eis inter nos placuit observari, quod Anquiritani canonis decrevunt.” 
Merovingian Church Councils (MGH Concilia I, 1893).
704 “per penitentiam purgari” - Histories V.27
705  This implication is circumstantially supported by a formula used by Gregory in describing 
the judgement on Austregesil’s fatal attack on some of Sichar’s pueri, where he states that it 
was decided that Austregesil “homicia erat et interfectis pueris”. This would appear to be a 
somewhat clumsy formula, repeating as it does the idea that Austregesil was guilty of killing 
superfluously, unless we add the gloss that it served to enunciate the secular and 
ecclesiastical versions of the same idea. Histories VII.47
706 In contrast to the “inter-” stems, which appear more than twenty times in each book.
707 Histories VIII.30, where Guntrams troops commit “multa homicida” including killing 
clerics, “sacratas Deo aras interementes.” The two terms also occur together at X.4, VII.47
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homicidia and  inter-stems  are  used  in  quite  different  ways  which  make  it
virtually impossible in most cases to substitute one form for the other. Homicidia
is principally concerned with the perpetrator of violence and the abstracted act of
killing. The grammatical construction of the concept, in which the killing itself is
the direct object, makes it awkward to construct a sentence that emphasises the
relationship between attacker and victim. And on the rare occasions where it is
used in  describing specific actions (“homicidium fecit”)  the term hardly ever
refers specifically to a victim.708 The inter-stems on the other hand, as the passive
forms in which they frequently appear suggest, are used in a way that clearly
identifies and emphasises the victim. Where they are used in active form, they
take  the  victim  rather  than  the  act  as  the  direct  object,  accentuating  the
relationship  between  victim  and  killer.709 Gregory  highlights  this  significant
difference in usage in his report of the judgement against Austrechild after he
kills several of Sichar’s entourage, where he relates that the judgement was that
Austrechild “homicida erat  et  interfectis  pueris”.710 This statement repeats the
same thought in two forms: the first principally concerning the act of violence
and connoting the moral absolutism of the Gospels; the second focusing on the
victims and deriving its moral connotations from their status and connections.
This difference made the inter-stems fundamentally better adapted to describing
killing in a retributive culture in which the allies and parentes of the victim were
expected to take responsibility for seeking redress. And Gregory’s tendency to
prefer such terms is illustrative of his connection to, and desire to communicate
with, a non-ecclesiastical social milieu.
    Overall the impression is of a dominant nomenclature of killing – the inter-
stems  –  that  concertina  our  modern  sub-categories  and  the  moral  and  legal
distinctions that they imply into an indistinct mass, such that a person would use
the  same  word  to  describe  the  assassination  of  his  relative  as  he  would  to
describe  the  execution  of  convicted  criminals  or  seditious  soldiers.711 The
implication of  this  generic  and distinctly  un-technical  terminology is  that  the
708 One exceptional instance occurs in the reported speech of Grippo, referring to the killing of 
his compatriots were killed in Africa - “qualiter homicidium factum est.” Histories X.2
709 For instance, V.17; VI.10; VII.47. Vocative form, in reported speech, at VIII.28-29.
710 “was a killer and killed boys”. Histories VII.47
711 Histories IX.10; VII.8; VIII.5
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conceptual boundaries by which we abstractly partition killing into more or less
justifiable acts were more ambiguous, vague and permeable for Gregory and his
contemporaries. And the sense of common identity between acts that we would
variously  describe  as  murders,  assassinations  and  executions  comes  through
distinctly  in  a  few passages  which  seem to  defy  categorization  according  to
modern  definitions:  When  duke  Rauching’s  treachery  is  revealed  to  king
Childebert,  the duke is “interfectu” on the orders of the king,  but rather than
being captured and publicly executed as we might expect, the duke is tackled at
the entrance to the king’s chamber and hacked to death without warning before
being  flung  naked  from  the  window,  in  an  act  which  seamlessly  combines
aspects of ‘assassination’ and ‘execution’.712 The presentation of the body after
the  fact  looks  very  much  like  Chramnesind’s  self-justificatory  hanging  of
Sichar’s body on his fence-post after a legally dubious private killing, and calls
to mind the provisions of the Lex Salica.713 Later on we hear  of “those who
Fredegund ordered interfeci”: the queen invites two feuding parties to dinner and
has  them suddenly  killed in  order  to  end what  Gregory describes  as  a  long-
running and destructive cycle of violence. Once again there is a tension, to the
modern mind, between the apparently public-spirited intention with which the
killings are done and their informal and furtive character.714 King Childebert is
persuaded to send out men to pursue Fredegund, implying that the action was
regarded as a crime, but the queen’s ultimate escape again muddies the waters of
legitimacy. As in so many cases, Gregory makes no comment on the morality of
these incidents, and his condemnation of the victims in both cases implies that he
saw nothing implicitly wrong in the distinctly informal manner of these killings.
    The  same  informal  and  non-technical  tone  that  appears  in  Gregory’s
descriptions of killing is evident in the language that he uses in describing non-
lethal violence. Another decidedly broad terminology is that applied to forcible
seizure of goods:  spolia and  preada.715 These terms are both nouns and verbs,
referring both to the process of forceful seizure of goods and to the seized goods
712 As well as “robbery” (“spolia”) - See below. Histories IX.9
713 Histories IX.19; Pactus XLI.11a, 11b
714 Histories X.27. Yitzhak Hen (1995, p. 245) takes a different view of the Fredegund incident.
715 The former term (or the nearly identical “expolia”) appears 39 times across the last six books
of the Histories. “Praeda” appears 29 times.
193
themselves.716 And the two terms are generally separated on the basis of scale. In
general,  individuals  and  small  groups  engage  in  spolia,  while  armies  are
responsible for praeda.717 On two occasions, moderately large non-campaigning
forces are described as engaging in both types of activity, and they are grouped
together  in  Radegund’s  monastic  foundation  letter,  implying  a  sense  of
continuity between the two.718 Spolia is explicitly associated in many instances
with personal effects of individuals, whereas praeda is more associated with the
abduction of the victims themselves, but the two clearly overlap in relation to
household wealth.719
    In the case of spolia in particular we observe the same kind of ambiguities that
appear in the use of the “inter-” terms. The word is deployed to describe both
what we would call robberies – i.e. violent seizures with no legal justification or
official sanction – and a range of more official actions which might be defined in
the present day by such terms as “fine” or “expropriation”, as well as a range of
other acts which look more like what we would call “extortion”, “swindling” or
“fraud”.720 We  might  be  tempted  to  believe  that  this  is  merely  Gregory
dramatizing  the  excesses  of  government,  and  in  some  cases  –  particularly
regarding taxation of the Tours region – this would appear to be the case.721 But
the  fact  that  Gregory  can  find  no  more  innocuous  verb  in  describing  the
appropriations of individuals who he evidently admires and against those who he
despises undermines such a conclusion.722
716 The verbal form is dominant. “Spoliis” used as a noun in Histories V.49, VII.29, VIII.39. 
“Praeda” as noun at VI.31, VI.46, IX.7.
717 The rule is not absolute: locals in the Tours regions are “spoliatus” by Desiderius’s troops 
after being captured (Histories VI.31); Goth forces in Septimania catch the Frankish army by
surprise and “spoliatis interemerunt” (VIII.30)
718 Radegund’s letter denounces “praedones et spoliatores pauperum”. Histories, X.42
719 Spolia associated with personal effects, for instance in Histories V.25, where the dead body 
of Duke Dragolen is “spoliatum” by Guntram Boso; also V.38, VII.15, VII.28. Praeda 
explicitly associated with taking captives at Histories V.29, VI.31, VII.13, IX.7, IX.18, 
IX.24, X.3.
720 In the sense of “fine” or “expropriation” - Histories V.3, V.30, VII.15, VII.22, VIII.22. In the 
sense of “extorted” or “defrauded” - Histories V.49, VI.11, VII.45, VIII.39
721 Histories XI.30, X.7
722 As in the Emperor Tiberius “spoliavit” of the treasonous Empress Sophia’s possessions 
(Histories V.30); and the seizure of the goods of the condemned former duke Eberulf, in 
which his house was “adplene spoliata” (Histories VII.22).
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    Mention of  spolia does not always imply violence.  When Merovech was
“spoliatumque ab armis,  datis  custodibus,  libere custodire  praecipit”723 by his
father, we hardly picture a hold-up or disorderly mugging. But the threat of force
is in every case imminent, and in several cases – as in the attack of the Poitevins
against  the  camp  followers  from  Tours  in  Guntram’s  army  (“inruentibus,
nonnulli  interempti,  plurimi  vero  spoliati  redierunt”)724 –  spolia is  an
unmistakably unofficial and violent process. In many instances, it is explicitly
associated  with  forcible  capture  (adpraehen-),  stripping  (denud-),  and  other
physical  attacks  (caes-/caed-  etc).725 Most  instances  of  spolia,  however,  lie
somewhere  between  these  extremes  in  a  way  that  sits  uncomfortably  within
modern conceptual schema. The ambiguity of the term is neatly illustrated by the
sorry  fate  of  the  princess  Rigunth’s  baggage  train  en  route  to  her  planned
marriage in Spain.  Passing through the countryside,  the massive entourage is
responsible  for  “tanta  spolia  tantaque  praeda”.  In  the  breakdown of  political
order  following  Chilperic’s  death,  Rigunth  herself  is  “expoliata”  by  duke
Desiderius in Toulouse, according to the report given to Queen Fredegund by her
servant  Leunard.  And,  enraged  by  the  news,  Fredegund  orders  Leunard
“spoliare” where he stands.726 All  three instances  are  pervaded by a  sense of
ambiguity over  the degree  of  formality,  legitimacy and violence  involved.  In
every case, the perpetrators of spolia could claim some justification on the basis
of  legitimacy  or  authority,  but  equally,  in  every  case  the  process  itself  feels
distinctly informal and forceful.
    This pervasive ambiguity makes many incidents in the Histories difficult to
interpret in modern terms. When we hear the Bishop Badegisel was engaged in
“spoliis civium”, are we looking at robbery or extortion, physical abuse or the
mere  over-use  of  his  ecclesiastical  prerogatives?727 When  some  clerics  are
“graviter caesi adque expoliati” as punishment for seditious writings, should we
imagine an orderly “fine”, as Lewis Thorpe would have it, or a physically brutal
723 “...ordered him to be spolia of his arms and guarded closely, in custody though not a 
prisoner”. Histories V.3
724 Histories VII.28
725 Histories V.25; V.30; V.38; VI.31; VII.15; VII.25; VIII.22; VIII.30; VIII.40. For more on 
these other terms, see below.
726 Histories VI.45; VII.15; See below.
727 Histories VIII.39
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on-the-spot  stripping?728 What  the  use  of  a  single  term  for  all  these  varied
incidents implies is that such distinctions are anachronistic. For Gregory, there
was no clear distinction between a “robbery” and an “expropriation”. Spolia was
the  act  of  taking  someone’s  personal  belongings  against  their  wishes,  it
ordinarily implied physical force, and – like the “inter-” terms for killing – it
contained no implicit judgement on the objective legitimacy or justifiability of
the  act,  which  instead  depended  on  the  respective  participants  and  their
relationship with each-other.
    Similar  principles  can  be  seen  operating  in  the  Histories’  handling  of
abductions  and  arrests.  Gregory  deploys  the  same terms  –  adpraehendo and
abduco – indiscriminately in describing the picking up of inanimate objects, the
physical  grabbing of  one person by another,  and various  captures  as  well  as
rescues in all manner of contexts.729 And again, the two terms are broadly (but
not  universally)  partitioned  according  to  scale,  with  the  latter  being  broadly
preferred  in  military  contexts.  At  the  smaller  scale,  no  separate  terminology
serves  to  distinguish  various  acts  either  in  terms  of  legitimacy,  formality  or
morality: the boy prince Childebert is “adpraehensum” by duke Gundovald, to
save him from death; after killing prince Merovech, Gailen is “adpraehensum”
before being viciously mutilated; an invalid is “adpraehensum” by a priest, who
drags him to a saint’s house to be cured; Clotild’s armed gang “adpraehendunt”
the  abbess  of  the  nunnery  of  Poitiers,  in  the  course  of  a  brutal  and  illegal
takeover; and a house is “adpraehensam” by fire.730 Only two modifying adverbs
–  “fraudolenter”  and  “blande”  –  are  ever  deployed  to  qualify  this  term,
suggesting that it was ordinarily expected to be open and forceful.731 This does
not  mean  that  “adpraehen-”  necessarily  entailed  physical  coercion,  but  the
728 Histories VIII.22 / Thorpe, p. 454
729 “Adpraehen-” (or occasionally the synonymous “conpraehen-”) appears 66 times in the last 
six books of the Histories, featuring prominently in books V-VII and becoming less frequent 
in books IX-X. “Abdu-” appears just 14 times, most frequently in the later books.
730 Histories V.1 (other examples of sense of ‘rescued’ at VII.1 and VII.29); V.18 (other 
examples of sense of ‘arrested’ at VI.24, VI.35, VIII.11); VI.6 (other examples of sense of 
physically ‘grabbed’ at IX.6, X.2); X.15 (other examples of sense of violently and 
illegitimately ‘abducted’ at  VIII.33 (another example of sense of figuratively ‘seized’ at 
VI.33)
731 Histories V.25; VI.5
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contexts  in  which  “adpraehen-”  appears  are  clearly  dominated  by  explicitly
forceful and violent incidents.732
    This ambiguity between a sense of physical grabbing, legitimate arrest and
forcible seizure again makes it difficult for the modern reader to interpret many
of the “adpraehen-” incidents that Gregory recounts. An especially apt example
is provided by the fate of Guntram Boso’s father-in-law Severus. After being
accused of treachery, Severus sets out to see the king “cum magnis muneribus”;
but,  “in  via  adpraehensus  et  spoliatus  atque  in  exilium  deductus”.733 Lewis
Thorpe  translates  this  as  “on  the  road  he  was  attacked  and  his  gifts  were
stolen...”;734 but we could as easily substitute, “on the road he was arrested and
his gifts were confiscated” without going beyond the conceptual boundaries of
the terms involved. The point is there is no way to distinguish these two ideas,
and Gregory – like his contemporaries – apparently had no interest in doing so,
as we would intuitively and automatically do in the modern world. In fact, the
failure to make clear whether the assailants were bandits, rivals or royal officials
implies that the Severus incident may be one occasion where Gregory is quite
happy to play  on  the  ambiguity  of  his  terminology –  which  in  this  instance
allows him to avoid explicit judgements on a possibly controversial incident –
again  deferring  judgement  to  the  audience  and  their  various  opinions  of  the
victim.
    The most basic, atomic elements of Gregory’s accounts of violence are the
words he uses to describe blows and beatings – principally  verbera and caedes
and their derivatives.735 These terms, which are constructed as verbs, participles
and nouns alongside verbs like ‘adficio’, are again quite broad in their range of
meanings.  Verber-  can  be  used  to  describe  both  lethal  and  non-lethal  blows,
depending on context;736 and caed-/caes- is sometimes used to describe deaths in
732 Including two occasions where royal women appear as attackers and victims – Histories 
V.38; IX.34.
733 Histories V.25
734 Thorpe (1974), p. 290
735 Verbero and its cognates appear 18 times in the last six books of the Histories. The various 
forms of caedo are dominant, appearing 71 times in the last six books. Adficio and its 
cognates, which appear 23 times, is also sometimes used to describe beatings, but the 
vagueness of the term may disguise other acts of violence.
736 Lethal instances of “verber-” at Histories V.25; VI.32; VII.29.
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fighting,  particularly  in  the  context  of  major  battles.737 This  latter  usage  is
particularly prominent in the early books of the Histories, completely dominating
Book II,  and may be the result  of the influence of Sulpicius Alexander,  who
twice  uses  caed-/caes-  to  describe  military  carnage  in  the  exerpts  quoted  by
Gregory.738 In the later books, however, the more mundane non-lethal meanings
of caed-/caes- and verber- become increasingly dominant.
    The tendency in the early books to use caed- terms to refer to violent death on
a large scale, which occasionally resurfaces in the later chapters, can result in
confusion over the whether attacks are deadly or not, since some incidents stand
between  the  personal  attacks  that  characterise  the  later  books  and  the  more
classical military contexts that dominate Book II. But the non-lethal definition
appears  to  be the  one  preferred  by  Gregory’s  perceived audience,  for  whose
benefit  he frequently seeks to make killings clear.  In describing an attack on
Frankish  ships  by  the  Goths,  he  states  that  “hominis  caesi  atque  interfecti”.
Childebert’s army in the Metz region commit “tantas preadas tantaque homicidia
ac caedes”. And when the condemned Duke Ursio sallies forth to inflict “tanta
caede”  on  his  assailants,  Gregory  adds  that  “quanti  in  eius  contemplatione
advenissent,  nullus  vivens  remanere”.739 His  apparent  assumption  that  the
audience  will  read  “caed-”  terms  as  non-lethal  attacks  for  want  of  specific
information  is  confirmed  by  the  text  of  the  bishops’ judgement  against  the
rebellious nuns at Poitiers, which uses “caede mactavit” in the sense of “beat up”
in referring to attacks on the clergy.740
Caed- and verber- terms, used in the sense of non-lethal attacks and beatings, are
understandably less frequent in the Histories than the “inter-” terms that describe
killings,  given  Gregory’s  evident  preference  for  spectacular  and  politically
momentous events. In the first two books they are used on occasion in describing
the suffering of the martyrs, but they are entirely absent from political history,
737 Histories II.3, 4, 9, 30, 33; III.7; IV.14-15, 42, 44; VI.42; IX.12, 25; X.9, 15, 31.
738 Histories II.9, where the relatively brief excerpt from Sulpicius three times uses “caed-” in 
this sense.




which concentrates on large-scale events.741 As events approach Gregory’s own
time in book III, references to beatings begin to appear in political contexts, and
the  caed-  and  verb-  stems  emerge  as  virtually  interchangeable  terms  for
describing a wide array of non-lethal attacks.742 These terms, used in this more
mundane  range  of  senses,  become  increasingly  prominent  as  the  narrative
becomes more grounded in Gregory’s personal knowledge from Book V onward,
and are of particular interest in a study of contemporary violence,  since their
deployment is evidently not grounded in Gregory’s literary influences so much
as  his  experience  and  contemporary  interests.  The  striking  thing  about  these
terms  –  and  the  range  of  non-lethal  attacks  that  they  indicate  –  is  the
extraordinary  range of  contexts  in  which  they  occur,  which  imply  the  social
conventionality of ‘percussive’ behaviour. The most frequent and significant uses
of “caed-/verber-” come in the context of discipline, punishment, interrogation
and  assaults.  Predictably,  these  four  categories  often  overlap,  and  they  are
associated with the same tools – “virgis et fustibus”, or occasionally “pugnis et
calcibus”743 – but for the purposes of analysis it is useful to treat them separately.
    Disciplinary  and  domestic  beatings,  broadly  defined  as  beating  directed
against subordinates by their superiors in familial and other hierarchical contexts,
can be glimpsed at all levels of society in the  Histories. An abbot has a monk
beaten, abbesses beat nuns, bishops and deacons beat their clergy, masters beat
their servi and pueri, a count beats his milites, the earstwhile daughter of a noble
family is beaten by the men sent to capture her, and even queens are not above
dishing out a  beating to disobedient  children or step-children.744 Some of the
assailants in question are evidently despised by Gregory, and some of the victims
have his sympathy, but where they do not, it is clear that he and his perceived
audience are emphatically sanguine about the principle of ‘teaching a lesson’ in
the sense  of  physical  abuse.  The bishop-saint  Nicetius  (who is  credited with
exceptional  qualities  of  love  and  forgiveness),  in  his  attempts  to  reform  an
741 Abuse of early Christians with caedes and verbera at Histories I.34, 41, 48.
742 Terms used interchangeably at Histories III.28, 33; V.14, 49.
743 With “fustis” at Histories I.34, 41; IV.40; V.20, 48, 49; X.16. With “virgis” at X.19, 22. With 
both together at IV.46; V.49; VI.8. There are a couple of mentions of “loris 
duplicibus/triplicibus” (‘double/triple thongs’) in addition to the other more ordinary 
implements at V.49; VI.35; and X.19.
744 Histories IV.34; IV.26; V.49; IV.46; VII.46; VII.47; III.31; X.34.
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adulterous  deacon,  “non  solum a  communione  removerat,  sed etiam  saepius
caedi praeceperat”. After death, the saint returns in a vision to punch another
deacon in the throat for failing to speak the truth.745
    When reporting the disciplinary beatings doled out by less savoury characters,
Gregory almost invariably adds some intensifying term to distinguish the attacks
from the  kind  of  run-of-the-mill  beatings  of  which  he  approves.  In  the  only
mention of spousal violence, the count Eulalius does not merely ‘knock about’
his  wife  as  one  translator  would  have  it,  but  rather  “gravissimis  eam plagis
saepius adficiebat.”746 The merchant Christopher is hated by his  pueri because
“crebrius gravissime verberarentur”; Sichar beats his slave so badly as to wound
him, “ictibus verberaret”;747 and the educated upstart Andarchius beats his new
servants so badly that “sangiunem elicuit”.748 The first of these incidents helps to
justify the victim’s illegal remarriage, and the other three culprits suffer violent
retaliations by their victims, resulting in death in two cases and serious injury in
the third. The implication is that Gregory at times used his editorial powers to
emphasise the dangers of excessive disciplinary violence, and wished to warn
men and masters off  violence toward their  women and servants that was too
severe. But of disciplinary caedes and verbera that were not gravissimus he had
no such cautionary tales.
    Disciplinary  and  domestic  contexts  of  caed-/verber-  form an  interesting
sample, but are understandably infrequent, given their confinement to passing
mentions in the course of more momentous sequences of events. Neither do they
distinguish the post-Roman culture much from its  Roman predecessor,  where
beatings were also a standard method of educational and hierarchal discipline.749
Much more numerous are the uses of caed-/verber- in describing interrogations
745 “not only removed him from communion, but also had him frequently beaten”. In another 
passage, an anonymous monk who displays miraculous powers is beaten by his abbot as a 
precautionary measure against the sin of pride – Histories VI. The story is repeated in Lives 
of the Fathers VIII.5
746 Histories X.8 (the translation is from Thorpe 1974).
747 “Ictus” appears over a dozen times in the Histories, and carries the sense of a wound in 
particular, often in the context of fatal attacks. See for instance Histories VI.13, 32, 35; 
VII.3, 22, 29.
748 Histories VII.46-7; IV.46.
749 Kaster, R. Guardians of the Language: the Grammarian and society in Late Antiquity (1988),
p. 17 n. 12
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and punishments, which are often politically significant and even momentous in
and of themselves.750 Caedes and verbera appear as the principle method both in
non-lethal punishment – where they are often proceeded by tying of the victim to
“trocleas” or “stipites”751 – and in torture. Indeed, although at times distinguished
from other forms of torture – usually vaguely defined as other “suppliciis” – at
other times torture seems to comprise little more than a severe extended beating,
and  “tortores”  can  be  found  dishing  out  the  same  beatings  as  “caesores”.752
Gregory offers one of his more evocative and personal moments in describing
the  punishment/interrogation  of  his  rival  Riculf  after  the  commutation  of  his
death sentence - “Nothing, not even metal, could bear such verbera as were done
to this wretch… he was beaten with  fustibus,  virgis et loris duplicibus, not by
one or two, but by as many as were able to get close to his wretched limbs.”753
    The evocation of a substantial crowd in this rare detailed description suggests
that caed-/verber- beatings were highly social and public activities, although the
reference to “not one or two” assailants implies that the attendant crowd were
usually satisfied to witness rather than actively participate in the process. The
further implication of the incident’s context – a commuted death sentence – is
that  beatings  could  be  considered  a  merciful  alternative  to  more  serious
punishments. This implication is borne out by King Guntram’s behaviour after an
assassin is  discovered waiting for  him in a  church  at  Chalon-sur-Saone.  The
several accused co-conspirators are hunted down and killed, but the would-be
assassin himself is “verberatum plagis et dimisit vivum”, since the king thought
it wrong to kill a man taken in church.754 At the harsher end of the spectrum,
caedes and  verbera appear repeatedly as warm-up acts for other punishments.
We have already seen how  caedes could precede  spolia, how the two together
750 There are 15 instances of caed-/verber- in the sense of disciplinary and domestic violence. 
The terms are used in the sense of punishment and interrogation on 40 occasions.
751 “Trocleas” at Histories V.49; VI.35; VII.32. “Stipites” at IX.38; X.15. Roughly “pulleys” and
“stakes”. The former in particular suggests the existence of specialized equipment. 
752 “Tormenta” and “verberibus” are distinguished from one-another at Histories VI.35, as are 
“caesi” and “supplicia” at VIII.11 and X.19. But “caedes” and “tormenta” are implicitly 
identified with one-another at VII.32; “tortures” are found dishing out “caedes” at VI.35. 
And beatings appear as the sole or principle form of torture at V.39; VIII.41; IX.38.
753 Histories V.49 – “Nam nulla res, nullum metallum tanta verbera potuit sustinere, sicut hic 
miserrimus…caedebatur fustibus, virgis ac loris duplicibus, et non ab uno vel duobus, sed 
quanti accedere circa miseros potuerunt artus, toti caesores erant.”
754 “beaten with blows and released alive”. Histories IX.3
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could form the prelude  to  exilio.755 The royal  wet-nurse and her  accomplice,
Droctulf, are “vehementer ceasa” in advance of their mutilation and reduction to
servitude  for  plotting  against  Queen  Brunhild.756 And  in  an  account  of  the
miraculous liberation of a condemned criminal, Gregory relates in passing that
the criminal was gratuitously beaten prior to his planned execution.757 He also
reports  with  evident  satisfaction  that  his  bete noire Leudast  was  “pugnis
calcibusque caesum” prior to his imprisonment for referring to slanders against
queen  Fredegund,  and  caed-/verber-  terms  appear  in  several  other  such
sequences  of  punishments,  being  frequently  associated  with  demotion  from
office.758 
    Caedes and  verbera were thus so ordinary as to form an integral part  of
punishment  and  interrogation,  even  potentially  when  impending  death  made
them superfluous. But they were also positively associated with hierarchy and as
such could also be symbolic of demotion and putting perceived inferiors in their
place. It is noteworthy that no duke – who as we saw appear to have commanded
fully independent retinues – is ever beaten.759 When accused of treason they are
killed at the earliest opportunity without ceremony.760 And in the one instance
where Gregory persuades king Guntram to forgive dukes for their disloyalty, he
uniquely  resorts  to  the  expedient  of  “vocans  eos  saepius  vulpis  ingeniosas”,
where a beating would surely be expected for lesser men.761 But the recognition
of the symbolic implications of  caedes and  verbera should not cause to us to
ignore the impression of spontaneous and sometimes disorderly aggression that
pervades Gregory’s accounts. Caedes and verbera were, as we have seen, public
and  social  activities  that  could  involve  multiple  participants,  and  in  several
755 Histories VIII.22; V.35.
756 Histories IX.38
757 Histories VI.8. Another superfluous beating prior to planned execution is detailed in 
Gregory’s Miracles of Saint Martin I.21
758 Histories V.47, 49. Other beatings that appear to be synonymous with demotions at III.36; 
IV.43; V.14; VI.11; VII.27; VII.31; VIII.22; IX.38 and X.15.
759 The high-born Clotild’s rebellion may also have been, in part, a reaction against such 
treatment at the hands of the abbess, who she claimed subjected her to - “famis, nuditatis, 
insuper et caedis se iam non ferre periculum” (Histories X.16)
760 Histories VII.38-9; IX.9,12. See above, n.711. A contrasting case is provided by duke Godin,
who is demoted without apparent violence (V.3), but this comes in the context of his public 
disgrace on the battlefield, which would have drastically weakened his personal authority.
761 “frequently called them cunning foxes”. Histories VIII.6; cf. Lex Salica XVII. 8, 10
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instances, as in the revenge attacks on the former tax-collector Parthenius and the
royal physician Marileif, they look distinctly informal and mob-handed.762 The
vagueness of the terminology, and examples like the beating of Riculf, suggest
that neither Gregory nor his contemporaries were particularly concentrated on
the difference between a disorderly assault and a formal punishment.
    This sense of ambiguity comes through in Gregory’s uses of  caedes and
verbera in  describing  non-lethal  assaults.  Gregory  accuses  Salonius  and
Sagittarius  of  caedes in  addition  to  homicidia,  adulteria and  other  unnamed
“scelera”, which would lead us to assume that in this instance the term is used in
the sense of illicit assaults.763 Similarly vague accusations are levelled at bishop
Badegisel of Le Mans, former  maior domo to king Chilperic, and the count of
the stables,  Pelagius.764 But in their  roles  as ecclesiastical  and royal officials,
such men would have been entitled, potentially even expected, to be responsible
for “caedes” in  the sense of  discipline and punishment.  When king Guntram
suspects bishop Theodore of disloyalty, “ira commotus”, he sends men to bring
the bishop before him, who precede to attack a religious precession, knocking
the  bishop  from his  horse  and  “clericos  caedunt”.765 Although  the  bishop  is
cleared, the assault itself – which precedes the trial – looks integral to the process
of apprehension. In each of these cases, there is a sense of continuity between
what we would describe as official punishments, and less formal attacks aimed at
putting erstwhile subjects and opponents in their place.
    The presence of sanguinem in caed-/verber- incidents emerges as an important
feature  in  scenes  of  non-lethal  assault  that  Gregory  wishes  to  paint  as
condemnable. The bishops Salonius and Sagittarius, quarrelling with their own
citizens, “verberantes fustibus, usque ad effusionem sanguinis saeviebant”; the
Goth  queen,  enraged  at  princess  Ingund’s  refusal  to  convert  to  Arianism,
“calcibus  verberatam  ac  sanguine  cruentatam  iussit”  in  addition  to  other
humiliations;  and  Amalo’s  pueri beat  a  free  girl  until  blood  pours  from her
nose.766 In the rebellion at the nunnery of Poitiers, both Gregory himself and the
762 Histories III.36; V.14.
763 Histories V.20
764 Histories VIII.39; VIII.40.
765 Histories VI.11
766 Histories V.20, 38; IX.27
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bishops’ second  judgement  refer  pointedly  to  the  blood  of  “pontifices  quam
ministros” being shed by the nuns’ agents.767 Again, in the last of these two cases,
the original offences contribute to the pretext for serious retaliatory violence.
Thus,  in  a  way  reminiscent  of,  but  not  identical  to,  the  Salic  Laws,768 the
shedding of blood appears in the  Histories as an important  distinction between
the kind of minor attack associated with ordinary regular discipline and the kind
of serious attack associated with violent reprisals.
    Overall,  the  range  of  contexts  in  which  caedes and  verbera appear  as
apparently  conventional  acts  –  in  discipline,  conflict,  interrogation  and
punishment – imply that they were a normal and uncontroversial expedient in a
wide array of scenarios, to the extent that were taken for granted by Gregory and
his  contemporaries  as  ordinary  means  by  which  hierarchy  was  enforced  and
wrongs were redressed. He protested when they were done to the undeserving or
in excess, but had no general objection to non-blood-shedding attacks in a good
cause. The centrality of this experience to contemporary life is alluded to by a
Jewish  scholar  debating  the  divinity  of  Christ  with  Gregory,  when  he  asks
rhetorically  how  God  could  be  subjected  to  those  three  indignities  most
fundamental to the human condition – “mulieri nasci, verberibus subdi, morte
damnare”.769
6.2.2 – “Warriors”: viri and pueri
    Just as Gregory’s descriptions of violence rely on a nomenclature with many
ambiguities and vagaries that confound attempts to categorize the incidents in
question  according  to  clear  criteria  of  relative  formality,  legitimacy  and
spontaneity, his descriptions of the perpetrators of violence are not marked by
precision or clarity. As we have already seen, warriors might be described with
the  vague pronoun “illi”  or  with  a  few other  pronouns,  but  by  far  the  most
common word used to  describe apparent members of the warrior elite  is  viri
(‘men’). Even this term is far from consistent in its application in the Histories,
767 Histories IX.41; X.16.
768 See Chapter 3, p. 135-9
769 Histories VI.5
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since it can be used to describe all manner of men from slaves to kings, criminals
or saints.770 This is a result of the fact that vir is used in two modes. In its more
simple form, the term is visually descriptive and conjugally oriented, often being
found alongside mulier and referring indiscriminately to any and all members of
the male sex.771 By far the most dominant use of the term vir, however, is as a
signifier  of social  position and is  particularly associated with churchmen and
warriors.772 It  is  this  latter  bifurcated  usage  and  it  derivations  that  primarily
concern us here.
    The contemporaneity of the more elite definition of the term vir to Gregory’s
own time is attested by its use in reported speech, where it is repeatedly deployed
by authority figures, including Gregory himself,  when addressing their armed
subjects in conciliatory terms. Queen Brunhild,  standing between the warring
factions  of  her  son’s  kingdom,  addresses  them,  “O  viri...”  in  attempting  to
dissuade them from war. Fredegund does the same when trying to persuade the
suspicious  Franci of  the  legitimacy  of  her  daughter’s  vast  dowry,  as  does
Guntram when he commends the young Childebert to the exercitus, proclaiming
that  his  nephew “vir  magnus effectus  est”.773 This  last  statement  hints  at  the
importance of modifying adjectives in the use of the term vir in the Histories, but
it is also clear that, in reported speech at least, the term has certain honorific
properties  without  the  need  for  any  intensifying  adjective.  In  fact  in  these
instances it looks more like a formal term of respect than the overall impression
of its use in the  Histories suggests, raising the question of whether Gregory is
freer in his use of the word  vir in his writing that contemporaries would have
been. 
770  Histories V.3 (slave); VI.4 (king); X.15 (criminals); V.7, IV.6 (saints); VII.23 (Jewish 
merchants). But these cases, with the exception of saints, are highly unusual. See below.
771 For instance, Histories V.14; V.32; VI.12; VI.29; VII.40; VIII.18-19; VIII.39; IX.13; X.8. In 
total the term is used in this sense about twenty times in the last six books. See also, VI.36, in
which a woman “mutate virili habitu” to disguise her identity.
772 For ecclesiastical figures, see for instance, Histories V.7, 10; VI.7-8; VIII.14; X.16. For 
armed secular figures, for instance, Histories V.Pref; V.14; VI.43; VII.29; VIII.30; IX.30-31; 
X.9. The term is used around twenty times to identify churchmen, and nearly fifty times to 
identify military leaders and other warriors.
773 Histories VI.4; VI.45; VII.33. Gregory’s similar plea comes in the context of attempting to 
resolve Sichar’s dispute with Austregisel (Histories VII.47).
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    Nonetheless it is worthy of note that neither Gregory, nor the elite figures
whose speech he reports, make any attempt to distinguish fighting men with a
more  specific  term,  in  particular  milites,  which  is  frequently  employed  by
Sulpicius  Alexander  in the passages  quoted in  Book II,  and is  again used to
describe  contemporary imperial  forces  at  Carthage by Gregory later  in  Book
X.774 This implies that the preferment of the more generic  viri is a deliberate
choice  reflecting  contemporary  usage,  and  possibly  even  recognizing  the
distinction between the kind of paid professional military service that continued
to characterize the sixth century empire and the customary arrangements that
pertained to the Frankish kingdoms. But there is no way to know if Gregory was
well-informed enough to comprehend this distinction, and it is more likely that
his consistent refusal to identify armed men, other than those serving the empire,
as “milites” was a convention inherited from the likes of Sulpicius Alexander
rather  than a  deliberate  choice informed by the conditions of their  service.775
Whatever the case, the result of this conventional and preponderant use of vir to
describe armed freemen is  twofold.  First,  the distinction between official  and
‘private’ violence  is  further  effaced.  Second,  the  field  of  ‘manhood’ in  the
Histories,  outside of the church, is entirely dominated by the warrior classes,
such that it becomes synonymous with the profession of violence.776
    The intimate association between the status of  vir in  secular  society and
retaliatory violence is attested by two parallel definitions of the term – the only
two that appear in the  Histories – attributed to king Guntram and the warrior
Chramnesind. Guntram, justifying his determination to avenge himself on bishop
Theodore, proclaims that if he fails to do so within the year he “ought no longer
be held a  vir”.777 The second incident – the denoument of the much-discussed
‘feud’ that revolved around the volatile teenager Sichar – is  more thoroughly
contextualised  and,  given  its  quotation  of  the  inner  thought  process,  more
774 Histories II.9; X.II
775 The opening book of the Histories does appear to communicate a vague sense that viri were 
morally superior to milites, quoting the Vulgate’s mention of the Isrealites’ heroic “virorum 
fortium”, who led them out of captivity, as well as the scene in which  the dying Christ is 
watched over “a militibus”.
776 The conjugal and honorific senses are usually distinct, but the two occasionally overlap (for 
instance at VII.8), illustrating the potential for conflation.
777 Histories VIII.5
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directly indicative of Gregory’s perception of warrior psychology and the social
values  that  conditioned  its  functioning.  In  a  drunken  joke  at  dinner,  Sichar
suggests that his killing of Chramnesind’s family members was a lucky stroke,
since the latter had been enriched by the resulting compensation. “But,” Gregory
informs us, “Chramnesind heard Sichar's word with a bitter heart and said within
himself: ‘Unless I avenge my kinsmen's death I ought to lose the name of vir and
be called a weak mulier.’”778
    This direct representation of the thoughts of a Frankish warrior is unique in the
Histories,  and we may wonder  why Gregory chose this  moment for such an
unusual addition. In the first place the  prima facie psychological credibility of
the passage, which is strikingly reminiscent of some of the rationales offered by
dangerously violent individuals in the modern age, is worthy of note.779 As in
those modern cases, the phrasing of the thought process (“I should lose the name
of a man” rather than “I  will...”) implies that Chramnesind was not so much in
fear of loss of reputation – as a strategic interpretation would infer – as he was
spurred  by  his  own  fully  internalized  retaliatory  psychology.780 Indeed,  the
incident  can  be  viewed  as  a  textbook  example  of  the  concept  of  ‘phantom
community’ – i.e. the collected attitudes of violent authority figures playing out
in the mind of the perpetrator – offered by criminologist Lonnie Athens as a
principle explanatory factor in many cases of strategically questionable reactive
violence.781 That Gregory could be capable of such psychological realism should
not surprise us, given his proximity to the local figures about whom he spoke.
His post-mortem description of Sichar implies that he was intimately familiar
with this local notable, and it is possible that he was even more familiar with his
killer.  As  we have  seen,  Gregory  was  rarely  forthcoming about  his  personal
relationships to the figures who appear in the Histories, and it is possible – given
778 “Haec ille audiens, amaro suscepit animo dicta Sichario dixitque in corde suo: 'Nisi ulciscar 
interitum parentum meorum, amittere nomen viri debeo et mulier infirma vocare'.” - 
Histories IX.19
779 Athens, L. Violent Criminal acts and actors revisited, Chicago 1997, p. 55-6. For instance – 
“I’m a man, and I want to be treated like a man. Hell, I’m real easy to get along with as long 
as people don’t take me too light… [but] …I’ve ruined more than one good man in my time, 
and Jack, I’ll do it again too.”
780 See Chapter 1, section 2. No other freemen were apparently present at the incident, although 
a few pueri were apparently in attendance. On these relatively lowly, though by no means 
necessarily unfree, figures, see below.
781 Athens (2003), p. 12-16
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his  personal  involvement  in  the  case  –  that  his  account  of  Chramnesind’s
thoughts were based on a personal account related directly to him or via king
Childebert, to whom Chramnesind subsequently went to justify his actions.
    The  possibility  that  this  incident  offers  us  a  direct  window into  warrior
psychology is tantalizing, but is not essential to the psychological interest of the
passage. More significant, given Gregory’s flair for emphasising the cautionary
and moral overtones of his stories, is the use of this assumed thought process as
the  plot  device  that  seals  the  fate  of  Sichar.  This  killing  was  a  source  of
considerable trouble for Chramnesind, who was the target of retaliatory measures
by Queen Brunhild, but Gregory skips the details of this conflict, immediately
informing  us  that  Chramnesind  was  forgiven  by  the  king  and  ultimately
recovered his property. And in the post-mortem condemnation, it is Sichar who is
framed as the deserving victim, reaping the rewards of his own drunken and
belligerent behaviour. We have seen how Gregory was inclined to mix divine
justice with mundane cautionary elements, as in the case of the priest Theodulf –
for whom the ultimate justification of death was his evil ways, but the immediate
cause of death was a drunken fall – and Sichar’s death appears to follow the
same  pattern.782 In  this  incident,  the  protagonist’s  ill-chosen  words,  and  the
predictable  response  of  Chramnesind,  become the  mundane device  by  which
divine justice is manifested. Therefore it seems likely that the thought process
evoked by Gregory was a stereotypical one with which he expected his audience
to be familiar and even sympathetic.
    The status of “vir”, then, was a gendered concept intimately associated with
violence and revenge, as well as military service and elite status. And the words
denoting manly qualities –  virtus and  virilitas – are clearly influenced by the
same range of concepts. The latter term appears in relation to such qualities as
procreative power or physical strength,783 but is more frequently associated with
courage  and  resilience  in  the  face  of  violence.  The  pretender  Gundovald’s
besieged army could, Gregory avers, have held out for years against Guntram’s
forces “si viriliter stetissent”.784 Women, in the face of violence, can also possess
782 Histories X.14. See previous section, n. 579-580
783 i.e. at Histories VI.26; VII.22; X.15
784 “if they had resisted like men” - Histories VII.24. See also, VI.41; X.4
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this quality, and in fact Gregory most frequently uses it in referring to female
acts  of  exceptional  strength  or  courage:  the  princess  Ingund,  beaten  and
humiliated by her Goth stepmother, is said to have resisted conversion “viriliter”;
queen Brunhild stands between two armies “viriliter” to prevent a battle; and a
free girl kills the duke Amalo with an “ictu virili”.785 These incidents, in which
women assume ‘manly’ qualities, serve to emphasise how deeply the concept of
manhood  was  bound  not  just  to  the  bearing  of  arms,  but  to  physical  and
psychological resilience and defiance in the face of actual violence.
    The other and more frequent cognate of manhood – virtus – is more jealously
guarded by Gregory,  who confines  his  use of  the term assiduously to  divine
subjects, denying it to secular men and women alike. In the Histories, virtus is an
index,  above  all,  of  miraculous  power,  to  the  point  where  “virtutes”  can  be
straightforwardly translated as “miracles” or the power to effect them.786 But the
term frequently has strong overtones of divine revenge in particular, especially in
reported  speech:  when  a  puer of  the  count  of  Bourges  enters  a  property
belonging to St Martin to punish a failure to attend the army,  “protinus dolore
percussus caecidit et graviter agere coepit.”787 The similarity to the language of
beating discussed above is noteworthy, as is the repentant cry of the afflicted
puer - “Nunc autem cognovi, quod magna est virtus eius.”788 Further instances of
the use of “virtus” in reported speech suggest that Gregory’s reservation of the
term for divine figures was deliberate and tendentious, and that in secular mouths
virtus had much less to with miracles and more to do with violence. The dukes
Berthefried and Ursio, promising to destroy their sworn enemy Lupus, proclaim
that “vivus virtute nostrae non evadit'.789 Here, in the mouth of a member of the
warrior elite, we see virtus stripped of its miraculous overtones and used in the
more down to earth sense of violent power. And the one other reported use of the
term emphatically  confirms that this  sense was in currency among Gregory’s
contemporaries:  a  cleric,  paid  to  assassinate  bishop  Aetherius,  miraculously
falters at the moment of truth, explaining afterwards that as he raised his axe to
785 Histories V.38; VI.4; IX.27
786 HistoriesV.7; VI.6; VI.40; VII.10; IX.2, 4, 6.
787 “he was immediately beaten by blows of pain and was badly affected”. Histories VII.42
788 “Now I understand how great his virtus is.”
789 “His life will not escape our virtus” – Histories VI.4
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strike, his eyes blurred and “manus absque virtute erant”.790 These examples are
only a tiny proportion of the uses of virtus in the Histories, but they are dominant
among the much smaller sample of the use of the word in reported speech.
    Comparing the  Histories to  Lex Salica,  there is  a  clear  sense of  identity
between  the  secular  vir –  with  its  connotations  of  military  service,  private
violence and elite status – and the ingenuus that dominates the legal landscape in
the Frankish laws.791 But the Histories imply a vague but definite sense of further
stratification  that  is  not  present  in  the  simple  tripartite  division  into  free
barbarian, Roman and slave attested in  Lex Salica. Again, it is difficult to pin
these terms down with any precision, partly because there is, again, ambiguity
between descriptive and honorific uses. When, for instance, Gregory tells us that
the “robustioris [sic] viri” advanced to Comminges while the rest of the army
crossed the torrid river Garrone,792 is he referring to a special elite category of
warrior, or merely identifying the stronger men who were able to swim across
first?  We  might  be  inclined,  at  a  glance,  to  assume  the  latter,  but  in  other
instances  such  physically  evocative  modifying  adjectives  give  the  distinct
impression of having an honorific meaning. In some cases – for instance when
Gregory mentions the viri fortissimi who accompany Merovech and Desiderius –
the term feels more like a signifier of elite status.793 Certainly the viri fortissimi
who Mummolus identifies as awaiting the pretender Gundovald outside the walls
of Comminges include such figures as dukes and other, more vaguely defined,
military leaders.794 And there is no doubt that when Gregory mentions viri nobili,
viri optimi and viri maginifici, he is referring to powerful political figures.795
    Further down the social spectrum, Gregory repeatedly uses the term pueri to
describe dependent, low status warriors. The word puer is occasionally used to
describe children, but in most cases it is abundantly clear that the term denotes
grown men who are quite capable of taking on viri and undertaking missions of
790 “[my] hand was without virtus” – Histories VI.36
791 As it does in the Burgundian laws. See Heather (2011), p. 138
792 Histories VII.35
793 Histories V.18; VII.9
794 Histories VII.38
795 Histories VI.45; VIII.9; IX.18; X.8.
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the utmost importance.796 Indeed, although they remain consistently anonymous,
pueri feature as key players in a number of the most detailed and interesting
incidents of violence reported by Gregory, several of which are dominated by
them. The legal status of pueri is unclear, and unlike the viri who dominate the
Histories, they are not well represented in the Salic Laws. But a few references
in the Laws to “half free” leti and liberti would seem to be strong candidates for
the  legal  category  which  the  pueri occupied.  A key  passage  in  Lex Salica
prohibits the liberation of leti and servi alike by a freeman who is not their lord,
but only in the case of the  letus is this potential  offence placed in a military
context.797 A passage  in  a  later  capitulary  casts  this  implication  into  doubt,
protecting  pueri of  the king (who were almost certainly more important than
ordinary pueri) with the same wergeld as a libertus, one hundred solidi.798 But in
one manuscript non-royal pueri are ranked alongside leti, liberti and Romani for
the purposes of composition.799
    The conclusion of some historians, that the pueri were servile, is supported by
some passages in which they are treated with apparent disdain by their superiors,
as  in  case  of  Rauching  and  the  merchant  Christopher.800 Gregory,  however,
rigorously  distinguishes  between  the  pueri,  who  are  almost  invariably  found
surrounding powerful individuals and bearing arms, and  servi,  who are never
described as armed or present during fights,  although they are the victims of
796 The few instances where puer is used in the sense of “child” - Histories VI.35 (“puerolus”); 
VIII.29; VIII.34. Pueri getting the better of viri at V.48, VI.32, VII.3, VII.29, and VII.46 (the 
second last of these incidents, in which the former duke Eberulf is grabbed by a “puer...qui 
erat robustior”, is especially instructive). Edward James offers some useful information on 
the multiple uses of puer in Justinian’s Digest (where it can describe slaves, boys or merely 
children), and illustrates that in his hagiography, Gregory generally distinguishes pre-
pubescant children with the diminutives “puerolus” or “puer parvolus”. James also takes the 
view that the armed pueri of the Histories were assumed to be adolescentes between fourteen
and twenty-five years old. Nothing in the Histories supports this theory, but there does seem 
to be a link between the status of puer and the early phase of a warrior’s career (see below) –
James, “Childhood and youth in the early middle ages”, in Goldberg, P. J. P. & Riddy, F. 
Youth in the middle ages (York 2004), p. 16
797 Pactus XXVI.1-2
798 Pactus Capit. V.cxvii
799 Pactus XLII.4 (Manuscript A1)
800 Ibid.; Bachrach, B. S. “Merovingian armies and paid soldiers in imperial perspective”, in 
France, J. (ed.) Mercenaries and paid men: the mercenary identity in the middle ages (Leiden
2008), p. 182-3; Halsall 2003, p.49 (who dissents from this view, see below). Histories V.3; 
VII.46. The servility of pueri is frequently an implicit assumption in Thorpe’s translation, 
where in many instances puer and servi alike are rendered as “servant” (e.g. p. 410, 427-8, 
547).
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attacks on property.801 In Sichar’s conflict with Austregisel, the killing of pueri is
taken seriously – first by Sichar and then in the judgement of the court – in a way
that finds no parallel for servi, and when one of Childeric the Saxon’s pueri runs
the  vir Avius  through  with  a  spear,  his  master  makes  composition  but  no
punishment  is  apparently  meted  out  to  the  culprit.802 Thus  the  pueri stood,
literally  and  figuratively,  in  a  closer  relationship  to  their  masters  than  servi,
acting as bodyguards, representatives and assassins. And as such they occupied a
social  position,  or  rather  a  spectrum  of  positions,  between  the  viri and  the
unarmed  servi, and their status was defined by their close familial ties to their
masters.803
    Although pueri are not always mentioned in the small-scale incidents reported
by Gregory, they are found at some point or other in the company of every kind
of notable, whether secular or ecclesiastical. Kings, queens and dukes have pueri
who they send on official missions from gathering taxes to arresting fugitives.804
They also  accompany  bishops  and form the  private  retinues  of former  royal
officials  and other  viri of  private  means,  including merchants  and prominent
Jewish subjects of king Guntram.805 In the rebellion at the nunnery of Poitiers,
pueri appear in the service of the abbess and one of her erstwhile noble nuns,
Basina, when a puer of the latter is killed in an altercation, fuelling the ongoing
dispute.806 But in all these instances the  pueri are never the focus of Gregory’s
prose, only coming into view as extensions of their more important superiors,
especially where they become the perpetrators and victims of violence.807 While
they  occupy  considerably  more  of  the  Histories’  attentions  than  the  servi,
801 For instance, Histories VII.47
802 Histories VII.47; VII.3.
803 See Halsall (2003), p. 48-50, for a discussion of the appearance of pueri in Lex Salica and 
7th-century hagiography. In the former the pueri regis are identified with counts, which 
militates against identifying them with the pueri referred to by Gregory. Bachrach (1972, p. 
51) similarly identifies those pueri described by the Histories as working for royals with the 
pueri regis of the Lex Salica, but Gregory seldom makes use of this more exalted term or 
seeks to distinguish royal pueri with with any other terminology.
804 Histories V.14 (duke Guntram Boso); V.18, VI.32 (Fredegund); V.48 (duke Berulf); VI.2 
(Chilperic); VII.42 (count of Bourges); IX.9 (Childebert & duke Rauching); 
805 Histories VI.17 (Jewish merchant Phatyr); VII.3 (Childeric the Saxon); VII.29 (royal servant 
Claudius); VII.46 (merchant Christopher); IX.19 (Sichar); X.2 (royal envoy Grippo); X.5 
(Chuppa, former count of Chilperic’s stables); X.14 (bishop Audioveus of Angers).
806 Histories X.15
807 See also Histories VI.17, VI.32, VII.29, VII.46, VIII.41, X.2.
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Gregory is absolutely uninterested in them as individuals, and there is a sense
that  they  are  taken  for  granted  in  a  way  analogous  to  the  other  typical
accoutrements of elite warriors: when Salonius and Sagittarius are forced into a
monastery, their transition from armed to unarmed life is marked by the loss of
“tam equos quam pueros” in addition to their other possessions, neither of which
were mentioned in the vague accounts of their many excesses.808 Thus, like equi,
we  have  cause  to  suspect  that  the  pueri were  more  ubiquitous  than  their
infrequent appearances in the  Histories implies, and they may have been more
numerous than the  viri  who dominate Gregory’s attentions. On a rare occasion
when he does give a  number of  pueri in  the company of a  powerful  figure,
Gregory states that the newly appointed royal official, Andarchius, travelled with
“septem pueri tantum”, implying that exalted figures would be expected to be
accompanied by considerably larger entourages.809
    Thanks to Gregory’s evident lack of interest in non-elite figures, what we see
of  pueri is  confined,  even  more  than  our  impression  of  elite  viri,  to  the
spectacular.  But  we are  at  least  provided with  a  wide  array  of  contexts  and
incidents that indicate the range of duties, opportunities and hazards to which
these figures were exposed. In elaborating on the evil character of Rauching,
Gregory reveals that it was customary for a puer to hold a candle at his master’s
table to illuminate his dinner, as a prelude to his accusation that Rauching would
force his  puer to hold the candle between his shins until the flame burned his
skin - “...If he uttered a sound or tried to escape, Rauching threatened him with a
naked  sword,  revelling  with  great  pleasure  in  the  puer’s  weeping.”810 Given
Gregory’s  evident  hatred  of  Rauching,  it  is  likely  that  this  scene,  like  the
merchant  Christopher’s  “crebrius  gravissime”  beatings  of  his  pueri,811 was
supposed to  exemplify behaviour  that  was reprehensible,  or  at  the very least
excessive. These incidents illustrate the exceptional proximity and trust between
808 Histories V.20
809 Histories IV.46. This broadly reflects the Salian provisions on abductions, which envisage up
to nine followers in addition to the principle offender – Pactus XIII
810 “Nam si ante eum, ut adsolet, convivio utenti puer cereum tenuisset, nudari eius tibias 
faciebat atque tamdiu in his cereum comprimi, donec lumine privaretur; iterum cum 
inluminatus fuisset, similiter faciebat, usque dum totae tibiae famuli tenentes exurirentur. 
Quod si vocem emittere aut se de loco illo alia in parte movere conatus fuisset, nudus ilico 
gladius imminibat, fiebatque, ut, hoc flente, iste magna laetitia exultaret.” Histories V.3
811 See above, p. 200
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pueri and their patrons, of which there are several other examples, and hint at the
conventional limits of maltreatment. Indeed, the divinely ordained punishment of
those who wantonly mistreat their pueri is a theme that appears three times in the
Histories,  constituting a small  but significant trope.812 But such incidents also
throw into relief the exceptional exposure of the pueri – who were always close
at  hand  and  expected  to  be  physically  and  psychologically  robust  –  to  the
violence and aggression of their masters. The death of the merchant Christopher
at the hands of his abused  pueri highlights the risks of such abuse,  but their
subsequent capture and condemnation to death also implies that short of virtually
suicidal  rebellion,  there  was  little  or  nothing  a  puer could  do  to  avoid  the
arbitrary power of a violent patron.
    The exposure to violence experienced by pueri was not, of course, limited to
victimization  at  the  hands  of  their  superiors.  Much  more  frequently  in  the
Histories,  they appear as participants in public conflicts, and are frequently on
the receiving end of the worst consequences of those conflicts.813 The violence of
the  pueri is often deployed explicitly on behalf of their patrons,  but on several
occasions they exhibit a high degree of agency, which goes beyond the better
judgement of their ostensible leaders. We have seen how the famous Tours ‘feud’
was sparked by an attack of one puer upon another, without apparent permission
from his master, and how several pueri of Childeric the Saxon killed Vedast after
an exchange of  insults,  necessitating a  compensatory payment.814 And further
signs of the agency and volatility of these figures appears when a puer of one of
Childebert’s ambassadors in Carthage first snatches an item from a merchant’s
stall,  and  then  kills  the  merchant  when  confronted  over  the  theft,  setting  in
motion a chain of events that results in the deaths of several nobles and lasting
enmity between Childebert and the empire.815
812 In addition to the above examples, Theodulf’s fatal fall, which is precipitated by a drunken 
attempt to punch a puer in the back of the head – Histories X.14. Cf. VIII.41 (on which more
below).
813 For instance, Histories V.14; VI.17; VI.32; VII.29; X.2
814 See above.
815 “...unus puerorum, Euanti scilicet, qui cum eodem abierat, direptam speciem de manu 
cuiusdam negutiatoris metato detulit. Quem ille prosecutus cuius res erant, reddi sibi rem 
propriam flagitabat. Sed isto differente, cum de die in diem hoc iurgium in maius 
propagaretur, quadam die negutiator puerum illum in platea repperit, adpraehensumque 
vestimento eius, tenere coepit, dicens, quia: 'Non a me laxaberis, priusquam res, quas 
violenter deripuisti, meae dicione restituas'. At ille excutere se de eius manibus conatus, non 
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    The pueri are only ever glimpsed in the more detailed, small-scale incidents of
violence that appear in the Histories, and are never mentioned in the context of
large-scale warfare. However, this does not mean that they did not participate,
and it may well be that Gregory subsumes them into the broad category of viri in
the same way he so frequently subsumes followers into the person of their leader
for literary convenience.816 When, for instance, Claudius rides ahead of his three
hundred viri to assassinate Eberulf, it rapidly becomes clear that he is surrounded
by  previously  unmentioned  pueri,  raising  the  question  of  how  many  of  the
aforementioned viri were in fact pueri, or had pueri of their own.817 Nonetheless,
it  is  significant  that  the  pueri are  so consistently  associated  with  small-scale
violence rather than warfare, and the implication is that – in line with Vegetius’s
psychologically sound principle that soldiers must be prepared for the rigours of
battle  through  minor  skirmishes  –  the  status  of  puer may  have  implied  a
preparatory phase in the life of a warrior, at the end of which stood the status of
vir and  its  associated  rights  and  (direct)  military  obligations.818 From  this
perspective, it is no coincidence that the concept of male youth is dominated by
the term puer  in the sense of junior warrior, just as the concept of manhood is
dominated  by  the  term  vir in  the  sense  of  warrior  in  general.  As  such  this
conceptual category is of considerable importance in understanding how military
preparedness was achieved without official training and camp discipline in the
Frankish kingdoms.
dubitavit erepto gladio hominem trucidare” Histories X.2, 4. Another (non-contemporary) 
example of spontaneous fighting between volatile pueri appears in Gregory’s hagiography – 
“...medio e vulgo commoventur pueri duo in scandalum, nudatoque unus gladio, alterum 
appetit trucidandum.” (The Suffering of St Julian, 5)
816 See Chapter 5.
817 Histories VII.29
818 The provision of Lex Salica, prohibiting ingenui from freeing the leati of their fellow 
freemen (XXVI.1), implies that statuses between full freemen and slavery were already 
recognized, although they may have been less important, at the end of the fifth century. 
Halsall (1998a, p.156-7; 2003, p.49-50), noting that furnished male graves from the Frankish
kingdoms are generally not provided with goods before the age of about twenty, reaches 
similar conclusions. He also persuasively links the pueri to the contubernia mentioned in 
Lex Salica as being involved in housebreakings and kidnappings, although his further 
suggestion – that armies were divided by age group – cannot be verified.
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    Given the Histories’ episodic structure and focus on elites, evidence for social
mobility at the level of the pueri is understandably meagre, but what little there
is suggests a strong link between the commission of violence and advancement
to elite status.  In a particularly revealing passage,  Fredegund,  accused of the
killing of her enemy, bishop Praetextatus, has a puer seized and beaten over the
incident; he is sent for interrogation at the hands of Praetextatus’ nephew, and
under  duress  reportedly  makes  the  following  confession  before  being  cut  to
pieces: “‘I received a hundred gold pieces from queen Fredegund for what I did.
From bishop Melanius I received another fifty and from the archdeacon of the
city fifty more. In addition to this, I had a promise to them that I should be given
my freedom and that my wife, too, should be freed’.”819 There are several layers
of interest  in this  incident,  which brings into relief  the potential  rewards and
punishments associated with the violence of  pueri, as well as highlighting the
tension  between  subordination  and  agency  that  characterized  the  relationship
between pueri and their masters.
    First, the grand total of the sums supposedly promised to the  puer – two
hundred solidi – is worthy of note for its symbolic importance in the Lex Salica,
where it represents the wergeld of a free man.820 By connecting each violent act
to a specific numerical value, the Salic Laws may thus have set the standard not
only for seeking redress for those acts, but also for ascribing positive values to
their commission.821 To borrow the language of modern finance, the ‘liability’
value ascribed to this act of violence in the Laws also framed conceptions of its
‘asset’ value. In other words, if killing a free man will cost two hundred solidi in
respect of those people who do not want to see it  happen (i.e.  his  allies and
relatives), it might also command two hundred solidi in respect of those who do
wish to see it happen (i.e. his enemies). The same logic can be seen operating
tacitly in the compensation paid by Childeric on behalf of his puer in respect of
the killing of Avius, a man to whom he was evidently hostile.822
819 “'A regina enim Fredegunde centum solidus accepi, ut hoc facerem, a Melantio vero 
episcopo quinquaginta et ab archediacono civitates alios quinquaginta; insuper et promissum 
habui, ut ingenuus fierem, sicut et uxor mea'.” Histories VIII.41. The reference to a wife 
circumstantially undermines the case for assuming that pueri would be adolescentes.
820 Pactus, XLI.1
821 See Chapter 4.
822 Histories VII.3
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    The  second,  more  general  implication  of  the  incident  is  the  relationship
between violence and social progress to which it points. For the first and only
time in the Histories,  we see a clear example – albeit an idiosyncratic one – of
what it could take to make the leap from puer status to full freedom. This chimes
with  the  more  widely  attested  and  generally  recognized  connection  between
military  violence  and  political  advancement  of  which  the  Histories  presents
several examples.823 The link between military service and potential freedom is
well established.824 But the puer’s reward for the killing of Praetextatus illustrates
– in line with what we have seen of Gregory’s literary partitioning of pueri from
military  violence  –  that  ‘private’ violence  on  behalf  of  the  powerful  could
equally be integral to social climbing, and potentially that such private violence
might be an ordinary preliminary to involvement in the military violence that
was the proper domain of viri.
    The third point of interest of the Fredegund incident consists in the implied
underlying controversy over the question of Fredegund’s personal responsibility
for the slaying of Praetextatus, and the issues of agency and volatility among the
pueri that it raises. There can be little doubt that Fredegund would have told a
different story about the death of Praetextatus to that offered by Gregory,  for
while his version of events makes emphatically clear her culpability, the reaction
of  the  murdered  bishop’s  nephew  and  his  supporters,  who  were  apparently
satisfied with the dismemberment of the puer ostensibly commissioned to do the
deed, implies that another  version of events was accepted in practice.  And –
given that Fredegund herself brought the accusation against her own puer – this
story might have had more in common with the most famous medieval incident
of bishop-slaying, the twelfth-century martyrdom of Thomas Becket, than the
narrative preferred by Gregory.825 In other words, Fredegund would presumably
have  argued  that  the  puer had  over-interpreted  her  evident  hostility  to
Praetextatus, just as Henry II’s knights arguably did six centuries later in respect
823 For instance, Histories, VIII.29
824 See Chapter 2; Chapter 4, and below.
825 Warren, W. L. Henry II (Berkeley 1973), p. 508-510 - “Whether Henry actually spoke the 
famous words ‘Will no one rid me of this turbulent priest’, there is no means of knowing… 
That he uttered some such words is, however, beyond doubt, for Henry himself later 
admitted responsibility, although disclaiming any intention of wishing to procure the 
archbishop’s death.”
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of Becket,  and taken it  upon himself  to  demonstrate  his  virtus (in  the  sense
conveyed in reported speech rather than the sense preferred by Gregory himself)
without waiting for explicit orders.
    Both versions of events – the one given by Gregory, which tends to view the
puer as the instrument of Fredegund’s will, and the other, implicit version, that
evidently  attributed  independent  agency  to  the  puer –  are  credible,  but  it  is
significant  that  contemporaries  were  apparently  more  inclined  to  believe  the
latter. This chimes with the impression given out by the apparently independent
and  wilful  behaviour  of  the  pueri of  Austregisel,  Childeric  the  Saxon,
Childebert’s ambassadors in Carthage, and of course the merchant Christopher,
who were all  apparently capable of unexpected and unwarranted moments of
violence that went far beyond the will of their patrons. All of these incidents
suggest that pueri – predictably given our discussion of the behavioural effects of
exposure  to  violence  –  could  be  prone  to  aggressive  volatility  that  at  times
escaped the boundaries imposed by convention, authority and even strategic self-
interest. They also suggest that as long as those excesses were directed at the
enemies of their patrons, or socially unimportant figures, they could be tolerated
and  even  defended  by  the  pueri’s  overlords,  although  the  denunciation  of
Fredegund’s puer illustrates the risks of putting one’s master in hot water. Thus,
the  aggressive  volatility  of  the  pueri was  by  no  means  systematically
discouraged.  On the  contrary,  such excesses  might  have  been integral  to  the
building of reputation for violent  virtus  and  virilitas that could make the  puer
worthy of elevation to the status of vir.
    In  considering  the  warrior  culture  of  the  Frankish  kingdoms  from  the
perspective of psychological and behavioural conditioning, the close relationship
between pueri and senior members of the (primarily warrior) elite, their exposure
to the violence and demands for violence of that elite, and their evident volatility,
may be fundamental in  understanding the constant  (re-)generation of military
preparedness by social means. The relationship facilitated not only the practice
of violence in a controlled (relative to the battlefield) environment, but also the
vital  psychological  conditioning  –  the  “toughening  up”  process  –  that
(re-)generated  the  aggressive  and  potentially  volatile  behavioural  profiles  so
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essential  for combat enthusiasm.826 Through the lens of strategic analysis  that
sees violence as directed toward socio-economic advancement, the various ill-
conceived  acts  of  violence  attributed  to  the  pueri,  which  evidently  brought
considerable trouble to all concerned, seem aberrant. But from the perspective of
behavioural conditioning, they can be viewed as predictable by-products of, and
episodes  in,  the  violent  socialization  processes  by  which  innately  empathetic
individuals were transformed into fully formed viri. That is, into men who would
not  be  alarmed by the  horrors  of  battle,  and who could  could  fight  and kill
without hesitation or compunction.
    The probable ubiquity of pueri serving as agents and bodyguards of exalted
figures raises the question of Gregory’s own retinue of armed men (viri/pueri),
who  are  never  mentioned  overtly,  much  less  described  as  being  involved  in
violence or even acting on his behalf in some other capacity. It is hardly credible
that the bishop of Tours uniquely walked alone amid the dangerous retinues of
his  exalted  contemporaries,  but  given  his  aversion  to  making  the  Histories
biographical, and his self-presentation as a righteous prophet,827 it is unsurprising
that  these  figures  remain  anonymous.  Nonetheless,  in  line  with our  previous
observation that Gregory was inclined to efface violence to avoid scandal, it is
worth considering the possibility  that  his  own  pueri are  at  times deliberately
excluded from the incidents that relate to himself and his domains.
    Particular suspicion arises in relation to Gregory’s extensive account of the
violence at St Martins that led to the deaths not only of the fugitive Eberulf, but
also the royal servant sent to kill or capture him – Claudius – and many of the
pueri of  both  men.828 Prefacing  the  incident,  Gregory  tells  us,  by  way  of
explanation for his absence from the scene, that he was away at the time, visiting
a local country estate.829 He also accuses Claudius of acting not only on royal
826 Simon, D. & Burns, E. The Corner: A year in the life of an inner-city neighbourhood (New 
York 1997), p. 234-5. See Chapter 1, section 2.
827 Heinzelmann (2001), p. 36-59
828 Histories VII.29. 
829 “...cum nos in villam quasi milia triginta ab urbe commoraremur...” The convenience of this 
ostensible coincidence has been pointed out by more than one historian – Brown (2002), p. 
21; Heinzelmann (2001), p. 58, n. 40
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orders,  but  also  secretly  accepting  payment  from  Fredegund  to  ensure  that
Eberulf died. These facts, and an extensive condemnation of Eberulf’s character
that  details  some  of  his  misdeeds  and  the  personal  animus  he  felt  toward
Gregory, set the scene for the disorderly massacre of fugitives and royal allies
alike. Claudius, we are informed, attacked Eberulf, mortally wounding him and
being mortally wounded himself in the process. With Eberulf dead, the stricken
Claudius and his  pueri took refuge inside the Abbot’s cell, where the  pueri  of
Eberulf found them and restarted the fighting. But the dramatic intervention of a
third party – certain “inergumini ac diversi egeni” armed only with stones and
sticks – resulted in the total slaughter of both parties. Leaving the naked bodies
of  their  victims  outside,  these  anonymous  “Percussores  vero  nocte  sequenti,
adpraehensis spoliis, fuga dilabuntur,” never to be seen again.
    The scene, despite its unique evocation of “inergumini ac diversi egeni” (who
apparently begged in the vicinity of Tours cathedral) as effective killers, capable
of taking on the fully armed pueri in the retinues of elite warriors, nonetheless
has a certain prima facie credibility. Gregory’s tendency to only introduce lesser
figures into his narrative where they become involved in momentous violence is
already well observed, and it is quite possible that this is an example of the same
habit. In the chaos of a disorderly skirmish between two hostile factions inside
the  precincts  of  Tours  cathedral  the  pueri of  both  sides  would  have  been
exceptionally vulnerable to attack. As Michael Burrows has pointed out, Gregory
surely had access to plentiful detailed information about the incident, and it is
likely  that  his  version  of  events  would  have  been  broadly  credible  to
contemporaries.830 As  such,  his  account  offers  a  tantalizing  glimpse  into  the
perceived restiveness and dangerousness of an otherwise unknown and unarmed
mass of urban indigents.831
830 Burrows, M.  “Gregory of Tours, political criticism and lower-class violence”, in Wood, I et 
al (ed.), Mirabilia 18 (2014), p. 38-44. 
831 Sulpicius Severus also noted the presence of such inergumini in the vicinity of St Martin’s, 
crying out for relief from their possession, but did not apparently consider them to be 
physically dangerous - Grey, “Demonaics and Dissent, and Disempowerment in the Late 
Roman West: Some Case Studies from the Hagiographical Literatures”, in Journal of Early 
Christian Studies, 13.1 (2005), p. 42, citing Sulpicius Severus, Dialogues, 2.3
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    However, several aspects of the circumstances of this report make the incident
it purports to describe an especially strong candidate for self-interested distortion
on  Gregory’s  part.  King  Guntram’s  allies  were  massacred  in  Gregory’s  own
cathedral, a slaughter that could have put the bishop under threat of retaliation
were he judged to be responsible.832 “King Guntram,” Gregory remarks dryly,
“was furious at what had happened, but he calmed down when he learned the full
details”.833 We also know that Claudius and his pueri formed the advance guard
of a force of three hundred men (many of whom presumably had personal ties of
loyalty  to  him)  who  would  have  arrived  at  Tours  shortly  after  the  incident
looking for an explanation for the carnage.834 These conditions beg the question:
would Gregory have admitted it  if  his  own  viri and  pueri had been partially
responsible for the slaughter? Could he have done so without risk to his own
position or the lives of his followers? Or might he instead have stolen away to a
nearby country residence with the guilty individuals, and claimed ignorance of
the whole messy affair?
    Some  other  features  of  the  incident  seem  to  militate  toward  this  more
pessimistic  interpretation.  First,  despite  his  dramatic  denunciations  of  the
fugitive Eberulf, Gregory makes no effort to disguise his disgust at Claudius’s
attempt to kill him by deceit within the sanctuary of St Martins, or his delight at
the slaughter of Claudius and his pueri.: “The vengeance of God was not slow to
fall  on those who had defiled his holy house with blood”, he proclaims with
evident  satisfaction,  “but  the  wrongdoing  of  Eberulf,  whom  St  Martin  had
permitted to endure all this, was certainly very great.”835 Of course, Gregory’s
own reverence for the sanctity of St Martin’s makes it unlikely that he would
personally order a spate of killings within its precincts, but we have already seen
how he sanctioned an assault on the occupants of the nunnery of Poitiers. And
given what we have seen of the agency and volatility of the  pueri who served
elite figures, killings  need not have been the result of specific orders. Gregory
832 We have already seen the violent humiliation of bishop Theodore at the hands of Guntram’s 
men above – Histories VI.11
833 Histories VII.29
834 Claudius’s body was apparently collected by his “parentes”. (ibid)
835 “Adfuit autem Dei ultio de praesenti super eos, qui beatum atrium humano sanguine 
polluerunt. Sed nec eius facenus parvum esse censetur, quem talia beatus antestis perferre 
permisit.”
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was  certainly  more  than  willing  to  celebrate  the  slaughter,  after  the  fact.
Furthermore, the virtually superfluous effort of depositing the despoiled bodies
of Claudius and his pueri outside the cathedral after the killings looks distinctly
like the kind of behaviour observed among elite figures, like  Chramnesind and
Childebert, elsewhere in the Histories in respect of their slain enemies.836 It may
seem contradictory to simultaneously advertise a killing and to deny it publicly,
but  we have  already observed other  probable  instances  of  such behaviour  in
Fredegund’s  handling  of  the  Praetextatus  affair,  and Brunhild’s  dealings  with
Abbot Lupentius and his killer, Count Innocentius.837
    All this returns us to the thorny issue of Gregory’s own attitude to violence, as
an author and – as the tendentious sequence of events discussed above throws
into sharper relief – as a powerful figure with extensive political involvements,
domains  and  armed  followers.  The  argument  that  Gregory  systematically
overstated violence for moral purposes having been undermined, the question
that now arises is whether the bishop systematically downplayed the violence of
his own strangely anonymous and invisible followers for political purposes, or
due to a desire to preserve his own reputation in the eyes of posterity. No firm
answer can be obtained, but we have already seen how Gregory admired the
sudden and apparently spontaneous violence of bishop Aurelius’s  viri  strenui
against  a  wandering  preacher,  and  even  demanded  violence  in  respect  of
Clotild’s  “evil-doers,  fornicators  and fugitives” (themselves  probably  viri and
pueri).838 It would therefore be remiss to neglect the possibility that if we had an
account of Gregory’s activities from a hostile perspective, he may have looked
less like an Old Testament prophet,839 and more like the elite figures he execrates
for complicity in the violence of their retinues.
836 Histories IX.19
837 See above, and Chapter 5.
838 See Chapter 5
839 Heinzelmann (2001), p. 140-143
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6.3 – Violently Socialised Individuals in the Histories
    So far we have analysed the  Histories primarily in order to improve our
understanding of the norms and expectations regarding violence and warriors,
and the  process  of  violent  socialization.  But  we have  also  seen  considerable
evidence of violence that goes beyond those norms and expectations, becoming
strategically  questionable,  excessive  and  ‘maladaptive’.840 This  aspect  of
violence has been almost absolutely ignored in recent historiography, which has
inclined  decisively  toward  explanations  of  violence  that  emphasise  its  social
functions and strategic value.841 But in psychological perspective, such evidence
of inappropriate violence should be taken seriously on a case-by-case basis as a
potential opportunity to observe the behavioural and psychological pathologies
of the Frankish warrior elite. 
    The psychological perspective also tells us that the causes of maladaptive
violence must be sought as much in the past experiences of its perpetrators as in
social expectations or strategic motivations. This is particularly problematic in
the study of early medieval sources, since most violent characters appear as fully
formed adults, before disappearing just as quickly. There is nothing resembling a
detailed ‘life course’ biography of any individual from the period,  that might
allow us to look in detail at the relationship between their experiences and their
subsequent violent actions. But the  Histories do in fact offer a few fascinating
reflections  –  some incidental,  others  deliberate  –  on  the  relationship  of  past
experience to present behaviour in this respect. And as such they present a rare
opportunity to contextualize the violence of at least a few individuals in their
past experiences.
    However,  any  such  deductive  conclusions,  based  as  they  are  on  partial
information (in every sense), necessarily only represent one potential version of
events.  But a further perspective through which aspects of the psychology of
violence in the Frankish kingdoms may be sought is Gregory’s moral register,
which as we have seen extends to a recurrent concern with the violent excesses
of his contemporaries. The Histories are full of salutary tales for monks, priests,
840 That is, maladaptive to contemporary society rather than our own. See Chapter 1, section 2.
841 Dailey (2015, p. 158-9) acknowledges this point without pursuing it.
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counts and kings, many of which did not fit comfortably into any grand schema,
but  rather  addressed  individual  aspects  of  contemporary  sinfulness,  such  as
excessive consumption of alcohol, false oaths, or the violation of the sanctuary
of the Church. But they also show a recurrent interest in acts of what modern
psychologists  would describe as pathological  or maladaptive violence,  and in
doing so  they  shine  a  light  on Gregory’s  sense  of  the  pathologies  that  most
troubled contemporary society. In other words, even where we suspect that the
information  regarding  violence  in  the  Histories is  deliberately  selected,
emphasised, exaggerated or distorted for narrative effect, the character of these
emphases and exaggerations can tell us much about Gregory’s sense of the kinds
of violence that demanded his moral intervention, and the pathologies that drove
them.
    Therefore  this  section  will  consider  the  theme  of  learned  maladaptive
aggression  among  Gregory’s  contemporaries,  and  his  appreciation  of  the
phenomenon. For these purposes, four case studies, focusing on characters about
whom  some  sense  of  behavioural  development  can  be  gleaned  (that  is,
individuals who appear more than once in Gregory’s narrative, and about whom
some  informative  biographical  information  is  provided)  will  be  considered.
These  are  Leudast,  the  former  count  of  Tours;  the  sons  of  the  former  royal
chamberlain, Waddo; the queen Fredegund; and the Breton monk Winnoch.
Leudast, Count of Tours
    Leudast, whose exploits have come up repeatedly in the course of our analysis
of the  Histories, is one of the characters for whom we are best provided with
biographical  information  by  Gregory,  including  –  almost  uniquely  –  some
reference to his  childhood.842 Plainly,  Gregory despised this  low-born upstart,
who for years had thrown his weight around in his bishopric. And the fact of
Leudast’s  lack  of  influential  family,  who  might  protect  his  reputation
posthumously,  freed  Gregory  to  add  the  kind  of  lurid  detail  to  his
characterization  of  the  former  count  that  we  rarely  find  in  respect  of  still-
842 Histories V.47, 48, 49; VI.32
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influential figures. This makes Gregory’s unsympathetic portrayal tendentious,
especially when it comes to his personal dealings with Leudast, but it equally
liberates the biography from the kind of self-censorship that applied to Gregory’s
accounts  of  himself  and such figures  as  Childebert  and Brunhild.  Given that
Leudast was count in Gregory’s jurisdiction, and even attended St Martins, we
can at least be certain that the information on which the Histories account was
based was detailed and partly derived from personal experience. As importantly,
Leudast  could  act  as  a  template  of  condemnable  behaviour  and  its  evil
consequences, through which Gregory could communicate his moral concerns to
others  who  held  secular  office  as  he  wrote  the  Histories,  including  the
anonymous man who held the countship of Tours.
    According to Gregory, Leudast was turgidum rixis,843 and flew into rages when
sitting in judgement on his citizens, having clerics and officials beaten altogether
too  readily  for  Gregory’s  taste.  In  other  words,  Leudast  was  described  as
exhibiting  heightened  aggression  and  emotion  dysregulation,  with  specific
references  to  incidents  of  reactive  aggression.844 We  are  also  informed,  in
Gregory’s typically vague style, that Leudast was guilty of “tantamque utebatur
crudelitatem, ut vix referri possit”. We have already seen how the evil bishops,
Salonius  and  Sagittarius,  were  accused  of  attacking  their  own  flocks  in  the
course of disputes, and similar charges were levelled at the mayor-turned-bishop,
Badegisel.  As such Gregory’s accusations against  Leudast may be generically
indicative of his concerns about the excessive violence of those in positions of
political power, which, as we have seen, the laws did nothing to prevent.
    But a more idiosyncratic detail opens up a sense of the process by which
Leudast might have acquired his reputed violent inclinations. In an observation
that is  both precise and verifiable by contemporaries, Leudast is said,  after  a
period in exile and subsequent (unexplained) reinstatement, to have walked into
church  fully  armed  and  armoured,  “de  nullo  securus,  quia  omnia  erat
843 Rixae, in keeping with the salient features of Gregory’s nomenclature, can be understood 
broadly as disputes, but with connotations of physical violence.
844 Comparison of Leudast’s reported behaviour with the Buss-Perry Aggression Questionnaire 
is suggestive - Buss, A. H., & Perry, M. “The Aggression Questionnaire” in Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 63 (1992), p. 452-459”
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adversus.”845 Although, clearly, churches were not necessarily safe places even
for the great and good, Gregory’s hyperbolic claim – that Leudast had no allies in
Tours – is untenable. In psychological perspective, the more realistic explanation
for the unusual habit of wearing armour even in relatively safe environments is
that Leudast was displaying symptoms of the kind of hostile attribution biases,
heightened  threat  perception,  and  hyper-vigilance  associated  with  past
experiences of violence, and exacerbated by the evident insecurity of Leudast’s
position.846 This  may in fact  have been what  Gregory meant  with the phrase
“omnia erat adversus”: not that Leudast was regarded as an enemy by all, but
that he regarded all as potential enemies. And there are some signs in Gregory’s
account that Leudast’s progress to the countship had been marked by experiences
of violence, both as victim and aggressor.
    As a slave in the royal kitchens and bakery of an unnamed monarch, we find
out that Leudast was an unusually spirited youth.847 His repeated escape attempts,
which presumably could not be remedied by the ordinary expedient of  caedes
and  verbera,  eventually  resulted  in  his  mutilation  –  “auris  unius  incisione
multatur”. This act was apparently designed to make him clearly identifiable as
an escapee, raising the possibility that it was a customary form of mutilation that
calls to mind the provisions of Lex Salica.848 Subsequently, Leudast was adopted
in spite of his mark by queen Marcovefa, somehow earning the important role of
custodian of some of her best horses. After this vaguely described promotion,
Leudast disappears from view, only to re-emerge as count of Tours without any
explicit indication of the mechanisms by which this became possible. But the
count’s  actions  after  falling  from  royal  favour  are  instructive:  rather  than
petitioning Chilperic directly, Leudast “asked the army to intercede for him with
Chilperic and gain him an audience. They all gave him their support and the king
845 Histories V.48. For an attempt to unpick the details of Leudast’s political involvements, see 
Van Dam, R. Saints and their Miracles in Late Antique Gaul, (Princeton 1993), p. 256-8 
846 Chen, P., Coccaro, E. F. & Jacobson, K. C. “Hostile Attributional Bias, Negative Emotional 
Responding, and Aggression in Adults: Moderating Effects of Gender and Impulsivity, in 
Aggressive Behaviour 38:1 (Jan-Feb 2012), p. 47-63; Dodge, K.A. & Somberg, D. R. 
“Hostile attributional biases among aggressive boys are exacerbated under conditions of 
threats to the self”, in Child Development 58:1 (Feb 1987), p. 213-224
847 Histories V.48
848 See Chapter 4, section 3.
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agreed to see him.”849 The clear implication is that Leudast had, in the course of
his  rise  to  the  countship,  distinguished  himself  by  military  service,  and  had
subsequently  proved  an  effective  commander  of  the  Tours  levies  as  count,
evoking a familiar picture of advancement of the unfree or semi-free puer to the
status  of  vir through the successful  commission of violence on behalf  of the
powerful. In the process of this astronomical rise, Leudast had also apparently
won armed allies, and possibly enemies, in the Bourges region, to whom he fled
when he lost his political struggle against Gregory.850
    The sketchy picture of Leudast’s life thus obtained takes us beyond Gregory’s
moral  agenda,  hinting  at  a  process  of  violent  socialization  that  helps  us  to
understand  his  reported  aggression  and  vigilance  as  count.  A  period  of
brutalization  in  the  formative  phase  of  adolescence  was  complemented  by
subsequent demands for the performance of violence, in a sequence very much
reminiscent of that described by criminologist Lonnie Athens in relation to the
creation  of  intractably  violent  behavioural  profiles.851 Thus,  instead  of  seeing
Leudast’s  reported  aggressive  and  vigilant  behaviour  solely  as  outcomes  of
strategic decision-making, or as equally strategic propaganda by which Gregory
sought to calumniate his adversary, the possibility opens up that the journey of
this man from slave to count, and specifically the experiences of violence both as
victim and perpetrator  entailed in  this  process,  had more-or-less  permanently
disposed him to aggression, reactive violence, vigilance and hostile attribution
biases. 
The Sons of Waddo
    Other than Leudast, there is only other instance in the Histories in which the
actions  of adult  warriors  are  contextualised by some direct  reference to their
childhood experience.  This is  the story of the anonymous sons of another of
849 Histories VI.32
850 Histories V.49
851 Athens, L. “Violentization in larger social context”, in Athens, L. & Ullmer, J. T. (eds.) 
Violent acts and violentization: assessing, applying, and developing Lonnie Athens’ theories 
(Oxford 2003), p. 8-18
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Gregory’s  more  disreputable  characters,  one-time  count  of  Saints,  Waddo.852
These men, who were active in the Poitiers region, were apparently known to
Gregory  more  by  reputation  than  as  a  result  of  personal  contact.853 But  the
involvement  of  their  father  in  the  disastrous  sojourn  of  Rigunth’s  doomed
baggage train and the subsequent failed rebellion of Gundovald drew them into
Gregory’s sphere of interest.  What little we know of their lives as a result is
clearly embellished for dramatic effect, but nonetheless again throws issues of
psychological development under violent social conditions into relief.
    Waddo,  who was  major-domo to  the  pricess  Rigunth  at  the  time  of  her
betrothal,  was  clearly  held  in  contempt  by  Gregory  for  what  he  saw as  the
opportunistic  plundering  of  Rigunth’s  rich  dowry  en  route  to  Spain  and
subsequent support for the pretender Gundovald. He was one of that generation
of famous traitors to the Frankish royal family – alongside duke Desiderius, the
patrician  Mummolus,  and bishop Sagittarius  – who Gregory  was at  pains  to
portray as ultimately suffering divine punishment in respect of their crimes and
general moral turpitude. Like Desiderius, and unlike Mummolus and Sagittarius,
Waddo somehow escaped death in respect of his part  in the rebellion, but he
eventually met a bad end in an attempt to seize control of a country estate in the
course of a legal dispute.854 Sometime later we find his sons engaged in a career
of violent banditry in the Poitiers region which, unfortunately for them, results in
the  death  of  a  royal  official.  They  come  to  the  king  bearing  treasures  –
presumably by way of compensation – but are tortured and condemned to death
and exile.855
    This  tragic  sequence  of  events  lends  itself  readily  to  religious-moral
interpretation.  The  death  and  exile  of  Waddo’s  sons,  who  are  tortured  into
revealing the location of his stolen treasure, calls to mind the biblical passages,
“the wages of sin...”, and “the sins of the father shall be visited on his sons...”856
But  strategically,  the  resort  to  banditry  of  these  young  men  defies  ready
852 Histories VII.28, 38, 39; IX.35; X.21
853 Although Gregory’s failure to name the sons may be the result of affectation rather than 
ignorance, as in the case of the killer of his brother, Peter (Histories V.5).
854 Histories IX.34
855 Histories X.21
856 Romans VI.23; Exodus XX.5
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explanation. Why, if the sons of Waddo had access to a rich cache of treasure,
presumably  including  a  quantity  of  coin  in  addition  to  its  more  unique  and
readily  identifiable  items,  would  they  set  about  violently  robbing  wealthy
passers-by at the risk of their own considerable fortunes, and indeed their lives?
Surely for able men of substance, there were other courses of action available?
The psychological perspective suggests that the causes of their behaviour may be
productively sought in their prior experiences, and in this case we are lucky to be
provided with some highly suggestive vignettes from the young lives of these
doomed men.
    The first mention of Waddo’s sons sees them being abandoned by their father
in his escape from the forces of Guntram outside the walls of Comminges.857 It is
not made clear whether this was a formal act of hostage-giving or the mere side-
effect  of  disorderly  flight  from impending  death,858 but  the  latter  is  implied.
Whatever the case, the young boys were left in the custody of an army that was
especially volatile and violent, implicated as it was in indiscriminate slaughter
both  within  Comminges  and  on  the  journey  home,  and  presumably
psychologically distressed by their difficult campaign.859 Gregory tells us nothing
about how the boys were treated, but given Waddo’s disgrace and removal from
royal protection, his children were hardly protected from the aggression of their
captors.
    The second appearance of Waddo’s boys finds them reunited with their father,
and becomes the occasion for another  idiosyncratic  piece of scene setting by
Gregory. In a unique evocation of social interaction between father and child in
the  household,  Gregory  casts  both  wife  and  child  as  Cassandras  to  Waddo’s
Priam: 
“...she said to him, ‘Don’t go, dearest husband! You will be killed if you
do! Then I and my children will be left destitute”…One of the boys
857 Histories VII.38-39
858 “Igitur Leudeghyselus rediens ad castra cum Mummolo et Sagittario, Chariulfo vel 
Waddone, nuntios occulte ad regem diregit, quid de his fieri vellit. At ille capitali eos iussit 
finire sententiam. Waddo tunc cum Chariulfo, relictis filiis obsedibus, discesserunt ab eis.” - 
Histories VII.39
859 The large army suffered from internal dissension between the regional units and raided 
widely and violently, both before and after the massacre at Comminges – Histories VII.38
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said: ‘If you go, father, we shall die! You will leave my mother a widow
and my brothers orphans!’ No matter what  they said,  they could not
dissuade Waddo. He flew into a mad rage with his son, upbraiding him
as a coward and a weakling, throwing an axe at him and nearly killing
him. The boy jumped to one side and avoided the blow.”860 
Sure enough, having ignored the pleas of his wife and son, Waddo attacks the
bailiff of the estate and is felled by a spear thrown by the son of the (possibly
accidentally) slain man. “Waddo’s son, who was sobbing his heart out, put him
on a horse and carried him back home”, where he died.861
  The  preliminary  household  scene,  like  the  one  between  Sichar  and
Chramnesind discussed earlier, is unusually intimate, but carries more hallmarks
of dramatic device, and we have much less reason to believe that Gregory had
uniquely privileged information in this case. Although it is of course quite likely
that other, unmentioned characters who might have later passed on the details to
Gregory were present, the conclusion that the scene was crafted in hindsight to
intensify the impact of subsequent, more public and verifiable events, is difficult
to resist. The authorial resort to a hyperbolic example of parental brutality – the
near-fatal  axe  attack  –  fits  comfortably  with  our  previous  observation  that
conventional  hierarchical  beatings  were  insufficient  to  inspire  moral  outrage
among the Histories’ intended audience.862 
    The scene is thus in all probability a crude stereotype that tells us more about
Gregory’s  assumptions  about  life  in  a  warrior  household  than  providing  any
specific  information.  Nonetheless,  Gregory’s  evocation  of  violently  negative
parental reaction to perceived cowardice – here equated with the desire to avoid
conflict  – in a male child,  which is  not matched by a similar reaction to the
virtually identical pleas of Waddo’s wife, is instructive. It gives us a glimpse of
the  dynamics  of  the  warrior  household  as  Gregory  perceived  it,  and  from
psychological  perspective  it  provides  a  credible  insight  into  the  social
860 Perhaps opportunistically given the recent death of the owner, Beretrude. This is another 
potential example of the tendency for the deaths of powerful figures to become the occasion 
for violent disorder observed above.
861 Histories IX.35
862 See above, section 2.1
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mechanisms by which such conflict aversion was ironed out of the young men
who would one day be expected to fight on behalf  of the household and the
army.863
    In psychological perspective, these factors in the lives of Waddo’s sons – their
capture by a hostile army, their treatment in the household at the hands of an
aggressively  volatile  father,  and the witnessing of  his  violent  death – are  all
worthy  of  consideration  in  reflecting  on  their  subsequent,  strategically  inept,
career  of  violent  banditry.  Such  experiences  frequently  play  into  the
developmental trajectory of behaviour, making future aggression and volatility
more likely.864 And the killings of important and well-connected figures in which
they  were  subsequently  implicated  were,  in  part,  manifestations  of  the
behavioural trajectories of these young men. After the disgrace of their father,
Waddo’s sons may no longer have been welcome in the army, but the lack of
legitimate opportunities for violence was evidently insufficient to fundamentally
alter their behavioural inclinations. And the fact that, having discovered that they
were wanted, the young men voluntarily presented themselves to the king with
rich gifts, suggests that their condemnation for these criminal actions was not a
foregone conclusion. On this occasion, the potential utilitas of these men to the
king was outweighed by the desire to avenge his tribune and the prospect of
discovering Waddo’s treasure, providing Gregory the opportunity to use these
young  men  for  the  moral  instruction  of  his  contemporaries.  But  again,  the
implication is that able men of aggressive dispositions could be useful to the
powerful, even if that aggression was sometimes misdirected.
Fredegund
    No other character in the Histories so spectacularly illustrates the potential of
elite  women  to  psychologically  adapt  to,  and  effectively  participate  in,  the
violence of Frankish political and social life, than queen Fredegund.865 She is
personally  implicated in  more  individually  enumerated  killings,  beatings,  and
863 Athens (2003), p. 9, citing Simon & Burns (1997), p. 205-6.
864 See Chapter 1, section 2
865 Gradowicz-Pancer (2002) p. 1-2; Dailey 2015, p. 118-140
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mutilations, than any other individual in the  Histories, but there is also no one
for whom the evidence is so complicated by their political career, social origins,
gender, and relationship to Gregory himself.  As a former serving-woman, the
widow of the “Nero and Herod of our time”, and – most importantly – the mortal
enemy of Childebert and Brunhild, under whose power the bishopric of Tours
resided  when  the  Histories was  brought  to  completion,  Fredegund  was
supremely unlikely to receive a positive treatment in the Histories.866 Gregory, as
we have seen, was also personally aggrieved by Fredegund’s treatment of bishop
Praetextatus, for whose death he held her personally responsible.867 But for all
that, Gregory’s treatment of Fredegund’s behaviour is not entirely negative, and
is marked by a considerable amount of not always unsympathetic reflection on
Fredegund’s state of mind at the time of her violent actions.
    Fredegund is accused by Gregory of all sorts of violent excesses, including the
assassination of king Sigebert and her own son-in-law, Clovis. He even goes so
far as to implicate her in conspiring with Goths and Bretons to bring about the
deaths of Frankish aristocrats and members of the royal family.868 The charges
levelled at Fredegund by Childebert’s emissaries in reported speech, however, go
even  further:  she  is  additionally  accused  of  the  killing  of  Brunhild’s  sister
Galswinth, her other stepson Merovech, and even her own husband, Chilperic, as
well as being referred to as a  homicida and  malefica.869 Gregory’s position on
these incidents is more nuanced: Fredegund is only indirectly implicated in the
death  of  Galswinth,  with  blame  being  squarely  placed  upon  their  mutual
husband, Chilperic; Merovech is again independently suspected and pursued by
Chilperic,  whose  suspicion  is  excited  primarily  by  Merovech’s  marriage  to
Brunhild; and Gregory indirectly exonerates Fredegund over the death of her
husband,  making  clear  that  Chilperic’s  assassination  was  disastrous  for
Fredegund, both personally, and in respect of the marriage plans of her daughter,
866 Wood (1993), p. 258-9. 
867 Histories VIII.31, 41
868 Histories V.18; VIII.31; VIII.41. 
869 “'Redde homicidam, quae amitam meam suggillavit, quae patrem interfecit et patruum, quae 
ipsus quoque consobrinus meus gladio interemit'.” (VII.7); “'Rogat nepus tuus, ut 
Fredegundem maleficam, per quam multi reges interfecti sunt, reddi iubeas ad ulciscendam 
mortem patris, patrui vel consubrinorum suorum'” (VII.14). Ian Wood (1994, p. 124) 
observes that the Liber Historiae Francorum repeats the charge that Fredegund had Chilperic
murdered, claiming that he had discovered her infidelity – Liber Historiae Francorum 35
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Rigunth.870 Gregory  also  insistently  refers  to  Fredegund  as  regina  or  mulier,
rather  than  adopting  the  insulting  language  preferred  by  Childebert’s
emissaries.871 And, as we have seen, although he reports the aspersions cast on
her marital fidelity, he does not use his editorial power to lend credibility to their
provenance.872
    Gregory’s attitude toward Fredegund is thus more ambivalent than it appears
at first glance. His refusal to directly impugn her sexual reputation may have
much to do with the desire to protect the kingdoms from the possibility of civil
war that could result from calling Lothar’s claim into question.873 But the relative
sympathy with which some of her violence is treated is not so readily explained
by reference  to  dynastic  concerns.  As  we  have  seen,  not  all  of  Fredegund’s
killings  equally  excited  Gregory’s  disapproval,  and  some  evidently  won  his
admiration, especially the brutal slaying of Leudast and the feuding viri, whose
deaths Gregory reported with grim satisfaction.874 And even some of her more
controversial assassinations, like the death of Clovis and Sigebert “of glorious
memory”, are prefaced with condemnations of the victims that serve to dilute the
audience’s  sense  of  outrage  and  cast  Fredegund  as  an  astute  decision-maker
and/or the instrument of God’s judgement.875 The assassination of Childebert’s
father,  Sigebert,  is  especially  illustrative  of  Gregory’s  determination  to  avoid
total partisanship: Rather than take the opportunity to bewail the underhanded
plotting  of  Fredegund,  Gregory  makes  clear  that  the  assassination  was  fully
justified – both in political and divine terms – by Sigebert’s sinful determination
to slay his brother, which disdained the prophetic warnings of St Germanus.
    Gregory’s condemnations of Fredegund, then, do not slavishly follow the lines
established by Childebert or his supporters, and he frequently balances them with
specific justifications of her actions, showing some willingness to portray her
870 Histories IV.28; V.2, 3, 14, 18; VI.46; VII.4.
871 Although he does accuse her of harbouring a woman with demonic powers of prophecy – 
Histories VII.44.
872  Dailey (2015, p. 127-8) takes a different view.
873 Wood (1993), p. 258-9. 
874 Histories VI.32; X.27. The killing of the feuding viri (X.27) – in which Fredegund is 
portrayed as well-intentioned and decisive – is especially instructive, since it is included 
gratuitously without any apparent link to wider events. 
875 Histories IV.51. On the circumstances of Clovis’s death, see below.
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actions with at least a modicum of fairness and sympathy. And, while Fredegund
was at  times used by Gregory as an exemplar of deplorable conduct,876 even
these embellishments are not without value, since they tell us something about
the types of behaviour about which he sought to warn his audience. If we do take
the evocations of Fredegund’s psychology seriously, they give the impression of
a  figure  whose  actions  bear  several  hallmarks  of  psychological  adaptations
resulting  from  the  experience  of  violence.  As  in  the  case  of  Leudast,  these
include  reactive  aggression  and  hostile  attribution  biases.  Unlike  the  former
count of Tours, Fredegund’s actions are not contextualized in any accounts of her
youth.  But  they  are  much  more  thoroughly  contextualised  in  immediate
circumstances,  particularly  the  often  politically  motivated  accusations  that
characterized the life  not  just  of Fredegund’s  court,  but  also those courts  for
which Gregory felt more sympathy. They are also embellished with considerably
more reflections upon her motivations and psychological disposition.
    Much of Fredegund’s violence is readily explicable by reference to strategic
concerns, usually the preservation of her and Chilperic’s positions and lives, and
promoting the interests of her children.877 Although Gregory is not at pains to
emphasise the point, Fredegund’s elimination of so many rivals, as well as her
accumulation of vast personal wealth and a coterie of able and loyal followers,
several of whom she induces to undertake virtual suicide missions, marks her out
as a highly capable strategist of considerable intelligence and charisma.878 But
some of Fredegund’s actions bear the hallmarks of a degree of psychological
volatility  and  vigilance  that  exceeds  the  ordinary  requirements  of  political
strategy. The episodes that stand out in this respect are (in chronological order)
some of her dealings with Nicetius, husband to an unnamed niece of Gregory;
with her stepson Clovis and Mummolus the prefect (both of which are associated
with the deaths of her children from disease); with her domesticus Leunard; with
bishop  Praetextatus;  and  with  her  own  daughter,  Rigunth.879 Through  these
876 See Daily 2015, p. 140-159
877 See. For instance, Wood (1994), p. 123-6
878 e.g. Histories IV.51; V.18; VI.32. For a detailed account of the justification of the first phase 
of Fredegund’s vendetta against Praetextatus, and the falsehood of Gregory’s claim that 
Praetextatus’s banishment was uncanonical, see Dailey (2015), p. 222-224
879 Histories V.14; V.39; VI.35; VII.15; VIII.31; IX.34
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incidents,  Gregory constructs  a  picture  of  an individual  –  and possibly  more
importantly,  of  a  court880 –  with  such  sensitivity  to  threats  that  they  are
sometimes perceived even where they do not exist, and with strong inclinations
to respond violently to such perceived threats.
    The first accusation implying hostile attribution bias comes in the context of
the defiance of Fredegund’s stepson, Merovech, who, after an abortive marriage
to her mortal enemy Brunhild, had escaped from relegation to monastic life and
taken refuge in Tours cathedral. Gregory sent a deacon to inform Childeric that
Merovech  had  taken  up  residence  at  Tours,  and  his  relative,  Nicetius,
accompanied the deacon on some other business. But when the two arrived with
the news, Gregory tells us that Fredegund ordered them arrested, claiming that
they were spies sent  by Merovech.881 Of course,  it  is  possible  that Gregory’s
relative was in league with Merovech, and if so we could not very well expect to
be made aware of the fact, but the fact of Nicetius’s subsequent pardon implies
that no evidence to this effect was ever produced.
    The next two incidents relate to the various diseases that ravaged the Frankish
kingdoms in the later 6th century, which were exceptionally hard on Fredegund.
The  queen  was  powerless  to  save  her  children,  whose  deaths  provided
opportunities for substantial reflections by Gregory not only on the moral causes
of  Fredegund’s  loss,  but  their  emotional  consequences.882 But  whatever  the
motives for his portrayal of Fredegund as seriously disturbed by these tragedies,
it  should  be  noted  that  it  is  psychologically  credible,  and  backed  up  with
references to specific and idiosyncratic acts, such as the burning of Chilperic’s
tax-records, and Fredegund’s retirement to the forest of Cuise for a period of
mourning, which do not cast the queen in an entirely negative light.883 After the
880 Gregory’s concern for the destructive effects of court whispering is evident in the Lives of 
the Fathers (VIII.3), in which he explicitly admonishes “those people [who]...do not even 
fear to have witnesses who by wicked reports say ‘We have heard so-and-so saying such-
and-such about you.’”
881 Histories V.14
882 Histories V.22; V.34.
883 Histories V.22; V.34; V.39. Cf. Rosenwein (2006), p. 117. Dailey insists, contra Myers and 
Halsall, that even Fredegund’s burning of the tax-records was intended simply to show that 
she was irredeemably sinful, and that any implied sympathy was accidental, but given 
Gregory’s several other moments of ambiguity toward Fredegund, this is not convincing. See
Dailey 2015, p. 134, citing Myers, H. A. Medieval Kingship (Chicago 1982), p. 86-8, and 
Halsall, “Nero and Herod...” (2002), p. 342.
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death of a third child (Theuderic), however, Gregory reports that Fredegund’s
attribution of the her losses to God rapidly gave way to suspicions of foul play
that  imply  severe  hostile  attribution  biases,  resulting  in  a  violent  campaign
against the perceived culprits.
    The first noble victim of these suspicions is the prefect Mummolus, whose
arrest and mutilation is preceded by an extraordinary episode in which a number
of Parisian women are rounded up and tortured into implicating both him and
themselves  in  the  ostensible  conspiracy,  before  being  executed  as  witches.
Gregory tells us that the grim events were set in motion when “it was announced
to the queen that her little son… had been taken from her by witchcraft  and
incantations,  and that Mummolus the prefect,  whom she had long hated,  was
involved in this.” Gregory is adamant that the story is incorrect, but interestingly,
he does not dismiss it as a pure fiction, telling us instead that it was based on the
rumour that Mummolus had bragged that he possessed a herb which was capable
of  curing  dysentery,  of  which  it  is  implied  that  Theuderic  had  died.  Indeed,
clarifying his dramatic opening statement, Gregory tells us that it was in fact this
rumour that had been reported to Fredegund, at which “a great fury was kindled”
within her.884 
    This  incident,  in  which  the  potentially  malicious  report  of  rumours  is
instrumental,  throws  into  relief  the  importance  of  court  attendants  and  the
rumours circulating among them in generating and exciting hostile attribution
biases.885 Naturally  the  suspicion  arises  that  Gregory  is  seeking  to  portray
Fredegund  negatively,  but  as  a  literary  device,  the  claim  of  a  malefic
misinterpretation  of  Mummolus’s  rash  statements  is  strangely  precise  and
superfluous. Had Gregory sought to paint Fredegund as hysterical, he could have
simply said that she had blamed Mummolus without cause; had he sought to
make her cunning and malicious, he could have reported that she had cynically
used her son’s death as a pretext for the killing of a long-term enemy. What he
actually gives us is a statement by Mummolus which, given the apparent pre-
884 Histories VI.35
885 cf. Dolan (2012), p. 2-9. See above, n. 878
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existing enmity between himself and the queen, was arguably open to the kind of
malefic over-interpretation which Fredegund had placed upon it.
    The next incident – which saw Fredegund’s stepson Clovis imprisoned on
suspicion of witchcraft and assassinated – extends the theme of the psychological
trauma  of  plague,  mixing  it  seamlessly  with  elements  of  dynastic  ambition.
Seeking, Gregory informs us, to bring about Clovis’s death, Fredegund sent him
to the city of Berny, where the plague was still raging. When Clovis returned
unharmed, Gregory reports that “he began to boast in a childish way… ‘fate has
made me heir to the entire country. My enemies are in my power and I may do to
them  whatever  I  choose.’  He  also  made  unforgivable  remarks  about  his
stepmother,  Fredegund.  She  came  to  hear  of  this  and  was  terrified...”886
Subsequently, Gregory tells us that Fredegund was persuaded by unnamed court
attendants  that  Clovis  was  responsible  for  bringing  about  her  sons’ deaths
through witchcraft,  just  as  in  the  case  of  Mummolus  some time  earlier,  and
presumably  by  the  same  logic:  his  personal  safety  from  plague  implied  his
complicity.
    The uncomfortable mixture of cool dynastic strategy and reactive aggression
defies any attempt to neatly categorise the motivations in this incident. In this
case,  of  course,  Fredegund  had  much  better  and  more  practical  reasons  for
wanting rid of her last remaining stepson Clovis, who Gregory makes quite clear
stood ready to dispose of her  once he assumed the throne.  But  interestingly,
without  clearing  the  queen  of  underhanded  tactics  or  dynastic  ambitions,
Gregory implies that her accusations of witchcraft – though unfair – were made
in good faith, and that she was genuinely unsettled by Clovis’s words, which
were both insulting and menacing. The overall impression is of legitimate fears
about Clovis’s intentions dovetailing with hostile attribution biases that tended to
put him at the centre of a conspiracy to which all of Fredegund’s past tragedies
were attributable. And again, discussions at court are implicated in the process.
886 “Igitur cum in supradicta villam apud patrem habitaret, coepit inmaturae iactare vel dicere: 
'Ecce, mortuos fratres meus, ad me restitit omne regnum; mihi universae Galliae subicientur, 
imperiumque universum mihi fata largita sunt! Ecce inimicis in manu positis inferam 
quaecumque placuerit!' Sed et de noverca sua Fredegunde regina non condecibilia 
detractabat. Quae illa audiens, pavore nimio terrebatur.” Histories V.39
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    The same tendencies to hostile attribution bias appear again in the case of
Fredegund’s domesticus Leunard, who comes to Paris to report the sorry fate of
Rigunth’s  dowry.  Fredegund,  “furore  commota”,  has  Leunard  spoliare and
thrown out of the cathedral, while the chefs and other servants who returned with
him  are  mutilated  and  stripped.887 Both  Dailey  and  Gradowitz-Pancer  are
inclined to view this act as cooler and more strategic than it appears at first sight,
relating it to social expectations and particularly the need for Fredegund not to
appear  weak  in  this  moment  of  political  vulnerability.888 But  the  title  of  the
chapter –  De malitia Fredegunde – implies that this was not a consensus view
among  her  contemporaries.  Indeed,  if  such  reactions  were  regarded  as
conventional,  the  functioning  of  the  entire  political  system might  have  been
compromised by the universal reluctance to deliver bad news, and we can hardly
imagine  that  Leunard  or  the  servi who  accompanied  him  walked  into  the
cathedral fully expecting to be so roughly treated. Social expectations demanding
a show of strength, after all, presumably had to be balanced against expectations
that  loyalty  would  be  rewarded  rather  than  punished.  The  impression  that
emerges  is,  once  again,  that  Fredegund  suspected  the  secret  complicity  of
Leunard and the  servi in the crime that they had come to report,  (unfairly, in
Gregory’s view,) and punished them accordingly.
    The next case – the assassination of bishop Praetextatus – has already been
considered at some length.889 As we have seen, while Gregory was of the opinion
that Fredegund was personally responsible for the killing, others were evidently
willing  to  accept  the  possibility  that  a  puer had  taken  matters  into  his  own
hands.890 Nonetheless,  similar  contours  to  the  previous  incidents  are  evident.
After being restored to his bishopric, Praetextatus exchanges bitter words with
the widowed and vulnerable Fredegund -  “She told him that  the time would
come  when  he  would  have  to  return  to  the  exile  from  which  he  had  been
recalled.  ‘In  exile  and  out  of  exile  I  have  always  been  a  bishop,’ replied
Praetextatus, ‘but you will not always enjoy royal power… when you give up
887 Histories VII.15
888 Dailey (2015), p. 128-9
889 Histories VIII.31. Above, p. 35-6
890 See above, n. 190
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your role as queen you will be plunged into the abyss...’ The queen bore his
words ill.  She was extremely angry when she left him.” Praetextatus’s words
may have been meant as a reflection on divine punishment,  or possibly as a
prophecy, but in a moment of such extreme political vulnerability, it is easy to
see how they might be perceived both as a grave insult and an indirect threat.
And whether or not Fredegund’s  puer received direct orders or not, his actions
imply that a threat was perceived within her court.
    The final incident is the only one in which Fredegund is accused of personal
violence, in this case against her erstwhile daughter, Rigunth.891 The two, we are
told,  frequently  fought  physically,  “et  non  de  alia  causa  maxime,  nisi  quia
Rigundis adulteria sequebatur”. But on one occasion Fredegund is said to have
gone considerably further, actually attempting to seriously injure or even kill her
daughter by slamming the lid of a large strong-box down on her neck. Again, the
attack is contextualized in the ill-chosen words of Rigunth, who reportedly “said
that she herself was the real mistress, whereas her mother ought to revert to her
previous rank of serving woman.” Once again, the implication is that Fredegund
overreacted to statements which may not have been intended as threats, but were
interpretable as such.
    Through this sequence of incidents, which span nearly the entire second half
of the Histories, Gregory constructs a picture of an individual and a court with
severe  and  recurrent  tendencies  to  over-interpret  potentially  threatening
behaviour and respond with extreme violence. And given that Fredegund’s court
was composed almost entirely of individuals who had been frequently exposed to
violence  of  the  utmost  physical  immediacy and severity,892 in  many cases  as
perpetrators as well  as witnesses and victims,  this  account is  psychologically
believable. Fredegund herself, in her journey from low status to political power,
would have been exposed in the early years in particular to the violence of her
royal  patron  and  husband.893 And  Fredegund  was  exposed  to  the  imminent
891 Histories IX.34
892 In the sense used by Grossman (1996), Section 3, ch. 5.
893 Given the vaunted cruelty of Childeric (e.g. Histories VI.46) this may be a significant point –
Richey, A. & Brown, S. et al, “The role of hostile attributions in the associations between 
child maltreatment and reactive and proactive aggression”, in Journal of Aggression, 
Maltreatment and Trauma 25:10 (2016), 1043-1057.
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possibility of a cruel death when Sigebert’s forces besieged her and Chilperic at
Tournai,  which Gregory again burnishes with an idiosyncratic  account  of her
psychological distress.894
  Overall,  then,  the  picture  constructed  by  Gregory  of  a  court  is  carefully
contextualized in  a  way that  lends  it  a  certain psychological  credibility.  It  is
nevertheless  overwhelmingly  likely,  given  Gregory’s  relationship  with
Fredegund and her enemies, that some elements of this consistent portrayal of
hostile attribution biases at Fredegund’s court were designed to set it up as an
exemplar of how not to behave in political life. But far from detracting from the
interest  of  the  sequence,  this  potential  didactic  intention  makes  these
psychologically  credible  incidents  all  the  more  instructive.  The  basic  pattern
observable through Fredegund’s career – accusations or suspicions leading to
violent  reprisals,  often after  attempts  to  extract  confessions  by torture – is  a
reasonably common phenomenon in the Histories at the other royal courts. The
fundamental  difference  in  the  case  of  Fredegund  is  the  level  of  detail  that
Gregory  supplies,  and  the  incredulity  he  shows  toward  the  accusers.  When
Fredegund suspects foul play, Gregory is frequently adamant that her suspicions
are unfounded, although he does not portray her as totally paranoid. Whereas in
the case of Childebert and Brunhild, the veracity of supposed plots against them
is never questioned, even when – as in the case of Septimina and Droctulf, or
even the  killing of  duke Rauching – the  only evidence  cited  are  anonymous
accusations  and  confessions  extracted  by  torture.895 Guntram,  though  more
admired  by Gregory than  any other  contemporary,  stands  between these  two
relatively idealized poles: he is the target of several real plots, but also on two
occasions, ira commotus, acts on unfair accusations, resulting in regrettable and
gratuitous acts of violence against his subordinates.896
894 Dailey sees this account, which claims that Fredegund rejected her newborn child and 
wanted to kill him because of her fear of imminent death, as designed to cast her as callously 
contemptuous of her son’s immortal soul. But again, the claim that such distress can cause 
severe psychological trauma is borne out by the scientific literature – See Osario, C. & Jones,
N. et al, “Combat experiences and their relationship to post-traumatic stress disorder 
symptom clusters in UK military personnel deployed to Afghanistan”, in Behavioural 
Medicine (Mar 2017), n. 17-22 
895 Histories VIII.36; IX.9; IX.38
896 Histories VIII.11; X.10
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    Thus  only  Childebert  and  Brunhild,  whose  political  power  loomed  most
immediately over Gregory’s diocese, escaped accusations of hostile attribution
bias. Yet it was their courts, more than any other, with which Gregory was most
familiar and to which he addressed his moral instruction. And while Fredegund’s
court was far from unique in being filled with people who had frequently been
exposed to violence, Gregory was uniquely liberated in her case to repeat what
he had heard  of  their  worst  excesses.  In  other  words,  what  Gregory may be
giving us in his reports of Fredegund is not so much an idiosyncratic account of a
uniquely violent political figure, as an idiosyncratically detailed account of the
kind of hostile attribution biases and aggressive responses that pertained to elite
court  life  more  generally,  the  psychological  realism  of  which  were  derived
principally from his intimate personal knowledge of the courts of his patrons.897 
Winnoch the Breton
    A final case pertains to a Breton pilgrim, Winnoch, who was induced by
Gregory to become a priest and remain in Tours when he passed through the
diocese on the way to Rome. Winnoch’s behavioural trajectory – which in this
case we can be absolutely certain was not embellished by Gregory to blacken his
reputation – raises  fascinating questions  about  the relationship of pilgrimage,
monasticism, and alcohol to the psychological consequences of contemporary
military violence. Winnoch, Gregory tells us, though unordained, was a pilgrim
of exceptional abstinence: “...He wore no clothes except sheepskins from which
the wool had been removed. He seemed to me a most pious man and in the hope
of keeping him with me I ordained him priest.” Winnoch is even credited by
Gregory with the special favour of St Martin, who performs a miracle through
him.898 But when we next encounter the Breton, he suffers a tragic fate, as his
abstinence is overcome by the generosity of his devoti, and he sinks into abject
alcoholism.  And  the  most  interesting  aspect  of  Winnoch’s  decline  from  our
perspective is the change in his behaviour when under the influence…
897 The posthumous reputation of Brunhild, which was much more violent than the impression 
offered by Gregory, tends to confirm this view, although this impression was equally 
coloured by contemporary political factors – see above, n. 619
898 Histories V.21
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“...as time passed, his intemperance became worse and worse. He
was possessed by a devil, and shaken by energy, to the extent that
he would pick up a knife or whatever weapon he could lay his
hands on, sometimes a stone, sometimes a stick, and chase after
people in insane fury. In the end, there was nothing for it but to
chain him up and lock him in his cell. Condemned to this fate, he
continued to rave for a couple of years, and then he gave up the
ghost.”899 
The most immediate context for Winnoch’s pilgrimage was a period of brutal
and inconclusive civil war among the Bretons, which had left the region divided
between hostile factions.900 Historians to date have not found this coincidence
interesting, but in light of modern research into the psychological consequences
of war, it may be highly significant.901 For many warriors, pilgrimage would have
been the one and only legitimate route away from military service. It not only
served to  assuage the  potential  guilt  associated  with the  excesses  of  military
campaigning, but also to distance the pilgrim from the violent social lives and
expectations that characterised their milieu.902 As we have seen, both guilt and
avoidance are potential symptoms of violent trauma, and Winnoch’s exceptional
self-denial and reluctance to return home imply that he was particularly troubled
in these respects.903 Winnoch’s initial abstinence from, and subsequent addiction
to, alcohol are also indicative of the effects of trauma, and his extraordinary and
indiscriminate physical aggression under its influence provides another reason to
suspect  that  this  individual  was  a  psychological  casualty  of  contemporary
warfare.904
899 “Unde factum est, ut, invalescente temulentia, tempore procidente, a daemonio correptus, per
inergiam vexaretur, in tantum ut, accepto cultro vel quodcumque genus teli sive lapidem aut 
fustem potuisset adrepere, post homines insano furore discurreret. Unde necessitas exigit, ut 
catenis vinctus costodiretur in cellula. In hac quoque damnatione per duorum annorum spatia
debachans, spiritum exalavit.” Histories VIII.34
900 Histories V.16. It is quite possible, and would be in keeping with Gregory’s narrative 
tendency to separate ‘personal’ from ‘historical’ matters, that Winnoch was the source of this 
account.
901 See Chapter 1, n. 62-64
902 Association with violent peers being one of the more important factors in continued 
participation in violence identified by modern studies – see Chapter 1, n. 81-84
903 Norman, S. B. & Wilkins, K. C. et al, “Trauma informed guilt reduction therapy with combat
veterans”, in Cognitive Behavioural Practice 21:1 (Feb 2014), 78-88. Pineless, S. L. & 
Mostoufi, S. M. et al, “Trauma reactivity, avoidant coping, and PTSD symptoms: A 
moderating relationship?”, in Journal of Abnormal Psychology 120:1 (2011), 240-246. See 
Chapter 1.
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    A further point of interest lies in Gregory’s description of Winnoch as “a
daemonio  correptus,  per  inergiam  vexaretur”  during  his  violent  outbursts.
Surveying the other uses of this kind of terminology in the Histories, it is clear
that  demonic  and  energetic  possession  –  which  appear  to  be  broadly
interchangeable – are used to describe several phenomena, including prophetic
powers, false testimony, and being troubled by voices or non-specific physical
pain.905 But  uncontrolled  aggression  and  violence  are  also  a  distinct  and
important facet of demonic possession: some members of Guntram’s army are
said to have fought and wounded each-other after being possessed by demons.906
Even  more  interestingly,  the  anonymous  men  accused  by  Gregory  of
indiscriminately  slaying the  pueri of  Claudius  and Eberulf  are  referred  to  as
“inergumini et diversi egeni”.907 And when Claudius launches a drunken torrent
of verbal abuse at Gregory for locking his men out of St Martin’s tomb, he is
described as “ut ita dicam, agi a daemone”.908
    The implication of these examples are threefold. First, it appears that there was
some  social  appreciation  of  uncontrolled  aggression  as  a  contemporary
behavioural  and  psychological  problem,  albeit  without  any  exclusive
terminology  to  describe  it.  Second,  the  identification  of  potentially  violent
“inergumini” in the urban environs of Tours raises the possibility that the wars
and violent social life of the period was producing an effluent of psychological
casualties which society, and the church in particular, struggled to accommodate.
And third, the description of the drunkenly aggressive, but clearly not totally out
of control, Eberulf as “ut ita dicam, agi a daemone”  illustrates the conceptual
904 Taft, C. T. & Kaloupek, D. G. et al, “Posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms, physiological 
reactivity, alcohol problems, and aggression among military veterans”, in Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology 116:3 (2007), 498-507; Brown, J. M. & Williams, J. et al, 
“Postdeployment alcohol use, aggression, and post-traumatic stress disorder”, in Military 
Medicine 177:10 (2012), 1184-1190. Mcfarlane, A.C. “Epidemiological evidence about the 
relationship between PTSD and alcohol abuse: The nature of the association”, in Addictive 
Behaviours 23:6 (1998), 813-825.
905 Histories VI.8; VI.29; VII.44; IX.6; cf. Gray (2005)
906 In the context of God’s punishment for an attack on the church of St Vincent - ““Nonnulli 
arrepti a daemone, per inergiam debachantes martyrem declamabant. Plurimi vero semoti a 
seditione propriis se iaculis sauciabant.” Histories VII.35
907 Histories VII.29; see above.
908 Histories VII.22
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continuity between conventional aggression associated with utilitas in excess and
the kinds of behaviours associated with demonic and energetic possession.
                                 *                                   *                                  *
These  rare  examples  of  behavioural  development,  although  invariably
incomplete and infused with the authorial agendas of Gregory, thus offer some
fascinating glimpses and unique insights into the psychological consequences of
the violent social lives in which the ruling elites were expected to participate.
There are  signs of a number of psychological  adaptations,  including intrinsic
motivations for violence, and possible traumatic symptoms. But at an elite level,
the consequences of experiencing violence appear to have manifested themselves
principally  in  the  form  of  learned  inclinations  to  hyper-vigilance,  hostile
attribution  biases  and  reactive  aggression.  Given  the  keen  competition  for
political power, the evident dangerousness of participation in elite affairs both
for political  figures and their  followers,  and the potential  social  capital  to be
derived from reputations for effective violence, this hardly comes as a surprise.
But  the specific  examples  cited here illustrate  that  these  behaviours,  and the
reactively aggressive psychological adaptations with which they were associated,
were capable of stretching and going beyond contemporary social expectations
and  political  expediency.  Indeed,  an  interesting  –  if  insoluble  –  question
extending from these case studies is how much of the political violence of the
period was associated with overreactions to perceived threats or slights, resulting
from such  adaptations.  But  perhaps  this  is  to  trifurcate  social,  strategic  and
psychological  causation  too  strictly,  when  in  reality  all  three  were  mixing
seamlessly.  In  a  world where learned inclinations  to  aggression  and violence
were so ordinary, the lines between justified violence and overreaction would
frequently have been obscure and tendentious, and the expectations and demands
relating to violence were in a constant state of negotiation.
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Overall Conclusion 
    This thesis  began with the problematisation of a  process that has all  too
frequently been taken for granted: the (sub-)cultural production of individuals
who are  willing  and able  to  participate  in  the  kind of  sustained,  savage and
intimate violence entailed in ancient warfare. It was established that the answer
potentially  lay  in  the  conditions  of  relatively  ordinary  social  life,  by  which
individuals can be inured to violence through a constellation of practices, mores
and values that perpetuate the experience of violence and construct it as normal,
necessary, and virtuous. And the Franks and other warrior groups who composed
the post-Roman Frankish kingdoms were offered as an excellent potential case
study – due to the rich repository of evidence for violence contained in  Lex
Salica and the Histories of Gregory of Tours – for analysis along these lines. It
remains to reflect on the conclusions of this  analysis,  consider questions that
remain unanswered, and point to new questions raised by the thesis that may be
addressed through future research.
    It must be restated that the strength of the Frankish evidence is relative rather
than  absolute,  and  the  conclusions  arrived  at  in  this  study  are  necessarily
suggestive rather than decisive. The most serious difficulty to emerge from any
attempt to interpret the period using the insights of psychology is the almost total
absence  of  the  minutiae  of  household  life.  Associated  with  this  is  the  clear
paucity of evidence relating to women and children, or the violence to which
they may have been exposed. Lex Salica, which is predominantly concerned with
violence between free families rather than within them, systematically ignores
this dimension of contemporary experience. At the same time, the predilection of
Gregory  of  Tours  for  momentous  and  spectacular  events,  and  his  occasional
reluctance to indulge in scandalous talk, ensure that the few scenes of home life
that he does depict are sketchy and stereotyped. This is a substantial problem,
since domestic and childhood experience in particular are universally agreed to
be profoundly influential in the behavioural and psychological development of
individuals. There may be some hope, in the form of hagiography in particular,
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that  this  limitation  can  be  partially  addressed,  but  anything  like  a  full  and
detailed account of domestic experience in this period is likely to remain out of
reach.
    The vision of a Frankish takeover characterized by ‘peaceful accommodation’,
and  the  low-violence  interpretation  of  the  Frankish  kingdoms  proposed  by
Goffart and others has not been conclusively overturned, and this would not be
possible given the available evidence. However, in seeing military violence as
the outcome not just of appropriate financial and social incentives, but also as the
expression  of  violent  behavioural  and  psychological  profiles  that  only  come
about  through  experience,  the  notion  that  a  society  governed  by  active  and
enthusiastic participants in ancient warfare would have been ordinarily peaceful
ceteris paribus is much more difficult to sustain. The view that the Franks were
relatively peaceful settlers determined to reach agreement with their new hosts
remains within the realm of possibility,  if  the maximal view of continuity of
Roman military organization and discipline offered by Bachrach is maintained.
But,  as  we have  seen,  there  are  strong indications  that  even the  late  Roman
armies of northern Gaul were substantially reliant for their manpower on violent
subcultures within and beyond the frontiers,  and Roman military organization
was never as homogeneous and tightly ordered as has sometimes been assumed.
Nonetheless, without denying the interest of the question of whether and in what
ways life was becoming more or less violent in this period, it must be accepted
that it remains open to a range of interpretations.
    Having acknowledged these difficulties and limitations, a tentative picture of
how the post-Roman Frankish kingdoms produced men who were behaviourally
and psychologically primed for the rigours and horrors of ancient warfare can be
constructed. The central forum for psychological conditioning identified here (in
the  absence  of  many  clues  about  domestic  life)  would  appear  to  be  the
contubernium or small group of men, the kind of which are alluded to in  Lex
Salica and described incidentally in the Histories. The key mechanism by which
the group psychologically conditioned its members was through the diversity of
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ages, statuses, and degrees of behavioural adaptation present in the group. This is
what facilitated the ‘transmission’ of psychological and behavioural adaptations
associated  with  violence  between veteran warriors  and their  less  experienced
counterparts. And the vital psychological substrate was the cultural construction
of violence as normal and necessary, and the cultural construction of manhood
and status as positively associated with violence and revenge.
    At  the  lowest  level  of  this  group,  in  terms  of  combat  experience  and
adaptation, were “those with arrows”: slaves and free or half-free juveniles.909 As
the bottom of the group hierarchy, these individuals would not be expected to
participate  in  armed conflict  with other  groups,  since they were ill-equipped,
materially, psychologically and legally, to fight with experienced and genuinely
hostile  opponents.  They  would,  however,  have  been  heavily  exposed  to  the
familial violence of their seniors. In practice much of this hierarchical violence
would have resulted from the psychopathologies of more experienced members
of  the  group.  But  it  would  equally  have  been  the  result  of  well-meaning
intentions to instil necessary virilitas – resilience in the face of violence – in their
inexperienced juniors. The young and unfree might also be expected to scuffle
with each-other,  although at this point the nature of their armament and their
limited behavioural adaptation would have made that violence, for the most part,
non-injurious.  Thus  at  this  point  in  the  psychological  development  of  junior
warriors, violence would have been experienced primarily as witness and victim,
rather than perpetrator.
    In the middle of the group hierarchy were the half-free warriors who are so
central to the action in the Histories. These would include unfree members of the
group who had showed the necessary physical and psychological qualities and
been armed with spear,  shield,  helm and,  depending on the benefactor,  more
advanced war-gear. This rank was associated with more responsibilities, the most
important of which was full participation in any violent conflicts between their
group and others. They also gained superiority over their unfree associates, with
the  corresponding  prerogatives  and  responsibilities  of  hierarchical  and
disciplinary violence. Thus the balance of experience for these middle-ranking
909 See Chapter 4, p. 138; and Chapter 6, section 2.2.
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members shifted toward perpetration of violence. But they were still  potential
victims  of  their  superiors,  and  they  were  now  most  exposed  to  the  greater
dangers of fully-armed skirmishes against  inimici who were not restrained by
bonds of kinship and service. It may have been in this period of development that
warriors  were  most  likely  to  suffer  the  sort  of  head injuries  that  Lex Salica
regards as conventional, and which appeared with such frequency in our sample
of Alammanic and Frankish skulls.910
    Those who survived and showed promise under such conditions could be
made into influential agents, and brought to the army by their free patrons, which
was associated with full  freedom and recognition as a  vir  rather than a mere
puer. At this point they graduated to full participation in the unrestrained, lethal
and terrifying violence of the battlefield. For this they had been prepared by long
experience  of  violence  as  witness,  victim,  and perpetrator,  including combat,
albeit under the relatively controlled conditions imposed by the customs alluded
to in Lex Salica. And in recognition of their now respected role, they gained full
legal protection from hierarchical violence, and could only be abused by figures
of  exceptional  wealth,  power  and  influence,  finally  escaping  the  ordinary
expectation of being violently victimised.
    Of course, those who were born into freedom would have been spared the
worst  excesses  endured  by  those  of  lower  status,  and  therefore  had  less
experience as  victims  of  violence.  But  as  juniors  they would  still  have been
exposed to the violence of their elders, who had every reason to encourage them
to develop virilitas. Thus for free and unfree warrior alike, the path to seniority
was a journey to a promised land of participation in battle and freedom from
hierarchical violence, which were intimately associated with one-another. And
this  journey  had  aspects  of  economic  incentive,  cultural  expectation,  and
psychological conditioning.
    The research done here thus implies that, contrary to common assumptions,
the violence and turbulence of elite social life in the Frankish kingdoms would
910 See Chapter 4, sections 1 and 3.
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have actually contributed to, rather than diminished, their military effectiveness.
Those  kingdoms had inherited  considerably  less  of  the  Roman machinery  of
government  than their  southern rivals,  but  they had inherited a  much greater
proportion of the violent frontier subcultures that had provided the late Roman
armies with an inordinate number of willing and effective military recruits. The
greater  facility  (relative  to  the  other  barbarian  codes)  for  reciprocal  and
hierarchical violence without state intervention provided by Lex Salica may be
regarded as a partial expression of that fact. And such customs may indeed have
been  instrumental  in  unifying  a  new  kingdom  in  which  the  most  important
common  bonds  shared  by  the  multicultural  elite  were  shared  traditions  of
participation in violence.
    In the long view, the work done here points to something of a synthesis
between existing theories about the process by which the Frankish kingdoms
were formed in the former empire. On the one hand, the considerable exposure
of the Franks and other frontier subcultures to warfare, and the violent tenor of
the laws and social life produced by the kingdoms into which they coalesced,
implies that the process of takeover would indeed have been characterized by
violence rather than peaceful accommodation. On the other hand, the similarities
of the the several subcultures out of which the warrior culture of the kingdoms
was formed may have facilitated a greater degree of assimilation and voluntary
alliance between incoming warrior elite and newly conquered groups than that
achieved  by  other  contemporary  barbarian  kingdoms.  Indeed,  even  the  self-
consciously ‘Roman’ units mentioned by Procopius rapidly embraced the new
ruling class and their customs, which were exceptionally tolerant of the excesses
associated with psychological adaptation to violence.
    Further lines of enquiry are also suggested by what we have seen of the
subculture of violence in the Frankish kingdoms. A question that naturally arises
from the study of the north-western frontier is comparative. Why did the warrior
cultures of the other frontiers – Britain, Thrace, Africa, and Asia – and of the
other gentes, turn out as differently as they did? This thesis has produced some
suggestive evidence regarding the warrior  culture that  emerged on the north-
western  frontier,  but  the  work  of  comparing  that  evidence  in  detail  to  near-
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contemporary  contexts  elsewhere  remains  to  be  done.  Another  question  is
chronological. How did this subculture evolve into the Carolingian period and
beyond? And how deep were its roots? The present study has been content to
look at Lex Salica in it’s early sixth-century context, but how far the contents of
this  text  represent  a  relatively  innovative  product  of  its  time,  a  modified
expression  of  ancient  customs  that  went  back  to  the  forests  of  third-century
Germany, or the enactment in writing of traditions of reciprocal justice that had
characterized  the  auxilia of  the  Roman  armies,  remains  a  matter  for
investigation. However, the extraordinary qualitative and quantitative diversity
of  the  evidence  between  regions  and  centuries  make  these  complicated
propositions.  A related  line of  investigation,  possibly  even more  difficult  but
certainly stimulating, would be a diachronic comparison of the warrior culture of
the Frankish kingdoms with the cultures and practices that characterise powerful
military or paramilitary elites in modern theatres of conflict, such as Somalia,
northern Iraq, Honduras and northern Mexico.911
    Probably the most interesting and potentially productive future line of inquiry
– given  the  nature  of  the  surviving  evidence  base  –  is  the  question  of  how
Christianity  interacted with  post-Roman warrior  cultures  in  conditioning how
participants  in  violence  perceived  and  processed  their  experiences,  and  the
knock-on effects  of  these processes  to  the  historical  development  of  Western
Europe. The example of Winnoch the Breton in the last section highlighted the
interpretation  of  spontaneous  violence,  through  a  Christian  lens,  as  demonic
possession.  It also touched on the potential  of monasticism to function as an
alternative  life  choice  for  those  who  were  particularly  troubled  by  their
experiences of elite violence, and even a program for the treatment of trauma.
What this suggests is that the growth of monastic culture may have been not only
a  means  of  enhancing aristocratic  esteem and defending property,  but  also  a
biproduct of the psychological effluent of trauma produced by the violence of
elite life.
911 Some studies raise interesting comparisons and contrasts, for instance, Quitero, G. A. and 
Estrada, A. L. “Cultural models of masculinity and drug use: ‘machismo,’ heroin, and street 
survival on the U.S.-Mexico border”, in Contemporary Drug Problems, 5.1 (1998), p. 147-
168; Williams, P. “Illicit markets, weak states and violence: Iraq and Mexico”, in Crime, 
Law and Social Change, 52. 3 (2009), p. 323-336
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    The intimate association of  Saints  and their  Lives  to  the experience  and
morality  of  violence  also  indicates  that  a  concerted  study  of  psychological
aspects of their vitae and cults could be productive. Some of the most prominent
early medieval saints – from Martin, forced into the army by his warrior father,
to Radegund, claimed as a prize by a conquering warlord – had lives in which
the experience of violence was an important context. And many miracle stories
of the period were based on the miraculous avoidance of violence, the restoration
of bodies destroyed by violence, or the divine punishment of violent men. These
represent a deep well of psychologically resonant material, whose relationship to
warrior cultures and the violent practices they entailed remains under-explored.
    In  a  recent  volume  on  warfare  in  late  Antiquity,  Alexander  Sarantis
complained about  the  still  “comparatively marginal  position” of  the study of
warfare, which “is undeserved considering that it  played a central  role in the
world of Late Antiquity, impinging on the social, economic and political life of
most  provinces  at  one  or  another  time”.912 By  bringing  into  relief  the
psychological implications of violence, this study has sought to comprehend the
relationship between warfare and “social, economic and political life” more fully,
and  to  show  that  they  are  joined  by  their  reciprocal  influence  on  –  and
responsiveness to – the behavioural development of their participants. 
912 Sarantis, A. “Waging war in Late Antiquity”, in A. Serantis and N. Christie (eds.), War and 
Warfare in Late Antiquity (Leiden 2013)
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Appendix – Graphic Illustration of Offence Distribution in  Pactus
Legis Salicae
Key – The major thresholds of violence valued in solidi (95 per cent of all 
offences fall into one of these categories).
3               =   Single Blow for Ingenuus [XVII.8, 10]
15             =   120 Lashes for Servus [XL.1]; 
                      Blood-shedding Assault for Ingenuus [XVII.3-4, 9]
30-35        =   240 Lashes or Castration for Servus [XL.4]; 
                       Serious Assault for Ingenuus [XVII.5-6]
45              =   Death for Servus [XL.5]; 
                      ‘Infamous’ Mutilation for Ingenuus (?) [XXIX.13; Above, p. 136]
62.5/100    =   Death for Letus, Puer or Romanus [XXV.8; XLI.9-10; XIII.7];
                       Disabling Mutilation for Ingenuus [XIX.1-3, 11-12, 15, 18]
200             =   Death for Ingenuus [XV.1; XLI.1, 3; XLIII.3]
600             =  ‘Triple Death’ for Ingenuus (?) [Above, p. 130-2]; 
                        Death for Ingenuus “in truste dominica” [XLI.5-7; LIV.1, 3]
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Graph 2 - Relative Exposure to Retaliatory Violence by Social Class
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